Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: a General Equilibrium Approach

We consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments. Contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes. We find that: (1) It may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully. (2) Less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption. (3) There may exist a 'free-lunch' such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption, increase investment, and achieve a better allocation of talent.     

Efficiency of Screening and Labor Income Inequality

We analyze the importance of information about individual skills for understanding human capital accumulation and income inequality. The paper uses the framework of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Agents in each generation differ by random individual ability, or talent, which affects the screening process. The human capital of an agent depends on both his talent and his investment in education. The investment decision is based on a public signal (test outcome), which screens all agents for their talents. We analyze how a better information system, which allows more efficient screening, affects investment in education and, hence, income inequality in equilibrium. As a main result, we find that, typically, less inequality in the distribution of actual incomes can only be achieved at the expense of more inequality in the distribution of income opportunities.     

Non-optimality of the myopic decision rule: The case of a two-sector open economy

This paper is concerned with optimal allocation of investment in a two-sector open economy with non-shiftable capital. We have assumed a stationary population and fixed terms of trade. It has been shown that, if the economy starts with a small amount of capital in each sector, the myopic decision rule under static expectations will not be compatible with the conditions of optimal investment allocation.     

Foreign Aid,Incentives and Efficiency: Can Foreign Aid Lead to the Efficient Level of Investment?

This paper develops a two‐period model in which the recipient faces borrowing constraint and the donor is a Stackelberg follower to address two important policy questions: (i) whether foreign aid can lead to the efficient level of capital investment in the recipient country and (ii) how does the form (e.g. budgetary transfers, capital transfer) and the timing of aid affect the recipient's financial savings and capital investment. It finds that the disincentive effect of the capital transfer on the capital investment by the recipient is larger than the budgetary transfers. It makes financial savings more attractive relative to the capital investment for the recipient. In the absence of capital transfer, the multi‐period budgetary transfers not only lead to the efficient level of capital investment by the recipient, but also achieve the same allocation as under commitment. The capital transfer can lead to the efficient level of capital investment, but in this case, it completely crowds out the recipient's own capital investment.     

Public overspending in higher education

We study the trade-off between governmental investments in pretertiary and tertiary education from an efficiency point of view. We develop a model comprising agents with different incomes and abilities, public and private schools, and public universities that select applicants based on an admission exam. Reallocating governmental resources from tertiary to pretertiary education may positively affect aggregate production and human capital if some conditions are satisfied. For instance, in an economy with a high proportion of credit-constrained students, a reallocation of expenditure toward public schools benefits many students, compensating for the negative effect of a decrease in public university investments. We also quantitatively investigate the optimal allocation of public investment between pretertiary and tertiary education, and we find that a 10% increase in productivity of public investments in pretertiary education could increase the optimal GDP between 2.1% and 3%.     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Trade Liberalization in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment and Tax Credits: Estimates for Costa Rica

The paper uses a calibrated general-equilibrium model to quantify the welfare impact of trade liberalization—and compute the optimal tariff structure—for Costa Rica when trade-policy-induced foreign direct investment and international capital taxation with credits are present. It shows that complete trade liberalization reduces Costa Rica's welfare, as it leads to an outflow of capital and loss of tax revenue which more than offset the efficiency gains from an enhanced resource allocation. The optimal tariff structure for the Costa Rican economy turns out to be a mixture of relatively small import tariffs and subsidies.     

General Equilibrium Impacts of Monetary and Fiscal Policies on Welfare of Households in South Asia

Impacts of fiscal and monetary policies are assessed in an open economy two sector multi‐household general equilibrium tax model with money for South Asia. Despite impressive growth rates there is evidence for alarming gaps in the distribution of income among households that require very careful design of economic policies. Generally the impacts of fiscal expansions are positive for all categories of households under the flexible price system but the gains are much higher for households in the upper income group than for those in the bottom. In theory the equilibrium relative prices guarantee the optimal allocation of resources in such economy. Simulation results show that demand, output and employment are sensitive to the preferences of consumers, confidence of producers and sector specific production technologies. Monetary policy is super‐neutral under flexible price regime but can complement fiscal policy well when aggregate prices are made sticky. Combination of monetary and fiscal policies in this manner can have extensive impacts in efficiency and redistribution. Higher taxes distort incentives to work and investment from richer households slowing down the economy. This reduces the welfare level of both rich and poor. Flexibility in prices enhances the market mechanism and makes the fiscal policy more effective and efficient.     

