Social Security Benefit Uncertainty under Individual Accounts

Social Security reforms that include individual accounts change both the expected benefit and the benefit risk. This article uses a long-term stochastic forecasting model to estimate the distribution of expected benefits under a simple individual account, recognizing uncertainties in the current system. Introducing individual accounts increases the overall variability of benefit levels relative to current law; indeed the standard deviations of expected benefit gains exceed the level of those gains. The increase in uncertainty about benefit replacement rates is even larger, however, because individual accounts partially sever the link between earnings and benefits in the existing system. (JEL H55)     

The social security early entitlement age in a structural model of retirement and wealth

A structural life cycle model of retirement and wealth attributes retirement peaks at both ages 62 and 65 to Social Security rules and wide heterogeneity in time preferences. Those with high discount rates often retire at 62. They have few assets and heavily value lost benefits from working after 62, largely ignoring potential increases in later benefits. Declining actuarial adjustments beginning at 65 induce those with low discount rates to retire at 65. Raising the Social Security early entitlement age to 64 induces 5% of the population to delay retiring, shifting the retirement spike from 62 to 64.     

Earnings,social security legislation and retirement decisions: the Austrian experience

This paper analyses the labour supply behaviour of elderly males in Austria and asks how far it is determined by the characteristics of the Austrian Social Security System. This is of particular interest because old age insurance in Austria is dominated by the public pension plan, so that private pension plans are of minor importance. I argue that from a theoretical point of view the actuarial unfairness of the insurance plan creates a strong incentive to withdraw from the labour force at the minimum retirement age. Secondly, the rising earnings replacement ratio might be responsible for the decreasing average retirement age. These hypotheses are tested empirically. A pooled time-series cross-sections labour force participation model is estimated for single birth year cohorts of elderly males. I find strong evidence for the proposition, that the age-participation pattern might be determined by the incentives created by social security and that the decrease in labour force participation rates over time may be due to the rising earnings replacement ratio. Remaining differences in labour force participation of elderly males may be attributable to cohort population size and to a long run trend.     

Policy Effects in Hyperbolic vs. Exponential Models of Consumption and Retirement

This paper constructs a structural retirement model with hyperbolic preferences and uses it to estimate the effect of several potential Social Security policy changes. Estimated effects of policies are compared using two models, one with hyperbolic preferences and one with standard exponential preferences. Sophisticated hyperbolic discounters may accumulate substantial amounts of wealth for retirement. We find it is frequently difficult to distinguish empirically between models with the two types of preferences on the basis of asset accumulation paths or consumption paths around the period of retirement. Simulations suggest that, despite the much higher initial time preference rate, individuals with hyperbolic preferences may actually value a real annuity more than individuals with exponential preferences who have accumulated roughly equal amounts of assets. This appears to be especially true for individuals with relatively high time preference rates or who have low assets for whatever reason. This affects the tradeoff between current benefits and future benefits on which many of the retirement incentives of the Social Security system rest.Simulations involving increasing the early entitlement age and increasing the delayed retirement credit do not show a great deal of difference whether exponential or hyperbolic preferences are used, but simulations for eliminating the earnings test show a non-trivially greater effect when exponential preferences are used.     

Labor supply responses to marginal Social Security benefits: Evidence from discontinuities

A key question for Social Security reform is whether workers respond to the link on the margin between the Social Security taxes they pay and the Social Security benefits they will receive. We estimate the effects of the marginal Social Security benefits that accrue with additional earnings on three measures of labor supply: retirement age, hours, and labor earnings. We develop a new approach to identifying these incentive effects by exploiting five provisions in the Social Security benefit rules that generate discontinuities in marginal benefits or non-linearities in marginal benefits that converge to discontinuities as uncertainty about the future is resolved. We find that individuals approaching retirement (age 52 and older) respond to the Social Security tax-benefit link on the extensive margin of their labor supply decisions: we estimate that a 10% increase in the net-of-tax share reduces the two-year retirement hazard by a statistically significant 2.0 percentage points from a base rate of 15%. The evidence with regard to labor supply responses on the intensive margin is more mixed: we estimate that the elasticity of hours with respect to the net-of-tax share is 0.42 and statistically significant, but we do not find a statistically significant earnings elasticity. Though we lack statistical power to estimate results within subsamples precisely, the retirement response is driven mostly by the female subsample, while the hours response comes from the male subsample.     

