Pro‐social leadership under authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is regarded as being unaccountable for people's needs, but few studies have documented how authoritarian countries balance their policy goals. China is known to use a promotion system to incentivize local leaders to develop the economy, while neglecting social spending. This paper documents that more leaders having a liberal arts background have been promoted as top provincial leaders. After carefully ruling out other channels, we provide evidence that the shift of top provincial leaders’ college educational backgrounds from science/technology to liberal arts/social science has increased fiscal expenditure shares on science, education, culture and public health and cut economic construction expenditures accordingly. The finding is mainly driven by the post‐1994 period, when local leaders had stronger incentives for economic growth. This indicates that Chinese top authorities are promoting more pro‐social local leaders when providing pro‐growth incentives in general.     

Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in post-reform China. Employing the turnover data of top provincial leaders in China between 1979 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination decreases with their economic performance. This finding is robust to various sensitivity tests. We also find that the turnover of provincial leaders is more sensitive to their average performance over their tenure than to their annual performance. We interpret these empirical findings as evidence that China uses personnel control to induce desirable economic outcomes. Our study adds some basic evidence to a growing theoretical literature emphasizing the role of political incentives of government officials in promoting local economic growth.     

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

Some attribute China's rapid economic growth to a cadre promotion system that rewards economic performance. Others argue that political promotion in China hinges on factionalism. Extant empirical studies often assume that performance can be measured independently from the effect of factionalism. We test the validity of this assumption by examining whether local cadres’ economic performance would change as a result of losing vertical ties to a higher authority. We find an immediate increase in the growth rates of local GDP and government revenue. However, the performance change is mediated by the type of succeeding leaders, as it occurs only under locally promoted leaders who have existing ties with the local cadres. We further examine various channels through which a leader's insider status may affect local economic performance and find that newly appointed outsider leaders would cut fiscal transfers to the local level, which may explain the drop in their short‐term performance.     

Does competition cause government decentralization? The case of state-owned enterprises

This paper examines the causal effects of competition on governments’ incentives in decentralizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By using the shocks to product market competition caused by China's trade liberalization, we find that competition substantially improves SOEs’ decentralization. Furthermore, we also provide evidence of the incentive to exploit local information and roll out an alternative interpretation that government divests itself of SOEs because they become burdensome. Finally, we find that the effect of competition on decentralization is augmented when governments are geographically distant from their SOEs or when SOEs are located in regions characterized by low social trust, high dialect diversity, or heavy pressure for economic growth.     

中央官员来源与地方经济增长

本文将1985—2007年中央官员的来源按籍贯与工作经历进行了划分,尝试系统考察中央官员对中国各省区经济增长的影响。研究结果显示中央官员对其籍贯来源省区的经济增长有显著的促进作用,对其曾工作过的省区经济增长的影响则并不显著,并且这一促进作用主要是通过提高其籍贯来源地的投资率来实现的。进一步运用分位数回归的研究结果则表明,上述作用对经济增长速度较慢地区的影响更为明显。本文的发现有助于拓展对中国经济增长过程中政府作用的认识。     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH OF VIETNAMESE PROVINCES: THE ROLE OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOVERNANCE

This study offers an insight into the public governance role in the relationship between fiscal decentralization and provincial economic growth in Vietnam. Fiscal decentralization measures are assorted. Applying a sequential (two‐stage) estimation for the panel data of 62 provinces of Vietnam over the 2006–2015 period, we find that first, fiscal decentralization is positively related to the economic growth of Vietnamese provinces. Second, the effects of public governance on economic growth vary across provinces depending on various levels of local public governance. Interestingly, the effect of fiscal decentralization is strengthened when this variable is added along with better quality of public governance. In a region of high public governance quality, fiscal decentralization exerts a positive effect on its economic growth. Our findings imply that the design of fiscal decentralization needs to be associated with local governments’ ability of public governance to improve the local economic growth.     

国有土地出让视角下的中国城市经济增长趋同研究

改革开放以来中国经济增长的历史经验表明,土地要素的市场化交易不仅极大地促进了资本的形成和城市化的推进,而且有效地增加了地方政府的财政收入,缓解了分税制改革带来的地方财政收支责任失衡,从而促进了经济增长。本文运用使用附加人力资本和土地出让的四要素CES生产技术模型构造了城市经济增长的面板趋同方程,考察了中国土地资源配置市场化改革的核心-国有土地使用权出让对中国城市经济增长趋同性的实质性影响。     

