UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive.     

Reinterpreting social pacts: Theory and evidence

We investigate the empirical determinants of social pacts over the 1970–2004 period. We adopt a political economy approach, showing that governments are more likely to sign a pact when the cost of a conflict with trade unions is relatively larger. Such a cost depends on macroeconomic variables and on measures of social conflict and union strength. These findings are remarkably stable across sub-periods, in apparent contrast with previous contributions that emphasised differences between first- and second-generation pacts. Our interpretation is that pacts were different across periods because the policy issues changed, but the incentives to seek union consensus did not.     

Do credit unions have distinct objectives? Evidence from executive compensation structures

Credit unions compete directly with commercial banks in markets for consumer financial services yet receive an exemption from federal corporate income tax. Commercial banks claim that credit unions are no different than banks and that the credit union tax exemption represents an unfair competitive advantage. Credit unions counter that while they offer similar products and services, they differ from commercial banks in terms of structure and mission, given their not-for-profit, cooperative status. In this paper, we test for substantive differences in the objective functions of commercial banks and nonprofit credit unions by comparing CEO compensation structures. Drawing on the relevant principal–agent literature, we provide several arguments to support the hypotheses that credit union boards of directors establish lower-powered incentive contracts with their CEOs relative to similarly sized commercial banks, and offer lower total compensation. We find that credit union CEOs receive approximately 250% less performance-based compensation relative to CEOs of similarly sized community banks. Bank CEOs also earn approximately 15% to 20% more total compensation on average. The results are generally robust to controlling for CEO- and board-level characteristics, local economic conditions, and institution-level indicators of size, growth, complexity, liquidity and risk. The findings suggest important differences in incentive structures and objectives between banks and credit unions.     

Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining

This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.     

Firm performance and labour turnover: Evidence from the 2004 workplace employee relations survey

We explore the impact of labour turnover on firm performance by analysing the predictions of an extension of the efficiency wage model of [Salop, S., (1979) ‘A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment’, American Economic Review, 69, 117–125.] developed by [Garino, G. and Martin, C., (2008) ‘The Impact of Labour Turnover: Theory and Evidence from UK Micro Data’, Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis in the Social Sciences, 1(3), 81–104.], which separates incumbent and newly hired workers in the production function. Within this theoretical framework, an exogenous increase in the turnover rate can increase profits if firms do not choose wages unilaterally. We test the theoretical predictions of the model using UK cross-section establishment-level data, the 2004 Workplace and Employee Relations Survey. In accordance with our theoretical priors, the empirical results support the standard inverse relationship between the quit rate and firm performance where firms unilaterally choose the wage and generally support a positive relationship between firm performance and the quit rate where trade unions influence wage setting.     

The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

UNION WAGE COMPRESSION AND SKILL ACQUISITION

In this paper, I examine the relationship between unionisation and total output in an economy with a dual labour market, heterogeneous agents, and human capital investment. My primary focus is the skill acquisition channel, through which unionization affects total output. I theoretically demonstrate that the skill premium, and thus human capital investment, is determined by the prevalence of unions in high‐ or low‐skill‐intensive sectors. In particular, if a low (high)‐skill sector is unionised, then the skill premium is higher (lower), ensuring a larger (smaller) high‐skill sector, irrespective of the unions bargaining power. To test this hypothesis, I also empirically investigate the effects of unionisation on total productivity. The results indicate that through the reallocation of labour, unionisation induces an expansion of high‐skill‐intensive sectors, while low‐skill‐intensive sectors contract.     

Between a rock and a hard place: US industrial unions, shop-floor participation and the lean, mean global economy

Utilising historical and contemporary studies of metalworkingplants, a review of current trends in labour-management relations,and observations from 15 years as a machinist and local unionofficer, the author describes the efforts of US workers andtheir local unions to play a positive role in shop-floor productionmatters in the post-Second World War period, only to be rebuffedby corporations intent on gaining hegemony on the factory floor.This history is juxtaposed to contemporary efforts by managersto kindle interest among workers in participating in variousshop-floor continuous improvement schemes, in the context ofthe implicit and explicit threats to employment security thatglobal production flexibility provides to corporations.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

国有上市公司并购中的高管代理问题

公司并购是资本市场的永恒焦点.本文以2007-2010年沪深两市A股国有上市公司为样本,考察国有上市公司并购中的高管代理问题.实证结果发现并购频率与并购规模对高管薪酬的不同部分其影响具有差异化:并购频率对高管显性薪酬总额有显著正影响,分别与货币薪酬正相关、与持股薪酬负相关;并购频率对高管隐性薪酬没有显著影响.说明虽然资本市场对公司频繁并购给予负面回应,高管持股薪酬下降,但高管货币薪酬的上升会抵消这部分下降的幅度,高管依然可通过实施更多的并购来提升显性薪酬总额;并购规模对高管显性薪酬、显性薪酬的两个组成部分(货币薪酬和持股薪酬)、隐性薪酬皆有正影响.国有上市公司高管通过操控并购频率与并购规模进行权利寻租.     

