WELFARE REFORM AND CHILDREN'S EARLY COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

In this paper, we use a dynamic structural model to measure the effects of (1) single mothers' work and welfare use decisions and (2) welfare reform initiatives on the early cognitive development of the children of the NLSY79 mothers. We use PIAT‐Math scores as a measure of attainment and show that both the mothers' work and welfare use benefit children on average. Our simulation of a policy that combines a time limit with work requirement reduces the use of welfare and increases employment significantly. These changes in turn significantly increase children's cognitive attainment. This implies that the welfare reform was not only successful in achieving its stated goals, but was also beneficial to welfare children's outcomes. In another policy simulation, we show that increasing work incentives for welfare population by exempting labor income from welfare tax can be a very successful policy with some additional benefits for children's outcomes. Finally, a counterfactual with an extended maternal leave policy significantly reduces employment and has negative, though economically insignificant, impact on cognitive outcomes. (JEL I38, J22, J18)     

The Social Norm of Tipping: Does it Improve Social Welfare?

Some economists believe that social norms are created to improve welfare where the market fails. I show that tipping is such a norm, using a model in which a waiter chooses service quality and then a customer chooses the tip. The customer’s utility depends on the social norm about tipping and feelings such as embarrassment and fairness. The equilibrium depends on the exact social norm: higher sensitivity of tips to service quality (according to the norm) yields higher service quality and social welfare. Surprisingly, high tips for low quality may also increase service quality and social welfare.     

On measurability and comparability: Comment on Pauwels's “the implicit welfare weights used when maximizing aggregate surplus”

The note demonstrates that the unweighted sum of the Hicksian equivalent variations is not a reasonable welfare indicator if consumers have different wages. It recommends the unweighted sum of the individual money metrics, all evaluated at thesame reference pricesand reference wage. For this measure the comparability and necessary measurability of utility functions and welfare changes can be guaranteed. In contrast to Pauwels's measure the indicator proposed possesses the properties one expects.     

Long‐Term Contracts,Irreversibility, and Uncertainty

Long‐term contracting implies contracting based on expected future demand. In this paper, I develop a multiperiod procurement model where, once the actual level of demand is realized, the irreversible initial provision level may be supplemented by additional provisions. This paper shows that, with the possibility of additional upward adjustments, the first‐period provision level will be lower than when no additional adjustments are possible. This reduction in first‐period provision level is higher under complete contracting than under incomplete contracting, and because of the reduction in information rents it yields a higher expected utility to the principal but lower total welfare.     

The implicit welfare weights used when maximizing aggregate surplus

Aggregate consumer and producer surplus is a special type of social welfare function. In this paper, we investigate how individual welfare weights and how the social marginal utility of an increase in an individual's income behave if one uses aggregate surplus as a measure of social welfare. Our conclusion is that aggregate surplus is an ethically unacceptable measure of social welfare.I am grateful to B. De Borger and to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Of course, all remaining errors are mine.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF MANDATORY REEMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS: COMBINING A STRUCTURAL MODEL AND EXPERIMENTAL DATA

This article estimates a model of job search with utility costs and benefits triggered by mandatory reemployment programs. I use data from an experiment that generates exogenous variation in the threat of program participation and an increase in the job finding rate. I calculate the impact of the experiment on worker welfare, and find that participants would be willing to give up 1.5–1.7 weeks of unemployment benefits to avoid participation. These welfare costs vary across workers and are larger for workers with weaker employment prospects. Overall, welfare costs are substantial and therefore important to take into account.     

Aggregation of Utility and Equivalence Scales: A Solution to the Pangloss Critique

Definitions of equivalence scales are usually based on a household utility function. This may be founded on an assumption of the household maximizing a welfare function of individual utilities. Basing inter-household comparisons of welfare on this approach is fallacious because households put different weight on the utility of the various household members, a weighting that does not necessarily correspond to an ethically sound aggregation of utility. This is called the Pangloss critique. To solve the problem, I suggest keeping the model of household behavior, but to introduce a new function to aggregate the household members' utilities. Equivalence scales based on this approach are shown to have desirable properties.     