政府支出规模、经济波动与经济增长——基于省级面板数据的实证分析

笔者在Barro的政府规模与经济增长理论基础上,引入经济波动以反映政府支出规模对经济活动的干预,利用中国28个省(市、自治区)1979年～2008年的面板数据,检验了政府支出规模与经济波动对经济增长的影响。研究结果发现,我国地方政府支出规模与经济波动对区域经济增长都产生了负效应,且经济波动比政府支出规模对区域经济增长的负效应更大。因此,政府在追求经济高速增长的同时,要更加注重保持经济增长的稳定性。     

经济发展中政府的财政行动逻辑及其影响

近年来,中央和地方政府的财政行动主要是为了获得拉动经济快速增长的资本积累。具体表现为:地方政府高度倚重土地财政收入,并将其作为拉动经济增长的投资资金;同时,中央和地方均高度重视通过政府投资来拉动经济增长。然而,政府的财政行动却导致中国经济陷入未来增长的不确定和发展环境不公的困境。作为应对,政府应在财政公共化的框架下逐步完成省以下分税分级财政体制的构建、规范土地出让金用途,以及建立以公共服务为导向的干部政绩考核制度。     

制度-垄断地租与中国地方政府竞争:一个马克思主义分析框架

竞争性地方政府作为改革以来形成的重要制度形式,在相当程度上决定了中国社会主义市场经济体制的特点。本文不仅承续了既有文献中将地方政府的经济动机归于租金,并将土地财政视为地方政府利用租金开展战略投资的观点,而且试图在一个马克思主义框架内进一步发展这一观点。为此我们对租金的生产性利用和国家的经济作用的关系做了初步探讨,并将大卫·哈维的制度-垄断地租理论运用于分析中国地方政府围绕营建环境的投资活动。本文的基本结论是,中国地方政府在以土地财政为核心的战略投资中,充当了租金的生产性分配者和使用者的角色,并因之嵌入了原本由企业之间的竞争所带来的相对剩余价值生产过程,形成了中国经济特有的相对剩余价值生产双重结构,从而在相当长的时间内造就了世所罕见的高投资率,推动了中国经济的持续快速增长。     

城镇化对耕地影响的研究

学术界在城镇化对耕地的影响问题上存在着较大的争论。本文利用中国科学院的土地利用遥感数据和社会经济统计数据,建立计量经济模型对我国东部14省城镇化对耕地的影响进行实证分析。研究结果表明,总体经济增长是影响耕地变化的主要因素,不同城镇化模式对耕地的影响也不同,在其他条件相同的情况下,相对于农村住宅建设用地而言,城镇化对耕地减少还起到一些缓解的作用。     

Trust,reputation and bidding behaviour in online mystery auctions

We use transactions from a distinctive online environment of ‘mystery’ auctions to examine the role that trust plays and how it impacts bidding behaviour when the exact characteristics of a good being auctioned are purposefully concealed from buyers. We show that buyers are generally trusting seller claims in online transactions and that seller reputation becomes significantly more important to buyers (as demonstrated by their bids) when the quality (or value) of the good is unspecified. Our findings can be extrapolated to consider broader economic implications of bidding behaviour impacted by trust, such as in financial markets, where over-bidding may lead to price bubbles.     

Task Routineness and Trade Policy Preferences

Understanding the formation of individual trade policy preferences is a fundamental input into the modeling of trade policy outcomes. Surprisingly, past studies have found mixed evidence that various labor market and industry attributes of workers affect their trade policy preferences, even though recent studies have found that trade policy can have substantial impacts on workers' incomes. This paper provides the first analysis of the extent to which task routineness affects trade policy preferences using survey data from the American National Election Studies. We find significant evidence that greater task routineness leads workers to be much more supportive of import restrictions, consistent with recent evidence on how trade openness puts downward pressure on employment and wages for workers whose occupations involve routine tasks. In fact, other than education levels, task routineness is the only labor market attribute that displays a robust correlation with individuals' stated trade policy preferences. We also provide evidence that there are some interactions between the economic and non‐economic factors in our study. For example, women's trade policy views are much more invariant to their labor market attributes than men, suggesting that women's views on this issue are driven more by personal and ideological beliefs than men.     

THE POVERTY REDUCTION SUCCESS OF PUBLIC TRANSFERS FOR WORKING AGE IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES

Although there has been some research on the impacts of federal tax and transfer policies on poverty rates for immigrants, virtually no previous work investigates the most disadvantaged group of immigrants: refugees. We estimate probit models for three standard measures of poverty. We find that while immigrants and refugees in particular had much higher poverty rates in the early 1990s, the strong economic growth of the 1990s led to a convergence of those poverty rates by 2000. Our analysis demonstrates that the improvement was largely because of economic conditions and that welfare reform policies appear to have little differential impact on immigrants or refugees. We also find that refugees show a markedly greater response to local labor market conditions than other immigrants or native born. (JEL H3, I3, J1)     

