阿根廷的货币危机:过去和未来

阿根廷的经济形势引起了人们对阿根廷是否会发生货币危机的关注。通过介绍70年代以来阿根廷历史上的货币危机以及分析阿根廷目前的经济状况可知，阿根廷经济中最严重的问题就是大量的公共债务和经济衰退，而造成这两个问题的深层次原因就是阿根廷目前的货币制度。大量的公共债务和经济衰退使阿根廷发生货币危机只是时间问题，一旦市场失去信心，货币危机就会随时爆发。     

发展中国家的汇率制度选择

文章运用随机效应、面板数据、多元离散选择模型来分析发展中国家自布雷顿森林体系崩溃以来的汇率制度选择.文章使用模拟最大似然值方法估计了静态与动态模型.解释变量包括最优货币区原则、最优稳定化需要以及和货币危机有关的因素.文章发现,最优货币区原则对选择汇率制度有指导意义,而很多变量对中间汇率制度的影响不同于对浮动或固定汇率制度的影响.此外,汇率制度选择的较高序列相关性主要由汇率制度选择的状态依赖性引起.     

发展中国家货币危机的经济代价——基于1990-2002年的经验分析

基于1990年以来发生在发展中国家的51次以发生了货币贬值为特征的货币危机为样本,且对货币危机后的产出变化进行的经验分析表明,危机前的经常账户状况、危机阶段的外资净流量对于危机前后的经济增长率变化有显著影响;此外,银行危机会显著地降低危机国的经济增长率。而外债余额占GDP比例、国际流动性指标、金融开放程度以及货币危机阶段的利率提高与否等因素,对货币危机前后的产出变化都没有显著影响。     

发展中国家货币危机的经济代价--基于1990-2002年的经验分析

基于1990年以来发生在发展中国家的51次以发生了货币贬值为特征的货币危机为样本，且对货币危机后的产出变化进行的经验分析表明，危机前的经常账户状况、危机阶段的外资净流量对于危机前后的经济增长率变化有显著影响；此外，银行危机会显著地降低危机国的经济增长率。而外债余额占GDP比例、国际流动性指标、金融开放程度以及货币危机阶段的利率提高与否等因素，对货币危机前后的产出变化都没有显著影响？     

货币危机预警理论及实证比较研究——兼对中国的模拟分析及启示

随着我国汇率制度改革的不断深入,人民币汇率浮动的幅度扩大,汇率对经济的调节功能日益显现。这同时也增大了我国的货币风险。文章在论述东南亚金融危机后货币危机理论最新发展的基础上,从理论和实证角度比较了五种货币危机预警模型的预警效果、优缺点,并对预警模型在我国的模拟应用作了探讨。     

人民币国际化的制度安排与货币合作伙伴研究

本文运用广义定序Logit模型对货币合作伙伴支持人民币国际化制度安排的程度及其影响因素进行实证分析.结果表明,"是否持有人民币资产""金融发展水平"等货币合作伙伴内部因素,"是否与中国政府签订特惠贸易协定""是否与中国政府签订服务贸易协定"等双边经济关系因素,以及"是否与中国政府存在领土争端"等双边政治关系因素,对货币合作伙伴支持人民币国际化制度安排的程度具有显著影响.更进一步,本文运用Logit模型逐一分析了货币合作伙伴支持每类人民币国际化制度安排的可能性.回归结果表明,货币合作伙伴内部因素均正向地影响其支持人民币双边货币互换协议、人民币合格境外机构投资者制度、人民币境外清算制度的可能性,双边经济关系显著地影响其支持人民币互换协议和人民币合格境外机构投资制度的可能性,双边政治关系显著地影响其支持人民币互换协议和人民币境外清算制度的可能性.     

泰国的货币危机与外汇政策—兼谈日元国际化的可能性

一、引言 亚洲货币危机终于趋于平静,经济的恢复比预期的快。但是不良资产处理、金融体制改革、汇率制度安排等作为中长期的课题。仍然摆在人们的面前有待我们去探讨解决。特别是经历大暴跌以后的亚洲货币虽趋向稳定(图1),但就是否仍维持现有的浮动汇率制。还是应该采取其它汇率制度正成为人们关注的焦点。     