Evaluating the long-run impacts of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US domestic airline travel

As a result of the Public Utilitie Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), state public utility commissions have begun to implement cost-based rate-setting procedures in order to rationalize energy choices made by utilities and utility customers. This rationalization had been necessary in view of the increased competition characterizing the eletric utility industry. Taking these regulatory and competitive change as a point of departure we develop and implement an electricity rate-setting model which is cost based, which explicitly accounts for static and dynamic competitive pressures, and which is welfare maximizing. The model extends standard Ramsey methods to include bothshort-run andlong-run price responses in the inverse elasticity rule. We use the estimated model to evalute and design alternative rates. Our analysis takes a distincly strategic approach, explicitly addressing competition from other fuels and the possibility of competitive bypass.     

The Potential Compensation Principle and Constant Marginal Utility of Income

In policy applications, industrial economists are wont to invoke the Kaldor–Hicks potential compensation principle to justify the use of deadweight loss as a measure of the welfare cost of market power. This usage rests on two assumptions. One of these assumptions, that changes in consumer and producer surplus are weighted equally, is well understood. The other assumption, that the marginal utility of income is constant, receives less attention. In a simple model, I show that if there is decreasing marginal utility of income, the use of deadweight loss as an index of market performance rests on shaky ground.     

Consumers' Surplus As an Exact and Superlative Cardinal Welfare Indicator

This article shows that the Bennet-Bowley consumer surplus measure is an exact measure of Allais' disposable surplus if the consumer's utility function is of the translation-homothetic generalized quadratic form. The Bennet-Bowley consumer surplus measure, therefore, is a superlative cardinal welfare measure for the entire class of translation homothetic preferences. Because the exactness results in this article apply for cardinal welfare measures, they can be meaningfully aggregated across consumers to make aggregate welfare comparisons.     

Service Quality,Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector

This paper presents a simple model which illustrates the possible policy- and welfare-implications of endogenous product selection in the postal sector. The cost of a unit of mail depends on its "quality" (e.g., speed of delivery) and on the type and location of the addressee (firms, urban households, and rural households). Senders have inelastic demands and differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Addressees are passive but their utility may affect social welfare. Two operators play a two-stage game, first choosing qualities and then prices. We first show that the equilibrium with two private (profit maximizing) operators results in an inefficient provision of quality. Then, we consider the mixed (Nash) equilibrium with one private and one (welfare maximizing) public operator. If the budget constraint of the public firm is not binding, this equilibrium is shown to be first-best efficient even if social welfare accounts for the utility of addressees. If the budget constraint is binding, the mixed equilibrium is not efficient but yields a higher level of welfare than the private equilibrium. Finally, we study the impact of minimum quality standards within our setting.     

FISCAL POLICY IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL WITH PUBLIC CAPITAL AND POLLUTION

This paper studies the growth and welfare effects of fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model with public capital and environmental pollution. I assume that pollution is due to aggregate production, and that it does not have a direct effect on production but only reduces household utility. I study the growth effects of fiscal policy for the model on the balanced growth path, taking transition dynamics into account. I then analyse the welfare effects of fiscal policy along the balanced growth path. Finally, I show how the fiscal parameters must be set so that the competitive economy replicates the social optimum.     

Allowing disagreement in evaluations of social welfare

There is no consensus on how to measure interpersonally comparable, cardinal utility. Despite of this, people repeatedly make welfare evaluations in their everyday lives. However, people do not always agree on such evaluations, and this is one important reason for political disagreements. Thus, to keep in control of the normative premises, decision makers may prefer information which can be used as input to an arbitrary social welfare function to information which is the output from a social welfare function specified by the analyst. In this paper we try to identify and simplify sufficient welfare indicators; information which enables decision makers to arrive at welfare evaluations of social states or projects, according to their own ethical beliefs. Our conclusion is that providing factual information about different population groups, their social state, size, and characteristics, may be better for this purpose than the more traditional approach of focusing on ordinal utility information.     

