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1.
Voucher privatization implies a significant wealth transfer from state to private agents who, in turn, would increase consumption. This paper investigates the consequences of this wealth effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium in a high unemployment economy. The model builds on a two-stage sequential game between the government and private agents. We verify the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which private agents cannot guess whether a policy of fast privatization will be continued in the future or not. This configuration presents an endogenous probability of privatization slowdown; as a consequence, the wealth effect is moderated and the genuine fast privatizer government bears an “undue” credibility cost in terms of employment  相似文献   

2.
This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.  相似文献   

3.
This paper tests whether the implementation of a key market‐oriented reform in post‐Soviet Russia, property rights in land, proxied by the percent of privatized land by region, affected the pace of sub‐national economic growth during two unprecedented expansion periods: 2001–2008 and 2010–2014. Individuals gained the Constitutional right to own land in 1993, but implementation was stalled. The pace of land privatization can be explained by arguably exogenous factors such as distance to Moscow, as well as climate and also regional political culture, proxied by concentration of votes in the 2004 presidential election. We show that this rate of land privatization in Russia's regions was significantly associated with output growth in 2010–2014, confirming the policy importance of this measure for developing economies. Regions where private holdings expanded most rapidly with the enforcement of property rights in land, gained a competitive advantage in the growth process through increased investment in fixed assets and private consumption.  相似文献   

4.
Dual Financial Systems and Inequalities in Economic Development   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
This paper analyzes the emergence and the evolution of a modern banking system, in a developing economy where banks coexist with informal credit institutions. Banks have a superior ability in mobilizing savings while informal lenders enjoy a superior information on borrowers. More specifically, banks cannot observe perfectly the behavior of borrowers; therefore the latter need to provide collateral assets in order to obtain bank loans. Physical collateral is not needed to borrow in the informal credit market: informal lenders can rely on social networks to obtain information on borrowers' behavior and invoke social sanctions to enforce repayment. The sustained growth path is associated with the successful development of the banking system that gathers savings on a large scale. However, informal lenders and other traditional credit institutions are necessary in the first stage of development when collateral is scarce. In this economy, the development of modern financial intermediaries is closely associated with the accumulation of collateral assets by entrepreneurs. This implies that the initial level of development as well as the initial distribution of wealth will determine the joint evolution of the real side of the economy and the financial system. Under certain conditions, two long-run steady-state equilibria exist: in the first one the economy stops growing and the banking system never successfully develops; in the second one the economy reaches a sustained growth rate and the informal sector asymptotically vanishes. The impact of the following policies is discussed: financial repression, micro-credit institutions and redistribution of assets.  相似文献   

5.
Contrary to popular perception, Russia entered the transition with significant inequality. Using the large Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey dataset, we demonstrate that inequality has subsequently risen yet further and by end-1996 was roughly comparable to inequality in Mexico, Colombia or Malaysia. Driving this increase has been not only wealth transfers through privatization but also changes in government expenditure and a sharp growth in earnings dispersion. There has been a large, associated shift in the structure of income. The paper also looks at the incidence and depth of poverty over the period 1992-96. At the start of transition, roughly half the population of households fell below the poverty line. While this has subsequently declined, at end-1996 nearly 40 per cent of households were below the poverty line and a substantial stratum of households were locked in chronic poverty.  相似文献   

6.
This paper is a brief review of the literature on contests, with focus on rent-seeking. A fairly general contest model is presented. We show that the Tullock contest model and the first-prize sealed-bid auction model are obtained as special cases. Some important modifications of the basic model are reviewed: hierarchical rent-seeking, rent-seeking under risk aversion, insecure rents, sabotage in rent-seeking contests, contest design, commitment and endogenous order of moves, and dynamic rent-seeking.  相似文献   

7.
Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on the public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 715–731.  相似文献   

8.
This paper examines the probability of success in a rent-seeking contest as a general function of the resources that both firms and consumers devote to lobbying the government. The object of lobbying is a possible restriction of market supply, where the likelihood that supply will be restricted to a given extent depends on everyone's lobbying efforts. In equilibrium the expected social loss due to rent-seeking activities is at most equal to the size of the contested rent, and this upper bound does not depend on the active participation of consumers in the contest. Markets in which supply is not restricted may also be associated with rent-seeking waste. Finally, consumers' rent-seeking efforts are shown to be socially productive, both on the margin and in total.  相似文献   

9.
It is often discussed that inflation introduces a substantial, arbitrary and regressive redistribution of income and wealth under even mild inflation. But after a quarter century of experience with inflation in postwar Japan, very little is known about these costs of inflation on an empirical basis. Due to the complexity of the evaluation of the redistributional impact on Japan, the present paper analyzes the effects of inflation on individuals or groups as wage earners, debtors and creditors, taxpayers, and holders of real estate. The main results of the present investigation suggest that the Japanese inflation for 1955–75 did not seem to introduce much inequality in the income (flow) account in the economy, but that the inequality between households has appeared more in the wealth (stock) account, especially between the house-owner groups and non-house-owner groups. These observations are mainly derived from the following investigations; (i) the wage lag hypothesis about inflation, even if not wrong, does not seem acceptable when applied to the entire period (1955–75) as well as to each of the five sub-periods; (ii) there has been a substantial transfer of real purchasing power from households to non-financial corporations, and, to a lesser extent, to government entities in the debtor-creditor redistribution; (iii) among households, the most substantial redistribution takes place from the non-houseowners to houseowners with land, because of the huge amount of capital gains from the rapid increase in the price of real estate relative to the prices of other assets or the consumer price index, except for the last three years of rampaging inflation.  相似文献   

10.
Using a novel panel data set from the Credit Suisse on the top wealth shares for 46 sample countries spanning 2000–2014, this paper empirically investigates to what extent wealth inequality influences economic freedom and whether this relationship is affected by the level of democracy. Economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute's economic freedom summary index as well as its five major sub-indices, such as government size, property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade, and regulations. Wealth inequality is measured by the top wealth shares. Trade union density is used as an instrument for wealth inequality. Empirical results suggest that the rising wealth inequality significantly hampers overall economic freedom, property rights protection, freedom to trade, soundness of money and regulatory environment. Furthermore, this negative effect of wealth inequality is reinforced at a lower level of democracy. These findings are robust to alternative measures of wealth inequality, economic freedom, treatment for endogeneity, and model specification.  相似文献   

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