Socialization and altruism

An important problem in theoretical biology is to explain how altruism can have positive selection value. We model socialization as a costly public good that raises altruism and we study evolution equations for altruistic preferences. Stable cultural (social) equilibria exist in which socialization is supplied privately and property rights exist without civil government. In equilibrium, agents are altruistic in ways not explained by traditional biological theories. The theory essentially formalizes the story in Adam Smith'sTheory of Moral Sentiments.     

Overseas Employment and Remittances to a Dual Economy

Overseas employment has become more commonplace, and remittances have increased in similar proportions. For poor countries, remittances often substantially influence domestic expenditures and real exchange rates. We study overseas employment, remittances and domestic underemployment in a simple general equilibrium model with a non-traded good and minimum wage. The influence of population growth, rural productivity, and family altruism are examined. If remittances per migrant exceed domestic productivity then multiple equilibria may occur exhibiting high or low overseas employment. We discuss how the equilibrium with highest overseas employment conditionally Pareto dominates the other equilibria, and analyse policy co-ordination.     

Parametric continuity of stationary distributions

For Markovian economic models, long-run equilibria are typically identified with the stationary (invariant) distributions generated by the model. In this paper we provide new sufficient conditions for continuity in the map from parameters to these equilibria. Several existing results are shown to be special cases of our theorem. This paper has benefitted from the helpful comments of Kevin Reffett, Rabee Tourky, an anonymous referee and participants at the 13th European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory, Venice 2004. The second author is grateful for financial support from Australian Research Council Grant DP0557625.     

FAVOURING FRIENDS

This paper focuses on the friendship effect on donations in a dictator game. Our results indicate that the taste for altruism is substantially increased when friends play the role of recipients. Controlling for reciprocity there is still a significant friendship effect on donations.     

Elimination of Social Security in a Dynastic Framework

Much of the existing literature on social security has taken the extreme assumption that individuals have little or no altruism; this paper takes an opposite assumption that there is full two-sided altruism. When households insure members that belong to the same family line, privatizing social security can gain public support. In our benchmark model calibrated to the U.S. economy, privatization without compensation is favoured by 52% of the population. If social security participants are fully compensated for their contributions, and the transition to privatization is financed by a combination of debt and a consumption tax, 58% experience a welfare gain. These gains and the resulting public support for social security reform depend critically on a flexible labour market. If the labour supply elasticity is low, then support for privatization disappears.     

WHY DO CHILDREN TAKE CARE OF THEIR ELDERLY PARENTS? ARE THE JAPANESE ANY DIFFERENT?

We conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of why children live with (or near) their parents and provide care and assistance to them using microdata from a Japanese household survey, the Osaka University Preference Parameter Study. We find that the Japanese are more likely to live with (or near) their elderly parents and/or to provide care and attention to them if they expect to receive a bequest from them, which constitutes strong support for the strategic bequest motive, but that their caregiving behavior is also heavily influenced by the strength of their altruism toward their parents and social norms.     

Punishment and the potency of group selection

It is known that altruism can be sustained in an evolving population by a process of group selection. There is also existing research on the role that punishment can play in inducing selfish agents to behave more co-operatively or in preventing selfish agents from evolving, and the limitations upon this mechanism. This paper embeds a simple model of a punishment system within an indirect cultural evolution framework. The use of punishment is shown to reduce the potency of the group selection mechanism, and thus the level of evolved altruism. This presents a novel reason why the use of punishment may have negative dynamic welfare implications.     

农村三代家庭中子女外出务工对老年人经济支持的影响研究

劳动力外流在积极推动农村经济发展的同时也给老年人的家庭养老带来了极大的挑战.本文利用深圳市外来农村流动人口调查数据,从子女角度分析了中国农村子女外出务工三代家庭中老年人的经济支持.结果显示:首先,农村老年人与其外出务工子女三代家庭的代际支持符合合作群体模型:经济支持主要由子女流向老年父母,最有需要的老年父母获得更多的经济支持;众多老年父母给留守未成年孙子女提供了同住和生活照料帮助,老年父母也因此获得了更多的经济支持.其次,外出务工子女的城市化程度并没有影响其提供的经济支持.最后,文章指出了研究结果对完善农村养老保障制度和促进剩余劳动力外流的启示.     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

Structural transformation in China and India: A note on macroeconomic policies

This paper explores macroeconomic policies that can sustain structural change in China and India. A two-sector open-economy model with endogenous productivity growth, demand driven output and income distribution as an important determinant of economic activity is calibrated to a 2000 SAM for China and a 1999/2000 SAM for India. Short-run analysis concerns temporary equilibria for output, productivity and employment growth rates in the formal sector. In the long-run, the model allows for multiple equilibria which can describe cases of (a) underdevelopment and structural heterogeneity or (b) sustained growth and development. Several simulation exercises are conducted. Specifically, we consider how changes in investment, wages, labor productivity trend and a depreciation of currency affect the macroeconomy and job creation in the formal sector.     

Agricultural sector and industrial agglomeration

In many developing countries, agriculture hires at least as many workers as manufacturing industries. We investigate an economic geography model in which agricultural goods are costly to transport and in which manufactures hire labor from the local agricultural sector as unskilled labor. Our conclusions show that the parameters in the agricultural sector are crucial to determine the spatial configuration of economic activity. We provide an analytic treatment to the model. The location equilibria are compared with the first and second best outcomes.     

