构建以财产税为主体的地方税体系研究

随着我国政治经济体制改革的深入,我国也开始了财政分权的改革历程,并期望以此来促进公共产品供给效率,解决基层政府的财政困难。财政分权的核心支撑因素就是地方应拥有可自主支配的地方税,且财产税和地方税主体税种的选择标准有很高的吻合度。另外,研究还发现:销售税和个人所得税作为地方税主体税种的合理性值得怀疑。在地方主体税种的构建中,综合国外成功经验并本着地方税收原则,建议把我国现行的房地产税收体系改革、整合为新的财产税,并以此作为我国地方税收入的主要来源。     

Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: Evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union

Tax competition arguments suggest that governments that operate in an open economy (such as local governments) should not and will not rely on non-benefit taxes, such as the income tax. Yet we observe reliance on income taxes by local governments in many countries, and such reliance changes over time. Evidence from a panel data set of 13 OECD countries over the period 1975-1984 suggests that competition between levels of government (resulting in a vertical fiscal externality) and between governments at the same level (resulting in a horizontal fiscal externality) provide some economic rationale for these changes. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities interact. These results have some interesting implications for fiscal policy in the European Union, particularly as the EU continues to evolve. One implication for the EU is that enlargement that increases tax base disparities within the EU (and is not accompanied by an EU-level income tax) will tend to lower national income tax rates, although this must be qualified because it also depends on the mobility of the population. A second implication is that fiscal expansion of the EU to include an EU-level income tax may tend to lower the reliance of national governments on income taxes through the vertical externality, but may also tend to equalize tax bases across countries, and so increase reliance on national income taxes through the horizontal externality.     

The Effect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities

I investigate if political alignment between central and local governments brings financial benefit to local governments, using financial data from Portuguese municipalities (1992–2005). I use regression discontinuity design to determine the effect of political alignment per se on transfers to municipalities. Municipalities aligned with the central government receive 19% more targetable transfers than unaligned municipalities. I test for electoral motivation of this transfer bias: extra transfers increase the vote share of incumbents in local elections for one of the two Portuguese major parties; however, municipal incumbency does not lead to better results in national elections.     

Do public account financial statements matter? Evidence from Japanese municipalities

Many governments are introducing business-like accounting systems. This paper examines the fiscal effects of compiling business-like financial statements on the expenditures of local governments in Japan as a complement to cash-based reporting. Using the variation in the deadlines for compiling new statements given by the central government in a difference-in-differences instrumental variable approach, we found that business-like financial statements have limited effects on municipalities’ expenditures but have short-run effects on social assistance expenses. This might be a part of the reconstruction of their expenditure structure.     

Assist or desist? Conditional bailouts and fiscal discipline in local governments

Central government bailouts of local governments are commonly viewed as a recipe for local fiscal indiscipline, as local governments learn that the center will come to the rescue in times of trouble. However, little is known about the consequences of bailouts granted conditional on local governments first making efforts to improve the situation. We examine a case in which the Swedish central government provided conditional grants to 36 financially troubled municipalities. We use the synthetic control method to identify suitable comparison units for each of the 36 municipalities. To compare the development of costs and the fiscal surplus of admitted municipalities to that of their most similar counterparts during the decade after the program, we then estimate fixed effects regressions on the resulting sample. The analysis suggests that conditional bailouts did not erode, and may even have improved, fiscal discipline.     

Decentralisation of active labour market policy: The case of Swedish local employment service committees

Decentralisation of decision-making in labour market policy may increase efficiency, since local authorities have first-hand knowledge about local labour market problems. However, decentralisation may also be associated with fiscal externalities generating misallocation. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of a Swedish pilot programme in 1996, which strengthened the role of the local authorities in labour market policy in certain regions. Our econometric findings do not indicate any increase in geographical lock-in of the unemployed, but decentralisation seems to spur local initiatives in the form of projects organised by the municipalities and increase targeting on outsiders in the labour market. The latter result is consistent with the hypothesis that municipalities used their increasing influence in order to improve municipal budgets at the expense of the central government.     

分税制改革、地方财政自主权与公共品供给

本文发现20世纪90年代中期以来中国地方公共品供给水平有下降趋势,同时发现较高的公共品供给水平总是和较高的地方财政自主权联系在一起.本文应用分省面板数据,特别利用了1994年分税制改革导致的地方财政自主权的跨时和跨区变化,为上述假设提供了实证证据.本文认为中国在财政分权化过程中面临的一系列既有制度设置可以作为上述因果关系的解释机制.一系列测量偏误和模型选择的检验显示本文的实证结论是稳健的.基于中国的研究支持了那些认为财政分权而不是集权将改善地方公共品供给水平的观点.     