SOCIAL SECURITY DEPENDENT BENEFITS,NET PAYROLL TAX,AND MARRIED WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY

This paper examines how Social Security dependent benefits impact the labor supply of married women aged 25–54. Specifically, I investigate whether the decrease in the rate of return to women's work discourages them from participating in the labor force by simulating expected net payroll tax rates and dependent benefits. Dependent benefits may reduce the net return to women's work, as they usually pay the full payroll tax without receiving marginal benefits for additional earnings if they claim benefits based on their husbands' earnings records. The results show that high net payroll tax rates reduce married women's work incentives, particularly those near retirement age. (JEL H24, H55, J22)     

RETURNS PAID TO EARLY SOCIAL SECURITY COHORTS

Previous research generally concludes that early participants in the Social Security system received a very good "deal"—better than later participants received, and much better than future participants are likely to get. However, researchers do not know the values of those deals and their distribution across individuals and groups largely because the necessary data have not been available. The study here uses the Social Security Administration's 1988 Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) to calculate early participants' real internal rates of return to contributions. The study analyzes sex, race, household type, income, and birth cohorts and employs new Census Bureau mortality projects to forecast more accurately how life expectancies and benefit streams vary by race as well as by sex and birth cohort .
Results contribute to an understanding of how the Social Security system redistributes income. All sample groups received high real rates of return. However, the returns varied widely by household type, income level, birth cohort, and other factors. The authors calculate that persons born from 1895 to 1922 received a total transfer of £3.5 trillion, of which £1.3 trillion remained to be paid as of 1988 .     

Aching to retire? The rise in the full retirement age and its impact on the social security disability rolls

The Social Security Amendments of 1983 reduced the generosity of Social Security retired worker benefits in the U.S. by increasing the program's full retirement age from 65 to 67 and increasing the penalty for claiming benefits at the early retirement age of 62. These changes were phased in gradually, so that individuals born in or before 1937 were unaffected and those born in 1960 or later were fully affected. No corresponding changes were made to the program's disabled worker benefits, and thus the relative generosity of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits increased. In this paper, we investigate the effect of the Amendments on SSDI enrollment by exploiting variation across birth cohorts in the policy-induced reduction in the present value of retired worker benefits. Our findings indicate that the Amendments significantly increased SSDI enrollment since 1983, with an additional 0.6% of men and 0.9% of women between the ages of 45 and 64 receiving SSDI benefits in 2005 as a result of the changes. Our results further indicate that these effects will continue to increase during the next two decades, as those fully exposed to the reduction in retirement benefit generosity reach their fifties and early sixties.     

Explaining the wealth holdings of different cohorts: Productivity growth and Social Security

In this paper, we explore the reasons why different generations accumulate different amounts of wealth. We use basic economic theory to propose two indicators of the economic conditions under which households accumulate wealth. The first one represents productivity differences across cohorts: The aggregate level of gross national product per capita around the time the head of the household entered the labor market. The second measure summarizes the changes in Social Security during the head of household's working life. Using panel data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, we show that productivity growth can explain all the cohort effects present in income data, while productivity growth and the generosity of Social Security can explain all the cohort effects present in household net worth. We also find a limited offset of Social Security on wealth holdings.     

The Effects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labour Supply and Retirement Behaviour

This paper estimates a life cycle model of labour supply, retirement, and savings behaviour in which future health status and wages are uncertain. Individuals face a fixed cost of work and cannot borrow against future labour, pension, or Social Security income. The method of simulated moments is used to match the life cycle profiles of labour force participation, hours worked, and assets that are estimated from the data to those that are generated by the model. The model establishes that the tax structure of the Social Security system and pensions are key determinants of the high observed job exit rates at ages 62 and 65. Removing the tax wedge embedded in the Social Security earnings test for individuals aged 65 and older would delay job exit by almost one year. By contrast, Social Security benefit levels, health, and borrowing constraints are less important determinants of job exit at older ages. For example, reducing Social Security benefits by 20% would cause workers to delay exit from the labour force by only three months.     

DISENTANGLING THE ANNUITY FROM THE REDISTRIBUTIVE ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES*

In the United States, the life-cycle relationship between initial Social Security contributions and subsequent benefits causes the effect of Social Security on income distribution to be overestimated in a single-period analytical framework. By separating the annuity from the redistributive aspects of Social Security we provide a life-cycle framework for measuring its net effect on redistribution. To this point in its history, we find all income classes have received positive net life-cycle income transfers and, in an absolute sense, upper-income groups have done at least as well as lower-income groups. This suggests a reason for the near-universal support of Social Security by past generations, as well as the controversy which now surrounds it. As it becomes apparent to younger cohorts of taxpayers that many of them will be net losers, it is inevitable that Social Security will be subject to the same controversy as other welfare programs which attempt to redistribute income.     

Projected U.S. Demographics and Social Security

Without policy reforms, the aging of the U.S. population is likely to increase the burden of the currently unfunded Social Security and Medicare systems. In this paper we build an applied general equilibrium model and incorporate the population projections made by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare implications of alternative fiscal responses to the retirement of the baby-boomers. Our calculations suggest that it will be costly to maintain the benefits at the levels now promised because the increases in distortionary taxes required to finance those benefits will reduce private saving and labor supply. We also find that the “accounting calculations” made by the SSA underestimate the required fiscal adjustments. Finally, our results confirm that policies with similar long-run characteristics have very different transitional implications for the distribution of welfare across generations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D58, E21, E62.     

