Revealed community equivalence scales

This paper estimates the equivalence scale revealed by discretionary community allocations of welfare benefits to poor households. I apply the proposed approach to a subsidized rice program in Indonesia in which villages designated program beneficiaries, and estimate the equivalence scale implicit in the beneficiaries they selected. I find that the “revealed community equivalence scale” for this program lies much closer to per capita expenditure than traditional demand-based equivalence scales, particularly in the poorest communities. This suggests that per capita expenditure may be closer to how poor communities actually compare households when allocating aid than previously thought.     

AN EXPLORATORY COMPARISON OF INCOME RISK IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Using longitudinal data, 1 estimate the impact of redistribution on the welfare cost of income risk in Germany and the United States. The estimates account fully for behavior because individuals in each country have responded optimally to that country's policy. The results indicate that the welfare cost of income risk is 5.4 percent of disposable income in Germany, 8.5 percent in the U.S. Redistribution has reduced these risks from their pre-tax, pre-transfer levels by 43 percent in Germany, 21 percent in the U.S. The political importance of income security is evident in both countries, as risk relief often eliminates the net burden of redistributive taxes among middle-class households. The conclusions are robust across several models of income expectations.     

农户借贷行为及其福利效果分析

本文研究分析了农户借贷行为及其对收入和福利状况的影响。研究发现 :受教育年限、土地规模、非农收入、所在村庄的发展水平和同一村庄其他竞争农户的特征对特定农户的借款数额都具有显著的影响 ;此外 ,农产品的价格对农户借款数额也具有显著的影响 ,产粮区的农户获取借款的难度明显比其它地区的农户大得多 ;借款对农户纯收入和福利状况在统计上有很显著的影响。     

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the currents of trade

This paper examines how criminalizing the act of bribing a foreign public official affects international trade flows using a watershed global anti-corruption initiative — the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. I exploit variation in the timing of implementation by exporting countries and in the level of corruption of importing countries to quantify the Convention's effects on bilateral exports. I use a large panel of country pairs to control for confounding global and national trends and shocks. I find that, on average, the Convention caused a reduction in exports from signatory countries to high corruption importers relative to low corruption importers. In particular, we observe a 5.7% relative decline in bilateral exports to importers that lie one standard deviation lower on the Worldwide Governance Indicators corruption index. This suggests that by creating large penalties for foreign bribery, the Convention indirectly increased transaction costs between signatory countries and high corruption importers. The Convention may have induced OECD firms to divert their exports to less corrupt countries; while non-OECD firms not bound by the Convention may have increased their exports to corrupt countries. I also find evidence that the Convention's effects differed across product categories.     

On the Welfare Cost of Economic Fluctuations in Developing Countries*

Macroeconomic fluctuations are much stronger in developing countries than in the United States. Yet, while a large literature debates the welfare cost of economic fluctuations in the United States, it remains an open question how large that cost is in developing countries. Using several models, we provide such a measure. We find that the welfare cost of consumption volatility per se is far from trivial and averages a substantial multiple of the corresponding U.S. estimate. Moreover, in many poor countries, the welfare gain from eliminating volatility may in fact exceed the welfare gain from an additional percentage point of growth forever.     

A Political‐Economic Account of Global Tariffs

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of three distinct factors that motivate redistributive government policy: tariff revenues, consumer welfare, and producer profits. We generalize Grossman and Helpman's (1994, American Economic Review 84: 833–850). protection‐for‐sale model by positing that government places different weights on these components of the welfare of its polity when it decides which industries to protect and to what extent. Employing tariff data from 40 countries, the predictions from this model are used to estimate these weights. The results are surprising in their range and variety. Developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue heavily, while more developed countries weigh producer interests the most. Very few hold consumer welfare dear.     

Estimating Distribution Costs with the Eaton–Kortum Model

Economists have mainly relied on input–output tables to calculate domestic trade costs for a relatively small number of developed countries. In this work we use an augmented Eaton–Kortum model to estimate the distribution costs of a group of consumption goods for 60 countries, which include both developing and developed countries. Our results show that developing countries are subject to much higher distribution costs, and that reductions in the distribution costs can result in large welfare gains.     

A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven

We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. We consider the choice of optimal bribes by corrupt officials and the share of the proceeds of corruption that will be concealed in tax havens. Our framework provides novel welfare implications of tax havens. First, tax havens’ services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption and the concealment of officials’ bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens’ operations. Using firm-level data, we provide new empirical results supporting this hypothesis.     