可置信政策、汇率制度与货币危机:国际经验与人民币汇率市场化改革启示

本文从外汇市场微观结构理论角度,阐释了一国政府对外宣布的汇率制度,以及该国汇率政策的可置信性对货币危机发生的影响,并基于新兴市场与发展中国家1970—2010年的经验数据进行了实证分析。研究发现,一国政府对外宣布的汇率制度弹性越大、容忍本国汇率波幅变动越大,其发生货币危机的几率反而更大;此外,若一国政府的汇率政策的可置信较低,将更容易引发国际投机资本对本国汇率进行投机冲击,增加发生货币危机几率。人民币汇率市场化改革,不应放纵汇率完全自由过度波动,尤其在应对国际投机冲击时,试图通过扩大汇率弹性消除投机冲击的政策,反而可能将增加货币危机发生几率;加强正确的预期引导与审慎监管、引入"逆周期因子"机制防止非理性情绪放大单边市场预期与自我强化、提高政府维护汇率稳定政策的可置信性,将有助于消除市场恐慌,减少投机冲击,防范货币危机发生。     

美日欧汇率结构变化对东亚区域内汇率特征的影响

本文分析了2005年7月以来东亚地区货币的汇率特征,认为东亚区域具有较强的汇率相关性并导致汇率行为的集群性,“实际”汇率制度正逐步走向钉住一篮子货币的汇率制度。而金融海啸后美日欧汇率结构的变化会通过这种集群性特点改变东亚现有汇率特征与行为。后危机时代东亚区域内钉住篮子货币仍合适,但政策协调极为重要。     

东亚区域汇率协调机制的构建——基于不同汇率制度下名义有效汇率稳定性的比较

笔者通过情景实验模拟出东亚各国货币在钉住美元、钉住G3货币、钉住AMU、钉住G3+1等不同汇率制度下的贸易加权名义有效汇率,在考察其稳定性的基础上对东亚区域汇率协调机制进行构建。东亚各国(除中国、日本外)在各自货币篮子区域内核心货币的选择中,可以考虑将人民币作为锚货币之一,而且人民币的权重逐渐递增;待条件成熟后,区域内经济、贸易、投资联系较为紧密的次区域可以考虑采用钉住共同货币篮子汇率制度,条件完备时在全区域内推行共同货币篮子制度。在汇率协调的不同阶段,人民币都将发挥重要作用。     

Asymmetric impact of monetary surprises on exchange rate

This paper examines the asymmetric response of exchange rate to monetary surprises. After controlling the type, direction and origin of the news as well as business cycle phase, a new asymmetry is found in the response of the exchange rate to news surprises. In specific, the US Dollar depreciates against major currencies as the response to the negative monetary surprises in the 2001 recession, while the Dollar appreciates responding to similar negative monetary surprises during the 2008 recession. The paper further explores possible causes and finds that time-varying status of the currency with higher financial returns may contribute to the new asymmetry.     

A few observations on financial liberalization and financial instability

Recent studies have conjectured that there may be a link between financial liberalization (FL) and financial instability in emerging economies. Most of these studies, however, do not investigate whether emerging economies are, in fact, becoming structurally more vulnerable to currency and banking crises. In this paper, I argue that emerging economies are becoming more susceptible to both currency and banking crises after FL. Using data for 27 emerging economies—excluding transition economies—from 1973 to the present, a univariate analysis indicates that the likelihood of currency crises may increase with stronger reactions to financial variables than to real or external trade variables. Similarly, for banking crises, interest rate, exchange rate, maturity, and default may increase, while simultaneously the support structure of the government seems to decline.     

Political booms and currency crises

This paper shows evidence that political booms, defined as the rise in governments’ popularity, are associated with a higher likelihood of currency crises. The reasoning behind this finding is that prudent economic policies to address underlying weaknesses in the economy may be political costly for incumbent governments in the short-term. Hence, popularity-concerned governments may not have enough incentives to take such corrective actions in a timely manner. This approach, in turn, can deteriorate economic fundamentals and increase related risks in the economy which can eventually lead to crises. This paper sheds light on this phenomenon in the case of currency crises, suggesting that currency crises can be viewed as “political booms gone bust” events. Moreover, it finds that higher international reserves, higher exports, and a higher degree of financial openness alleviate the effect of political booms on currency crises.     

放弃成本、政府偏好与资本控制:一个审慎的机会主义汇率制度选择模型

本文在Obstfeld(1 996)第二代货币危机模型的基础上 ,建立了一个考虑经济结构、供给冲击以及金融风险的多因素汇率制度选择模型 ,以成本分析为工具解释了资本控制、各类成本和政府偏好对均衡的影响以及对汇率制度选择的影响。研究表明 :(1 )资本控制可以通过多种途径对均衡产生影响 ,在一定条件下可以利用资本控制措施使经济避免多重均衡 ;(2 )放弃成本对汇率制度选择发挥关键作用 ;(3 )较大的政府偏好促使政府选择固定汇率制度 ,在放弃成本不足够大的条件下 ,决策者也可以通过提高政府偏好或者实施资本控制措施来保护本国固定汇率制度 ;(4)对人民币现行汇率制度的放弃成本的估计表明 ,当前人民币汇率制度放弃成本正处于中间水平 ,因此有必要增大政府对固定汇率制度的偏好并且对资本帐户实施适度管理以保持人民币汇率的稳定 ,防范金融风险。至于未来人民币汇率波动幅度的扩大、资本项目自由化的进程以及人民币汇率制度何时回归真正的“管理浮动” ,应主要取决于人民币汇率制度放弃成本的有效降低     

Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to fully fund the resulting bailout via an explicit fiscal reform. These features of our model imply that government guarantees lead to self-fulfilling banking-currency crises.     

