法治理念和道德观念对执法者的影响

法治理念的社会影响是全方位的，但对执法者的影响是最深刻的，既能够影响执法者法律信仰的形成，也能够影响执法者的法律逻辑思维。法治社会并不等于不需要道德，法治理念和道德观念对执法者都具有一定的影响，道德理念同样在影响着法律共同体的职业伦理的形成，并对法律的漏洞作有效的补充。每一名执法者只有不断提高道德修养，锻造执法能力，才能促进法律的公平正义，社会的和谐进步。     

企业信誉及其产权基础

完善的市场经济是建立在高度发达的信用经济之上的商品经济,信誉机制是市场良好运行的必不可少的制度基础之一。入世后的中国企业,要在激烈的国际竞争中获得竞争力,培育自己的竞争优势,就必须融入全球化的过程中,建立一套符合国际规范的信誉机制。本文正是从这个角度出发,根据经济学的一般原理,分析了企业信誉机制与产权之间的关系,并在此基础上提出明晰企业的产权归属、保持企业产权关系的长期性和稳定性、实现企业产权的自由交易是我国企业真正建立起信誉机制所应具备的产权基础。     

入世与企业信誉

当我们热衰于讨论中国企业如何进入世界500强时，似乎忘记了世界500强中的每个企业都有一个（或多个）世界知名的商标。这种商标既是这些企业信誉的标志，也是它们能够立足于世界市场的条件。中国企业与国际知名企业的差距不仅仅是规模的差距，更重要的是信誉的差距。如果说企业的规模差距还能够在短期内依靠人为的方式迅速缩小的话（当然这样做的后果通常并不是理想的），那么信誉差距的缩小则不是一朝一夕所能完成的。而且，在一定程度上企业信誉的维持比信誉的建立更为困难。企业信誉的建立和维持不是单个企业的努力所能实现的，它受制于整个国家经济的信誉水平。改革开放20多年来，我国经济的市场化程度有了长足的进展，但是企业信誉水平却没有相应的发展。因此，企业信誉水平发展的滞后已成为我国整个市场经济发展的一个重要障碍。同时，伴随加入世贸组织，中国经济与世界经济融为一体，信誉问题将居为制约中国企业竞争力的一个重要因素，探讨建立和维持企业信誉的机制已成为迫在眉睫的问题。     

论企业与顾客信誉机制及其失灵

企业与顾客信誉机制是促进企业诚信经营，维护市场有序运行的一个基本机制。重复博弈是这一机制发挥作用的前提条件。但这一机制运行中存在的失灵现象往往被我们忽视了，本从顾客的角度对这一问题进行探讨。     

企业家品德与企业信誉

在市场经济条件下现代企业间的竟争已扩展到信誉竟争,企业若不讲信誉就无立足之地,无生存之根,因此,树立良好的信誉是企业必须解决的问题。企业信誉与企业家品德密切相关。一、企业信誉的作用企业信誉是指企业在市场经济的运行中所获得的社会评价,是企业在社会上公认的信用和名声,企业信誉是企业的一种无形的资产和生产力,也是企业在市场经济中获得竞争优势的法宝。1.企业信誉决定企业的品牌形象。“信招天下客,誉赢海内心”在激烈的市场经济竞争中,得信者,得人心;得信者,得天下;得信者,得市场。良好的企业信誉,可以赢得消费者的好感和信赖,…     

研发过程的信誉缺失、法律治理及博弈模型研究

企业作为自主创新的主体,其外部环境已经得到较广泛的关注。研发过程是企业自主创新的关键环节。值得注意的是,基于研发过程的特殊性,研发人员的信誉缺失问题是影响企业研发成败乃至自主创新及自主知识产权的重要问题。于是分析了研发过程的信息不对称、信息不完全及时滞特征,提出解决研发人员信誉缺失的博弈论思路,然后通过构建动态博弈模型,分析了如何运用法律手段来治理研发人员的信誉缺失问题,以及法律治理中存在的问题。研究结论表明,从法律上治理研发人员信誉缺失的有效性不在于对失信行为单纯地进行惩罚,而是要增强投资者胜诉的可能性,并且对于失信的惩罚也存在着上限和下限,其范围依赖于胜诉的可能性。     

