自我控制论

人生有太多的诱惑,难以自制则失却人性,毁灭自我,所以,我倡导“自我控制”。 自我控制是相对的。是相对于求、索、占、抢、贪而成立的,唯有将“自我”控制在适当境地之内,人方为人,人方不为神,人方不成为兽,人方能自立。 自我控制是能动的。自我控制总是受精神指使的,而精神是能动的,精神的力量是难以预计的,所以“自我控制”与人的信念、意志、情怀、学识、修养的息息相关,表现着一个人的风度与气质。谁能说,一个形象完美品德高尚的人是一个放纵的人     

“八荣八耻”是加强党的思想建设的重大举措

一、进行以“八荣八耻”为主要内容的社会主义荣辱观教育,是全面提高人的素质,构建社会主义和谐社会的客观要求荣辱观是人们在依据一定的思想道德标准进行自我评价和社会评价活动中逐渐形成的关于荣辱观念的总和。荣或辱不仅是指人们在进行自我评价时产生的自尊或自愧的心理体验,而且是指社会在对人们的     

体验经济时代的旅游产品开发

体验经济作为社会高度发达之后所形成的新型经济形态之一。体验创造具有十分广阔的发展空间,旅游行业在开发旅游产品时应当着重考虑到该产品对旅游者所形成的良好体验结果,并为各类旅游者建设能够满足其需求的产品。本文在界定相关概念的基础上分析了体验经济和旅游产品之间的联系,阐述了体验旅游产品的基本特征,并提出了体验经济时代下的旅游产品开发类型和策略。     

体验经济时代饭店营销策略探讨

一、关于体验及体验经济 所谓体验，从心理学的角度来看它是一种感受，通常是在人们对事物的直接观察或参与中形成的，它涉及到人的情感、情绪等感性因素和智力、思考等理性因素。从经济学的角度而言，体验是消费者为了满足自身追求个性和实现自我需要而花费一定的时间、费用和精力所享受到的经历和感受。     

小说的地理表征及其诗意呈现

小说不管是对地理、自然还是人文景观进行描写,事实上都不是单纯地以一个旁观者的身份来构筑外界自我的映像,而是将自我本真的内在世界投射到外在地理空间中.由此形成的小说的地理学表征就显得意味丰富而颇具风格.     

小说的地理表征及其诗意呈现

小说不管是对地理、自然还是人文景观进行描写，事实上都不是单纯地以一个旁观者的身份来构筑外界自我的映像，而是将自我本真的内在世界投射到外在地理空间中。由此形成的小说的地理学表征就显得意味丰富而颇具风格。     

员工职业生涯规划——一剂激励员工的良方

职业生涯规划可分为个人职业生涯规划和员工职业生涯规划，前能动主体为员工自身，后的能动主体为企业组织。结合员工的自我评估，企业对员工的评估和加强信息交流等角度，对员工职业生涯的成功标准及实现途径，作一些具体的分析。     

论学生自我效能感及其培养

自我效能感对学生的心理和行为具有重要作用。成功的体验、目标的激励、成败的归因等因素影响学生自我效能的形成。我们可以通过为学生确立合理的目标、创造成功的机会、提供良好的榜样、建立积极的归因模式等策略来培养学生的自我效能感。     

从博弈论的角度看军队预算管理

西方新制度经济学认为：“经济活动主体行为的动机和模式直接影响和制约着经济活动结果和效率水平,是最能动的因素。”军队预算形成和执行过程本身就是一系列预算主体问的策略选择,从博弈论的角度看军队预算管理行为,能进一步弥补军队预算制度的设计盲点,对提高军队预算编制和决算的科学性和效率具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

体育教育与学生健全人格的培养

健全人格的培养是素质教育中的一个重要组成部分,体育教育不仅能增强学生体质,而且能促进学生正确认识自我,教育自我,进而促成健全人格的形成.     

On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation

We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents’ standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games.     

A general hypothesis of aggregated expectations

The aggregated expectations hypothesis, described here in full for the first time, offers a new way of examining likely future outcomes based upon the most important contributor—expectations—to the individual decisions which aggregate to create these final macro-outcomes. It also offers more powerful actors, especially governments, a new tool for influencing some of those future outcomes. The core concept is that the future outcome of an issue, economic or political, will be largely determined by the expectations of those in the population affected whose aggregated individual decisions will shape that outcome.     

Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note

We examine whether the payoff dominant sequential-move (Stackelberg) outcome is realized when timing is endogenized. We adopt the observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky [Games Econ Behav 2(1):29–46, 1990]. We find that if one sequential-move outcome is payoff dominant, either (i) the outcome both players prefer is the unique equilibrium; or (ii) two sequential-move outcomes are equilibria and the one both players prefer is risk dominant. In other words, no conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game exists, in contrast to other games such as (non pure) coordination games. We also find that even if one of two sequential-move outcomes is the unique equilibrium outcome in the observable delay game, it does not imply that the equilibrium outcome is payoff dominant to the other sequential-move outcome.      

Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes

Summary. A theory is developed to explain all positional voting outcomes that can result from a single but arbitrarily chosen profile. This includes all outcomes, paradoxes, and disagreements among positional procedure outcomes as well as all discrepancies in rankings as candidates are dropped or added. The theory explains why each outcome occurs while identifying all illustrating profiles. It is shown how to use this approach to derive properties of methods based on pairwise and positional voting outcomes. Pairwise voting is addressed in the preceding companion paper [15]; the theory for positional methods is developed here.     

The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test

In collaborative negotiation, stakeholder representatives are charged with the development of a mutually acceptable set of public policies. Although this approach has become popular in environmental negotiations, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached. In this paper, we employ an Edgeworth box framework to investigate the nature of bargaining over public goods (environmental policies) that have multiple attributes. We then design and conduct laboratory experiments within this framework to test whether negotiated outcomes satisfy standard axiomatic bargaining predictions under a variety of conditions. Specifically, we test whether two parties with Pareto inefficient endowments of two goods will trade to Pareto improving and Pareto efficient outcomes, and to the Nash bargain in particular. We vary whether the Nash bargain coincides with or diverges from the outcome that maximizes the joint payoff, or the outcome that equalizes payoffs, and whether subjects are provided full or partial information. We find that bargainers reach Pareto improving and efficient outcomes across treatments, but withdraw support for the Nash bargain when it generates unequal payments or when payoff information is private. We conclude that this experimental framework offers a promising method for studying multi-attribute negotiations.     

A Two-stage Cournot Duopoly with Inventory Costs

This paper analyses the Cournot duopoly model which has two production periods before the market clears. As shown by Saloner (1987), if inventory costs are zero, many outcomes including both Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes are subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. However, if small inventory costs are introduced, the Cournot outcome is no longer found in equilibrium and the equilibrium outcomes are only of Stackelberg-type. This suggests that more attention should be paid to the Stackelberg model than to the Cournot model.     

Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.     

What to Value and How? Ecological Indicator Choices in Stated Preference Valuation

The ecological literature accepts that many policy outcomes cannot be observed directly and must be characterized using indicators. Multiple indicators can often be used to communicate similar ecological outcomes. Previous studies using alternative indicators in stated preference surveys suggest that welfare estimates may be indicator-dependent, casting doubt on whether welfare estimates are sufficiently reliable for cost benefit analysis. We suggest that the reason for such indicator dependence may be that indicators used in these prior studies represented different outcomes valued by respondents. This possibility underscores the need for greater attention to selection of indicators and their properties within stated preference survey design. This paper develops a model introducing the concept of outcome equivalent indicators, defined as indicators that provide alternative representations of identical underlying outcomes. To assess empirically whether welfare estimates are indeed robust to indicator choice when alternative indicators are expected to be outcome equivalent, we analyze data from a choice experiment estimating willingness to pay for migratory fish restoration in Rhode Island, USA. Results demonstrate that welfare estimates are robust to the use of alternative ecological indicators within stated preference scenarios.     

Determinacy of equilibrium outcome distributions for zero sum and common utility games

We show the generic finiteness of probability distributions induced on outcomes by the Nash equilibria in two player zero sum and common interest outcome games.     

Comment

How well does competitive theory explain the outcome in experimental markets. The authors examined the results of a large number of classroom trading experiments that used a pit-trading design found in Experiments with Economic Principles, an introductory economics textbook by Bergstrom and Miller. They compared experimental outcomes with predictions of competitive-equilibrium theory and with those of a simple profit-splitting theory. Neither theory was entirely successful in explaining the data, although in the first rounds of trading there was significant profit splitting and, as traders became more experienced, outcomes were closer to those predicted by competitive theory.