我国流域水市场的制度研究思路

本文针对我国流域水资源管理的现状和引入流域水市场的必要性,对国内外流域水市场研究的文献进行了系统综述,同时系统分析了我国流域水市场研究中存在的问题和建立流域水市场所面临的约束因素.在此基础上,结合流域水市场的研究趋势,归纳、提炼出我国水市场研究的主要问题与内容.最后,提出应在方法论的整合基础上,以我国流域的特殊性为视角展开研究.     

流域水制度研究的基本框架及其应用——以黑河中游张掖市为例

基于生态经济学理论和方法,从整体性视角出发,对将环境与发展问题结合在一起的IMPACTS等式进行解耦和拓展,即在人地系统中对人文因素进一步解耦.对代表社会资源的S赋予具体的涵义,进而引入"制度"因素,将制度分析与环境资源管理结合在一起.在此基础上,对流域水制度的研究框架进行述评,接着对制度分析与发展(IAD)研究框架进行修正得到水制度分析与发展(WIAD)研究框架.最后,将这一框架应用于典型区黑河流域中游张掖市的甘州区、临泽县和高台县,对水制度和水部门进行绩效评估.通过分析,试图提供进行内陆河流域水制度研究的基本框架.     

我国湖泊流域水环境保护研究现状及展望

在当今社会经济高速发展的同时,我国湖泊流域水环境问题已经使我们难以获取其自然和社会的双重红利。在系统分析了我国湖泊流域水环境保护研究现状的基础上,认为湖泊流域水环境保护研究是一项长期的复杂的系统工程;其次,从复杂性认知、系统性研究和研究方法三个方面总结了湖泊流域水环境保护研究面临的挑战;最后,从提升认知和分析能力、跨学科研究、"人"的行为以及水环境保护的管理理论创新研究等四个方面对我国湖泊流域水环境保护的未来研究进行了展望。     

不同市场类型的消费者剩余

政府进行制度设计和宏观调控时,将考虑到不同的市场情形的社会福利差异,以及生产者利润和消费者剩余的权衡问题.用微分法研究了一个垄断厂商市场情形,用博弈论方法研究了n厂商市场情形的总产量、价格、总收益和消费者剩余.最后把各种市场情形的消费者剩余归纳为统一的公式并详细分析了其性质.     

基于复杂性理论的产业集群协同进化探究

近期的研究越来越多地运用复杂性理论来解释各种组织形式,如何将复杂性理论运用于产业集群研究是其中的一个前沿问题。文章将产业集群看作为复杂适应系统,运用复杂性理论特别是其中的协同进化原理对产业集群的演化过程进行分析。文章论证了Pouder&St.John(1996)和其他学者所描述的"热点"类型集群在演化过程中的衰落并非不可避免。基于复杂性理论,来探究一个高绩效产业集群的演化过程,用协同进化观点来支持产业集群高绩效的持久性。     

复杂科学在生态系统研究中的应用

复杂科学的理论、方法在生态系统的研究应用具有很高的价值.生态系统是一个复杂适应性系统,处于混沌边缘或临界态,内部作用是生态系统复杂化、有序化及自组织的主要推动力.生态系统复杂性是目前生态研究的前沿领域之一.文章介绍了生态系统的复杂性和利用复杂科学的原理和方法来研究进化和生态学问题.生态系统复杂性就是生态系统内不同层次上的结构与功能的多样性,自组织性及有序性.其研究方法主要有元胞自动机法、遗传算法、博弈论、复杂网络等.运用复杂科学的原理和方法,探讨生态系统复杂性的机理及发展规律,为认识和解决生态问题提供一条新的途径.     

