Coordination and transfer

We study the ability of subjects to transfer principles between related coordination games. Subjects play a class of order statistic coordination games closely related to the well-known minimum (or weak-link) and median games (Van Huyck et al. in Am Econ Rev 80:234–248, 1990, Q J Econ 106(3):885–910, 1991). When subjects play a random sequence of games with differing order statistics, play is less sensitive to the order statistic than when a fixed order statistic is used throughout. This is consistent with the prediction of a simple learning model with transfer. If subjects play a series of similar stag hunt games, play converges to the payoff dominant equilibrium when a convention emerges, replicating the main result of Rankin et al. (Games Econ Behav 32:315–337, 2000). When these subjects subsequently play a random sequence of order statistic games, play is shifted towards the payoff dominant equilibrium relative to subjects without previous experience. The data is consistent with subjects absorbing a general principle, play of the payoff dominant equilibrium, and applying it in a new related setting.     

Evolution and correlated equilibrium

Given a normal form game and a signal generating process, we construct an expanded game in the spirit of Aumann (Econometrica 55(1):1–18, 1987) in which agents condition their strategic choices on perceived signals. We collect results on evolutionary selection dynamics of Ritzberger and Weibull (Econometrica 63(6):1371–1399, 1995), Swinkels (J Econ Theory 57(2):306–332, 1992b) and Samuelson and Zhang (J Econ Theory 57:363–391, 1992) to apply them to normal form games with payoff irrelevant signals. We suggest a selection dynamic for the evolution of signals and characterize the set of signal distributions and induced payoffs for sets that are asymptotically stable with respect to this evolutionary selection on signals.     

Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction

We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find that even small communication costs dramatically reduce message use when communication is optional, but efficient coordination can occur with similar frequency as under costless communication. These findings can be accounted for by formalizations of forward induction that take Nash equilibrium as a reference point (such as Kohlberg and Mertens in Econometrica 54: 1003–1037, 1986; Govindan and Wilson in Econometrica 77: 1–28, 2009), while formalizations that only appeal to (higher-order) knowledge of rationality remain silent in this environment.     

The role of the German Historical School in the development of Mises’s thought

Hülsmann (2007) and Hayek ([1922] 1981) have argued that Mises’s first book The Development of the Relationship between Lords of Manor and Peasants in Galicia, 1772–1848 (1902) is written in the tradition of the German Historical School. Historicist contemporaries of Mises also considered his first academic work a continuation of the Knapp-Grünberg tradition (Kaser Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 28(1), 374–79, 1904; Wimbersky, 1906). We argue that von Mises (1902) does not represent the younger German Historical School. First, Mises provides a rationalization of the history rather than ethical and cultural explanation of historical events. Second, he does not support the Knapp-Grünberg argument about the historical development of serfdom under a Slavic rule. Finally, von Mises (1902) does not adhere to the ideology of the Historical School regarding the virtues of the Prussian bureaucracy.     

Surplus measures and luenberger Hicks–Moorsteen productivity indicator

This paper extends to production theory some notions of compensated and equivalent variation analyzed in Luenberger (Econ Theory 7:445–462, 1996) in a consumer context. Along this line the Luenberger–Hicks–Moorsteen productivity indicator introduced in Briec and Kerstens (Econ Theory 23:925–939, 2004) is derived from these concepts for multi-output production technologies. The dual properties of this productivity indicator are analyzed and an aggregate indicator is introduced inspired from the resource function proposed in Luenberger (1996). A connection to a suitable Slutsky matrix is established.     

Accounting Price of an Exhaustible Resource: Response and Extensions

Wei (Environ Resour Econ 60:579–581, 2015) presents a novel derivation of the accounting price for an exhaustible resource in a non-optimal economy subject to an allocation mechanism. We show that Wei (2015) and Hamilton and Ruta (Environ Resour Econ 42:53–64, 2009) are in fact employing different and mutually exclusive allocation mechanisms for the economy, and this explains the differences between the respective accounting prices. Because accounting prices must be defined subject to the allocation mechanism for the economy, the prices derived in the two papers are equally valid within their respective allocation domains. Further analysis shows that if there is declining marginal product of factors, a ‘Hartwick investment rule’ for the model economy (set investment just equal to depletion, valued at the accounting price) will lead to declining consumption for the Wei (2015) accounting price, and increasing consumption for the Hamilton and Ruta (2009) accounting price. This result is extended to consider the accounting standards recommended in the UN SEEA (System of environmental-economic accounting 2012: central framework. United Nations, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, 2012), as well as accounting for environmental externalities from resource use.     

Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination

This paper compares behavior under four different implementations of infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: the standard random termination method [proposed by Roth and Murnighan (J Math Psychol 17:189–198, 1978)] and three other methods that de-couple the expected number of rounds and the discount factor. Two of these methods involve a fixed number of repetitions with payoff discounting, followed by random termination [proposed by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (J Econ Behav Organ 48:37–50, 2002)] or followed by a coordination game [proposed in (Andersson and Wengström in J Econ Behav Organ 81:207–219, 2012; Cooper and Kuhn in Am Econ J Microecon 6:247–278, 2014a)]. We also propose a new method—block random termination—in which subjects receive feedback about termination in blocks of rounds. We find that behavior is consistent with the presence of dynamic incentives only with methods using random termination, with the standard method generating the highest level of cooperation. Subject behavior in the other two methods display two features: a higher level of stability in cooperation rates and less dependence on past experience. Estimates of the strategies used by subjects reveal that across implementations, even when the discount rate is the same, if interactions are expected to be longer defection increases and the use of the Grim strategy decreases.     

Finance–growth nexus: does causality withstand financial liberalization? Evidence from cointegrated VAR

The main finding of the paper is that, contrary to Rousseau and Wachtel (Economic growth and financial depth. Is the relationship extinct already? UNU-Wider discussion paper no. 2005/10, 2005), a long-run equilibrium relationship between financial and economic development is identified with data up to 2006—well over the financial openness boom of the nineties—in countries whose history is characterized by numerous years of high inflation and/or episodes of crisis or other structural change. Also, financial openness, or lack thereof, proves to be an important feature both in explaining differences in sensitivity of financial development to capital accumulation and in determining the direction of causality between financial and economic development. The paper finds that bidirectional causality between economic and financial development is not as frequent an outcome as in Luintel and Khan (J Dev Econ 60:381–405, 1999), and in several cases, Joan Robinson’s (The generalization of the general theory in the rate of interest, and other essays, Macmillan, London, pp 67–142, 1952) statement on the primacy of economic development over finance is supported by the estimations.     

Rank based cointegration testing for dynamic panels with fixed <Emphasis Type="Italic">T</Emphasis>

In this paper, we show that the cointegration testing procedure of Binder et al. (Econom Theory 21:795–837, 2005) for Panel Vector Autoregressive model of order 1, PVAR(1) is not valid due to the singularity of the hessian matrix. As an alternative we propose a method of moments based procedure using the rank test of Kleibergen and Paap (J Econom 133:97–126, 2006) for a fixed number of time series observations. The test is shown to be applicable in situations with time-series heteroscedasticity and unbalanced data. The novelty of our approach is that in the construction of the test we exploit the “weakness” of the Anderson and Hsiao (J Econom 18:47–82, 1982) moment conditions. The finite-sample performance of the proposed test statistic is investigated using simulated data. The results indicate that for most scenarios the method has good statistical properties. The proposed test provides little statistical evidence of cointegration in the employment data of Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (J Bus Econ Stat 17:36–49, 1999).     

Markups and bargaining power in tradable and non-tradable sectors

This article jointly estimates product and labour market imperfections for narrowly defined sectors in the Portuguese economy for the period 2006–2009, following Roeger (J Polit Econ 103(2):316–330, 1995), Crépon et al. (Ann Econ Stat (79/80):583–610, 2005), Dobbelaere (Int J Ind Organ 22(10):1381–1398, 2004) and Abraham et al. (Rev World Econ 145(1):13–36, 2009). In addition, we propose a criterion for the identification of tradable and non-tradable sectors based on the export-to-sales ratio and compare markups and workers’ bargaining power along this dimension. Our findings suggest that markups are higher in the non-tradable than in the tradable sector but workers’ bargaining power is similar. In addition, there is a significant level of heterogeneity across markets, particularly in the non-tradable sector. Moreover, the article confirms that, if labour market imperfections are disregarded, markups are significantly understated.     

Austrian theories of entrepreneurship: Insights from complexity theory

This paper examines various Austrian theories of entrepreneurship through the lens of complexity theory, more specifically via the concept of a dancing fitness landscape. Problems in many fields (including economics) can be characterized as attempting to find the highest peak on a fitness landscape (which corresponds to an efficient or optimal resource allocation). A rugged fitness landscape is one characterized by many peaks and troughs, while a dancing fitness landscape is one where the peaks and troughs change over time due either to exogenous or endogenous activity. I argue that several key disagreements among Austrian economists can be better understood through the metaphor of a fitness landscape. The implications of this insight for various branches of Austrian economics are also considered. This study is timely as radical Austrian views are starting to percolate into business schools leading to increased debate among management scholars about the precise nature of the entrepreneurial process (Chiles et al. 2007; Sarasvathy and Dew 2008; Alvarez et al. 2010).     