The Effective Protection Rate Under Uncertainty: A Note*

This note presents a measure of the effective protection rate in a general equilibrium model under uncertainty where a stock market exists and international trade in securities takes place. Real equity prices replace the final commodity prices since, in the presence of uncertainty, resource allocation and therefore the output of each industry is governed by real equity prices. Using expected utility as a welfare criterion, it is shown that second-best optimum can be achieved by a tariff on the intermediate good at a rate given by setting the new measure to zero. This note provides the theoretical foundations to the measure estimated by Eldor (1984).     

Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: The Private Ownership of Monopoly in General Equilibrium

Employing a general equilibrium framework, Blackorby and Murty prove that, with a monopoly and under 100% profit taxation and uniform lump‐sum transfers, the utility possibility sets of economies with unit and ad valorem taxes are identical. This welfare equivalence is in contrast to most previous studies, which demonstrate the superiority of the ad valorem tax in a partial equilibrium framework. In this paper, we relax the assumption of 100% profit taxation and allow the consumers to receive profit incomes from ownership of shares in the monopoly firm. We find that, under certain regularity conditions, for any fixed vector of profit shares, the utility possibility sets of economies with unit and ad valorem taxes are not generally identical. But it does not imply that one completely dominates the other. Rather, the two utility possibility frontiers cross each other. Additionally, employing a standard partial equilibrium welfare analysis, we show that the Marshallian social surpluses resulting from the two tax structures are identical when the government can implement unrestricted transfers.     

Can welfare be measured with a preference-satisfaction index?

Welfare in economics is generally conceived of in terms of the satisfaction of preferences, but a general, comparable index measure of welfare is generally not taken to be possible. In recent years, in response to the usage of measures of subjective well-being as indices of welfare in economics, a number of economists have started to develop measures of welfare based on preference-satisfaction. In order to evaluate the success of such measures, I formulate criteria of policy-relevance and theoretical success in the context of preference-satisfaction measures of welfare. I present a detailed case study of the methodological choices put forward in a prominent generalized proposal for measuring welfare through preferences recently published in the American Economic Review. I contrast this with an alternative welfare measure which also uses preferences to weight aspects of welfare: the ICECAP-A measure. I assess the methodology of both approaches in detail and argue that the two goals of a preference measure of welfare can only be satisfied at the expense of making a measure prohibitively costly.     

Seigniorage and Japanese fiscal sustainability: Simulation analysis using an overlapping generations model

This study examines two tax policies for achieving fiscal sustainability in Japan: (i) an increase in consumption tax and (ii) consumption tax hike combined with inflation. To evaluate these policies from both fiscal and welfare perspectives, I develop a multi-period overlapping generations model with money. The results reveal that, compared to the first policy, the second policy can substantially delay the timing of and curb the increase in consumption tax through seigniorage revenue. This suggests seigniorage could be a useful tool for the Japanese government in resolving its fiscal problems. In addition, in an aging Japan, the second policy can enhance future generations’ utility. Because inflation reduces money holdings and utility of the elderly, policies that cause inflation in the present but reduce it in the future improve the utility of future generations. From a social welfare viewpoint, such policies are desirable in a government that has foresight.     

Urban Pollution,Unemployment and National Welfare in a Dualistic Economy

This paper undertakes a comparative static analysis in the Harris–Todaro (H–T) model by accommodating local pollution. Unlike in the classical H–T model where migration proceeds in response to urban–rural differences in expected earnings, we consider labor movement taking place according to the difference in utility, which is influenced by the quality of the local environment. The paradoxical result is that an improvement in pollution‐abatement technology gives rise to an increase in urban unemployment and has no effect on the workers' aggregate welfare.     

TIME‐INCONSISTENCY AND WELFARE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE NLSY*

We empirically implement a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program participation for agents with potentially time‐inconsistent preferences. Using panel data on the choices of single women with children from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY) 1979, we provide estimates of the degree of time‐inconsistency, and of its influence on the welfare take‐up decision. With these estimates, we conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify a measure of the utility loss stemming from the inability to commit to future decisions, and the potential gains from commitment mechanisms such as welfare time limits and work requirements.