Portfolio allocation and international risk sharing

Abstract We show that recent explanations of the consumption‐real exchange rate anomaly that rely on goods and financial market frictions are not robust to introducing just one additional international asset. When portfolios are selected optimally, international trade in two nominal bonds implies a consumption‐real exchange rate correlation that is too high compared with the data even when there are many shocks. Monetary policy specification plays a potentially important role for the degree of risk sharing provided by nominal bonds, both in the benchmark model with only tradable and non‐tradable sector supply shocks and also in the model that allows for news.     

INTERNATIONAL ASYMMETRY IN BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND APPRECIATION OF A STAGNANT COUNTRY'S CURRENCY*

This paper develops a two‐country, two‐commodity continuous‐time dynamic optimization model that accommodates a liquidity trap and persistent unemployment. It investigates a theoretical possibility of international asymmetry in business activity and a stagnant country's currency appreciation, which has been the common experience of Japan and the USA after Japan's total capital liberalization. It is found that if the marginal utility of consumption relative to that of liquidity exogenously declines in a country, its current account improves and the home currency appreciates. Consequently, home products lose competitiveness, causing home employment to decrease and foreign employment to increase.     

Terms‐of‐Trade Shocks and Exchange Rate Regimes in a Small Open Economy*

We examine the impact of terms‐of‐trade shocks on key macroeconomic variables by numerically solving a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy. The model considers nominal price rigidity under different exchange rate regimes. The numerical solutions obtained are consistent with the empirical regularities documented by Broda (2004), in which output responses to shocks are smoother in floats than in pegs; in moving from pegs to floats, the rise in nominal exchange rate volatility is coupled by the rise in real exchange rate volatility; and in both exchange rate regimes, net foreign assets is the most volatile variable.     

ENDOGENOUS FLUCTUATIONS IN TWO‐COUNTRY MODELS*

This paper investigates the interlinkage in the business cycles of large‐country economies in a free‐trade equilibrium. We consider a two‐country, two‐good, two‐factor general equilibrium model with Cobb‐Douglas technologies and linear preferences. We also assume decreasing returns to scale in the consumption good sector. We first identify the determinants of each country's global accumulation pattern in autarky equilibrium, and secondly we show how a country's business cycles may spread throughout the world once trade opens. We thus give capital intensity conditions for local and global stability of competitive equilibrium paths.     

EXCHANGE RATE,EXPECTED PROFIT AND CAPITAL STOCK ADJUSTMENT: JAPANESE EXPERIENCE

This paper empirically investigates the impact of exchange rate shocks on capital stock adjustment in the Japanese industry. An intertemporal optimization model is developed, in which an individual corporation in an open economy adjusts its capital stock according to Tobin's q. By explicitly considering the marginal q, the transmission mechanism from real exchange rate shocks to investment dynamics is examined based on the Vector Autoregressive model. Empirical evidence suggests that the depreciation of the Japanese yen increases the expected profitability of the firm and stimulates investment, especially in the machinery sector.     

Macroeconomic,institutional, and sectoral determinants of outward foreign direct investment: Evidence from Japan

This paper empirically explores the determinants of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Japanese manufacturing sector. We estimate a gravity model of FDI for 30 host countries covering the period 2005–2017, using Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood to tackle the issue of zero-value observations. The results indicate that Japanese overseas investments are not only driven by traditional factors, such as market size, the yen real exchange rate, trade openness, differences in perception of corruption, and financial instability, but also by industry characteristics. In particular, we find that low technological industries characterized by growing labour costs are more likely to be relocated abroad. Furthermore, we demonstrate nonlinearities in the determinants of Japanese overseas investments depending on the host country's development, the host country's region, and the category of FDI implemented (vertical vs horizontal).     

LINKAGES BETWEEN EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Using a sample of 104 countries, we study macroeconomic performance from 1973 to 2007. We examine GDP growth, inflation rate, growth volatility and inflation volatility, and their response to a ‘words versus deeds’ measure of exchange‐rate policy, which is obtained by interacting a country's de jure and its de facto policy. For non‐industrialized countries, the highest growth rates and the lowest inflation volatility are associated with countries that pursue fear of floating policy, whereas countries that pursue a matched float policy (de jure and de facto floating) have the highest inflation rates but the lowest GDP volatility.     

Productivity Growth of the Nontradable Sectors in China

Little is known about the total factor productivity of the nontradable sectors in China. In this paper we estimate productivity growth of the nontradable sectors by studying the relative price movements of the nontradable sectors vis‐à‐vis the tradable sectors, i.e. changes in the internal real exchange rate. We find that prices of the nontradable sectors have risen significantly faster than those of the tradable sectors since China's accession to the WTO, and as a result China's internal real exchange rate has appreciated faster than the renminbi real effective exchange rate. We also find that the nontradable sectors have seen much lower productivity growth than the tradable sectors. We argue that it is important to raise China's productivity growth in the nontradable sectors through policy actions to achieve growth rebalancing and containing inflationary pressures in the medium run.     