Balance Sheet Effects, Growth, and Crises

This paper addresses two questions: are currency crises predicted by increases in a central bank’s external and contingent liabilities relative to assets, and do these “balance sheet effects” generate persistent output losses following a crisis? I find empirical evidence that the answer to both questions is yes. I use data on stocks of gross external assets and liabilities for 167 countries over 1973–2003, in an unbalanced panel probit regression to obtain robust estimates of the probability and determinants of a post‐crisis recession. Several single and simultaneous equation specifications support the idea that the output cost of a currency crisis depends on its transmission mechanism. Specifically, a recession is likely to be severe if it is preceded by a crisis that works its way through the financial sector. In addition, the results show that measures of contingent liabilities, capital flight, and lack of financial depth are significant predictors of costly crises.     

Monetary Policy in the Aftermath of Currency Crises: The Case of Asia

The paper evaluates monetary policy and its relationship with the exchange rate in the five Asian crisis countries. The findings are compared with previous currency crises in recent history. It is found that there is no evidence of overly tight monetary policy in the Asian crisis countries in 1997 and early 1998. There is also no evidence that high interest rates led to weaker exchange rates. The usual tradeoff between inflation and output when raising interest rates suggested the need for a softer monetary policy in the crisis countries to combat recession. However, in some countries, corporate balance sheet considerations suggested the need to reverse overly depreciated currencies through firmer monetary policy.     

Exchange Rate Regimes and Currency Crises: an Evaluation using Extreme Value Theory*

We test whether the exchange regime in place has an impact on the vulnerability of countries to currency crises. Our paper is distinguishable from others (i) in its use of extreme value theory to identify currency crisis periods and (ii) in using two separate designations for the exchange regime in place. The first is the self‐reported or announced exchange rate system. The second classification scheme, by Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger, is based on the relative movements of international reserves and exchange rates. The Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger procedure is intended to reveal the actual as distinct from the “legal” exchange arrangement. We find, interestingly, that the announced exchange regime has an impact on the likelihood of currency crises, while the “true” or observed regime does not. Announced pegged exchange regimes increase the risk of currency crisis even if, in reality, the exchange rate system in place is not pegged.     

Three measures of East Asian currency evaluation

One of the prominent explanations for the East Asian financial crises of 1997 relies upon East Asian currency overvaluation. However, most empirical studies of these crises do not undertake serious examination of whether these currencies were overvalued. In this article, three major approaches to identifying the equilibrium exchange rate are implemented: long-run purchasing power parity (PPP), a productivity-based model, and a monetary model of the nominal exchange rate. The PPP calculations indicate that as of May 1997, the Hong Kong dollar, baht, ringgit, and peso were overvalued, and the won undervalued. In a framework that explicitly accounts for the role of productivity, substantial overvaluation of the peso is detected, but an undervaluation of the won is also uncovered. Misalignments of the ringgit and baht are small. Finally, the estimated equilibrium rates from a monetary model do not imply much deviation from short-run equilibrium at the end of June 1997. A conclusion of substantial overvaluation on the eve of the East Asian currency turmoil is not very plausible, suggesting that some alternate mechanism for generating crises - other than one involving the conventional macroeconomic fundamentals - was at work.     

Exchange rates,inflation and growth in small,open economies: a difference-in-differences approach

Financial crises in emerging markets have led many observers to recommend abandoning fixed exchange rates and adopting more flexible regimes. Moreover, some recent research suggests that the correct exchange rate regime may have a significant effect on inflation and even economic growth. The estimated effect found in such studies, however, likely suffers from an upward bias, as countries which choose a given exchange rate regime have other hard-to-measure policies and attributes which also affect economic performance. Utilizing a recent data set on actual, as opposed to official exchange rate regimes, this article employs the difference-in-differences method, currently popular in applied microeconomics, to a set of emerging markets that switched to more flexible currency policies. Results indicate that, contrary to previous studies, exchange rates themselves exert no significant impact on inflation or output.