Pareto-improving firing costs?

We examine self-enforcing contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms (the ‘invisible handshake’) in a labor market with search frictions. Employers promise as much wage-smoothing as they can, consistent with incentive conditions that ensure they will not renege during low-profitability times. Equilibrium is inefficient if these incentive constraints bind, with risky wages for workers and a risk premium that employers must pay. Mandatory firing costs can help, by making it easier for employers to promise credibly not to cut wages in low-profitability periods. We show that firing costs are more likely to be Pareto-improving if they are not severance payments.     

Severance Payments and Unemployment Insurance: A Commitment Issue

In the event of a job termination, many workers receive severance payments from their employer, in addition to publicly provided unemployment insurance (UI). In the absence of a third party enforcer, contracts featuring severance payments must be supported by an implicit self‐enforcing contract. Workers believe employers will make severance payments only if it is in their best interest ex post. If firms discount the future deeply, they will reduce the severance payment they offer, in order to relax their incentive constraint. Workers are forced to bear risk, and too many workers are laid off. We show that a well‐designed public UI system can correct these distortions.     

Understanding the Determination of Severance Pay: Mandates,Bargaining, and Unions*

A substantial share of severance payments derives from private contracts or collective agreements. In this paper, we study the determination of these payments. We analyze joint bargaining over wages and severance payments in a search-and-matching model with risk-averse workers. Individual bargaining results in levels of severance pay that provide full insurance, but also depend on unemployment benefits and job-finding rates. Unions also choose full insurance. Because their higher wage demands reduce job creation, this requires higher severance pay. Severance pay observed in eight European countries, to which we calibrate the model, lies between predictions from the bargaining and union scenarios.     

Starting Wages Respond to Employer's Risk

Firms hiring new graduates face uncertainty on the future productivity of workers. Theory suggests that starting wages reflect this, with lower pay for greater uncertainty. We use the dispersion of exam grades within a field of education as an indicator of the unobserved heterogeneity that employers face. We find solid evidence that starting wages are lower if the variance of exam grades is higher and higher if the skew is higher: employers shift the cost of productivity risk to new hires, but pay for the opportunity to catch a really good worker. Estimating the extent of risk cost sharing between firm and worker shows that shifting to workers is larger in the market sector than in the public sector and diminishes with experience.     

General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive external benefits from their training. In this paper, training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion. At these high wages, only good workers are retained. This signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit. Regulation of apprenticeship length (a historically important feature) enhances efficiency. Appropriate subsidies enhance it further.     

Overcompensation by severance payments

An important aim of severance payments is to reduce the economic disadvantages of dismissed employees. However, it may well be the case that a considerable fraction of employees is actually better off, if they are re-employed shortly after their dismissal. This is the first attempt to estimate the relevance of overcompensation by severance payments. It is found that about 7% of dismissed employees or about one quarter of those with severance payments are overcompensated in Germany. In particular, employees with many years of tenure have chances to receive severance payments as well as wage increases in their new jobs subsequent to dismissal.     

Severance Payment Programs in Latin America

Latin America stands out among different regions in the world for her high employment termination costs. To this contribute both a high level of severance payments and the existence of overlapping benefits. The effectiveness of these protective measures, however, is limited by the size of the informal sector, which, in turn, may be related to employment protection levels. Another important limitation on the effectiveness of employment protection regulation is the often large transaction costs associated with making good of law provisions for the worker. Equilibrium severance pay levels may thus be well below what law mandates as evidence of low coverage rates and undesirable side effects is mounting, reform seems a critical policy issue. However, this reform cannot focus exclusively on severance pay, but it has to incorporate other overlapping benefits, such as UISAs, and advance notice. It also has to contend with a problematic political economy. Jaramillo is a Senior Researcher at the Group for Analysis of Development, GRADE. Saavedra is with the World Bank. Authors are grateful to Eduardo Nakasone for superb research assistance. They also wish to thank participants at the World Bank’s International Workshop on Severance Payments Reform (Laxenberg/Vienna, 2003) for valuable comments.     

