Peak-load pricing with continuous and interdependent demand

Issues concerning time-of-use (TOU) pricing with continuous and interdependent demand are examined in a context where increasing marginal costs of production, as opposed to capacity constraints, provide the major incentive for flattening the load curve. The analysis develops the underlying consumer preferences sufficient to insure a continuously varying load curve and generalizes previous considerations of the peak load pricing problem by simultaneously considering continuous and interdependent demand in determining optimal prices and pricing period lengths. A profit incentive for TOU pricing as a form of price discrimination is revealed, which is tempered as substitution across pricing periods allows limited intertemporal arbitrage. The profit incentive leads a price-regulated firm, ceteris paribus, to choose a peak pricing period longer than the social optimum.     

THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS*

Consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved. Since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous, this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers. Results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits. Furthermore, evidence suggests that a menu of optional two‐part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective.     

Using real-time electricity data to estimate response to time-of-use and flat rates: an application to emissions

Using a generalized McFadden specification, we estimate the determinants of hourly response for the years 2006 through 2010 for all 16 standard retail customers who were on an optional real-time electricity rate offered by Duke Energy as of 2010, and provide a method to estimate how these customers would respond to time-of-use (TOU) and flat rates. We generalize the model to allow for inter-day response, as well as threshold prices, above which individual customer response may increase or decrease. With these inclusions, we find hourly elasticity for the group of customers to be as large as ?0.7, larger than previous studies. We apply the method to examine a recent finding that time-differentiated rates could increase electric utility emissions. However, that result did not differentiate between real-time and TOU rates, and furthermore held energy use constant in comparing flat rates and time-differentiated rates. We perform a case study to examine emissions of SO₂, NOx, Hg, and CO₂ based on predicted energy use changes as well as for an energy-neutral case for real-time, TOU and flat rates. Employing energy use predictions from the model, increased energy use results in increased emissions in almost all cases. For the energy-neutral case, time-differentiated rates increase CO₂ as compared to flat rates, and the TOU rate causes a larger increase than does real-time pricing. But both rates decrease other emissions in the majority of years, particularly SO₂ In addition, time-differentiated rates reduce NOx potency by shifting it to non-daylight hours when conditions for the formation of smog are less favorable. Our application leads to the conclusion that the effect of the rates on emissions must consider total energy use as well as the shift from peak to off-peak. Furthermore, the predictions require consideration of the generating mix at a more detailed level than was contained in previous studies.     

DOWNSTREAM R&D RIVALRY WITH SPILLOVERS AND DISCRIMINATORY INPUT PRICING

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by the upstream monopolist affects the R&D choices of downstream duopolists in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that the monopoly supplier can benefit from a precommitment to uniform pricing because under uniform pricing the downstream firms invest more in R&D, leading to larger output and thus benefiting the supplier. When R&D spillovers are sufficiently large, the downstream firms are also better off under uniform pricing. Moreover, social welfare is always higher under uniform pricing.     

24/7 Hourly Response to Electricity Real-Time Pricing with up to Eight Summers of Experience

This paper provides hourly own and cross price elasticities for industrial customers with up to 8 years of experience on Duke Power optional real-time rates. We include the effects of customer characteristics and temperature conditions. Aggregated results show larger own elasticities than have previous studies, complementarity within the potential peak hours and substitution in the late evening. As customers gain experience with hourly pricing, they show larger load reductions during higher priced hours. As compared to a TOU rate, net benefits are $14,000 per customer per month, approximately 4% of the average customers bill, and much greater than metering costs.JEL classification: L51, L94, D00We wish to acknowledge helpful comments from Herb Thompson and Steve Braithwait. We also wish to thank Colin Loxley and other participants at the Rutgers Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, Lake Tahoe, CA, June 2002, as well as participants at the Second World Congress of Environmental Economics in Monterey, CA, June 2002, for comments on a preliminary version of this paper. Finally, we thank two anonymous referees for helping to improve this paper.     

Social welfare loss due to second-best pricing: an application to the Portuguese telecommunications

The telecommunications industry is usually characterized by low marginal costs and significant fixed costs which are the conditions for the inefficiency of marginal cost pricing. In such cases theory postulates that optimal pricing is obtained by maximizing welfare subject to a restriction of viability of the firm: the second-best pricing scheme. The possible welfare losses due to second-best pricing varies according to the values of marginal costs, prices and demand elasticities. This paper analyses to what extent the second-best pricing has been achieved in the Portuguese telecommunications firm CTT, over the period 1950#150;1984 as well as the magnitude of the price-cost margins and welfare losses created. We obtained empirical evidence of the presence of economies of scale, a welfare loss estimate of 1% of the telecommunications receipts and a result that price was 40% greater than marginal cost. We concluded that price regulation and public ownership of the firm did not seriously affect social welfare over the sample period (it should be noted that it is the non-digital and fixedwire infrastructure period). Therefore, it is important to study the impact of new digital and non-wire technologies and new services provided in the old regulatory scenery.     