SOCIAL SECURITY AND LABOR SUPPLY INCENTIVES

Many provisions of the Social Security program distort an individual's labor supply incentives. In particular, the payroll tax, the earnings test, the offsetting actuarial adjustment, and the dependence of the size of future benefits on the level of current earnings all affect the net return to extra work. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the size of the net tax rate on labor income in a variety of circumstances, taking into account all these provisions, as well as the personal income tax. We find that the Social Security Program on net in the past has provided a large subsidy to labor supply, which for many people effectively offset the personal income tax. This subsidy rate, however, has been declining steadily over time     

HOUSEHOLD SAVING IN THE '90s: EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-SECTION WEALTH SURVEYS

This paper uses a series of cross-section surveys to measure how wealth accumulation and active saving rates varied across cohort-groups during the early and mid 1990s. Our estimated rates of saving and wealth change across cohorts show a somewhat more dramatic life-cycle pattern than found in previous studies, in part because we use a new technique, and in part because the cross-section wealth surveys we use oversample the wealthiest families whose behavior dominates aggregate changes. Adjusting the wealth-change rates for bequests and subtracting out the capital gains component of wealth change move the estimates in the direction of results from previous studies, but the biggest changes in that direction result from excluding the top of the wealth distribution in each year.     

New evidence on earnings and benefit claims following changes in the retirement earnings test in 2000

This paper examines the labor force activity and timing of benefit claims of workers aged 65–69 in response to the removal of the retirement earnings test in 2000. We use the 1% sample of longitudinal Social Security administrative data that covers the period from 4 years before to 4 years after the removal of the test. Using a reduced-form quantile regression method, we find that effects on earnings are limited to workers with earnings just around the test threshold and above, as predicted by economic theory. Our estimated effects suggest that labor supply elasticities with respect to the net-of-tax rate are approximately 0.05–0.07 for working primary beneficiaries aged 65–69 whose earnings are between the median and the 80th percentile. Further, results show that applications for Social Security benefits following the earnings test removal accelerated by 2 to 5 percentage points among individuals aged 65–69 and by 3 to 7 percentage points among those reaching age 65.     

Does Medicare benefit the poor?

Measuring the progressivity of age-targeted government programs is difficult because no single data set measures income and benefit use throughout life. Previous research, using zip code as a proxy for lifetime income, has found that Medicare benefits flow primarily to the most economically advantaged groups, and that the financial returns to Medicare are often higher for the rich than the poor. However, our analysis produces the starkly opposed result that Medicare is an extraordinarily progressive public program, in dollar terms or welfare terms. These new results owe themselves to our measurement of socioeconomic status as an individual's education, rather than the geographically aggregated measures of income used by previous research. We argue that individual education has important practical and conceptual advantages over geographically aggregated measures of income. Our results suggest the crucial importance of accurate poverty measurement in evaluating the progressivity of complex government programs like Medicare or Social Security.     

Labor supply effects of the recent social security benefit cuts: Empirical estimates using cohort discontinuities

In response to a “crisis” in Social Security financing two decades ago Congress implemented an increase in the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) of 2 months per year for cohorts born in 1938 and after. These cohorts began reaching retirement age in 2000. This paper studies the effects of these benefit cuts on recent retirement behavior. The evidence suggests that the mean retirement age of the affected cohorts has increased by about half as much as the increase in the NRA. If older workers continue to increase their labor supply in the same way, there might be important implications for the estimates of Social Security trust fund exhaustion that have played such a major role in recent discussions of Social Security reform.     

美国延迟退休激励机制分析——兼论对中国延迟退休年龄改革的启示

美国社会保障法案的颁布标志着现代社会保障制度的建立。在人口老龄化的背景下,美国对法定退休年龄和养老金领取年龄进行改革,逐步废除法定退休年龄,提高正常退休年龄,同时对养老保险制度中的退休收入核查制度进行调整,建立延迟退休补助制度,由此增强延迟退休对老年劳动力延迟退休的激励。美国废除法定退休年龄和延迟正常退休年龄的改革对中国延迟退休年龄改革提供了有益借鉴。     

The effect of health improvements due to tobacco control on earnings in the United States

There is minimal evidence causally estimating the relationship between tobacco tax policy, population health and earnings. This article uses state tobacco taxes as an instrument for life expectancy to estimate the effect on earnings per capita in a panel of almost 3000 counties in the United States over the period 1970 to 2000. In the first stage of the model, we find that a one dollar increase in state tobacco taxes significantly increases life expectancy between 1.9% and 2.1%. Despite showing that tobacco tax is correlated with higher life expectancy and that, theoretically, improvements in health from reductions in smoking should lead to increased earnings, we find an insignificant impact of the induced gains in life expectancy from tobacco policy on county level earnings per capita over the period 1970 to 2000. The lack of significance is explained through local average treatment effects and the smaller economic impact of certain policies that impact health later in life. These results provide further evidence that the most effective interventions for improving income later in life are policy interventions with a direct impact on the health of younger cohorts rather than older cohorts.