With whom do you trade? Defensive innovation and the skill‐bias

Abstract We examine whether increased trade with countries with ineffective protection of intellectual property has contributed to the skill‐deepening of the 1980s. We construct an index of effective protection of intellectual property at the country level, combining data on protection of patents and rule of law. Next, we construct an industry‐specific version of this index, using as weights each country's trade share in the total trade of the industry. We find a decline in this trade‐weighted index, owing to a rise in trade with countries with low effective protection of intellectual property, which explains 29% of the rise in within‐industry skill‐intensity.     

A monetary model of China–US trade relations

This paper develops a general equilibrium monetary model to study China–US trade relations. The model captures two main features of China–US trade: China's fixed exchange rate regime and the use of the US dollar as the international medium of exchange. The main conclusions of this paper are threefold. First, an improvement in the productivity of China's tradable sector would benefit both China and the US. Second, a RMB appreciation would reduce consumption in the US and increase consumption in China, and would likely reduce China's trade surplus. It would also lead to a contraction in China's tradable sector and an expansion in US's tradable sector. Third, a monetary expansion in the US would hurt China because it would lead to a transfer of wealth from China to the US, a fall in China's relative wage rate and terms of trade, and an artificial expansion in China's tradable sector. A US monetary expansion would also increase China's trade surplus.     

Vertically Integrated North–South Trade and the Redux Model

The paper uses the framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff's Redux model to study the impact of monetary shocks on exchange rate, terms of trade, and welfare in the context of a North–South trade. The authors show that a relative Northern monetary expansion can depreciate or appreciate its currency depending on whether the consumption elasticity of money demand and the degree of monopolistic distortion are low or high enough. This shock has asymmetric effects on welfare in such a way that “beggar‐thyself” or “beggar‐thy‐neighbor” effects always occur.     

The extensive margin,sectoral shares,and international business cycles

Abstract This paper documents some previously neglected features of sectoral shares at business cycle frequencies in OECD economies. We find that the non‐traded output share is as volatile as aggregate GDP and for most countries is countercyclical. While the standard international real business cycle model has difficulty in accounting for these properties of the data, an extended model that allows for sectoral adjustment along both the intensive and the extensive margins does a much better job of replicating these statistics. The model also matches better the correlation between relative consumption growth and real exchange rate changes, a key measure of international risk‐sharing.     

THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ON REAL EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE BASED ON A NEW DATASET

Do alternative exchange rate regimes affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently? The existing empirical evidence is quite mixed with slightly more papers supporting that they do. We show that such lack of consensus is mainly due to current literature limitations regarding the measurement of real exchange rates (RERs), the identification of exchange rate regimes (ERRs), and the control for the incidence of real and nominal shocks. To address these limitations, we construct a novel monthly dataset for 63 countries over the period 1946–2007, which includes market‐determined multilateral RER and a proxy for terms of trade. We find that ERRs indeed affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently. While the evidence is generally consistent with Mussa's sticky prices argument, we find that for nonadvanced countries in post‐Bretton Woods there exists a “U‐shape nominal flexibility puzzle of RER.” We also find evidence of a “short‐run RER volatility puzzle.” Having controlled for the incidence of real and nominal shocks, nonadvanced countries' RER volatility remains between 25% and 150% greater than that of the advanced economies. Moreover, the key literature finding that short‐term RER volatility is higher in Bretton Woods (BW) than in post‐Bretton Woods (PBW) for industrialized countries vanishes when using market‐determined multilateral RER instead of official bilateral RER. (JEL F31, F33, F41)     

Increasing Returns,Financial Capital Mobility and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics*

The late 1990s saw a US IT investment boom, large capital flows into the USA and an appreciation of the US$. At the time, this appeared to be driven by expectations of continued IT‐related knowledge spillover externalities and associated productivity and profit growth. Using a two‐region dynamic general equilibrium model with externalities, we find a once‐off productivity shock leads to capital inflow and a real appreciation only in the short term. In the long term, capital flows stabilise and the real exchange rate depreciates. For a single shock to trigger long‐term growth in capital flows requires unrealistically large externalities.     

