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1.
我国自然垄断行业的市场化改革:放松管制与民营化   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
邸晓燕  潘素昆 《生产力研究》2005,(11):130-131,142
自然垄断行业引入竞争、放开准入,进行市场化改革是必然趋势。我国自然垄断行业主要是行政垄断,改革的任务是放松行政管制,同时规范经济管制,并在渐进式改革基础上由市场来选择垄断企业的所有制形式。  相似文献   

2.
文章在新制度经济学的理论框架下,对新中国的经济国有化和行政垄断制度的发展历程进行了经验研究。研究结果表明,行政垄断与国有经济存在很强的共生关系。当今中国的行政垄断是以法律法规形式存在的社会正式规则,它与国有经济、市场经济长期稳定共存,是转轨时期中国经济制度的一大特色。  相似文献   

3.
行政垄断是从计划经济体制向市场经济体制转型之中遗留下来的问题,目前已经成为制约中国经济增长的最大的制度瓶颈。在转轨时期要破除行政性垄断,就要对政府职能进行重新定位,通过完善市场经济体制,建立健全法律法规,对行政垄断进行合理规制。  相似文献   

4.
中国经济体制转型中的自然垄断、政府垄断及规制改革   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
自然垄断与政府垄断是完全不同的两种垄断形式,但是人们却常常将两者混为一谈。在很多情况下,政府是以自然垄断为由对本不属于自然垄断的行业或不再是自然垄断的行业施加进人限制的。自然垄断理论因此往往被一些部门或行业用作政府垄断的理由。在我国,这种情况更为普遍。在经济体制转型过程中,我国的垄断现象具有特殊性,经济生活中的垄断行为主要不是来自于经济力量,而是来自政府认为的制度或政策性安排,同时存在以行政性审批为主的过度规制现象。因此,反对政府垄断行为以及改革行政性审批制度,成为我国当前改革的重要内容。  相似文献   

5.
行政垄断问题研究述评   总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7  
行政垄断问题已引起学术界的广泛关注,国内理论界对行政垄断问题的研究主要涉及行政垄断含义、形式、成因、后果和反行政垄断的措施等。学者们在该领域进行了深入的研究,并取得了一批重要的研究成果,其中不乏合理的见解,富有启发性的理论观点,但几乎在行政垄断问题的各个方面都存在着严重分歧,而且在认识上还存在诸多不足之处。所以,关于行政垄断问题的研究还有待进一步深入。  相似文献   

6.
目前我国市场上行政垄断,行业垄断和经济性垄断行之所以盛行,反垄断遇到了相当大的阻力,原因在于人们反待反垄断问题在某些认识上的误区,认为中国目前不需要反垄断法,反垄断不利发展规模经济以及行政垄断范畴,事实上,在我国发展市场经济过程中迫切需要反垄断方法,反垄断不仅不会阻碍规模经济反利于发展规模经济,行政垄断也应该纳入反垄断范畴,要有效制止垄断行为,就必须走出反垄断的认识误区,尽快出台反垄断法。  相似文献   

7.
本文从宏观上研究了中国自然垄断产业的改革趋势。全文首先论证了市场结构的发展趋势必将是从垄断走向竞争 ,由竞争代替垄断 ,其发展路径必将是完全垄断→寡头垄断→垄断竞争→完全竞争。接着 ,在阐释自然垄断产业基本理论的基础上 ,通过划分国民经济各个产业、各类业务的自然垄断性 ,分析了中国自然垄断产业的改革趋势 ,建立了中国自然垄断产业的改革趋势图 ,并提出了一些衡量中国自然垄断产业改革的标准 (有效竞争 )的理论模型。最后 ,对中国电信产业进行了实证研究 ,分析了中国电信产业各类业务的性质和改革趋势 ,并对中国电信产业的市场结构进行了实证研究 ,论述了中国电信产业下一步改革所应该采取的措施。  相似文献   