Capability and opportunism: Evidence from city officials in China

Opportunism is prevalent in political competition and public policy making. This paper investigates how opportunism is mitigated by capabilities among city leaders in China. Taking advantage of China’s institutional setup with ample bureaucratic transfers, the paper estimates leaders’ capabilities as their personal contributions to local economic growth. The paper finds strong evidence of political business cycles – a typical form of political opportunism – as manifested by a significant boost in the growth rate preceding the Communist Party’s national congress. However, more capable leaders are found to generate more modest political business cycles than less capable ones do. The findings suggest that, to the extent that political selections are associated with the long term reputation of officials, career-concerned opportunism is at least partially moderated by the selection of capable officials in China. The paper provides supportive evidence for the reputation model of political business cycles as well as enriches the study of government officials in weak institutional environments.     

Economic growth and growth linkages in China 1994–2003

This paper investigates to what extent income growth in the Chinese provinces is linked to growth and income levels in neighboring provinces. We find that the rate of income growth in a province is positively related to income and growth in neighboring provinces. However, we find no evidence of such positive interdependence between growth in rich coastal provinces and their immediate inland neighbors. This suggests that there has been little synchronization in economic growth rates between these regions, and/or that the immediate hinterland of the coastal growth centers might have been bypassed as China's manufacturing sector has migrated westward.     

股票市场发展对资本积累的增长效应研究——基于中国省际面板数据的实证分析

本文通过中国31个省、自治区和直辖市1993~2006年的面板数据,先后采用混合估计和固定效应方法对股市融资对资本积累的影响进行实证分析,考虑到股票市场发展初期融资规模和效率的制约会影响到股市融资对资本积累的作用程度,本文构建两类样本,分别对两类样本中的股市融资对资本积累的影响进行实证分析。结果发现,随着中国股票市场的发展,股市融资对资本积累的增长效应更加明显。这不仅证明了资本积累是股票市场发展影响经济增长的一条重要渠道,而且还为深入把握股票市场发展促进经济增长的机理、路径与效果提供了重要的理论基础。     

地方经济增长目标与要素市场扭曲*

本文采用中国2005—2017年省级政府工作报告中的经济增长目标数据，实证检验了地方经济增长目标对要素市场扭曲的影响。研究发现：（1）地方经济增长目标对要素市场具有显著的扭曲效应。通过干预信贷资源配置、扩大土地出让和压低劳动力工资等方式扭曲要素市场是地方政府实现经济增长目标的主要方式。（2）地方经济增长目标对要素市场扭曲的影响存在区域异质性。经济增长目标对要素市场的扭曲效应在中西部地区和保增长压力较大地区更为明显。（3）地方经济增长目标对要素市场扭曲的影响存在基于制度环境的门槛效应。随着金融制度、法律制度和产权制度的改善，经济增长目标对要素市场的扭曲效应将会减弱。本文为政府目标管理和要素市场扭曲等领域的研究提供了新视角，为相关政策的制定提供了重要的现实依据。     

地方经济增长目标与要素市场扭曲*

本文采用中国2005—2017年省级政府工作报告中的经济增长目标数据，实证检验了地方经济增长目标对要素市场扭曲的影响。研究发现：（1）地方经济增长目标对要素市场具有显著的扭曲效应。通过干预信贷资源配置、扩大土地出让和压低劳动力工资等方式扭曲要素市场是地方政府实现经济增长目标的主要方式。（2）地方经济增长目标对要素市场扭曲的影响存在区域异质性。经济增长目标对要素市场的扭曲效应在中西部地区和保增长压力较大地区更为明显。（3）地方经济增长目标对要素市场扭曲的影响存在基于制度环境的门槛效应。随着金融制度、法律制度和产权制度的改善，经济增长目标对要素市场的扭曲效应将会减弱。本文为政府目标管理和要素市场扭曲等领域的研究提供了新视角，为相关政策的制定提供了重要的现实依据。     

Land rental markets in the process of rural structural transformation: Productivity and equity impacts from China

Although the importance of land rental for overall economic development and development of the non-agricultural economy has long been recognized in theory, empirical evidence on factors that can promote or impede operation of such markets and their productivity and equity impacts, especially in rapidly developing economies with rather equal land endowments, remains limited. A large household level panel is used to illustrate the large contribution of land markets to occupational diversification, productivity of land use, and household welfare. Factors affecting land market participation are derived from a household model with transaction cost and individual ability. Results suggest that, by transferring land from less able and more affluent households who joined the non-farm sector to poorer ones with ample family labor, land markets are critical not only for non-agricultural growth but, by allowing more effective use of potentially idle land can contribute to significant productivity gains. Policy implications are derived.