Equilibrium capital taxation in open economies under commitment

This paper analyzes equilibrium capital taxation in open economies with strategic interaction in a neo-classical growth model. Under perfect commitment, I show that non-cooperative capital taxes are zero in the long run for a large open economy, thereby generalizing the result previously established only for the special cases of a closed and a small open economy. This does not represent a race to the bottom, though, since the result is independent of the degree of capital mobility, the number of countries, or a country׳s size relative to the rest of the world. Moreover, when countries cooperate, they still set capital taxes to zero in the long run. These outcomes are robust to different equilibrium specifications, the inclusion of endogenous government spending, and heterogeneous agents and non-linear labor income taxation. Governments find it optimal to implement the efficient capital allocation in the long run, both in a closed and an open economy; this trumps incentives to tax foreigners’ domestic capital holdings by raising capital taxes and attracting capital from abroad by lowering capital taxes.     

The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality

We consider an OLG economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Heterogeneity in individual human capital levels is modelled by a distribution of innate ability across agents. This distribution is common knowledge but, at young age, no agent knows his/her ability. The production of human capital depends on each individual’s investment in education. This investment decision is taken only after observing a signal which is correlated to his/her true ability, and which is used for updating beliefs. Thus, a better information system affects the distribution of human capital in each generation. Assuming separable and identical preferences for all individuals, we derive the following results in equilibrium: (a) If the relative measure of risk aversion is less (more) than 1 then more information raises (reduces) income inequality. (b) When a risk sharing market is available better information results in higher inequality regardless of the measure risk aversion. We are grateful to Alex Cukierman, Zvi Eckstein, Yona Rubinstein and Daniel Tsiddon. An anonymous referee made extremely useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development (GIF) is gratefully acknowledged.     

财政政策的供给效应与经济发展

本文分析了发展中国家公共投资对私人资本积累的动态响应。针对公共资本的拥挤性特征 ,同时考虑财政投资可能引起的风险。在不考虑公共投资风险的分权经济中 ,由于公共资本和私人资本都处于短缺状态 ,企业争夺拥挤性公共资本而扩张私人资本的投资行为虽然使经济超常增长 ,但是存在过度投资和过度拥挤。在集中优化模型中 ,如果考虑到公共投资的风险 ,政府通过税收方式弥补公共投资风险 ,同时将企业投资产生的拥挤效应内部化 ,就能消除企业的过度投资和过度拥挤现象 ,使经济保持合理持续的增长。对中国这样的发展中国家 ,需要重视财政的供给效应 ,在经济起飞初期保证一定数量的政府资本性支出是必要的 ,但随着经济的不断发展和政府资本性支出累积的风险增加 ,财政转型十分必要。     

Financial Markets and Stochastic Growth

The authors study the effect of financial markets on the investment of a two-good two-country economy with stochastic production in a dynamic framework. Each country produces and invests only one good and, therefore, makes decisions as a central planner in an optimal growth model. Trade between consumers of both countries, however, takes place on competitive (spot or financial) markets. The authors compare the investment–consumption decisions of both "market" models with the benchmark case of an integrated world-equilibrium. In the log-linear case, it is possible to uniquely characterize the state-dependent preferences of consumers that lead to dynamically efficient investment decisions. It is shown that the investment decisions in both "market" models are, in general, inefficient compared with the efficient, or integrated world economy, case.     

Investment options and the business cycle

This paper extends [R. Mehra, E.C. Prescott, Recursive competitive equilibrium: The case of homogeneous households, Econometrica 48 (1980) 1365-1380] to a production economy with two capital goods. It is an RBC model in which each unit of investment requires a new idea, an ‘option.’ When options are scarce, new capital is harder to put in place and the value of old capital rises. Thus the stock market and Tobin's Q are negative indexes of intangibles. During a boom, Q rises gradually, as options are used up. Because investment represents an exercise of options, it has an intertemporal substitution tradeoff that is absent from the adjustment-cost model. Equilibrium may be efficient even without markets for knowledge; the stock market may suffice.     

Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation

We study the structure of optimal wedges and capital taxes in a dynamic Mirrlees economy with endogenous distribution of skills. Human capital is a private, stochastic state variable that drives the skill process of each individual. Building on the findings of the labor literature, we construct a tractable life-cycle model of human capital evolution with risky investment and stochastic depreciation. In this setting, we demonstrate the optimality of (a) a human capital premium, i.e., an excess return on human capital relative to physical capital, (b) a large intertemporal wedge early in the life-cycle, and (c) a non-zero intratemporal wedge even at the top of the skill distribution at all dates except the last date in the life-cycle. The main implication for the structure of optimal linear capital taxes is the necessity of deferred taxation of physical capital. The average marginal tax rate on physical capital held in every period is zero in present value. However, expected capital tax payments do not equal zero in every period. Necessarily, agents face negative expected capital tax payments early in the life-cycle and positive expected capital tax payments late in the life-cycle.     

Public versus private risk sharing

Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy where private risk sharing is incomplete? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is limited because insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley (1986) [8]) publicly provided risk sharing improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but their use is limited by limited enforcement (as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) [23]) then the provision of public insurance interacts with equilibrium private insurance, as, by providing risk sharing, the government affects the value of exclusion from private insurance markets and thus the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. We characterize consumption allocations in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing plausible income risk and tax systems with various degrees of progressivity (public risk sharing). We provide conditions under which more publicly provided insurance actually reduces total insurance for agents (excess crowding-out), or under which more public insurance increases total insurance (partial crowding-out).     

Distributional Effects of Public Education in an Economy with Public Pensions*

We study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays—education and pay‐as‐you‐go social security—affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents. We consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs, and allocates tax revenues to finance them. In our model, human capital is one of the factors of production. It is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs. Parents' decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism, heterogeneous in its strength across the population, which leads to heterogeneity of incomes. We investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution. We show that in this framework, contrary to some earlier results, increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality. Our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology.     

Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy, seeks to insure a risk-averse domestic constituency, and is more impatient than the market. Optimal policy generates long-run cycles in both sovereign debt and foreign direct investment in an environment in which the first best capital stock is a constant. The expected tax on capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy, and investment is distorted by more in recessions than in booms, amplifying the effect of shocks. The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a "debt overhang" effect. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment. Furthermore, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment.     

Investment in Hierarchical Human Capital

Advanced human capital requires "basic" human capital as an input. Physical capital does not, in general, have such hierarchical structure. This paper models optimal investment in hierarchical human capital as well as nonhierarchical physical capital. The authors analyze the steady state, transition dynamics, and endogenous growth properties of the system. The optimal program exhibits non-monotonicities in human capital stocks. This result has important implications for the optimal timing of investment in hierarchical human capital. The analysis also addresses the debate regarding the distribution of education expenditures and the divergence between ex-post and ex-ante rates of return to education.     

THE COEVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT FROM MONARCHY TO DEMOCRACY*

This article establishes a unified political economy model to analyze the democratization process from monarchy to oligarchy and to democracy in the context of dynamic economic development. As the predominant source of wealth evolves from land to physical capital and finally to human capital, the relative economic and hence coercive power of land owners, capitalists, and workers shifts accordingly, inducing the transition of the political system where political power is expanded from landlords to capitalists and finally to workers. A smooth transition through political compromise facilitates efficient allocation of savings in physical capital followed by efficient investment in human capital.     

Dynamic Inefficiency in an Overlapping Generation Economy with Pollution and Health Costs

We analyze an overlapping generations model in which pollution arises, in an accumulatively way, from production. Householders do not care directly about the environment, but pollution leads them to incur health costs when they are elderly. We show that the presence of pollution means that the economy more likely to be dynamically inefficient. For these cases we analyze two kinds of tax scheme: one based on production taxes and the other based on capital and wage taxes. We show how to design both schemes to put the economy into the golden rule allocation. We also show that under the production tax scheme young and elderly agents pay less taxes (or receive more transfers) than under the production tax system.