8.
中国自然垄断行业属于垄断的一种形式,具有自然垄断的一般特征和特点;同时,中国对自然垄断行业的管制是在转型经济和不完全市场经济的大环境下形成的,又带有浓厚的行政色彩。在这样一种管制条件下,中国自然垄断行业失去了原本应在建立和完善社会主义市场经济体制中起到的积极作用,再加上垄断自身存在的由于缺乏竞争所导致的种种弊端,使其对中国经济发展的不利影响日益突出。对自然垄断行业的改革已经成为深化中国经济体制改革的关键。  相似文献   

9.
试论发达国家的行政垄断及其启示   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
发达国家历史上存在行政垄断,近现代也存在行政垄断。发达国家的行政垄断具有临时性、阶段性和灵活性的特点,并与其社会政治经济环境联系密切。各国行政垄断的形式和内容、政府对竞争行为的政策,在很大程度上取决于社会经济发展的需要。能否最大限度地提高经济效率和实现社会公平,并维护社会公众利益和本国民族利益,这是政府是否和如何干预市场竞争和市场活动的前提和出发点。  相似文献   

10.
中国转型时期行政性垄断的制度成因及其破解   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
王雷 《生产力研究》2003,(4):145-146
行政性垄断是中国转型时期特有的经济现象 ,也是当前中国垄断的主要形式。作者认为 ,政府与企业间难以分割的经济利益及政治利益关系、以及具备独立利益主体的地方政府 ,是行政性垄断产生的深层次原因 ,而“诺斯悖论”的存在则加大了政府反垄断的难度。消除行政性垄断 ,必须从深化体制改革入手 ,坚决推进国有企业改革 ,明确产权关系 ,真正实现政企分开 ,并重新规范中央政府与地方政府的关系。  相似文献   

11.
本文提出目前我国土地行政管理体制中不够合理的土地行政权力配置、有待完善和提高的土地行政审批程序和效率,为土地腐败行为创造了条件,也损害了正常的市场秩序和公众利益。合理配置土地行政审批权力、进一步规范土地行政审批程序、提高土地行政审批效率是抑制土地腐败的有效途径。  相似文献   

12.
Systematic differences in the incidence of corruption between countries can be explained by models of coordination failure that suggest that corruption can only be reduced by a “big push” across an entire economy. However, there is significant evidence that corruption is often sustained as an organizational culture, and can be combated with targeted effort in individual organizations one at a time. In this paper, we propose a model that reconciles these two theories of corruption. We explore a model of corruption with two principal elements. First, agents suffer a moral cost if their corruption behavior diverges from the level they perceive to be the social norm; second, the perception of the norm is imperfect; it gives more weight to the behavior of colleagues with whom the agent interacts regularly. This leads to the possibility that different organizations within the same country may stabilize at widely different levels of corruption. Furthermore, the level of corruption in an organization is persistent, implying that some organizations may have established internal “cultures” of corruption. The organizational foci are determined primarily by the opportunities and (moral) costs of corruption. Depending on the values of these parameters, the degree of corruption across departments may be relatively uniform or widely dispersed. These results also explain another surprising empirical observation: that in different countries similar government departments such as tax and education rank very differently relative to each other in the extent to which they are corrupt. This is difficult to explain in incentive‐based models if similar departments face similar incentives in different countries.  相似文献   

13.
奖章与陷阱:渐进转轨中的腐败   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
中国在1970年代后期开始推进以市场化为导向的改革战略,国民经济和社会福利得到迅速的改善和提高,但腐败现象也比较严重;同时,市场化的推进并未能遏制住腐败的扩散,市场化程度较高的地区反而面临着更为严重的腐败现象。通过分析中国的经济转轨过程,本文对此作出了解释。与其他处于经济转轨过程中的经济体相比,中国经济发展所具有的特殊的制度安排既促成了经济的迅速成长,也引发了普遍的腐败问题。它们包括:经济决策的地方分权、双轨制市场化和集体所有的产权形式,这些要素既提高了官员推动经济增长的激励,也促使许多官员以腐败的形式分享经济增长的红利,而以“关系”为基础的社会文化背景、中央政治权威的稳定性有助于减少官员在抽租过程中对经济增长可能产生的负面影响。另外,我们认为,市场化改革对腐败可能产生两方面效应,一方面,市场化通过培育新型的企业家阶层促使大量资源由市场配置,这有助于减少腐败发生的可能性;另一方面.市场化进程通过促进经济增长提高了经济中的租金总量,这成为诱发寻租行为的因素。最终的净效应取决于政府部门的改革。发生在中国的现象可以归结为政府改革的不彻底性。  相似文献   