员工离职成本与企业在职培训*

假设员工转换工作的“离职成本”是员工的私人信息,对企业而言服从特定分布,企业对员工采取（买方的）三级区别定价。企业的在职培训既提高员工的劳动生产率,又改变员工离职成本的分布,最终影响员工的离职率和“生产率—工资”之差。这两个作用都会影响企业投资于在职培训的激励。已有文献仅关注后一个激励,本文模型则二者兼顾,研究了企业在职培训的决定因素,以及企业培训与员工离职的关系。本文证明,即使没有压缩的工资结构,企业仍有激励提供一般性员工培训。较高的离职率也可以伴随着较高的培训水平,从而同时实现培训效率和劳动力配置效率。本文认为这是欧洲“双元制”培训体系的成功经验,可作为我国经济转型升级的政策参考。     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EXPERIENCE RATING: INSURANCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY*

Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts firms' layoff decisions by reducing the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested that UI should be financed with an experience‐rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of experience rating can reduce unemployment, it can reduce the insurance coverage workers receive. With high experience rating, firms may reduce their severance payments by more than the UI benefit. We build a model where competitive firms offer contracts with severance payments to risk‐averse workers. Frictions in the labor market lead to incomplete insurance. This article shows that less than full‐experience rating enables the government to increase the insurance coverage workers receive. Welfare implications are also investigated.     

Advances in supervision technology and economic welfare: a general equilibrium analysis

We analyze the impact of improvements in the technology by which employers monitor their workers. It is unclear a priori whether workers should benefit or not from such advances. On the one hand, they decrease the total costs of hiring workers and stimulate labor demand. On the other hand, as supervision becomes less costly employers tend to substitute monitoring for wages as a means of motivating workers. We show how the impact on firms and workers of such technological progress depends on the nature of the labor market equilibrium (i.e. whether there is full employment or not) and the cost (technology) of monitoring. A distinct possibility is that unemployed workers welcome the changes in supervision because they promote employment, while employed workers resist such changes and the more intensive supervision they encourage.     

Ethnic discrimination: Evidence from China

We study the role of ethnicity in experimental labor markets where “employers” determine wages of “workers” who perform a real effort task. This task requires a true skill which we show is not affected by minority status. In some treatments, we provide subtle priming to employers about minority status of workers as commonly depicted on Chinese “Hukou” identification system. We conduct our experiments at two sites located in provinces that differ by their historical shares of ethnic groups in the population. We find that: (1) Han and minority workers are equally productive in both provinces; (2) in the diverse province, there is no difference in the wages between Han and minority workers; (3) in the non-diverse province, minority workers receive 4–7% lower wages than Han workers.     

Social Security and Old Age Unemployment Risk with Efficient Wage Bargaining

I analyze a life‐cycle economy with old age productivity risk where wages, employment, and severance payments are set through efficient bargaining between risk averse unions and risk neutral firms. Allocations with limited union membership are second‐best inefficient as they generate too little labor supply in young age, too much consumption before retirement, too little employment of older workers (early retirement), and too little insurance against old age unemployment. Providing public transfers to early retirees (disability benefits or early pensions) might help to increase the degree of risk sharing at the cost of lower old age employment. Depending on whether absolute risk aversion is increasing or decreasing in consumption, these policies might or might not produce efficiency gains at equilibrium.     

Employer and Employee Ignorance in Developing Countries: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago

The authors examine the degree of employer and employee ignorance about reservation and offer wages in Trinidad and Tobago and find this to be considerable. On average employers pay more than 26% above workers’ reservation wages, while employees earn 22% less than the maximum wage on offer, ceteris paribus. However, there are some differences across sub‐groups of jobs, particularly with regard to individuals’ lack of information about the best wage offers. Some differences are also found compared to previous results for developed nations, although the level of ignorance does not appear to be higher in Trinidad and Tobago.     