教学型虚拟实验通用平台的设计

虚拟实验系统采用网络技术、远程控制技术、虚拟现实技术、计算机仿真技术、多媒体技术等实现的各种虚拟实验环境。对教学型虚拟实验系统进行研究和应用,具有一定的学术和实用意义。本文对教学型虚拟实验通用平台的设计原则以及设计方法进行了介绍。     

美国制造业出现的十大发展趋势

自90年代以来,随着计算机技术、市场行销、设计理论与方法、企业管理、质量控制、微电子技术、先进材料等技术的进展,大大推动了美国制造业的发展进步。美国制造业通过计算机设计技术、市场需求分析、先进技术应用、工艺设计、质量保证和联合研究开发等手段,缩短了产品设计和制造周期,降低了投资和开发成本,大大提高了美国产品在国际市场上的竞争能力。 一、三维功能计算机的应用 功能齐全、速度超强的计算机在各种产品设计中广泛应用,过去需要几天的工作量现在     

基于水生态承载力的产业结构优化研究综述

水生态承载力研究近年来在我国逐渐开展,并受到较多关注。论述了生态承载力概念的起源、水生态承载力的概念和内涵,以及水生态承载力的评估技术方法研究现状,同时总结了目前以系统动力学结合情景分析法相结合的研究方法在基于承载力的产业结构调整领域应用较为广泛。文章提出了基于水生态承载力的产业结构优化研究的思路和技术路线,并基于符合水生态系统耦合作用分析和"驱动力—压力—状态—影响—响应(DPSIR)"模型建立了流域水生态承载力评价指标体系,并设计了流域水生态承载力综合评价模型。最后,构建了基于水生态承载力的产业结构演化情景模式。     

编辑手记

博弈论在经济学中得到广泛的应用,博弈论的应用正在超越经济学,逐渐出现在政治学、社会学等社会科学其他学科的分析当中,理解博弈论的逻辑对于了解和吸收社会科学新成果,以及推动社会科学研究意义重大。诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伯特·J.奥曼在肯尼思·阿罗主编的《经济学前沿》上发表的“博弈论的目标”全面、系统、简练地探讨了博弈论的哲学思想,对于理解和把握博弈论的实质,很有帮助。本期选登此文,期望能促进我国学界对博弈论的认识。在比较研究方法论栏目,本期组织了三篇论文,围绕概念的界定展开讨论。概念的界定是研究的基本出发点,许…     

西方经济伦理研究中的数理方法述评

从古典经济学时期起,伦理学和经济学就有着千丝万缕的联系,而数理方法在经济学中的应用,必然会影响到与之相关联的伦理学方面的研究。本文剖析了现代西方经济伦理学研究里出现的数理解释现象,追溯其历史渊源,介绍当前数理方法在西方经济伦理研究中的现状和影响,将经济伦理研究中的数理方法归纳为基础数学和统计学方法、经济数学方法、经典博弈论方法和演化博弈论方法、实验的方法以及计算机模拟仿真等方法,并阐述其在公平正义、合作诚信和利他行为的研究中取得的突出成果。通过梳理西方经济伦理研究中的数理方法,可以揭示其在完善经济学和经济伦理学的方法论体系、弥补西方经济学研究伦理不涉的缺陷并为经济伦理学成为一门客观、严密和精确的独立科学学科奠定基础等方面的重要意义。     

The Market Instinct: The Demise of Social Preferences for Self-Interest

Environmental policy design has much to gain from a better understanding of existing voluntary behaviour and motivations. In laboratory experiments, participants often exhibit social preferences such as altruism, spite, reciprocity and notions of fairness. In contrast, traditional neoclassical theory assumes that people act rationally in a way that maximises their self-interest. In environmental markets, social preferences and self-interest interact. We apply experimental economics to test the hypothesis that social preferences are not maintained in the presence of a competitive market institution. In the initial public goods game, many participants were prepared to make costly voluntary contributions. However the introduction of the market institution triggered a ‘market instinct’ in experimental participants. They abandoned the social preferences they were previously expressing and became self-interested profit maximisers. This self-interested behaviour persisted even after the market institution was discontinued. These findings are important to understanding the role and impact of markets for environmental policy.     

USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS TO DESIGN EFFICIENT MARKET INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to the electricity industry. The analysis is dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very details of the market rules or institution, that is the auction rule. We argue that these experimental results contribute to a better understanding of the performances properties and implementation features of competitive market designs and that experimental economics has proven very useful to public authorities to inform the restructuring of the electricity industry. It thus confirms the role of experimental economics as a complement to theoretical approaches in the design effort.     