14.
科技行政审批在缺乏有效的制度约束下,极易引发腐败行为。通过构建科技行政审批与腐败发生率关联机理模型,经过相关性分析、内在一致性与EFA检验以及二阶验证性因素分析,拟合出结构方程模型路径系数。结果显示,市场激励型科技行政审批能够直接影响腐败发生率,命令控制型科技行政审批与市场激励型科技行政审批都可以通过科技行政审批人员滋生消极腐败的公共服务动机进而产生腐败行为,市场化程度提升带来的外在影响相对于内在公共服务动机变异对于腐败发生率增加的影响表现得更加显著。因此,针对不同类型科技行政审批,可实施差异化腐败预防控制机制,转变审批人员公共服务动机,阻断腐败发生的中介,深化科技行政审批制度改革,推进审批制度化、标准化、规范化建设,精简优化科技行政审批流程,提高审批集约化程度,以效能提升倒逼腐败发生率下降。  相似文献   

15.
双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0       下载免费PDF全文
修国英  于渤 《技术经济》2008,27(2):49-53
城市公用事业通常是自然垄断行业,在我国从计划经济向市场经济转轨的过程中,它还具有较强的行政垄断性。我国对自然垄断与行政垄断并存的公用事业的规制改革与西方国家有所不同,应区别两种垄断的不同性质,有针对性地确定改革目标。本文阐述了我国城市公用事业的自然垄断特性,分析了其行政垄断的根源及表现,对双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择提出了一些建议。  相似文献   

16.
We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D10, J13.  相似文献   

17.
Corruption and cross-border investment by multinational firms   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Motivated by previous studies on the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment, we examine the impact of a distance measure of corruption between host and source countries on cross-border direct investment and find that corruption distance deters cross-border investment. The evidence indicates that corruption distance is not as serious a deterrent of outward direct investment from more-corrupt countries as it is from less-corrupt countries. We conclude that multinational firms with the capacity to engage in bribery can disregard this activity in transparent environments, whereas multinational firms accustomed to operating in transparent environments find it difficult to overcome the administrative complexities in corrupt environments. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 839–856.  相似文献   

18.
The prediction that economic freedom is beneficial in reducing corruption has not been found to be universally robust in empirical studies. The present work reviews this relationship by using firms' data in a cross-country survey and argues that approaches using aggregated macro data have not been able to explain it appropriately. We model cross-country variations of the microfounded economic freedom–corruption relationship using multilevel models. Additionally, we analyse this relationship by disentangling the determinants for several components of economic freedom because not all areas affect corruption equally. The results show that the extent of the macro-effects on the measures of (micro)economic freedom for corruption, identified by the degree of economic development of a country, can explain why a lack of competition policies and government regulations may yield more corruption. Estimations for Africa and transition economy subsamples confirm our conjectures.  相似文献   

19.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(4-5):853-870
This paper examines the degree to which the corruption in developing countries may impair the ability of governments to redistribute wealth among their citizens. Specifically, I examine a large anti-poverty program in Indonesia that distributed subsidized rice to poor households. I estimate the extent of corruption in the program by comparing administrative data on the amount of rice distributed with survey data on the amount actually received by households. The central estimates suggest that, on average, at least 18% of the rice appears to have disappeared. Ethnically heterogeneous and sparsely populated areas are more likely to be missing rice. Using conservative assumptions for the marginal cost of public funds, I estimate that the welfare losses from this corruption may have been large enough to offset the potential welfare gains from the redistributive intent of the program. These findings suggest that corruption may impose substantial limitations on developing countries' redistributive efforts, and may help explain the low level of transfer programs in developing countries.  相似文献   

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