并购是银行国际化扩张主路

<正>银行机构国际化扩张分为新设和并购两种方式。并购优于新设在目前,并购已成为银行国际化扩张的主要方式,原因是并购不仅可以规避政策障碍,而且迅速扩大规模,     

跨国并购和新设投资的比较——一个经济学分析框架

跨国公司对外投资有两种方法可供选择，即跨国并购和新设投资，其中跨国并购已日益成为一种流行的对外投资方式而受到更多跨国公司的青睐。可以证明，当国内资产的战略性价值足够高时，跨国并购就一定会发生。由于各个跨国企业对国内资产的竞争性竞价，国内资产的地提升到高于或大大高于其内在价值的高价。同样可以证明，跨国并购会提高目标企业的股票价格，而对并购企业的股价影响是不确定的。     

银行海外扩张方式选择的博弈分析

银行海外扩张所采用的方式主要有新建与并购,其选择是一个博弈的过程.本文考察了跨国银行、东道国银行及东道国政府三者之间就跨国银行进入东道国市场方式选择的博弈过程,建立了银行海外扩张方式选择的定量分析模型,以增加银行海外扩张的经济效益.     

我国银行跨国并购策略探讨

随着我国金融市场的逐步开放,在外资银行对我国寻求投资、并购对象的同时,中资银行也开始将目光投向海外市场,通过跨国并购方式提升综合竞争力,实现国际化经营。但如何制定银行跨国并购战略十分重要。本文对我国银行跨国并购的地域选择、业务选择与管理整合策略、银行跨国并购时机选择以及相关政策进行了探讨。     

我国银行业海外发展的模式及选择

跨国新建与海外并购是银行对外直接投资的两种组织方式.随着我国银行业改革的进一步深化,到海外投资成为国内银行走出国门,成为国际性银行的重要手段.目前国内银行要根据自身实际,利用海外新建分行和跨国并购等方式,选择适当的国际投资区域,走出一条海外经营的新路径.     

跨国并购对我国就业的影响

跨国公司对外直接投资（FDI）的方式主要有两种：一种是新建或称为绿地投资；另一种是跨国并购。进入20世纪90年代以来，跨国并购逐渐取代绿地投资成为世界FDI的主要的方式。我国是世界上吸引外国直接投资最多的国家之一，长期以来，由于我国对外资进入（特别是跨国并购）的严格控制，跨国公司对中国的FDI主要是以上新项目、建新企业的方式进行，通过兼并收购方式进行的直接投资不到外商直接投资总额的10％，     

跨国企业跨国并购与新建选择的博弈分析

跨国公司进入东道国面临两种进入方式的选择:并购进入和新建投资进入。文章在现有跨国公司直接投资理论研究的基础上,从博弈论的视角,通过建立跨国公司与东道国企业之间的博弈模型,将不同投资方式收益的影响因素纳入模型中进行定量的比较分析,得出选择最佳进入方式的决策框架,并针对我国企业的实际情况,提出我国企业跨国投资进入方式的最佳选择。     

国际银行业并购分析及对我国银行业的挑战

金融全球化导致全球金融市场竞争日趋激烈,为了争夺市场,各国跨国银行都希望通过扩大规模,降低经营成本,提高竞争能力。单个银行的规模效益毕竟有限,跨国并购已经成为扩大银行规模的一条捷径。通过跨国并购来实现银行规模扩张是国际银行业近10年来的明显趋向。在此大背景下,外资银行将会通过并购的方式进入我国银行业,我国银行业也会通过并购的方式实施"走出去"的战略。基于此,对银行跨国并购进行研究就显出重要的意义。     

我国商业银行跨国经营的特点及对策

我国商业银行跨国经营呈现以新建投资为主、海外并购为辅并倾向进入我国出口额和FDI规模比较大的国家和地区等特点。未来一段时间商业银行跨国经营除考虑新设分支机构外,还可在风险可控的情况下择机开展中小型并购交易;由"追随客户"逐渐向"引导客户"转变,进而实现本土化经营;采取多种形式规避新兴市场银行业准入限制等问题,使我国商业银行在海外扩张道路上能更进一步。     

绿地投资与海外并购的比较分析

进入21世纪，企业全球化趋势日益加强，各国的跨国公司都在调整战略以便能占领市场。对外直接投资则是大多数跨国公司选择的进入方式，但是究竞是选择并购还是跨国创建方式进入，成为决定企业命运的关键。本文阐述了不同跨国市场进入方式的优缺点，并从短期和长期角度对其进行比较，从而对我国对外直接投资进入方式提供借鉴。     

从效率优先到更加注重公平——改革开放以来我国在公平与效率关系上的演变

改革开放以来,我国在公平与效率关系的权衡上,经历了从"公平优先→兼顾效率和公平→效率优先,兼顾公平→初次分配注重效率,再分配注重公平→更加注重公平"的演变过程。     

Incentives to invest and to give access to non-regulated new technologies

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces retail services of a higher quality than the old technology, and is left unregulated. We show that for intermediate values of the access price for the old technology, the vertically integrated firm may decide not to invest. When investment occurs, the vertically integrated firm may be induced to give access to the entrant for a low access price for the old technology. Furthermore, when both firms can invest, investment occurs under a larger set of circumstances, and it is the entrant the firm that invests in more cases. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the old technology.     

How to talk to multiple audiences

Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matches and thus have heterogeneous beliefs. We provide conditions that ensure that the system converges to a state with homogeneous beliefs, and that its asymptotic behavior is the same as with a single representative agent in each player role.     

Committing to transparency to resist corruption

This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. A low quality firm may prefer not to commit only when the agent's discretion is strong and the market's profitability is small. In that situation, the high quality firms commit when commitment decisions are kept secret, but some conditions on firms' beliefs are required when commitment decisions are publicly announced. A mechanism combining both conditionality and a reward (a transparent selection advantage that needs not be large) allows complete elimination of corruption.     

应对反倾销的策略

近年来，我国对外贸易快速增长，已跻身世界贸易六大强国行列。但同时，我国出口产品被反倾销、反补贴涉诉案件日益增多。针对这一情况，提出一些应对反倾销的策略和措施。