从建筑市场看建立企业信誉制度的重要性

企业信誉机制应该包含两个主要部分,一是对企业信誉的评价内容,二是形成这些信誉的社会评价机制。对于企业身份,工商行政管理部门已经有了一个比较完备的管理体系。在企业守法层面上,各部门也以各自的角度实现对企业守法信息的公布、公开,实现共享。将这两个层面上的企业信誉信息合而为一,就可初步建立一个企业信誉管理体系框架,然后再逐步增加有关企业经营的情况,可以最终完成企业信誉管理体系。古往今来的企业,无论是“老字号”,还是现代的企业,在其宗旨中都十分重视“信誉”,在某种意义上说,市场经济就是信誉经济。市场的公正和完善,参与市场竞争的企业的合法权益,都需要信誉的支持和保障。诚实守信,是维护市场正常秩序的灵魂。     

浅谈"合同农业"的非正式履行机制

法律社会学的研究证明,法律只是影响人们行为的一种强制制度,同时非正式的制度也制约着社会主体的行为.本文探讨了"合同农业"的非正式履行机制--自我履行机制.它是以信誉为基础、以文化传统及习俗作为约束方式的非正式制度,在"合同农业"的顺利运行与发展中起着重要作用.     

企业应高度重视信誉预警管理

企业信誉是指企业在市场经济的运行中所获得的社会上公认的信用和名声。信誉对个人来讲，是一种道德、一种做人的基本准则；而对于企业来讲，信誉是企业的生产经营原则、是其生存之本；对现代市场经济来讲，如果没有信誉，就没有秩序，市场经济就不能健康发展。由中国企业联合会、中国企业家协会开展的“2003年企业经营者问卷调查”结果显示     

浅谈“合同农业”的非正式履行机制

法律社会学的研究证明，法律只是影响人们行为的一种强制制度，同时非正式的制度也制约着社会主体的行为。本文探讨了“合同农业”的非正式履行机制——自我履行机制。它是以信誉为基础、以文化传统及习俗作为约束方式的非正式制度，在“合同农业”的顺利运行与发展中起着重要作用。     

我国听证制度研究

我国听证制度由外国引入,基于民主法治建设而存在,并随着公民的民主法治意识的增强不断完善。在了解听证制度的基本概念,发展历程,发挥作用的基本条件,以及社会作用的基础上,更应认识到听证制度存在的缺陷。深入研究它的理论知识,它运行的程序、原则,全面分析它的不足之处,针对性的提出更多的建议以供立法者,执法者参考,使我国的听证制度逐渐形成一个完整的体系。     

Leniency policies and illegal transactions

We study the consequences of leniency—reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers—on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager–auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that—when not properly designed—leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence.     

Setting standards for credible compliance and law enforcement

In this paper we examine the setting of optimal legal standards to simultaneously induce parties to invest in care and to motivate law enforcers to detect violators of the law. The strategic interaction between care providers and law enforcers determines the degree of efficiency achieved by the standards. Our principal finding is that some divergence between the marginal benefits and marginal costs of providing care is required to control enforcement costs. Further, the setting of standards may effectively substitute for the setting of fines when penalties for violation are fixed. In particular, maximal fines may be welfare reducing when standards are set optimally.
Nous considérons dans cet article la détermination, en information incomplète, de normes légales optimales pour à la fois inciter les citoyens à faire preuve de diligence (prévention) et motiver les agents de la paix à veiller au respect des lois. L'interaction stratégique entre citoyens et agents de la paix détermine l'efficacité des normes choisies. Notre résultat principal est à l'effet qu'un écart entre bénéfices marginaux et coûts marginaux de la diligence est nécessaire afin de réduire les coûts d'application des lois. De plus, les normes peuvent être un substitut aux amendes lorsque les pénalités pour infraction sont fixes. Des amendes maximales peuvent en particulier être contre-indiquées lorsque les normes sont optimalement déterminées.     

Private law enforcement,fine sharing,and tax collection: Theory and historical evidence

This paper contributes to the literature on private law enforcement by proposing a novel solution to the problem of underenforcement by monopolistic enforcers. Monopolistic enforcers underinvest in enforcement because they ignore the social benefits of deterrence. We show that this problem can be partially resolved by combining law enforcement with tax collection because a joint enforcer-collector will have an interest in reducing the crime rate in order to maximize his tax income. In support of the theory, we discuss two historical examples of this practice: decentralized law enforcement under European feudalism, and centralized law enforcement in the Ottoman Empire.     

Crime and Punishment and Corruption: Who Needs “Untouchables?”