On the Cyclicality of Public Finances in Europe

Under EMU, monetary policy is oriented toward the euro area as a whole and fiscal policy is an important instrument remaining in the hands of national governments to cushion economic shocks to individual countries. The current paper analyses the cyclical pattern of public finances in Europe and addresses the question of whether fiscal policies have been geared towards this stabilising role. Although taxes fluctuate countercyclically in a conventional manner, we find that discretionary measures have tended to undermine automatic stabilisers. On the expenditure side, we find that public investment also displays a consistent procyclical pattern. Dynamic analysis reveals that a permanent shock to output induces asynchronous fluctuations in taxes and expenditures in the year of the shock and in periods thereafter. Finally, we examine political and institutional factors. The political fragmentation of the government as well as the partisan hue of the government do not interfere with the cyclical response of public finances, but we do find evidence of a pronounced electoral cycle.     

Revenue decentralization,central oversight and the political budget cycle: Evidence from Israel

This paper examines whether revenue decentralization and direct external financial supervision affect the incidence and strength of political budget cycles, using a panel of Israeli municipalities during the period 1999–2009. We find that high dependence on central government transfers – as reflected in a low share of locally raised revenues in the municipality's budget – exacerbates political budget cycles, while tight monitoring – exercised through central government appointment of external accountants to debt accumulating municipalities – eliminates them. We also find that this pattern is predominantly accounted for by development expenditures. These results suggest that political budget cycles can result from fiscal institutions that create soft budget constraints: that is, where incumbents and rational voters can expect that the costs of pre-election expansions will be partly covered later by the central government.     

韩国应对气候灾害的机制与启示

韩国也是气候灾害多发国家,政府采取了一系列应对措施.目前,韩国已颁布20多部有关法规,并建立起从中央到地方再到基层三级应对机制.重视法规建设和应对机制建设是其两大特点,这或许对我们有一定的启示.     

中国式分权下的区域创新绩效研究---基于资源获取与资源配置视角的分析

依据资源基础理论,财政自主权作为一种有价值、稀缺、不可完全模仿、组织可利用的财政资源,是地方政府取得良好区域创新绩效的来源;使用2007—2016年中国分省(自治区、直辖市)的面板数据,实证检验了财政分权对区域创新绩效的影响。研究发现:①财政分权对区域创新绩效具有显著的正向影响,在考虑财政分权异质性、创新绩效异质性、创新强度、内生性等问题后,结果依然稳健;②地方政府在运用支出自主权为获取良好的区域创新绩效时,存在"软约束"问题,即收入分权对支出分权与区域创新绩效之间的关系具有约束作用但不显著,可能的原因在于转移支付的"公共池"效应与创新锁定效应。     

公共财政体系与农村新型合作医疗筹资水平研究——促进公共服务横向均等化的制度思考

新型农村合作医疗(新农合)的筹资主要来自政府补助。对于很多县级政府来说,其新农合筹资来自上级政府(主要是中央政府和省级政府)的补助金,这对于新农合的平稳实施至关重要。然而,由于新农合补助金是一种带有配套要求的专项补助,而上级政府大多采用一刀切式的固定金额补助法,这样财力较弱、农业人口比重高的地方政府不得不承担相对较大比重的筹资责任。为了发挥上级政府补助金推进地方政府财力横向均等化的作用,促使财力不同的地方政府为民众提供大体相同的新农合服务,有必要在政府间转移支付上探寻更为制度化的方法。     

中国财政体制演进中的路径依赖和制度创新

财政体制是处理中央和地方各级政府之间财政关系的基本制度,是政府间财政关系的具体体现。建国后我国的财政体制伴随着经济体制的变迁经历了四个阶段：统收统支财政体制阶段、财政包干体制阶段、分税制财政体制阶段、公共财政体制阶段,每一次财政体制发展阶段的调整既蕴涵着新制度的创新,又有旧制度的保留,财政体制在渐近式制度变迁的推进过程中产生了路径依赖。要破解财政体制变迁中的路径依赖问题,完善现行公共财政体制,体制创新是必由之路。其基本思路是：推进财政制度的宪政变革,建立与完善本国的宪政体制,建构＂有限＂兼＂有效＂的现代政府;因地制宜实施政府层级改革,在区分经济发达和经济不发达地区的基础上,对政府架构进行变革;＂财政职能-财政体制-财政管理＂的改革三位一体协调共进,只有三者相互协调,才能保证财政体制改革的效果更加有效。     