效率工资理论的新发展：阿克洛夫的观点

阿克洛夫的效率工资理论,通过吸收社会学、人类学的研究成果,将人的劳动行为看成基于公平出发的社会习俗。根据这一习俗,企业支付的工资不少于工人预期的公平工资,而工人根据企业支付的工资决定自己的努力程度,从而决定自己的边际产出。对于追求利润最大化的企业来说,并非支付的工资越高越好,支付工人的工资应等于工人的边际产出。当公平工资高于市场出清工资时,非自愿失业问题出现,工人技术程度与其失业率负相关。二元劳动力市场的现实与人类内生的行为规范,使得非自愿失业问题的解决前景十分悲观。     

The incidence of mandated maternity benefits

I consider the labor-market effects of mandates which raise the costs of employing a demographically identifiable group. The efficiency of these policies will be largely dependent on the extent to which their costs are shifted to group-specific wages. I study several state and federal mandates which stipulated that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans, raising the relative cost of insuring women of childbearing age. I find substantial shifting of the costs of these mandates to the wages of the targeted group. Correspondingly, I find little effect on total labor input for that group.     

The Austrian Severance Pay Reform: Toward a Funded Pension Pillar

With the beginning of 2003 a new severance pay scheme was introduced in Austria. The reform extends the coverage of the scheme to all employees, and moves it to full and enterprise external funding, but average payments will be lower than previously. This paper provides some evidence on two explicit aims of the reform, namely to generate more fairness in the distribution of severance payments among employees and the creation of a basis of the underdeveloped second pillar of the Austrian pension system. The empirical analysis based on a cross section of completed job spells of different durations indicates that differences in payments among groups will be stronger in the new scheme compared to the old system. Based on retirement income projections and simulations of a multi-pillar pension reform for the blue and white collar workers’ pension system, we conclude that, an increase of the contribution rate would be necessary to achieve a sufficient second pillar retirement income. Helpful comments by Milan Vodopivec and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

Skills scarcity and export intensity

We describe a model of trade with skills-based product differentiation and non-proportional trade costs that predicts a positive correlation between firms' export intensity, the price of their exports and the wages they pay to their workers. In equilibrium, firms that employ workers with comparatively scarcer skills export a larger proportion of their output, pay higher wages and charge higher prices. In line with empirical evidence, the model predicts that trade liberalization can cause the distribution of earnings to become more polarized, with patterns that reflect the heterogeneous effects of trade liberalization on firms' export performance.     

Nominal Wage Rigidity in the United Kingdom

This paper studies the degree of downward rigidity in nominal wages in the United Kingdom using micro-data. Around 9 % of employees who remain in the same job from one year to the next have zero pay growth. But on investigating the causes of rigidity we find that up to nine-tenths can be attributed to 'symmetric' causes (such as contracts and menu costs) or to error. Thus only 1 % of workers have pay that may be downwardly rigid. This suggests asymmetric, downward rigidity is not large enough to have serious macroeconomic consequences. The labour market provides almost no evidence to support a positive inflation target.     

The changing employment situation in some cities with living wage ordinances

More than 120 municipalities (cities, towns, and counties) have introduced living wage ordinances. These laws mandate that certain employers in their jurisdiction pay their workers wages that are above federal and state minimum levels. The opponents of these laws argue that these ordinances have adverse impacts on local labor markets. This study considers rates of growth of employment and unemployment trends in a sample of these cities before and after they introduced their living wage ordinances. It finds that while a few cities have had negative labor market experiences after introducing their living wage law these cities represent the exception rather than the rule.     

Mandatory sick pay provision: A labor market experiment

The question whether a minimum rate of sick pay should be mandated is much debated. We study the effects of this kind of intervention with student subjects in an experimental laboratory setting rich enough to allow for moral hazard, adverse selection, and crowding out of good intentions. Both wages and replacement rates offered by competing employers are reciprocated by workers. However, replacement rates are only reciprocated as long as no minimum level is mandated. Although we observe adverse selection when workers have different exogenous probabilities for being absent from work, this does not lead to a market breakdown. In our experiment, mandating replacement rates actually leads to a higher voluntary provision of replacement rates by employers.