不同订货策略下周期服务水平相对稳定性研究

分别在周期盘点和连续盘点订货策略下,研究了供应链周期服务水平的确定。研究表明:销售剩余的处理方式和成本分担方式对服务水平有较大的影响;合作情况下,周期盘点订货策略的服务水平在销售季节的大部分时间保持了稳定性;建立了存在数量折扣和运费折扣的随机型连续盘点订货模型,证明了由该模型确定的服务水平对于订货批量的相对稳定性。     

忠诚折扣、转售价格维持组合与非对称零售服务投资

忠诚折扣与转售价格维持组合可以实现零售服务异质条件下的非对称最优投资,这一新的发现不仅解决了长期困扰转售价格维持服务理论的一个难题,而且为转售价格维持反垄断效率识别提供了一个可操作的维度.当需要以转售价格维持解决零售服务"搭便车"、同时还需要以非对称零售服务投资实现异质零售服务有效供给时,如果制造商信息不完全、但零售商信息完美,两部收费与转售价格维持组合即可实现非对称最优零售服务投入;但若制造商信息不完全及零售商信息不完美同时存在,则仅有忠诚折扣与转售价格维持组合才能够保证最优零售服务投资实现.原因在于,忠诚折扣能够通过事后销量识别零售商投资是高或低,从而有效解决不完全信息条件下非对称零售服务投资的识别和差别补偿问题.相较于两部收费,忠诚折扣与转售价格维持组合不仅有利于制造商利润最大化,而且能够改善社会福利.在事前对称的市场环境中,忠诚折扣内生形成事后非对称的零售商市场结构,其中低投资零售商的降价激励强于高投资零售商,这一特征有助于识别并检验转售价格维持合约的真实动机.     

主导零售商总量折扣策略竞争效应及其政府规制

总量折扣是各零售商最常用的折扣策略之一，就其本质而言，是一种价格歧视行为，具有促进竞争和抑制竞争两方面的效应。本文通过对主导零售商总量折扣竞争效应的分析，指出在何种情况下，主导零售商的这种折扣行为是反竞争的。在此基础上，提出对主导零售商总量折扣策略的政府规制取向。     

延期付款与零售商努力的供应链协调研究

为解决制造商提供延期付款的商业信用和零售商付出销售努力情形下供应链协调问题,笔者建立了零售商采取联合补货策略下集中协调和分散协调的多产品两级供应链决策模型,设计了价格折扣契约和销售努力成本共享契约两种协调机制,分析了两种契约机制的协调条件与参数设置,得出了零售商偏好价格折扣契约和销售努力成本共享契约协调机制的条件.数值仿真分析说明了两种契约协调机制的有效性,并分析了信用期限对供应链协调的影响.     

家乐福"价格门"带来的影响及相关启示

今年年初,法国零售业巨头家乐福在华被曝出"价格欺诈"丑闻,被指虚构原价,夸大折扣以及标签价与结账价不符.此事一经曝光,受到广大消费消费者和国家价格主管部门的极大关注.本文通过事件的回放与分析,深入剖析了家乐福"价格门"事件的成因以及影响,并对类似家乐福的国际大型零售业巨头在华的经营和发展提出了启示.     

"文化折扣"与中国对外文化贸易的产品策略

"文化折扣"是文化产品区别于其他一般商品的主要特征之一.语言、文化背景、历史传统等都可以导致文化折扣的产生.不同文化产品类型所产生的文化折扣也不一样.在推动中国文化产品走向国际市场的过程中,重视文化折扣研究,采取各种策略降低文化产品的折扣度有着极为重要的意义.该文在对文化折扣进行分析的基础上,提出了中国文化产品走向国际市场应采取的几种策略.     