Auctions and Regulation: Reengineering of Regulatory Mechanisms**

The FCC auctions, beginning in July 1994, were a watershed event in what may be best called reengineering regulation. It was the first time a new market mechanism, in the form of an auction, had been developed especially to replace traditional administrative procedures for regulating access to a natural resource. The spectrum auctions, and the soon to follow trading in SO₂ emission rights were the two initial instances in which game theory, and more specifically auction theory, played an essential role in the design of an market-based allocation process. The FCC developed a novel auction format for the spectrum auctions. The replacing of administrative regulatory processes with market mechanisms is a major innovation in regulation, or perhaps more accurately, deregulation.     

Public choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science

The paper is an account of the development of laboratory experimental methods in the early 1970s as influenced by the fields of Public Choice and Social Choice. Just a few key experiments conducted during a period when no experimental markets research was taking place, provide a bridge with the subsequent, rapid, growth of experimental economics. A new focus on public goods and externalities, as opposed to private goods traditionally used in economics experiments, required new representations of the commodity space and preference inducement methods. The importance of voting and collective decision making processes dictated the testing of equilibrium concepts from political science and cooperative game theory as opposed to the competitive equilibrium and Nash equilibria found in economics. The existence of many theories from multiple disciplines required new experimental designs and experimental tests. The Public Choice and Social Choice emphasis on comparing the performance of different types of collective decision processes induced early experiments related to institutional design and testing.     

市场结构及市场效率的实验经济学综述

实验经济学对于市场效率和市场结构的研究最早在1948年由Chamberline开创。经济学家经过大量实验发现,不但市场前提假设关系到市场均衡结果及效率,交易制度也会对均衡产生重大影响。并且,不符合完全竞争市场假设的市场结构也有可能实现资源有效配置。本文对实验经济学关于市场结构及市场效率的相关研究进行了回顾与综述,并重点阐述其对完全竞争市场的研究,以揭示交易制度及市场前提对市场效率的综合影响。本文得到的结论显示：即使没有达到完全竞争市场的严格假设,也可能达到完全竞争市场的均衡状态,因而达到最优的配置效率。并且,对于市场结构——完全竞争、垄断和寡头垄断市场的实验研究也表明,并不是如传统古典经济学模型所言：只有完全竞争的市场结构才能够达到资源的有效配置,垄断市场效率也并不是完全与模型所言一致。而且不同于古典经济学,实验经济学将交易制度看作外生变量,认为其对最终市场效率也会产生很大影响。     

2010年亚运会特许商品市场分析

随着金融市场理论研究和实践检验的不断发展,资本市场的许多基础理论受到了极大的挑战,与现有理论相悖的异象不断涌现。新近兴起的实验经济学为人们研究资本市场提供了一条更为有效的途径。本文分析了实验方法在资本市场研究中的利与弊,介绍了部分资本市场实验的设计过程,并应用该方法分析了风险与收益、资本市场的效率、市场泡沫的产生和破灭、CAPM理论,以及交易制度等。文章指出,在资本市场中运用实验方法进行研究,具有可控性、可比性以及可重复性等优点,为我们对于资本市场诸多理论进行检验提供了可能。在资本市场实验的设计中,我们不但需要考虑实验的各种交易制度,还需要考虑到被试人员的选择、交易资产的确定以及市场信息的设计等很多问题,只有对这些问题进行全面地考虑,才能保证实验结果的可信度,进而为我们对于各种金融理论的检验提供可能。     

Behavioral political economy: A survey

In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research.     

实验经济学的兴起与公共产品理论的发展

实验经济学是经济学的一个新的分支,其研究内容主要包括个人决策、市场交易、博弈论、学习理论和方法论。它的兴起对公共财政论的核心理论——公共产品理论产生了影响,加深了搭便车问题的研究,对如何有效提供公共产品从实验角度给出了有益的启示,推动了公共产品理论的研究。     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.