Nonlinear models with panel data

Panel data play an important role in empirical economics. With panel data one can answer questions about microeconomic dynamic behavior that could not be answered with cross sectional data. Panel data techniques are also useful for analyzing cross sectional data with grouping. This paper discusses some issues related to specification and estimation of nonlinear models using panel data.JEL Classification: C230The research behind this paper was supported by the National Science Foundation, the Gregory C. Chow Econometric Research Program at Princeton University, and Danish National Research Foundation (through CAM at the University of Copenhagen). The author thanks Ekaterini Kyriazidou, Hong Li, Marina Sallustro, and the editors for helpful suggestions.     

Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness

This paper investigates the problem of obtaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of negative consumption externalities. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we show that even if consumers’ preferences are monotonically increasing in their own consumption, one may have to dispose of resources to achieve Pareto efficiency when negative consumption externalities exist. We provide characterization results on destruction both for pure exchange economies and for production economies. As an application, our results provide an explanation to Easterlin’s paradox: average happiness levels do not increase as countries grow wealthier. We thank an anonymous referee, Xiaoyong Cao, Li Gan, and Tapan Mitra for helpful comments and suggestions that improved the exposition of the paper. The first author thanks the National Natural Science Foundation of China and Private Enterprise Research Center at Texas A&M University for financial support.     

Unemployment dynamics in an OLG economy with public pensions

Pension benefits in old age establish a disincentive to save in youth, thereby yielding lower levels of capital stock and the wage rate. As a result, the trade union has an incentive to change the composition of its two targets: employment and the wage rate. This paper develops a model that includes employment effects of public pensions via capital accumulation and union wage setting. Within this framework, we consider how contribution rates to the pension system influence the level and time path of the unemployment rate. It is demonstrated that (1) a higher contribution rate results in a lower unemployment rate, and (2) the economy with a high (low) contribution rate experiences monotone convergence towards (oscillatory convergence towards or a period-2 cycle around) the steady state. The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, and seminar participants at Osaka University for their useful comments and suggestions, and Masako Ikefuji and Hiroaki Yamagami for their research assistance. Financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (No.17730131), the Asahi Glass Foundation, the Japan Economic Research Foundation and the 21st Century COE Program (Osaka University) is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.     

Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry

Summary This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in a price setting duopoly in which firms have limited capacity, and in which unit costs of production up to capacity may differ. Assuming concave revenue and efficient rationing, we show that the case of different unit costs involves a tractable generalization of the methods used to analyze the case of identical costs. However, the supports of the two firms' equilibrium price distributions need no longer be connected and need not coincide. In addition, the supports of the equilibrium price distributions need no longer be continuous in the underlying parameters of the model.As an application of our characterization, we examine the Kreps-Scheinkman model of capacity choice followed by Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition and show that, unlike in the case of identical costs, Cournot equilibrium capacity levels need not arise as subgame-perfect equilibria. The low-cost firm has greater incentive to price its rival out of the market than exists under Cournot behavior.We are grateful to Joseph Harrington, Marie Thursby, Casper de Vries and, especially, William Novshek for helpful discussions and comments. Thomas Faith and Ioannis Tournas provided valuable research assistance. This paper was presented at the Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society in December 1988, the Midwest Mathematical Economics Conference in April 1989, the Sixteenth Annual Congress of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics in August 1989, the European Meetings of the Econometric Society in September 1989, and in seminars at the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Indiana University, INSEAD, Texas A&M University, Tilburg University, the University of Bonn and the University of Florida. Deneckere acknowledges financial support through National Science Foundation Grant SES-8619012 and the Kellogg Graduate School of Management's Beatrice/Esmark Research Chair. Kovenock acknowledges financial support through Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Purdue Research Foundation, the Ford Motor Company Fund, and an Ameritech Foundation Summer Faculty Research Grant.     

A generalized theorem of the maximum

Summary This paper generalizes the Theorem of the Maximum (Berge [2]) to allow for discontinuous changes in the domain and the objective function. It also provides a geometrical version of the (generalized) theorem.This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant SES-86-19012. Financial assistance was also provided, for Lawrence Ausubel, by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, and for Raymond Deneckere, by the Kellogg School of Management's Beatrice/Esmark Research Chair. We thank Alejandro Manelli and Israel Zang for many helpful conversations.     

Survival auctions

Dynamic clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However, clock auctions require congregating bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability and introduces inefficiencies of its own given the time cost of congregating bidders. In this experiment we explore the effects of removing these inefficiencies through survival auctions—a multi-round sealed-bid auction which is theoretically isomorphic to the dynamic clock auction with drop-out information. Kagel’s research was partially supported by National Science Foundation Grants No. 0136925 and 0136928. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. We thank the associate editor, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at Purdue University, especially Tim Cason, participants at International Industrial Organization April 2004 Conference, the ESA June 2003 meetings, and our discussant, Tim Salmon, for valuable comments. Kirill Chernomaz provided valuable research assistance. The usual caveat applies.     

