Age Discrimination in Employment in Canada

Issues pertaining to age discrimination in employment in Canada are analyzed with a view toward highlighting lessons that may be learned from the Canadian experience—an experience that is taking on increased policy importance. Reasons for the increased attention to age discrimination issues are outlined, followed by a portrayal of the age discrimination legislation and court interpretations in Canada, especially as they pertain to mandatory retirement. Enforcement aspects are discussed, as is the evidence on age discrimination in employment and the effectiveness of legislation with respect to age discrimination and mandatory retirement. The article concludes with a discussion of the lessons to be learned from the Canadian experience, especially with respect to the poorly understood but complicated relationship between age discrimination and mandatory retirement. Policy recommendations for strengthening age discrimination legislation are also outlined. (JEL J14 , J24 , J71 )     

Statistical Discrimination and Efficiency

This paper asks whether statistical discrimination is a market failure. I consider the problem for a utilitarian social planner who operates in an environment that can generate statistical discrimination as an equilibrium phenomenon. It is found that there are potential efficiency gains from discrimination in terms of reduced "mismatch" between workers and jobs. Whether the solution to the planning problem involves discrimination depends on the trade-off between the informational gains of specialization and the losses in terms of increased investment costs.     

Measuring wage discrimination in Italy: a random-coefficient approach

Using data from a representative 1989 household survey for Italy we estimate random-coefficient earnings frontiers by gender, marital status and location. These estimates are used to calculate discrimination indices. Our results show that fixed coefficients can be rejected in all cases. A wide range on the estimated coefficients indicates a high degree of variation in the quality of the observed human-capital variables as well as different degrees of ability as perceived by the employer. We find reverse discrimination for single females in the South and the North. For married females there is evidence of discrimination, particularly in the South. We isolate the effects of tenure and education on discrimination and find that these reduce discrimination for Southern-married females.     

Gender wage differentials and discrimination in Korea: comparison by knowledge intensity of industries

This study estimates the relative size of the non-productivity-related gender wage gap across industries with differing knowledge intensities. More specifically, a gender wage premium was estimated from a modified Mincerian earnings equation, and an Oaxaca's discrimination coefficient was computed. Empirical evidence indicates that gender wage differentials tend to be less subject to potential discrimination in knowledge-based industries than in other industries with lower knowledge intensity. The estimated discrimination effect is least noticeable in top hierarchical occupations such as professionals and technicians, while it is most sizeable in production workers and sales/service workers, regardless of industrial affiliation.     

Price discrimination: A classroom experiment

In this article, the authors describe a classroom experiment aimed at familiarizing students with different types of price discrimination (first-, second-, and third-degree price discrimination). During the experiment, the students were asked to decide what tariffs to set as monopolists for each of the price discrimination scenarios under consideration. The objective was to allow the students to work empirically, through trial and error, selecting tariffs for each type of discrimination that would maximize a monopolistic entrepreneur's profits. The purpose of the exercise also was to enable the students to differentiate each type of price discrimination and to set tariffs in each case, as well to help them understand the repercussions in terms of welfare for each type of price discrimination.     

Discrimination and the unemployment durations of white and black males

In this study we develop a model to decompose the longer unemployment duration of blacks into discriminatory and non-discriminatory components. By extending Becker's theory of discrimination to job-search theory, the discriminatory component is seen to be the result of two separate effects. First, a white treatment advantage shortens the unemployment duration of whites because they receive more frequent and higher wage offers than would prevail in the absence of discrimination for working alongside blacks. Second, a black treatment disadvantage lengthens the jobless spell of blacks because blacks receive lower wage offers than would prevail without discrimination as discriminating employers extract quasi-rents from their labour. We estimate our model using date from the CPS Displaced Workers Survey. The results show that 3.81 of the 4.58 weeks longer unemployment spell for blacks is due to discrimination, with 3.11 weeks resulting from the white treatment advantage, and 0.7 weeks emanating from the black treatment disadvantage.     

美貌溢价:劳动力市场歧视是主因吗?—基于中国劳动力动态调查数据的实证研究

文章利用中国劳动力动态调查(CLDS)数据,分析了具有不同身高等外貌特征的劳动力的工资差异及其来源.分解结果显示,较高男性的高收入几乎全部可以用人力资本、社会交际及其他劳动能力特征差异来解释,劳动力市场歧视等不可解释部分非常小.较矮男性的低收入有60%可以用劳动能力特征差异来解释,有40%属于劳动力市场歧视等不可解释部分.身高较高(矮)的女性的高(低)收入也主要源于劳动能力特征差异;对较矮女性来说,歧视等不可解释部分具有相反的影响,即劳动力市场不但不歧视反而偏爱较矮的女性.因此,劳动力市场歧视并不是身高溢价的主要原因.然而,劳动力市场之外,在社交活动中的外貌歧视会通过增加社交网络差异而提高美貌溢价.     

A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination

We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize. Discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model is also consistent with “reverse discrimination” as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity.     

Price discrimination via information provision

We study price discrimination where different prices are offered as a bundle with different levels of information about a product. The seller’s price discrimination induces high valuation buyers to purchase a good without information and low valuation buyers to purchase with information. Our analysis highlights several interesting results about price discrimination: (i) the seller’s choice of information provision is the combination of full information and no information, (ii) products can be cheaper without information provision than with information provision, (iii) as a result of price discrimination, prices can be more dispersed as buyers’ valuations become largely similar, and (iv) the high valuation buyers purchase a damaged good and may earn negative surplus. Furthermore, we investigate under which circumstances price discrimination is more profitable than uniform pricing. We show that a decline in transportation costs which facilitate price discrimination can be welfare reducing.     

Open access policies, regulated charges and non-price discrimination in telecommunications

Open access policies in telecommunications, including interconnection and unbundling, are implemented by regulators in an effort to increase competition in the sector. Lack of cooperation from incumbents is pervasive, given their incentives to engage in non-price discrimination and the moral hazard resulting from the inability of regulators to monitor the contract. We build a relationship between the access price and non-price discrimination, neither assuming a pre-determined market strategic interdependence or a specific demand function format. When the access charge is liberalized, the incentive for non-price discrimination disappears. It may be optimal for the regulator to set a second-best regulated access price to avoid non-price discrimination.