Becker's result that fines should be maximized is also applicable to some social environments where law enforcers are corrupt. If the regulated activity is legal, the principal may efficiently deter crime without an anti‐corruption unit. An opportunistic anti‐corruption unit, even when corrupt, becomes useful for the principal when the activity is illegal, since the principal's goal of maximizing fines motivates the unit to collect bribes from the enforcer, which subsequently induces the enforcer to be nearly completely honest, minimizing corruption. Therefore, we show that there is not necessarily an infinite regress originating with the puzzle of who polices the police.     

Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest average payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.      

Culture,legal heritage and the regulation of labor

According to cross-cultural psychologists, cross-country differences in individualism vs. collectivism constitute an important dimension of cultural variation. Legal-economic theorists argue that legal philosophies such as common law and civil law have developed differently over centuries and have persistent effects. In this paper, we argue that the effects of culture and institutions should not be analyzed in isolation from each other, as this disregards their interactions. We merge the two separate literatures on cultural attributes and legal origin theories, and derive a hypothesis regarding their joint effects on labor market regulations. We hypothesize that the effect of individualism on the political determination of labor regulations should be particularly pronounced in more market-oriented economic systems (as in British common law countries) compared to more rigid and bureaucratic state-centered systems (as in French civil law countries). Market oriented economies give individual effort and ability greater room to flourish, which in individualistic cultures yields weaker labor regulations. The effect of individualism should be smaller in state centered systems. Using data on the average rigidity of labor regulations during the years 1950–2004 in 86 countries, we find that the negative effect of individualism on the rigidity of labor regulations is enhanced by the presence of a common law legal system. In fact, individualism has no effect on the rigidity of labor market regulations in civil law countries. Analogously, the negative effect of common law legal origin on labor market regulations is found to be conditional on the level of individualism. Individualism and common law legal systems are complements in the determination of labor regulations.     

ENTRANTS' REPUTATION AND INDUSTRY DYNAMICS

This article analyzes entry–exit decisions in a market where reputation determines the price that firms may charge, within a rational‐expectation model of competition in a nonatomic market under heterogeneous reputations. The analysis focuses on the class of name‐switching reputational equilibria, in which a firm discards its name if and only if its reputation falls below the entrants' reputation. The main technical result is the existence of a unique steady‐state equilibrium within this class, in which the entrants' reputation is endogenous. The resulting industry dynamics is largely on agreement with the findings in the empirical literature.     

Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions

We compare two alternative legal presumptions, one more pro-defendant than the other, with the objective of reducing bureaucratic corruption to any target level at minimum social costs, broadly defined to include law enforcement costs, trial costs, and verdict error costs. In the absence of collusion possibilities between law enforcers and offenders, presumption of innocence involves lower social costs for low corruption targets while presumption of guilt has a cost advantage for high corruption targets. Allowing for collusion enlarges the corruption range over which the presumed innocence rule will dominate. However, there are two possible exceptions to this outcome, namely, if the government's law enforcement budget is limited and if the offenders can be penalized only up to a maximum permissible limit. In each of these cases, presumption of guilt may become the cost-effective rule. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 722–748. Bilkent University, Bilkent 06533, Ankara, Turkey; and Department of Economics and Finance, Birkbeck College, University of London, 7-15 Gresse Street, London W1T 1LL, United Kingdom. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D73, D78, K41, K42.     

二元体制下我国军民融合深度发展的法治实施困境与对策

军民融合发展是统筹经济建设与国防建设、实现富国强军与构建一体化国家战略体系和能力的必由之路。我国军民融合从初步融合走向深度融合,涉及多方主体的关系调整与利益重塑,需要在法治轨道上通过法律规范与法律运行两个维度整合各类主体力量、配置各类要素资源。目前,军民融合法治实施受制于“军”“民”二元分离体制结构的现实约束,在法律规范层面处于制度供给不完备状态,在法律运行层次面临主体实践不协调困境。二元体制下破解军民融合深度发展的法治实施困境,宜从静态规范层面和动态运行层面综合调整军民融合行为。一方面,通过适时制定和颁布具有统一效力的军民融合发展法,清理、废止和修订不适应军民融合发展需要的法律法规和政策文件,在规范层面建立健全统一完备的军民融合发展法律法规体系;另一方面,探索建立“委员会统一领导、各小组分工负责”的军民融合法治实施领导体制和统一领导、军地协调、顺畅高效的军地联合法律执行机制,形成诉调对接、诉仲结合的军民融合案件多元化纠纷解决机制暨法律适用机制,在法律运行层面建立协调高效的军民融合发展法律实施体系。