Applying a microfounded-forecasting approach to predict Brazilian inflation

We investigate whether combining forecasts from surveys of expectations is a helpful empirical strategy for forecasting inflation in Brazil. We employ the FGV–IBRE Economic Tendency Survey, which consists of monthly qualitative information from approximately 2000 consumers since 2006, and also the Focus Survey of the Central Bank of Brazil, with daily forecasts since 1999 from roughly 250 professional forecasters. Natural candidates to win a forecast competition in the literature of surveys of expectations are the (consensus) cross-sectional average forecasts (AF). We first show that these forecasts are a bias-ridden version of the conditional expectation of inflation using the no-bias tests proposed in Issler and Lima (J Econom 152(2):153–164, 2009) and Gaglianone and Issler (Microfounded forecasting, 2015). The results reveal interesting data features: Consumers systematically overestimate inflation (by 2.01 p.p., on average), whereas market agents underestimate it (by 0.68 p.p. over the same sample). Next, we employ a pseudo out-of-sample analysis to evaluate different forecasting methods: the AR(1) model, the Granger and Ramanathan (J Forecast 3:197–204, 1984) forecast combination (GR) technique, a Phillips-curve based method, the Capistrán and Timmermann (J Bus Econ Stat 27:428–440, 2009) combination method, the consensus forecast (AF), the bias-corrected average forecast (BCAF), and the extended BCAF. Results reveal that: (i) the MSE of the AR(1) model is higher compared to the GR (and usually lower compared to the AF); and (ii) the extended BCAF is more accurate than the BCAF, which, in turn, dominates the AF. This validates the view that the bias corrections are a useful device for forecasting using surveys. The Phillips-curve based method has a median performance in terms of MSE, and the Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) combination method fares slightly worse.     

Determining the number of factors after stationary univariate transformations

A very common practice when extracting factors from non-stationary multivariate time series is to differentiate each variable in the system. As a consequence, the ratio between variances and the dynamic dependence of the common and idiosyncratic differentiated components may change with respect to the original components. In this paper, we analyze the effects of these changes on the finite sample properties of several procedures to determine the number of factors. In particular, we consider the information criteria of Bai and Ng (Econometrica 70(1):191–221, 2002), the edge distribution of Onatski (Rev Econ Stat 92(4):1004–1016, 2010) and the ratios of eigenvalues proposed by Ahn and Horenstein (Econometrica 81(3):1203–1227, 2013). The performance of these procedures when implemented to differentiated variables depends on both the ratios between variances and dependencies of the differentiated factor and idiosyncratic noises. Furthermore, we also analyze the role of the number of factors in the original non-stationary system as well as of its temporal and cross-sectional dimensions. Finally, we implement the different procedures to determine the number of common factors in a system of inflation rates in 15 euro area countries.     

The Lindahl equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models

The main motivation of the paper is to determine the social value of innovations in a standard scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model, which explicitly introduces knowledge diffusion over a Salop (Bell J Econ 10(1):141–156 1979) circle. The social value of an innovation is defined as the optimal value of the knowledge inherent in this innovation. We thus have to price optimally knowledge. For that purpose, contrary to what is done in standard growth theory, we complete the markets using Lindahl prices for knowledge. The Lindahl equilibrium, which provides the system of prices that sustains the first-best social optimum in an economy with non rival goods, appears as a benchmark. First, its comparison with the standard Schumpeterian equilibrium à la Aghion and Howitt (Econometrica (60)2:323–351 1992) enables us to shed a new light on the issue of non-optimality of the latter. Second, the Lindahl equilibrium also allows us to revisit the issue of R&D incentives in presence of cumulative innovations. Finally, this benchmark may be a first step to understand how knowledge is exchanged in new technology sectors.     

Testing spatial regression models under nonregular conditions

In time series context, estimation and testing issues with autoregressive and moving average (ARMA) models are well understood. Similar issues in the context of spatial ARMA models for the disturbance of the regression, however, remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we discuss the problems of testing no spatial dependence in the disturbances against the alternative of spatial ARMA process incorporating the possible presence of spatial dependence in the dependent variable. The problems of conducting such a test are twofold. First, under the null hypothesis, the nuisance parameter is not identified, resulting in a singular information matrix (IM), which is a nonregular case in statistical inference. To take account of singular IM, we follow Davies (Biometrika 64(2):247–254, 1977; Biometrika 74(1):33–43, 1987) and propose a test procedure based on the supremum of the Rao score test statistic. Second, the possible presence of spatial lag dependence will have adverse effect on the performance of the test. Using the general test procedure of Bera and Yoon (Econom Theory 9:649–658, 1993) under local misspecification, we avoid the explicit estimation of the spatial autoregressive parameter. Thus our suggested tests are entirely based on ordinary least squares estimation. Tests suggested here can be viewed as a generalization of Anselin et al. (Reg Sci Urban Econ 26:77–104, 1996). We conduct Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the finite sample properties of the proposed tests. Simulation results show that our tests have good finite sample properties both in terms of size and power, compared to other tests in the literature. We also illustrate the applications of our tests through several data sets.     