Altruism and Spite in a Selfish Gene Model of Endogenous Preferences

Economists and biologists have long grappled with the apparent contradiction of altruism in a naturally-selected world. Standard economic models are built upon an assumption of material self-interest where agents maximize individual outcomes without regard for the effects on others. This paper begins with a brief discussion of the evidence that human behavior deviates from the economic assumption. With the goal of more accurately describing human nature, the interpersonal components of preferences are derived in a genetic model. This model predicts a variety of behaviors that are considered paradoxical within the standard economic framework. The optimal attitude towards others is parameterized by the genetic relationship between individuals and by the population size. For interactions between ‘average’ individuals, the standard economic assumption is the limiting case of the genetic model as the population becomes arbitrarily large. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

EVIDENCE ON FEATURES OF A DSGE BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL FROM BAYESIAN MODEL AVERAGING*

The empirical support for features of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with two technology shocks is evaluated using Bayesian model averaging over vector autoregressions. The model features include equilibria, restrictions on long‐run responses, a structural break of unknown date, and a range of lags and deterministic processes. We find support for a number of features implied by the economic model, and the evidence suggests a break in the entire model structure around 1984, after which technology shocks appear to account for all stochastic trends. Business cycle volatility seems more due to investment‐specific technology shocks than neutral technology shocks.     

Economic growth and endogenous intergenerational altruism

The recent literature on the endogenous formation of preferences has emphasized that while some preferences are more conducive to growth than others, economic growth also contributes to the formation of particular tastes [Becker, Gary S. (1996): Accounting for Tastes, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press]. In this paper, we construct a neoclassical growth model where intergenerational altruism can be endogenously reinforced and entails costly sacrifices on the part of parents to acquire such trait. While the incentives to acquire altruistic traits depend on the economic conditions, in turn altruism determines the level of intergenerational bequests and ultimately the pace of capital accumulation and economic growth. It is shown that intergenerational transfers are driven by a natural degree of altruism at earlier stages of economic growth. Once individuals have satisfied their own physiological constraint in the course of economic development, they devote resources to shaping their altruistic preferences, increasing their social degree of altruism above its natural level. This in turn increases the share of intergenerational transfers and speeds up economic growth.     

The opportunistic approach to monetary policy and financial market conditions

We test the concept of the opportunistic approach to monetary policy in South Africa post-2000 inflation targeting regime. The article contributes to the current debate on central banks having additional objectives over and above inflation and output by incorporating a measure of financial conditions in the modelling framework. Our findings support the two features of the opportunistic approach. First, we find that the models that include an intermediate target that reflects the recent history of inflation rather than simple inflation target improve the fit of the models. Second, the data supports the view that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) behaves with some degree of nonresponsiveness when inflation is within the zone of discretion but react aggressively otherwise. Recursive estimates from our preferred model reveal that overall there has been a subdued reaction to inflation, output and financial conditions amidst the increased economic uncertainty of the 2007–2009 financial crisis.     

Indirect taxation and the welfare effects of altruism on the optimal fiscal policy

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of altruism on the optimal fiscal policy. The existence of positive bequests links present and future generations in the economy. We show that these altruistic links provide a new role for indirect taxation (consumption and estate taxes) with important welfare implications. We use three different altruistic approaches (warm-glow, dynastic, and family) to illustrate how the presence of bequests in the budget constraint of the donee gives the government the ability to use indirect taxation to mimic lump-sum taxes and to implement the first-best outcome in the long-run. This channel is not present in economies without altruism, such as the infinite-lived consumer economy or the overlapping generations economy, where long-run welfare is suboptimal and indirect taxation is irrelevant.     

Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games

There are many economic problems which, when modelled as games of incomplete information, give rise to many sequential equilibria, severely limiting the usefulness of the model. There has recently been a large literature devoted to "refining" the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs. This paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and, further, proposes an alternative refinement that avoids the difficulties. We also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C70, D82.     

Democracy and Economic Growth in an Interdependent World

We model dynamic interdependence in cross‐country economic growth processes by allowing it to vary according to democratic distance among economies. Stochastic distributional dynamics and temporal effects of democracy on economic growth are studied, and spatial variation in economic growth is explored. Among important results, democratic poverty trap is found to exist indicating the possibility of persistence of (un)stable democratic equilibria at different levels of democracy. Our cross‐sectional regression evinces that democracy has exerted significant growth‐enhancing effect and that the democratic distribution has steadily shifted locus from low‐level to high‐level equilibrium. Our spatial analysis of democracy‐economic growth nexus provide evidence of significant dynamic spatial autocorrelation and complementarity among countries' growth processes. Finally, it is demonstrated that the relevance of geographical proximity in facilitating interdependence in economic growth is overshadowed by relational proximity.     

A multi-region model of economic growth with human capital and negative externalities in innovation

We use a multi-region model and provide the first theoretical analysis of the effects of human capital use and a particular kind of innovative activity on economic growth. In each of the N heterogeneous regions in our model, consumers have constant relative risk aversion preferences, there are negative externalities in innovation, and there are three kinds of manufacturing activities involving the production of blueprints for inputs or machines, the inputs or machines themselves, and a single final good for consumption. Our analysis generates four salient findings. First, for each of the N regions, we define a balanced growth path equilibrium, we characterize the market clearing factor prices, and we determine the free entry condition in the R&D sector. Second, we show that without growth in human capital, there is no sustained economic growth in any of the N regions. Third, we show that human capital growth generates sustained economic growth in each of the N regions. Finally, when discussing the above three findings, we shed light on the spatial dimensions of economic growth in our multi-region aggregate economy.     

Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games

This paper provides a model for the study of direct, public and strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. We propose an equilibrium concept which takes into account communication possibilities of exogenously certifiable statements and in which beliefs off the equilibrium path are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility correspondences, without making reference to perturbed games. Properties of such an equilibrium and of revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown that our equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive form game with communication. Finally, sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized in some classes of games. Several examples and economic applications are investigated.