Impostors in the Temple,by Martin Anderson

The Teaching Innovations Program (TIP) was a six-year project funded by the National Science Foundation that gave economics instructors the opportunity to learn interactive teaching strategies for use in undergraduate economics courses. TIP participants first attended a teaching workshop that presented various teaching strategies. They then could enroll in a follow-up program of online instruction and mentoring to learn more about one or two teaching strategies. TIP participants also had the opportunity to engage in the scholarship of teaching and learning economics to share their work. A retrospective survey was administered to the participants after attending the program to obtain a longitudinal assessment of TIP. This article presents the overall survey findings and discusses the results from each TIP phase (workshop, online instruction, and scholarship).     

Bounded rationality in laboratory bargaining with asymmetric information

Summary. This paper reports an experiment on two-player sequential bargaining with asymmetric information that features some forces present in multi-round monopoly pricing environments. Buyer-seller pairs play a series of bargaining games that last for either one or two rounds of offers. The treatment variable is the probability of continuing into a second round. Equilibrium predictions do a poor job of explaining levels of prices and treatment effects. As an alternative to the conventional equilibrium model, we consider models that allow for bounded rationality of subjects. The quantal response equilibrium model captures some of the important features of the results.Received: 30 April 2003, Revised: 10 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D82, D42, C91. Correspondence to: Timothy N. CasonThis research was funded in part by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9809110). The experiments were run at the Economic Science Laboratory of the University of Arizona and the Krannert Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research at Purdue University, using the z-Tree software developed at the Institute for Empirical Research at the University of Zurich (Fischbacher [8]). David Cooper, Rachel Croson, Charles Noussair, an anonymous referee, and conference participants at the Economic Science Association and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings provided helpful comments. Timothy ONeill Dang, Thomas Wilkening and Marikah Mancini provided expert research assistance.     

Incentives,information, and organizational design

NÖG Lecture delivered to the annual meeting of the Austrian Economic Society, Vienna, September 29, 1988. Financial support from the Olin Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the Hoover Institution is gratefully acknowledged. This paper is partly based on joint work undertaken with Raaj K. Sah, to whom I am most indebted. I have also benefitted greatly from conversations with Joseph Farrell. Research assistance of Serge Marquié and Rohit Rahi is gratefully acknowledged.     

Information,capital, and organization

Summary This paper examines on of the roles that information plays in the production process by looking at the information that firms collect about their workers. This information, concerning the worker's abilities, is used to improve the quality of job matches within the firm and reduce future production costs. This paper models this information as a capital good and shows how the existence of this capital good can be used to explain some of the residual firm value observed in equity markets as well as the rigidities observed when firms expand their scale.I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Edward Prescott, Hugo Hopenhayn, Herbert Mohring and Jim Schmitz who provided many insights and comments concerning this work. This paper has benefited from the comments and suggestions of seminar participants at Minnesota, Western Ontario and Caltech. This research was supported in part by grants from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship.     

基于ANT视角的国家科技计划课题制实施过程研究

借助行动者网络理论（ANT）对国家科技计划课题制实施过程进行了研究。研究结果表明,课题制的实施是受一定制度和环境条件限制的,课题的执行者处于课题制行动者网络的核心地位。构建行动者网络能够解决在课题制实施过程中,由于课题制行为主体为了自身利益最优而有损课题整体实施效果的矛盾。     

Learning and transfer in signaling games

We explore how learning to play strategically in one signaling game promotes strategic play in a related signaling game. Following convergence to a pooling equilibrium, payoffs are changed to only support separating equilibria. More strategic play is observed following the change in payoffs than for inexperienced subjects in control sessions, contrary to the prediction of a fictitious play learning model. Introducing a growing proportion of sophisticated learners, subjects who anticipate responders’ behavior following the change in payoffs, enables the model to capture the positive cross-game learning observed in the data. Research support form the National Science Foundation grant number SBR9809538 is gratefully acknowledged. We have received research support from Jo Ducey, Guillaume Frechette, Steve Lehrer, and Carol Kraker Stockman. We have benefitted from comments of Eric Bettinger, John Ham, Jim Rebeitzer, Bob Slonim and seminar participants at Case Western Reserve University, Ohio State University, the University of Mississippi, the University of Illinois, and Purdue University. The usual caveat applies.     

Mortality,Human Capital and Persistent Inequality

Available evidence suggests high intergenerational correlation of economic status and persistent disparities in health status between the rich and the poor. This paper proposes a mechanism linking the two. We introduce health capital into a two-period overlapping generations model. Private health investment improves the probability of surviving from the first period of life to the next and, along with education, enhances an individual’s labor productivity. Poorer parents are of poor health, unable to invest much in reducing mortality risk and improving their human capital. Consequently, they leave less for their progeny. Despite convex preferences and technologies, initial differences in economic and health status may perpetuate across generations when annuities markets are imperfect.Additional support was provided by the National Science Foundation. Additional support was provided by the National Science Foundation.     

Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games

There is a good deal of miscommunication among experimenters and theorists about how to evaluate a theory that can be rejected by sufficient data, but may nevertheless be a useful approximation. A standard experimental design reports whether a general theory can be rejected on an informative test case. This paper, in contrast, reports an experiment designed to meaningfully pose the question: “how good an approximation does a theory provide on average.” It focuses on a class of randomly selected games, and estimates how many pairs of experimental subjects would have to be observed playing a previously unexamined game before the mean of the experimental observations would provide a better prediction than the theory about the behavior of a new pair of subjects playing this game. We call this quantity the model’s equivalent number of observations, and explore its properties. This research was supported by a grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation and the USA–Israel Binational Science Foundation. We are very grateful for helpful conversations with David Budescu, Jerry Busemeyer, Gary Chamberlain, Paul Feigin, Dave Krantz, Jack Porter, Tom Wallsten, Wolfgang Viechtbauer, and Richard Zeckhauser.     

Reevaluating the relationship between transferable property rights and command-and-control regulation

Economists generally assume that systems of transferable property rights are preferable to non-market systems. This paper suggests that the design of a market-based policy that dominates a command-andcontrol regime is more subtle than is commonly believed, even in theory. The subtlety arises because identical approaches to monitoring and enforcement will not generally yield the same results in different regulatory environments. The paper identifies conditions under which a kind of market dominance result obtains. The theory is then applied to the problem of trading rights to emit pollutants from motor vehicles.Mr. Hahn is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and an Adjunct Professor of Economics at Carnegie University. Mr. Axtell is a Research Associate at the Brookings Institution. We would like to thank Linda Cohen, Glenn Loury, Eric Stork, and participants in the Harvard environmental economics workshop and the Stanford environmental economics conference for constructive comments. Jeff Alson, Richard Wilcox, and Don Zinger helped identify useful data sources. This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation.     

Social learning with private and common values

Summary. We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result for pure common-value environments where the state is never learned, resulting in herds or informational cascades. The medium run dynamics to convergence can be very complex and non-monotone: posterior beliefs may be concentrated on a wrong state for a long time, shifting suddenly to the correct state.Received: 6 January 2005, Revised: 5 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82.Jacob K. Goeree: Correspondence toFinancial support from the National Science Foundation NSF (SBR-0098400 and SES-0079301) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Richard McKelvey posthumously for insights and conjectures about information aggregation that helped shape our thinking about the problem. We also acknowledge helpful comments from Kim Border, Tilman Börgers, Bogachen Celen, Luis Corchon, Matthew Jackson and seminar participants at University College London, the University of Arizona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the California Institute of Technology, the 2003 annual meeting of ESA in Pittsburgh, the 2003 Malaga Workshop on Social Choice and Welfare Economics, the 2003 SAET meetings in Rhodos, and the 2003 ESSET meetings in Gerzensee.     

The projective independence axiom

Summary A new axiom for preference orderings over lotteries, called the projective independence axiom, is formulated. Given suitable continuity and monotonicity assumptions, the axiom implies that utility is either in the weighted utility class or is quadratic in probabilities. The betweenness axiom is used to distinguish between these two classes of functions.We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.     

Hours and employment variation in business cycle theory

Summary Previous business cycle models have made the assumption that all the variation in the labor input is either due to changes in hours per worker or changes in number of workers, but not both. In this paper, both vary. We think this is a better model for estimating the contribution of Solow technology shocks to aggregate fluctuations. We find that about 70% of the variance of U.S. postwar cyclical fluctuations is induced by variations in the Solow technology parameter.This material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Numbers SES-8722451 and SES-8909361. The Government has certain rights to this material.Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Science Foundation, the University of Minnesota, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, or the Federal Reserve System.     

Intangible capital,corporate valuation and asset pricing

Recent studies have found unmeasured intangible capital to be large and important. In this paper we observe that by nature intangible capital is also very different from physical capital. We find it plausible to argue that the accumulation process for intangible capital differs significantly from the process by which physical capital accumulates. We study the implications of this hypothesis for rational firm valuation and asset pricing using a two-sector general equilibrium model. Our main finding is that the properties of firm valuation and stock prices are very dependent on the assumed accumulation process for intangible capital. If one entertains the possibility that intangible investments translates into capital stochastically, we find that plausible levels of macroeconomic volatility are compatible with highly variable corporate valuations, P/E ratios and stock returns. We thank Ellen McGrattan, Edward Prescott, Rene Stulz and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments as well as workshop participants at FAME, the 5th Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, the European Central Bank, Columbia Business School Finance Free Lunch and the University of Zürich. This research has benefited from financial support from the National Center for Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and Risk Management”. The National Centers of Competence in Research are managed by the Swiss National Science Foundation on behalf of the Federal Authorities.