Why equity cannot be separated from efficiency: the welfare economics of progressive social pricing

Applied neoclassical microeconomists maintain that when profits are constrained, and average costs are higher than marginal costs, Ramsey “inverse elasticity” pricing optimizes static consumer welfare. However, when weighted, instead of unweighted, consumer surplus aggregation is used, the Ramsey pricing rule becomes a “progressive social pricing rule,” which suggests that under plausible conditions “direct-elasticity” rather than “inverse-elasticity” pricing is consumer welfare optimal.     

Delivered pricing and endogenous delegation of contract type

This article demonstrates for the first time that owners will delegate the location decision under delivered pricing using a relative performance contract rather than a market share contract. It goes on to evaluate the welfare consequences of this demonstration. With linear production costs and simultaneous location, both incentive contracts reduce welfare, but the chosen relative performance contract reduces it by less. Yet, with linear costs and sequential location, the chosen relative performance contract reduces welfare by more. Finally, with enough convexity in production costs, welfare can be improved by the chosen relative performance contracts.     

Industrial organization implications of QR trade regimes: Evidence and welfare costs

Evidence of the relationship between trade regimes, concentration and profitability in semi-industrial countries' manufacturing sectors is reviewed. This evidence is used to justify the formulation and simulation of a three sector general equilibrium model in which the manufacturing sectors's behavior is linked to the degree of restrictiveness of the QR regime. Simulations are conducted with several variants of the model to ascertain separately the effects of introducing economies of scale, firm entry/exit, departures from competitive pricing, and interactions between entry and pricing rules. Numerical results suggest that a 20 percent rationing rate of intermediates and consumption goods can have welfare costs of about 2.0 percent of national income in the absence of economies of scale and industrial organization interactions with the trade regime. When industrial organization features are included, the costs of the same 20 percent rationing quadruples.     

Firm/interruptible gas pricing patterns in a regulated environment

Conclusion This study provides empirical tests for the effects of rate base regulation, curtailment priorities, fuel clauses, and elected commissioners on firm/interruptible gas pricing patterns. These regulations do alter observed pricing patterns with curtailment priorities, fuel clauses, and elected commissioners all producing net social gains. Rate of return regulation imposes social costs resulting in a net decrease in social welfare. Ignoring the political influences upon regulators, regulation generally encourages consumption at the peak relative to the off-peak. Nonetheless, overall social welfare is improved if all four types of regulatory characteristics are present, since most rates are reduced from their monopoly levels.     

Optimal pricing when rational consumers anticipate monitoring cost

This article considers a monopolistic firm’s optimal pricing decision over two periods among dynamic pricing, preannounced pricing and single pricing. In the models, consumers rationally determine whether to exhibit strategic waiting by weighing their costs against prospectively lower price. Our analysis yields three main results. First, single pricing that completely eliminates strategic waiting surely would be dominated by intertemporal pricing when facing rational consumers. Second, preannounced pricing may actually yield lower revenue than dynamic pricing when considering its effect on the reduction of consumer monitoring cost. Only when monitoring costs under dynamic pricing and under preannounced pricing are equal, is firm revenue weakly greater under preannounced pricing than under dynamic pricing. Third, in dynamic pricing equilibrium, increasing monitoring cost may increase firm revenue, consumer surplus and social welfare simultaneously.     

Country Size,Technology and Manufacturing Location

Country size, technology and trade costs jointly affect the location of manufacturing activity. In this paper, the combined effects of country size and technology differences on manufacturing location are examined in a simple new economic geography model. The specification yields a closed‐form, analytic relationship between measures of relative productivity, country size and trade costs. The patterns of agglomeration are consistent with recent empirical evidence. Market and supplier access favor manufacturing agglomeration in large countries for high to intermediate trade costs. High productivity countries, however small, are favored for low trade costs. The model's tractability facilitates welfare analysis.     

Quality heterogeneity and global economic growth

This paper develops a fully endogenous, variety-expansion growth model with firm-specific quality heterogeneity, limit pricing, and an endogenous distribution of markups. Firms with high-quality products engage in exporting, firms with intermediate-quality products serve the domestic market, and inefficient firms with low-quality products exit the market. Trade liberalization, measured by a reduction in trade costs or a decline in foreign market entry costs, generates a reallocation of resources from low-quality to high-quality products and exit of inefficient firms. However, it has ambiguous effects on the average global quality level, long-run growth, and welfare. An increase in the rate of population growth or in the intensity of trade-related knowledge spillovers accelerates economic growth. The laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient, and this leaves room for welfare-improving government intervention.     

