首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到10条相似文献,搜索用时 94 毫秒
1.
《Journal of public economics》2007,91(5-6):901-914
This paper is the first to systematically document the relationship between individual teacher performance incentives and student achievement using the United States data. We combine data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey on schools, students, and their families with our own survey conducted in 2000 regarding the use of teacher incentives. This survey on teacher incentives has unique data on frequency and magnitude of merit raises and bonuses, teacher evaluation, and teacher termination. We find that test scores are higher in schools that offer individual financial incentives for good performance. Moreover, the estimated relationship between the presence of merit pay in teacher compensation and student test scores is strongest in schools that may have the least parental oversight. The association between teacher incentives and student performance could be due to better schools adopting teacher incentives or to teacher incentives eliciting more effort from teachers; it is impossible to rule out the former explanation with our cross sectional data.  相似文献   

2.
非财产损害赔偿有别于精神损害赔偿,其含义国内外学者表述不一,但对违约责任下非财产损害的救济,两大法系的立法与判例均给予了一定认可。伴随着交易的不断复杂,违约产生的非财产损害纠纷在我国日渐彰显。为保证交易的公正,我国有必要在现有合同立法体系中补充完善关于非财产损害赔偿的规定。  相似文献   

3.
I analyse how the inclusion of working condition data influences the estimated marginal effects of student demographics on teacher mobility. Using detailed administrative data on public schools, combined with unique data describing teachers’ perceptions of working conditions, I estimate a model characterizing the multinomial outcomes of teachers choosing to work at different schools. By comparing the estimated marginal effects of student characteristics with and without incorporating detailed working conditions, I find that excluding these additional data results in overestimating the effect of student characteristics on the probability a teacher moves to a different school, but has no influence on estimated effects for the probability of leaving teaching altogether.  相似文献   

4.
This article studies the distribution of teacher quality measures across the New York City school system. Because teachers are paid along a fixed salary schedule and they have the option to transfer schools, this analysis measures the degree to which environmental factors affect teacher location choice. Both school-based and neighborhood-based effects are measured, and both types are significant. Furthermore, this article finds that the location of the school in relation to the suburban borders is an important determinant of teacher location choice. (JEL I29 , J24 , J61 )  相似文献   

5.
This paper computes the change in welfare associated with the introduction of incentives. We calculate by how much the welfare gains of increased output due to incentives outweigh workers' disutility from increased effort. We accomplish this by studying the use of incentives by a firm in the check-clearing industry. Using this firm's production records, we model and estimate the worker's dynamic effort decision problem. We find that the firm's incentive scheme has a large effect on productivity, raising it by 12% over the sample period for the average worker. Using our parameter estimates, we show that the cost of increased effort due to incentives is equal to the dollar value of a 5% rise in productivity. Welfare is measured as the output produced minus the cost of effort; hence, the net increase in the average worker's welfare due to the introduction of the firm's bonus plan is 7%. Under a first-best scheme, we find that the net increase in welfare is 9%.  相似文献   

6.
Universal health systems often rely on both pubic provision and contracting arrangements with private hospitals. This paper studies the optimal mix of public and private provision of health care services. We propose a model in which the regulator acts as athird-party payer, and aims to ensure universal access to treatment at minimal cost. Patients need one unit of medical services and differ in the severity of illness. A private and a public hospital are available. Under incomplete contracts, ownership affects the regulatory constraints and the power of managerial incentives. Only the private manager internalizes profits, and has incentives to reject costly patients and to exert effort in cost reduction. Contracting with the private hospital is optimal when managerial effort is relatively effective in reducing costs. By using the public hospital as a last resort provider, the regulator can ensure access, provide incentives to the private manager, and internalize part of the resulting cost savings. Imposing a no-dumping constraint on the private hospital reduces the power of incentives and is not always optimal.  相似文献   

7.
This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must prevent two sorts of free‐riding problems – free riding in effort provision and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultaneously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the provision of incentives to participate. With such a mechanism, all countries voluntarily contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its ‘business as usual’ level.  相似文献   

8.
International research suggests that differences in teacher performance can explain a large portion of student achievement. Yet little is known about how the quality of the Australian teaching profession has changed over time. Using consistent data on the academic aptitude of new teachers, we compare those who have entered the teaching profession in Australia over the past two decades. We find that the aptitude of new teachers has fallen considerably. Between 1983 and 2003, the average percentile rank of those entering teacher education fell from 74 to 61, while the average rank of new teachers fell from 70 to 62. We find that two factors account for much of the decline: a fall in average teacher pay (relative to other occupations) and a rise in pay differentials in non‐teaching occupations.  相似文献   

9.
In this paper, we examine whether combining non‐monetary and monetary incentives increases municipal solid waste sorting. We empirically investigate this issue, exploiting the exogenous variation in waste management policies experienced during the years 1999–2008 by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso (Italy). Using a panel regression analysis, we estimate that pay‐as‐you‐throw (PAYT) incentive schemes increase the sorted‐to‐total waste ratio by 17 percent, and that their effect reinforces that of a door‐to‐door (DtD) collection system, which is equal to 15.7 percent. Moreover, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to find learning and spatial effects associated with both PAYT and DtD.  相似文献   

10.
Fixed-wage workers comprise the bulk of the labor force and yet little is known about how they respond to changes in their wage. Given recent interest in theories of reciprocity and intrinsic motivation and their implications for effort provision, the neoclassical prediction seems less obvious today. To better understand the motivation of these workers, I estimate their labor supply using a real effort experiment. Two results stand out. First, no one theory seems to fit the pooled data. On average, people work considerably harder than the minimum but they do not respond to changes in the wage. Second, pooling the data is deceptive because there seem to be distinct types with differing responses to the wage. Most workers can be classified as reciprocal or intrinsically motivated and, indeed, these types respond as theory would predict: reciprocators return wage gifts with increased effort and extrinsic incentives crowd out motivation for intrinsic workers.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号