论环境管理体系标准对商业银行加强环境风险管理的作用

ISO14001环境管理体系标准是组织规划、实施、检查、评审企业环境管理运作系统的规范性标准。目前,在国际上已广泛应用于商业银行管理公司融资模式下的环境风险,是商业银行识别和认定拟借款企业面临的环境风险、环境风险管理现状及所取得绩效等的重要手段,有助于商业银行降低管理借款企业环境风险的成本。因此,商业银行应鼓励借款企业获得ISO14001环境管理体系标准认证。     

环境风险管理国际规范对企业海外投资的借鉴意义

环境风险管理可以帮助企业充分权衡经济、社会、技术发展和环境状况并作出综合决策,有效提高企业减轻和避免环境及相关社会风险的管理水平。尤其在我国企业海外投资过程中,由于项目所在国各类情况与我国差异较大,更应关注环境风险管理的国际性规范要求。本研究针对国际金融公司标准,介绍环境风险管理国际规范的涵盖内容,并通过实际案例分析,探讨我国企业在海外投资中容易忽视的环境风险管理典型问题。     

我国商业银行风险经理制运作环境研究

银行风险经理制的推行是现代商业银行进行全面风险管理的有效手段.风险经理制运作有一定的环境要求,而我国商业银行风险经理制的运作环境存在诸多问题,在此,从内外环境两方面提出相应的对策和建议.     

浅析财务公司在企业集团保险管理中的作用

我国企业集团成员单位通过各自为战的分散型保险管理模式初步实现了风险转嫁,随着集团业务规模和资产规模的不断扩大,该模式固有的弊端逐步凸显.利用持牌财务公司的专业优势实行统一保险管理是解决保险管理瓶颈,提高风险管理水平的有效途径.     

保险在商业银行操作风险管理中的应用

伴随着国际银行业全面风险管理理念和框架的基本建立,新巴塞尔资本协议对商业银行的操作风险给予了高度重视,并且将成熟的风险管理工具——保险引入商业银行操作风险管理中。在界定商业银行操作风险的基础上,详细探讨了操作风险管理中得到广泛运用的保险产品,并对引入保险后的资本准备金替代方法进行了比较分析。     

论我国商业银行国际贸易融资风险及防控对策

目前,我国经济正朝着国际化的方向发展,其中国际贸易融资业务占商业银行业务的比例正在逐年增加。由于我国商业银行从事国际贸易融资业务起步相对较晚,缺乏风险管理方面的经验,导致了我国商业银行国际贸易融资存在了一定的风险。本文将结合我国商业银行国际贸易融资的风险管理现状,研究分析贸易融资过程中存在的风险,并就风险提出几点防控对策。     

我国商业银行环境风险管理压力的实证研究

该文采用"商业银行环境风险管理压力"问卷,收集我国商业银行的实际数据,建立LISREL模型。结果表明:我国商业银行进行环境风险管理的压力,主要有三大类:"政府的规制压力"、"市场压力"和"公众与非政府组织的压力"。其中:"政府的规制压力"是主导压力,对商业银行环境风险管理的压力最大;"市场压力"居于第二位,而"公众与非政府组织的压力"最小,居于第三位。     

保险——操作风险管理的创新工具

在我国商业银行操作风险管理中运用保险是一种管理创新。文章从操作风险的内涵及其外延入手,在给定操作风险准确定义的基础上,分析了运用保险管理操作风险的优越性以及存在的潜在问题,并就我国商业银行在操作风险管理中运用保险的必要性进行了分析,有针对性地提出了建议。     

久期技术在我国商业银行利率风险管理中的应用分析

随着利率市场化进程的推进，我国商业银行的利率风险更加凸现。久期技术虽是国际银行业中先进的利率风险管理方法，但现阶段其在我国银行利率风险管理中的应用具有很大的局限性。根据我国商业银行经营环境的变迁，提出久期技术在我国商业银行利率风险管理中应用的“两阶段”战略。     

立足环境风险管理,打造绿色保险无锡模式——访无锡市环境保护局副局长王晓栋

试点中,无锡坚持把加强对企业的环境风险指导服务和督促企业尽快整改环境风险隐患作为工作的重点,把提高参保企业的环境风险管理水平和事故防范能力作为推行试点的工作目标,加强监督管理,形成了绿色保险的无锡模式。     

Monetary policy and bank lending in a low interest rate environment: Diminishing effectiveness?

This paper analyses the effectiveness of monetary policy on bank lending in a low interest rate environment. Based on a sample of 108 large international banks, our empirical analysis suggests that monetary policy is less effective in stimulating bank lending growth when interest rates reach a very low level. This result holds after controlling for business and financial cycle conditions and different bank-specific characteristics such as liquidity, capitalisation, funding costs, bank risk and income diversification. We find that the impact of low rates on the profitability of banks’ traditional intermediation activity helps explain the subdued evolution of lending in the period 2010–14.     

论赤道原则中的利益相关者互动机制

赤道原则是用于确定、评估和管理贷款银行项目融资中环境和社会风险的国际行业标准.项目融资所具有的特性,使贷款银行在进行项目融资贷款业务时会面临比传统融资更多的环境和社会风险.随着公民社会的兴起和民间团体地位的提高,因贷款项目的环境影响导致利益相关者对项目的强烈抵制从而引发的金融风险越来越严重,成为了项目融资中环境和社会风险的主要来源.为了规避环境和社会风险,赤道原则特别强调贷款银行在从事项目融资业务时要建立利益相关者互动机制.贷款银行在建立利益相关者互动机制时需要重点关注的问题是对利益相关者的鉴别和分析必须全面,同时明确划分项目公司的责任.     