买方抗衡势力与制造商定价决策

本文研究了买方抗衡势力的存在对上游制造商定价决策的影响,讨论了制造商在不同定价形式（线性定价、两部收费制和转售价格维持（RPM））之间的选择问题,并构建了两阶段动态博弈模型,引入买方抗衡势力,比较分析了制造商在零售商具有和不具有买方抗衡势力两种情况下,制造商最优定价形式的选择。研究发现当零售商不具有买方抗衡势力时,制造商选择两部收费制和RPM是无差异的,都能使上游制造商获得相等的最优利润;当零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,对于上游制造商来说两部收费制优干RPM,RPM又优于线性定价。此外,本文还发现存在一个由抗衡势力和零售商替代程度决定的临界条件,当满足这一条件时,两部收费制是上游的最优选择;一旦这一条件不满足时,RPM就成了上游的最优选择。     

Transportation capital and its effects on the U.S. economy: A general equilibrium approach

We analyze the effect of the US transportation system on economic activity by building a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model with a taxpayer-funded transportation capital stock. We highlight stark differences between the positive welfare effects of additional infrastructure spending in the long run, and its potentially negative effects when we account for the large transition (time and delay) costs to build. We also quantify large differences between the effects of additional infrastructure spending and efficient transportation policies, such as congestion pricing and eliminating laws that artificially inflate input prices, concluding that taxpayer-funded transportation improvements that increase GDP significantly may produce smaller welfare gains than efficient policies that increase GDP modestly.     

Renewable energy subsidies: Second-best policy or fatal aberration for mitigation?

This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare and energy prices in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. The imperfectness of the carbon price is motivated by political concerns regarding distributional effects of increased energy prices. Hence, carbon prices are considered to be temporarily or permanently absent or endogenously constrained by their effect on energy prices. We use a global general equilibrium model with an intertemporal fossil resource sector and calculate intertemporally optimal policies from a broad set of policy instruments including carbon taxes, renewable energy subsidies and feed-in-tariffs, among others. If carbon pricing is permanently missing, mitigation costs increase by a multiple (compared to the optimal carbon pricing policy) for a wide range of parameters describing extraction costs, renewable energy costs, substitution possibilities and normative attitudes. Furthermore, we show that small deviations from the second-best subsidy can lead to strong increases in emissions and consumption losses. This confirms the rising concerns about the occurrence of unintended side effects of climate policy – a new version of the green paradox. Smart combinations of carbon prices and renewable energy subsidies, however, can achieve ambitious mitigation targets at moderate additional costs without leading to high energy price increases.     

Regulating prices for shifting between service providers

The price that a regulated access provider charges for shifting customers between service providers has significant welfare implications. Typical regulatory approaches to pricing, such as pricing based on fully allocated cost or incremental cost, ignore the characteristics of consumer demand. A theoretical alternative, Ramsey pricing, considers only the elasticity of demand for given products. This paper directs attention to the competitive process. Using US long-distance telephone services as an example, this paper shows how empirical evidence concerning customer acquisition costs, customer switching costs, and churn among service providers can help to inform price regulation.     

International Pricing with Costly Consumer Arbitrage

Consumer arbitrage affects international pricing in several ways. If all consumers face the same arbitrage costs, a monopolist's profit increases with arbitrage costs, and world welfare declines with them (if output does not rise). If arbitrage costs differ across consumers, a monopolist may sell in a second country even if there is no local demand—it can use the second country to discriminate across consumers in the first country. Again, world welfare typically falls with arbitrage costs. When there is also local demand in the second country, world welfare may be increasing in arbitrage costs, even if output falls.     

ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES

We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.     

递增阶梯电价的收入再分配效应研究: 嵌入分时电价更有效吗*

本文从理论与实证角度分析了递增阶梯电价为实现收入再分配目的必然伴随着效率损失,进而探讨嵌入分时电价能否改善两难困境。理论模型刻画了递增阶梯电价追求再分配目的所致两类效率成本的特征、结构和类型,以及递增阶梯电价在实现再分配和最小化效率损失间的两难困境。基于杭州市居民用电和家庭收入等微观数据,使用工具变量,通过反事实场景构建和二次近乎理想需求函数（QUAIDS）模型,实证估算了阶梯电价为实现再分配目的而引致的家庭与社会效率成本,本文为系统评估和完善阶梯水价和气价等政策奠定了基础。