Monetary Institutions,Monopolistic Competition,Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance*

Recent literature on the interactions between labor unions and monetary institutions features either a supply or a demand channel of monetary policy, but not both. This leads to two opposing views about the effects of central bank conservativeness. We evaluate the relative merits of those conflicting views by developing a unified framework. We find that: (i) the effect of conservativeness on employment depends on unions’ relative aversion to unemployment versus inflation, and (ii) for plausible values of this relative aversion (and more than one union), social welfare is maximized under a highly conservative central bank. We also evaluate the effects of centralization of wage bargaining and product market competition on unemployment and inflation.     

Productivity,Efficiency and Strike Activity

The economic impact of unions has received increasing attention in the literature. However, the channels through which unions impinge on performance are seldom identified. This paper examines the impact of industrial conflict on output and factor productivity in a panel of British manufacturing industries for the 1970s. Production frontiers augmented by various dimensions of strike activity are estimated and strikes are found to have a negligible net impact on output. Furthermore, while there is some weak evidence to suggest that union presence adversely affects (relative) efficiency, this effect is not derived from higher levels of strike activity.     

基于顾客需求的隐性营销模式及适应性边界

隐性营销是针对顾客的隐性需求层次,侧重于提升顾客对产品的认知和顾客的心理满足,进而促使其自主地改善其购买决策行为.但是,对于不同的产品层次和产品利益,隐性营销模式有其适用的边界,并且依条件的不同,隐性营销与显性营销具有一定的互补性和替代性,企业应对此做出有效的选择.     

Trade and unions: Does size matter?

Our empirical analysis builds upon the hypothesis that unions are detrimental to a firm's efficiency. Using a rich survey of German manufacturers, we investigate firm-level determinants on the probability of collective wage bargaining with particular focus on the impact of a firm's engagement in foreign markets. An interesting and very robust finding is that exporters are less likely to engage in union wage bargaining. This finding is in line with a pessimistic perception of unions. The negative effect of collective bargaining can be offset by efficiency gains for larger exporters, who can benefit from operation cost saving effects. Size does matter as larger firms export and may find bargaining with a single entity representing the workforce more convenient than bargaining with each worker individually. We are using firm level information on IT investment as instrument for the export dummy and successfully test for the validity of this instrument.     

The tax (dis)advantage of a firm issuing options on its own stock

It is common for firms to issue or purchase options on the firm's own stock. Examples include convertible bonds, warrants, call options as employee compensation, and the sale of put options as part of share repurchase programs. This paper shows that option positions with implicit borrowing—such as put sales and call purchases—are tax-disadvantaged relative to the equivalent synthetic option with explicit borrowing. Conversely, option positions with implicit lending—such as warrants—are tax-advantaged. I also show that firms are better off from a tax perspective issuing bifurcated convertible bonds—bonds plus warrants—rather than an otherwise equivalent standard convertible.     

Tragedy of the Commons in a Stochastic Game of a Stock Externality

This paper investigates a tragedy of the commons where an Ito‐process traces the accumulation of pollution and differentiates between reversible (i.e., clean up is feasible) and irreversible emissions (past pollution cannot be undone). The reversible case allows for an explicit analytical solution, while other means are necessary to characterize irreversible outcomes. More precisely, a different characterization of equilibria (in Markov strategies) as smooth connections between an initial and a stopping manifold is suggested.     

Cooperative economic growth

We comparatively study optimal economic growth in a simple endogenous growth model and under two different games, i.e., dynamic sequential game and cooperative stochastic differential game, between a representative household and a typical self-interested politician. Sequential equilibrium solution is derived by applying Backward Induction Principle and corresponding optimal economic growth rate is endogenously determined. Moreover, cooperative equilibrium solution is established with group rationality, individual rationality and sub-game consistency requirements fulfilled, and it is further confirmed that the representative household will save more, and the self-interested politician will tax less, thereby leading to much faster economic growth, when compared to those of the sequential equilibrium solution.     

Incomplete information in the acid rain game

This paper provides a model that attempts to deal with the transboundary nature of the acid rain problem, using a game theoretic approach consistent with mainstream economic theory. The general forms of cooperative and non cooperative equilibria in explicit and implicit set-up of the model are presented under the assumptions of complete and incomplete information.     

Informal work networks

Abstract We present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labour supply, where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers. In addition to formal income taxation and enforcement, individuals’ labour supply decisions depend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties. Workers allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information transmission is good. More connected social networks (e.g., wheel, complete) feature lower average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks (e.g., star, empty). Average income may be non‐monotonic in tax enforcement.     

SOCIAL NORMS,LOCAL INTERACTION,AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING*

This article examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individual's discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized. Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an equilibrium in which each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one “acceptable” group of neighbors. Our main results demonstrate a basic trade‐off in the design problem between suboptimal punishment and social conflict. Potentially suboptimal punishment arises in designs with local interactions since in this case monitoring is imperfect. Owing to the heterogeneity of discount factors, however, greater social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When individuals' discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits a cooperative “core” and an uncooperative “fringe.”“Uncooperative” (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when the planner knows only the ex ante distribution over individual discount factors, then in some cases the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul‐de‐sacs), whereas in other cases incomplete graphs with small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible.