经济绿色化发展与积极绿色财政政策的实施

我国实施可持续发展战略要求经济的绿色化发展，适应消费结构的同级化需要经济的绿色化发展，打破“绿色壁垒”也需要经济的绿色化发展。可以说，经济绿色化是我国国民经济发展的必然选择。本文拟就我国实施积极的绿色财政政策，促进国民经济的绿色化发展进行阐述。     

生态文明导向的我国工业绿色化发展战略

随着社会经济的迅速发展,资源的瓶颈约束作用日益凸显,环境污染问题愈发严重,为了实现国民经济可持续发展,我国必须实施生态文明导向的工业绿色化发展战略。文章详细阐述了工业绿色化的概念及内涵,进而分析了实施该战略的必然性和紧迫性,最后提出工业绿色化发展战略的对策和政策建议。     

低碳经济背景下企业实施绿色化生产的经济绩效研究

绿色化生产是发展低碳经济的基本要求,绿色化发展更是大势所趋.但是,目前国内有许多企业对企业绿色化发展还停留在"改善企业形象"、"树立企业道德观"、"是做广告的另一种方式"等低层次的认识上,有的甚至认为企业经济效益与绿色化发展是对立的.在这样的背景下,文章以企业实施绿色化生产经营行为的收益成本结构为研究的切入点,解释企业实施绿色化生产的绩效来源,从而澄清企业实施绿色化生产的思想误区,确立了企业实施绿色化生产的成本收益结构,为企业实施绿色化生产的决策提供理论支持和方法指导.     

我国农业龙头企业绿色品牌“局部化”战略的现状、动机、问题与对策

我国绿色产品产业规模每年以20%以上的速度增长,80%的贡献率来自于绿色食品认证企业数量的扩张,企业规模扩张的贡献率不足20%,绿色食品产业发展呈现粗放式增长的特征。从微观的角度来看,我国农业龙头企业普遍实施"局部化"绿色品牌战略,且农业龙头企业"绿色化"规模扩张有停滞的趋势。究其原因主要有三方面:一是绿色农业扶持政策激发龙头企业绿色认证激情,但制约其绿色化规模增长;二是农业龙头企业通过绿色食品联合品牌特性转移消费者"绿色态度",通过品牌联想机制"漂绿"企业形象,通过"局部化"绿色食品战略提高企业经济效益,最终减缓"绿色化"扩张意愿;三是大型农业龙头企业普遍实施非农化战略,通过"漂绿"企业形象,获得更多的政策扶持,但其"绿色化"扩张冲动减弱。因此,政府部门要以促进农业龙头企业进行"绿色化"扩张为抓手,建立绿色食品管理部门考核机制,进一步优化原有的绿色食品产业扶持政策,形成针对大、中、小不同规模农业龙头企业的扶持政策体系,从而促进我国绿色食品产业发展模式由粗放式向集约式转变。     

我国产业绿色化对策分析

当前，已成为国际贸易中最重要壁垒之一的绿色贸易壁垒已给我国产业带来了严峻的挑战。实行产业绿色化战略、积极应对绿色贸易壁垒，是我国当前面临的一项重要任务。我国应从政府、企业、公民社会等几个维度入手，实施产业绿色化策略。     

论国际贸易绿色化趋势与促进环保型FDI的发展

随着我国经济日益融入世界经济,我国的经济"绿色化"进程进一步加快。国际贸易的绿色化趋势对我国外商直接投资(简称FDI)企业提出了更高的环保要求。我国在引进外商直接投资项目上要适应这种趋势,采取有效措施促进环保型FDI的发展。     

实施商标战略提升企业竞争力

实施商标战略,对提高企业竞争力,建设创新型国家,提升国家整体经济实力,具有重大战略意义。文章从企业转变经营方式、发展对外贸易,参与国际竞争和世界经济一体化的战略高度,审视了我国企业在实施商标战略中存在的主要问题,进而从发展理念、企业战略管理、国家政策等方面提出了企业实施商标战略的对策。     

完善我国企业跨国经营战略与控制体系构想

随着经济全球化的发展和我国加入世贸组织,我国已经成为世界经济的有机组成部分。为了以更加主动的姿态全面参与国际分工,提高我国的国际竞争力,我国政府正在推动实施“走出去”战略。这是关系到整个国民经济发展全局的一项重大经济战略,将直接影响未来一个时期我国在经济全球化格局中的国际地位。企业是市场经济的主体。我国外向型经济战略的实施,归根结底要体现在我国企业跨国经营战略的实施上。因此,我国企业的跨国经营战略与控制,应该适应新的国际国内形势的要求,借鉴跨国公司的有效做法,建立和完善符合中国企业特点的跨国经营战略和控…     

谈我国经济绿色化发展的制度支持

制度对经济发展的作用正越来越被人们所认识。主要论述了制度对经济的绿色化发展,即国民经济各部门的生态化、无污染化、无公害化发展的支持作用。指出不能靠消耗资源、牺牲环境换取经济的高速增长,而要依靠科学的制度安排和实施,使我国经济绿色化发展可持续进行下去。     

工业绿色化的内涵及影响因素分析

工业绿色化指工业企业对环境问题的认知、思维和行为不断朝着减少污染,使投入、生产过程及其产出和提高环境质量目标相协调方向变化的过程。影响工业绿色化的宏观因素包括自然经济、社会文化和政治法律等因素;中观因素包括环境政策、市场机制和公众参与等因素;微观因素包括行业特征、企业实力、企业家特质、企业战略目标等因素。厘清工业绿色化影响因素和作用机理,对于全面分析工业绿色化发生发展规律,推进我国工业绿色化进程具有十分重要的理论和现实意义。     

中国的选择:生产力发展的绿色道路

随着中国经济的发展 ,环境问题日益严重 ,解决发展与环境问题就成为一个迫切任务。但就目前现有的环境和发展理论而言都有根本性缺陷 ,不能胜任这一任务。因而本文把中国未来环境、资源和发展问题归结为“中国生产力发展的绿色道路”问题。这一提法的要义在于强调中国“发展是硬道理”的过渡时期的时代特征和有中国特色的绿色道路只有从生产关系、上层建筑这样的大视角下才能被正确理解和最优化其组织过程。这也是绿色生产力概念存在的必要充分条件。“生产力发展的绿色道路”理论不是排斥现有“绿色”和“发展”的相关理论 ,而是在中国实践之上的一次理论综合     

Can cross–border pollution reduce pollution?

We develop a two–country model of foreign aid and cross–border pollution resulting from production activities in the recipient country. There is both private and public abatement of pollution, the latter being financed through emissions tax revenue and foreign aid. We characterize a Nash equilibrium in which the donor country chooses the amount of aid and the recipient chooses the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement and the emission tax rate. At this equilibrium, an increase in the donor’s perceived rate of cross–border pollution reduces emission levels. JEL Classification: Q28, F35, H41 Est–ce que la pollution trans–frontière peut réduire le niveau de pollution? Les auteurs développent un modèle à deux pays d’aide à l’étranger et de pollution trans–frontière résultant d’activités de production dans le pays qui reçoit l’aide. Il existe des efforts privés et publics pour réduire la pollution, ces derniers étant financés par les rentrées fiscales d’une taxe sur la pollution et par l’aide étrangère. On définit un équilibre à la Nash pour lequel le pays donateur choisit le montant de l’aide, et le pays récipiendaire choisit la fraction de l’aide étrangère qu’il allouera à la lutte à la pollution ainsi que le taux de taxation sur la pollution. A cet équilibre, un accroissement dans le taux de pollution trans–frontière perçu par le donataire réduit le taux de pollution.     

没有惩罚就没有道德

十几年前,笔者与已故北大经济学教授陈岱孙同在一个教研室。每周一次严肃的政治学习中也难免讲一点社会新闻,讲的最多的是干部腐败与假冒伪劣产品横行。陈老把这些现象的原因归结为惩罚太轻。他说,对这些劣行的惩罚总是像“三娘教子”中所唱的:“我把鞭子高高举起,轻轻打下”。陈老主张“乱世用重典”,加大惩罚力度。十几年过去了,陈老也已作古,但陈老的忠言仍是一种善良的愿望。     

中国:奥巴马面临的初次考验

《商业周刊》2009年1月12日全球经济衰退能够暴露出贸易伙伴最糟糕的一面。由于国内需求疲软,中国和美国的制造商纷纷遭遇产能过剩的问题。     

Institutionalized pollution havens

A multiple-principal, multiple-agent lobby group model suggests that the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policies is conditional on the structure of host countries' political institutions such as the number of legislative units (veto players). The model also yields the novel concept of “aggregate honesty” which combines veto players and corruption. FDI raises environmental policy stringency where the number of legislative units are many (aggregate honesty is high), but reduces it where the legislative units are few (aggregate honesty is low). Our panel data evidence is fully consistent with these predictions. An additional contribution is to show the empirical importance of endogenizing environmental policy in Pollution Haven Hypothesis studies. Only when treated as endogenous does environmental policy have a significant negative effect on FDI.     

Demography and pollution

In this paper, we consider an OG model with endogenous fertility and pollution externalities. We assume that pollution lowers the productivity. In the long run, under dominant income (substitution) effects, a raise in the cost of rearing children, increases (decreases) consumption and decreases (increases) pollution. In the short run, under dominant income effects, a sufficiently low pollution elasticity of labor productivity promotes deterministic cycles through a Hopf bifurcation jointly with expectations-driven fluctuations.     

Dynamic pollution regulation

This paper examines pollution regulation in a dynamic setting with complete information. We show that tradeable pollution permits may not achieve the social optimum even when the permit market is perfectly competitive. The reason is that the optimal tradeable permits regulation will typically be time inconsistent. We then show that pollution taxes can achieve the first best and are time consistent.We thank Claudio Mezzetti, Wally Oates, and Paul Rhode for helpful comments. The last two authors thank the National Science Foundation for financial support.     

On modeling incentive systems which utilize pollution charges for pollution abatement

This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data.     

An empirical study of income growth and manufacturing industry pollution in New England, 1980-1990

This paper is an empirical examination of how a community's income growth is affected by polluting manufacturing activity. The hypothesis I test is that this activity has two conflicting effects: first, industrial investment encourages economic growth through the creation of employment and other positive economic spillover effects and, second, the associated pollution causes out-migration of residents. I hypothesize that a community that is initially relatively wealthy will experience relatively more out-migration of its higher income residents, who are assumed to have a lower tolerance for pollution. Thus, such communities will grow less in response to such investment compared to its poorer neighbors. Therefore, in my econometric model the marginal effect of pollution on income growth is allowed to vary with initial incomes. I use a unique data set that incorporates Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) and census tract-level data for New England for the years 1980 and 1990. The estimated effect of pollution on growth is negative, on average, and is more negative in initial incomes. In an effort to measure the out-migration effects of pollution, I use a separate measure of toxic pollution. I find that, holding constant total pollution, ‘toxic’ pollution has a more negative effect on growth for wealthier communities. These results are consistent with the above hypotheses.