Decentralisation and income inequality in Central and Eastern European countries

This paper provides empirical evidence for the association between fiscal decentralisation and income distribution for a panel of 11 economies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) during 1992–2016. We focus on three research topics: the effect of decentralisation on income inequality; the effects of the structure of subnational government finance on income inequality; and the validity of the Kuznets hypothesis. The main findings from the empirical exercise are as follows: first, we provide firm evidence on the presumed favourable effects of fiscal decentralisation on income distribution in the CEE countries; second, our empirical model suggests that the effects of fiscal decentralisation on income inequality are dependent on the source of finance of subnational governments, i.e. intergovernmental transfers may have a role in income equalisation; third, we cannot confirm the validity of the Kuznets hypothesis in CEE countries.     

The effects of vertical and horizontal incentives on local tax efforts: evidence from China

Tax effort is a measure of a government’s effort to collect taxes. This study explores what impacts both vertical and horizontal incentives have on local governments’ tax efforts in China. For consistency with the literature, we first include typical economic and institutional factors in our analysis. We find that the effects of economic factors on local tax efforts are significant, but the effects of institutional factors tend to be weak. Fiscal decentralization, as a vertical incentive, has a significantly positive effect on tax efforts at the provincial level. Meanwhile, fiscal interaction, as a horizontal incentive, is also taken into account in a spatial specification to explain tax competition among local governments. The results show that local tax effort in China also depends on the horizontal incentive. Hence, to improve local tax effort, the central government should let the locals have more autonomy in collecting taxes and evaluate local tax effort by referring to tax collection in adjacent provinces simultaneously.     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

Revisiting the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: evidence from Taiwan

This paper employs a panel of 23 local governments in Taiwan over 1998–2010 to re-estimate the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers by considering a self-financing resources of local government as the transition variable in panel smooth transition regression models. Empirical results show that the income (or tax revenues) redistribution effects of fiscal transfer policies are nonlinear and vary with time and across local governments. The grants from central government can improve income and tax revenues distribution of local governments; however, the centrally allotted tax revenues have inverse effects and the total fiscal transfers have ambiguous effects. The total fiscal transfer is a proper policy instrument for improving income redistribution, and the grants for improving tax revenues redistribution. However, high self-financing resources ratios are harmful for these redistribution effects.     

财政关系调整与地方政府行为的变迁——纪念改革开放30周年

30年来,我国财税体制改革先后经历了财政包干制、分税制和公共财政体系建设三个阶段,每个阶段的地方政府与同一阶段不同层级或地域的地方政府,其行为表现出较大的差异。导因于中央与地方财政关系调整对地方政府的不同激励与约束机制,地方政府对中央政府的财政依附性在不断增强;地方政府之间的财政竞争逐渐让位于合作;地方政府推动市场化改革进入了良性轨道;地方政府职能逐步从经济性向公共性过渡。     

Temporary grant programmes in Sweden and central government behaviour

The purpose of this paper is to study whether the central government in Sweden approves applications for temporary grants from municipalities according to political objectives. We also study factors that determine the municipal decision to apply for temporary grants. Two hypotheses are tested, that the central government supports municipalities with many swing voters in order to influence voters, and that the central government provides benefits to groups that share its ideology and that provide political support. Data is used from three election years 1982, 1985, and 1988. Under the Socialist governments municipalities with a high share of Socialist voters were more likely to apply for grants. The same pattern does not apply to the 1982 Conservative government. There is evidence that Socialist governments approved temporary grants on the basis of party tactical criteria. However, there is no indication of vote purchasing behaviour by the 1982 Conservative government.     

Is centralization a solution to the soft budget constraint problem?

This paper focuses on the centralization program implemented in Israel in 2004 to analyze whether the administrative subordination of municipalities is an effective policy to deal with problems related to soft-budget constraint of lower level governments. The results consistently show, for different specifications and samples of municipalities, that this program brought a substantial decrease of municipalities’ expenditures (mostly because of decreases in salary payments), and an increase of local property tax collection. Our analysis shows that all of the fiscal impact of the program is due to the appointment of an accountant that reports directly to the central government, a relatively mild form of administrative subordination. In contrast, more intrusive forms of subordination, like the central imposition of a recovery program, do not result in any substantial improvement of municipalities’ fiscal situation. This leads us to conclude that a mild form of administrative subordination is an effective tool to cope with problems related to soft-budget constraints, whereas political subordination is not an effective tool to reach that goal.