The Effects of Competition on Banks’ Risk Taking

We consider the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on risk taking by banks when bank risk is unobservable to depositors. It turns out that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the structure and side of the market in which competition takes place. If the bank is a monopoly or banks are competing only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking. Banks in this situation tend to take risk, although extreme risk taking is avoided. In contrast, introducing deposit insurance increases risk taking if banks are competing for deposits. Then, deposit rates become excessively high, thereby forcing banks to take extreme risks.     

An empirical note on the impact of federal deposit insurance on bank failures in the U.S.

This study empirically examines the impact of federal deposit insurance coverage on the failure rate of commercial banks in the U.S. over the 1963–91 period. The analysis allows for the potential bank failure rate impact of the growth rate of real GDP, the real prime lending rate, the real cost of funds, and the commercial bank tangible capital-to-asset ratio, while measuring federal deposit insurance coverage as the percentage of deposits at federally insured banks that was covered by federal deposit insurance. The instrumental variables' estimates indicate that the greater the extent of federal deposit insurance coverage, the higher the bank failure rate.     

The relevance of supply shocks for inflation: the spanish case

A retrenchment in crossborder credit is under way, the product of both market forces and political pressure on international banks to lend at home (Economist, 2009). In addition, banks, particularly the largest, have also dramatically expanded their retail banking operations over the past few years (Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007). Our goal, in this article, is to study the effects of default risk on equity returns through bank interest margin management under a renewed focus on domestic retail banking, a trend often attributed to the stability of banking activities. Specifically, this article explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on an option-based firm-theoretical model with multiple sources of structural breaks due to political pressure. The model demonstrates how capital regulation and political pressure on foreign lending return and risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We show that a more stringent capital requirement is linked with lower equity return, but higher default risk of the bank in the return to domestic retail banking. An increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending return is linked with higher equity return and default risk of the bank. It is also showed that an increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending risk decreases the bank's equity return and default risk. We conclude that the return to domestic retail banking may be a relatively stable activity when the political pressure decision impacts only the expected risk of the bank's foreign lending and not the return.     

The Theory of the Second Best and the Competitive Equilibrium Model

We study the international transmission of bank liquidity shocks from multinational, Islamic, bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Based on a total sample of 120 Islamic and conventional bank subsidiaries, we test whether foreign bank lending for Islamic and conventional banks is determined by different factors. We estimate a model that includes subsidiary and parent bank characteristics as well as host and home country variables. Our empirical findings show that lending is negatively affected by the fragility of conventional parent banks' subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we show that parent Islamic banks do not significantly affect lending by subsidiaries. Finally, we examine the market discipline regarding the transmission of liquidity shocks. We also find that reduction in foreign Islamic bank lending is stronger for those that are dependent on the interbank market. We establish that the depositors react to a deterioration of bank performance and punish their institutions by withdrawing their money. We show that market discipline has a more important role for Islamic banks, whereas liquidity needs determine the change in conventional banks.     

The Number of Bank Relationships of SMEs: A Disaggregated Analysis of Changes in the Swiss Loan Market

This paper investigates changes in the number of bank relationships of small and medium-sized enterprises in Switzerland from 1996 to 2002. It differentiates between overall bank relationships and lending relationships and disaggregates the loan market with respect to firm sizes, industries and banking groups. On average, bank lending declined, and the concentration of lending relationships increased. The changes seem to have been driven by demand and supply for medium-sized firms, but only by supply for micro and small firms. Supply-side reductions resulted from a merger and changes in credit risk management by major banks. We find evidence of increasing specialization of larger banks on transaction lending and of smaller and regional banks on relationship lending.     

Does corruption hamper bank lending? Macro and micro evidence

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of corruption in bank lending. Corruption is expected to hamper bank lending, as it is closely related to legal enforcement, which has been shown to promote banks’ willingness to lend. Nevertheless the similarities between the consequences for bank lending of law enforcement and corruption are misleading, as they consider only judiciary corruption. Corruption can also occur in lending and may then be beneficial for bank lending via bribes given by borrowers to enhance their chances of receiving loans. This assumption may be validated particularly in the presence of pronounced risk aversion by banks, resulting in greater reluctance on the part of banks to grant loans. We perform country-level and bank-level estimations to investigate these assumptions. Corruption reduces bank lending in both sets of estimations. However, bank-level estimations show that the detrimental effect of corruption is reduced when bank risk aversion increases, even leading at times to situations wherein corruption fosters bank lending. Additional controls show that corruption does not increase bank credit by favoring only bad loans. Therefore, our findings show that while the overall effect of corruption is to hamper bank lending, it can alleviate firm’s financing obstacles.     

中小企业信贷市场的监控研究——基于信息和产品差异化模型

中小企业信用缺损成为中小企业陷入融资困境并制约其发展的重要原因,但中小企业信贷市场风险高,对中小企业信贷市场的监控便成为研究的重要课题.银行监控中小企业信贷市场的有效途径之一是对借主的事前监控.构建监控模型和产品差异化模型在于银行利用资源在发放贷款之前监测企业,通过银行获取信息或者在市场力(产品差异化)投资模型的分析表明两种选择产生不同的预测,即银行加大分支机构和人力资本的投入,有利于提高信息获取的范围以及信息获取的准确性,但对市场力增长不显著;银行对借主资金交易的管理有利于提高借贷风险控制能力.     

Deposit insurance and depositor discipline: direct evidence on bank switching behaviour in Japan

As Japan's financial system becomes more market oriented, depositor discipline is playing a larger role in the monitoring of banks. Matching household survey data with banks’ financial data, we examine households’ response to bank risk and different deposit insurance schemes. We find that bank switching in response to risk increased between 1996 and 2001 and households’ choice of bank adequately reflects banks’ financial health. We also examine the determinants of households’ knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme and how this affects switching behaviour. The results suggest that depositor discipline works and could play an important supplementary role in bank monitoring.