Intergenerational transfers,demographic transition,and altruism: Problems in developing Asia

This paper develops a three‐period overlapping‐generations model where middle‐aged agents care about not only their own lifetime utility but also their old parents' and children's well‐being. The doubly altruistic agents choose amounts of intergenerational transfers to their old parents and children as well as private savings. The government specifies amounts of public transfers from working adults to the dependents. The model also takes the effects of demographic transition on the burdens of supporting the elderly and children into account. Using 23 countries' data from the National Transfer Accounts (NTA ), we estimate the degrees of filial and parental altruism and adjust them for their respective life expectancy and fertility rates. The findings suggest that people in developing countries are more parentally altruistic than those in developed ones while the adjusted degree of filial altruism tends to be low in developing Asia. Our welfare analyses reveal that the developing Asian countries must introduce more comprehensive public welfare programs for the elderly to maximize social welfare. Moreover, their low adjusted degree of filial altruism may trap the developing Asian countries at the low levels of public old‐age support and social welfare as the further demographic transition ensues.     

中国社会福利和收入再分配： 1988-2007年

基于中国居民收入分配课题组（CHIPs）1988-2007年的住户调查数据，本文分析了中国福利体系的大小、结构及其再分配性质。本文发现，中国的福利体系仍然存在巨大的城乡分割，城市居民的社会福利更全面，福利收入更丰厚，其福利水平接近于一些西方发达国家；而农村的福利制度则不完善，福利收入非常微薄。同时，城市的福利收入体系尽管近几年的再分配作用有所减弱，但总体而言是累进的，有效降低了收入不平等。而农村的福利体系几乎对收入差距的缩小没有影响，但从2007年的结果来看，农村累退的福利体系开始向累进的方向转变。农民工的社会福利收入在2002-2007年间大幅度增加，并发挥了巨大的再分配作用。     

International migration and the welfare state revisited

Immigration is a controversial topic in most developed economies. The presence of a redistributive welfare state in all major immigrant host countries creates a margin on which immigration affects native welfare. The primary focus of the paper is whether a large intake of immigrants reduces welfare state effort. It is usually argued that steady increases in immigration lead to public pressure for lower levels of publicly-funded social expenditures. In contrastz to the earlier empirical literature on this topic, we find little evidence in favour of this hypothesis. While immigration does have a relatively modest effect on the welfare state, if anything there is some support for the view that a greater influx of immigrants has lead policy-makers to increase welfare state spending.     

Must conditional cash transfer programs be conditioned to be effective? The impact of conditioning transfers on school enrollment in Mexico

A growing body of evidence suggests that conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs can have strong, positive effects on a range of welfare indicators for poor households in developing countries. However, there is little evidence about how important each component of these programs is towards achieving these outcomes. This paper tests the importance of conditionality on one specific outcome related to human capital formation, school enrollment, using data collected during the evaluation of Mexico's PROGRESA program. We exploit the fact that some beneficiaries who received transfers did not receive the forms needed to monitor the attendance of their children at school. We use a variety of techniques, including nearest neighbor matching and household fixed effects regressions, to show that the absence of these forms reduced the likelihood that children attended school with this effect most pronounced when children are transitioning to lower secondary school. We provide substantial evidence that these findings are not driven by unobservable characteristics of households or localities.     

Dynamic analysis of bribery firms’ environmental tax evasion in an emissions trading market

Using an R&D-based growth model with dual regulation, we analyse how environmental policies influence pollution, corruption, a growth rate, and welfare. Considering that polluting firms bribe bureaucrats to evade paying environmental tax, we find that a stricter environmental tax leads to a decrease in growth rate via a decrease in the permit rent as well as an increase in pollution and corruption per firm and results in worsening households’ welfare and in improving the bureaucrats’ welfare. Thus, tax evasion with corruption improves households’ welfare and worsens the bureaucrats’ welfare. Our findings imply that tax evasion under dual regulation improves social welfare.     