Modeling Financial Integration,Intra-EMU and Asian-US External Imbalances

Intra-EMU external imbalances in the pre-crisis period up to 2008 are traditionally explained by EMU-oriented factors, e.g. euro-related financial integration. Chen et al. (2013) also emphasize external trade shocks, such as the competitive challenge of emerging Asia and oil exporters to EMU-periphery’s exports. Moreover, Asian-U.S. external imbalances are attributed to financial integration between East Asia and the USA in the aftermath of the East-Asian currency crises in the late 1990s (Angeletos and Panoussi 2011). Acknowledging these empirical facts this paper develops a Buiter (1981) three-country (EMU, Asia, US), two-region (EMU core, EMU periphery) OLG model to investigate the effects of both intra-EMU and Asian-U.S. financial integration on intra-EMU, Asian and U.S. external imbalances. We find that the widening of the intra-EMU external imbalances, in particular of trade imbalances, is related to the growth in Asian-U.S. imbalances and the dynamic inefficiency of the world economy, caused by excessive saving in Asia.     

Do internal references lead to wage rigidity?

This paper analyzes three prominent models of internal references and their impact on wage rigidity (Danthine and Kurmann in Scand J Econ 109(4):857–881, 2007; J Monet Econ 57(7):837–850, 2010; Koskela and Schöb in J Econ 96:79–86, 2009). With one exception, these studies find that internal references, nested in reciprocal worker preferences, unambiguously increase wage rigidity. In contrast to that literature, the present study provides analytical proofs, calibration results as well as impulse response functions which show that the effect of internal references on wage rigidity is in fact ambiguous. Several model extensions are discussed and robustness checks conducted. The intuition for this result is similar in all models: as internal and external references are modeled as weighted average, an increase in the weight on the internal reference implies a simultaneous decrease in the weight on the outside option. Therefore, the effect of the internal reference relative to the external reference determines whether wage rigidity increases or decreases.     

Using simulation experiments to test historical explanations: the development of the German dye industry 1857-1913

In a simulation experiment, building on the abductive simulation approach of Brenner and Werker (2007), we test historical explanations for why German firms came to surpass British and France firms and to dominate the global synthetic dye industry for three decades before World War 1 while the U.S. never achieved large market share despite large home demand. Murmann and Homburg (J Evol Econ 11(2):177–205, 2001) and Murmann (2003) argued that German firms came to dominate the global industry because of (1) the high initial number of chemists in Germany at the start of the industry in 1857, (2) the high responsiveness of the German university system and (3) the late (1877) introduction of a patent regime in Germany as well as the more narrow construction of this regime compared to Britain, France and the U.S. We test the validity of these three potential explanations with the help of simulation experiments. The experiments show that the 2nd explanation—the high responsiveness of the German university system— is the most compelling one because unlike the other two it is true for virtually all plausible historical settings.     

The impact of personal beliefs on climate change: the “battle of perspectives” revisited

The paper proposes a multi-agent climate-economic model, the “battle of perspectives 2.0”. It is an updated and improved version of the original “battle of perspectives” model, described in Janssen (1996) and Janssen/de Vries (1998). The model integrates agents with differing beliefs about economic growth and the sensitivity of the climate system and places them in environments corresponding or non-corresponding to their beliefs. In a second step, different agent types are ruling the world conjointly. Using a learning procedure based on some operators known from Genetic Algorithms, the model shows how they adapt wrong beliefs over time. It is thus an evolutionary model of climate protection decisions. The paper argues that such models may help in analyzing why cost-minimizing protection paths, derived from integrated assessment models à la Nordhaus/Sztorc (2013), are not followed. Although this view is supported by numerous authors, few such models exist. With the “battle of perspectives 2.0” the paper offers a contribution to their development. Compared to the former version, more agent types are considered and more aspects have been endogenized.     

An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules

Buchanan and Tullok (The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962) argued that the optimal k-majority rule should minimize the sum of external costs and decision costs. Dougherty et al. (Public Choice, 163(1–2):31–52, 2015) formalized their approach using various groups of voters. In this study, we analyze the optimal k-majority rule in terms of expected utility and compare our results to Dougherty et al. (2015), which focuses on costs alone. Specifically, we replace Buchanan and Tullock’s external cost function with an external utility function that accounts for both the benefits and costs of enacting proposals. We find that analyzing k-majority rules in terms of utility, rather than costs, affects the optima. Furthermore, in terms of utility, the optimal k-majority rule can vary depending on the group one expects to be in during a vote. With some interesting exceptions, individuals from groups that favor the proposal often find small k-majority rules optimal. Individuals from groups that oppose the proposal often find large k-majority rules optimal.