MARKET DISCIPLINING OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS

In this article, we contribute to the current literature on market disciplining of the sovereign governments of the developing countries by distinguishing both sides of the market discipline hypothesis by adopting three‐stage least square estimation to incorporate the contemporaneous feedback effects between primary structural budget balances and the country's default‐risk premiums. We provide empirical evidence of a unidirectional causal relationship between a country's default‐risk premium and primary structural budget balances with the direction flowing from primary structural budget balances to country's risk premium in 40 developing countries over the period 1975–2008. We also employ the Arellano‐Bond dynamic panel generalized methods of moments estimation to control for this joint determination of primary structural budget balances and the country's default‐risk premium, and find supportive evidence of undisciplined sovereign governments and of nonlinearly behaving well‐functioning financial markets in the sample countries. (JEL C5, G1, G3)     

The changing nature of the real exchange rate: The role of central bank preferences

We investigate the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations. We do so, first, in the context of a DSGE model that explicitly considers the central bank's preferences. Then we estimate SVAR models, where shocks are identified by sign restrictions derived from the DSGE model. We perform this exercise for twelve countries, nine of which have adopted inflation targeting during the period analyzed. In sharp contrast to the previous evidence in the literature, we find that exchange rate (country risk premium) shocks have become the main drivers of real exchange rate dynamics, while real shocks play a less important role. Evidence from the DSGE model reveals that, as the central bank becomes more averse to inflation movements, and cares less about nominal exchange rate fluctuations, the impact of nominal shocks on the real exchange rate tends to increase, while the impact of real shocks decreases. Our results suggest that the adoption of inflation targeting, along with a floating exchange rate, contributes to a shift in the relative importance of demand and country risk premium shocks in determining the RER.     

MEASURING POVERTY USING BOTH INCOME AND WEALTH: A CROSS‐COUNTRY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SPAIN

We study the correspondence between a household's income and its vulnerability to income shocks in two developed countries: the U.S. and Spain. Vulnerability is measured by the availability of wealth to smooth consumption in a multidimensional approach to poverty, which allows us to identify three groups of households: the twice‐poor group, which includes income‐poor households who lack an adequate stock of wealth; the group of protected‐poor households, which are all those income‐poor families with a buffer stock of wealth they can rely on; and the vulnerable‐non‐poor group, including households above the income‐poverty line that do not hold any stock of wealth. Interestingly, the risk of belonging to these groups changes over the life‐cycle in both countries while the size of the groups differs significantly between Spain and the U.S., although this result is quite sensitive to whether the housing wealth component is included in the wealth measure or not.     

(Asymmetric) trade costs,real exchange rate hedging,and equity home bias in a multicountry model

There has been controversy between (two‐country) theory and the empirics about whether hedging against real exchange rate fluctuations in the goods market influences foreign equity holdings. This study reconciles the theory with the empirics by introducing a multicountry framework with asymmetric trade costs. We find that the incentive to hold foreign equities to hedge real exchange rate risk is negligible because multiple trade partners act as a hedging channel for real exchange rate fluctuations. Further, our theory calls for a country's covariance–variance ratio to be constructed as the sum of the bilateral covariance–variance ratios of the multiple partners. The empirical analysis of 24 advanced countries confirms the theoretical prediction.     

HUMAN CAPITAL DISTRIBUTION,GROWTH AND TRADE

Distribution differences in human capital matter for a country's growth and trade. While the existing literature considers only the diversity difference in talent distribution, we argue that the kurtosis difference is also an important factor. In a two‐sector equilibrium growth model, where the production function is supermodular for the consumption‐good sector and submodular for the R&D sector, we prove that the diversity effect and kurtosis effect are opposite to each other. A country endowed with more diverse but leptokurtic talent distribution may have lower growth rate and import submodular goods, opposite to the conventional result from considering only the diversity difference.     

NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY*

The United Nations' newly completed study of purchasing power parities covering 34 countries varied in region, income level, and form of economic organization shows the systematic differences between the usual view of the structure of the world economy arising out of international comparisons based upon foreign exchange rate conversions and the structure one sees when actual prices are available. The real per capita GDP of developing countries is understated relative to developed countries when exchange rates are used in converting countries' national income accounts to a common currency, with the degree of understatement for any two countries being inversely related to the per capita income difference between them. The reason for this is that relative prices in the non-traded goods sector are lower relative to traded goods prices in low income countries. The systematic pattern observed in the 1975 data of the 34 countries has been extrapolated over time and space to get estimates of GDP for other years and countries. In the absence of detailed price data, the real shares of final expenditures devoted to particular components of the total can only be estimated as the proportion of own currency total expenditure devoted to the components. The observed differences in the pattern of prices of poor countries relative to rich for different components makes this clearly wrong for international comparisons, and in systematic ways. For example, (i) the relative price of services compared with commodities in poor countries is lower than in rich; so the apparent tendency of the share of services to rise as a country's income rises disappears when real quantities are considered; similarly, (ii) the relative price of capital goods is greater in poor countries compared with rich ones, so the difference in investment ratios out of GDP between rich and poor countries is understated.