Forests, biomass use and poverty in Malawi

Malawi is one of the poorest countries in Africa and has faced significant deforestation over the years. This paper seeks to examine the nature of the relationship between poverty and forests in Malawi. We try to answer three sets of questions: a) what is the extent of biomass available for meeting the energy needs of the poor in Malawi and how is this distributed? b) To what extent does fuelwood scarcity affect the welfare of the poor? And c) do households spend more time in fuelwood collection in response to scarcity? We answer these questions by matching household surveys with remote-sensing data.Our analyses suggest that biomass scarcity is associated with small but significantly lower household welfare, particularly for the rural poor. At current high levels of scarcity, 80% of rural poor households are likely to benefit from an increase in biomass in the community. Rural women spend more time on fuelwood collection where biomass is scarce. The small decrease in welfare associated with biomass scarcity suggests that households cope with scarcity in a variety of ways. Any effort to reduce degradation and deforestation in Malawi has to build on a clear understanding of household adaptation to fuelwood scarcity.     

Election cycles in mining licensing: theory and evidence from Albania

Most of the literature on political business and budgetary cycles (PBBC) has focused on fiscal and monetary policy variables in advanced-country contexts. We extend this literature by investigating political cycle effects in a non-monetary, non-fiscal policy regime (the allocation of mining licences) in a transition country context. We propose a model of mining licensing that allows for corruption and for both supply and demand effects to determine the outcome. We then estimate this model using time-series data from post-communist Albania. Relying on a dynamic Poisson model, we find evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects. Based on our theory, we suggest a corruption interpretation of political cycles in non-fiscal/non-monetary variables. This interpretation, we suggest, may be more applicable to the context of developing and transition countries. Our study raises important questions about the unintended (and often pernicious) effects of transition politics on economic regulation and economic performance in post-socialist economies.     

WELFARE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN EDUCATION

Distortive effects of government intervention, especially in international trade, have received considerable attention. But not much literature exists on similar effects of public policies toward education. This paper provides a review of government intervention in education and its likely effects on economic growth and equity. Although governments may act with good intentions, educational policies often have adverse effects on social welfare. Less government involvement in education might actually lead to greater and more equally distributed real income, especially in developing countries.
Section I of this paper identifies and documents the extent of government-induced distortions directly or indirectly related to education. Section II assesses the likely effect of such distortions on social welfare. The final section discusses the role of government in education.     

农户金融抑制及其福利损失的计量分析

本文运用biprobit模型和match模型,采用3000个农户的微观数据,计量分析了农户金融抑制的程度及其福利损失的大小。研究发现,农户金融抑制的程度为70.92%;由于金融抑制,所有样本农户平均所损失的纯收入、净经营收入、消费性支出和非土地性资产分别为9.43%、15.43%、15.57%和14.58%,直接受到金融抑制的样本农户平均所损失的纯收入、净经营收入、消费性支出和非土地性资产分别为9.55%、16.83%、16.46%和14.70%;土地面积、教育和医疗费用支出,对农户资金需求具有正的显著影响,金融资产余额对农户资金需求具有负的显著影响,生产性固定资产原值、受教育水平、交通条件和地理位置对农户资金需求的影响不显著;土地面积、受教育程度、地理位置和“关系”对资金供给具有正的显著影响,固定资产总值、交通条件对资金供给的影响不显著。     

The case for international tax co-ordination reconsidered

In a world of high capital mobility, governments may be tempted to undercut each other's capital income taxes to attract capital from abroad. Since such tax competition may have detrimental effects for all countries, European policy makers have debated the introduction of a minimum capital income tax rate within the EU. This paper develops an applied general equilibrium model to estimate the effects of such tax co-ordination on resource allocation, income distribution and social welfare. The model allows for the concern of policy makers that a rise in capital taxes within the EU may cause a capital flight out of Europe. Capital flight will indeed reduce the welfare gain from tax co-ordination within Western Europe, but a positive net gain will remain, although it is likely to be well below 1% of GDP. The gain from co-ordination will be unevenly distributed across European countries, due to differences in economic structures and in the social preference for redistribution. Moreover, even if the median voter's gain from tax co-ordination may be small, the gains for the poorer sections of society may be quite large.     

Foreign direct investment,tax competition and social expenditure

The aim of this paper is to make a first step towards studying the role of social expenditure and its interaction with corporate taxation in determining the destination of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Using panel data for 18 OECD countries and measuring the extent of social welfare policies by the (public social expenditure)/GDP ratio, we find strong support for the conjecture that redistributive social welfare state policies are valued by multinationals as, for instance, they may signal a government's commitment to social stability.