价格歧视及其应用研究

文章通过对价格歧视定义以及价格歧视种类的分析,并运用套利理论验证价格歧视,研究总结了经济中应用较为普遍的价格歧视形式,讨论了价格歧视在多级折扣票价和选择资费中的具体应用。     

商业企业促销方式与税收筹划

一、商业企业促销方式与税收政策的适用 商业企业的促销方式主要有：商业折扣、现金折扣、买一送一、返还现金等。分述如下： “商业折扣”又称价格折扣，是企业最常用的促销手段，通常用“几折”表示。销货方为了扩大销售、占领市场，往往采用销量越多、价格越低的促销策略，即通常所说的“薄利多销”。对于企业采取商业折扣方式销售货物的，税法规定：如果销售额与折扣额在同一张发票上分别注明的，可以按折扣后的净额计税（包括增值税、企业所得税）；如果将折扣额另开发票，不论其在财务上如何处理，均不得从销售额中减除折扣额计税（包…     

我国专利药独家药价格谈判机制的战略问题

我国专利药、独家药价格谈判机制的战略问题涉及谁来谈判、怎样定价、如何支付。核心问题是构建需求方单一主体,以寡头对寡头的形式消解药企寡头的寻租空间,用中国巨大的整体市场为筹码换取最优惠的价格。该文通过构建国家层面的谈判主体"全国药品价格谈判委员会"及其下属的"药品专家委员会"、"药品经济委员会"、"全国药品信息中心"、"招标谈判工作团",解决谁来谈判问题。通过利润控制+参考定价+不超现价+分类管制的方法,解决怎样定价问题。通过科学确定"支付主体"和"共付比例",解决如何支付问题。     

价格促销为何只能带来人气而没有买气

价格促销是商家提高销售量的最常用手段之一,但是它虽能有效地吸引顾客(人气)却不能有效地提高销售量(买气),即能带来人气而不能创造买气。本文从决定购买行为的一个重要方面——购买坚定性入手,探索价格折扣幅度对消费者购买坚定性的影响机制。研究发现,价格折扣幅度是双刃剑:它一方面降低了消费者对未来降价的预期,提高了购买坚定性,而另一方面则提高消费者对商品质量的质疑,从而降低了购买坚定性。本研究对商业企业的促销管理具有启示作用。     

Anchoring effects in experimental discount rate elicitation

Discount rates are often elicited using incentivized or hypothetical multiple price lists. We conduct two multiple price lists according to Coller and Williams (Experimental Economics 2: 107–127, 1999) with varying ranges of larger–later payments. Participants carry out both tasks and are randomly assigned to a task order as well as to a payment or no-payment treatment. Our results indicate that the range of the first completed task anchors discount rate decisions. Participants who begin the task with the lower range of the larger–later payments stated lower discount rates than participants who start with the task containing a wider range. Paying monetary incentives does not influence the detected anchor effect.     

Convex Time Budgets and Individual Discount Rates in the Long Run

The purpose of this study is to use experimental data to estimate individual discount rates and test for hyperbolic discounting over a long time horizon. To do this, we employ the convex time budget experimental approach with cash payments over a 20 year time horizon. To date, there are few experimental studies that explore discount rates beyond a 1 year time horizon. Previous experimental studies that focus on short time horizons find high discount rates, which may not be applicable to decisions that affect outcomes in the distant future. Our findings are quite similar to the average rate of 4.9% found by Grijalva et al. (Environ Resour Econ 59:39–63, 2014), who similarly use a 20 year time horizon, but use the multiple price list elicitation method along with payment via government savings bonds. We find annual discounts rates in the range of 1.9–5.5%, depending on the specific model used. We also find evidence for declining discount rates, and that this hyperbolic pattern of behavior is related to the confidence subjects have in receiving distant-future payments.     

Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs

This paper formalizes the idea that input transactions might be used to implement side payments among colluding firms. A model is proposed to analyze the effect of backward integration on collusive outcomes in a downstream duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs. Vertical integration expands the set of collusive outcomes that are sustainable for a given realization of the discount factor. This is an additional effect of vertical integration that antitrust authorities should consider. Side payments implemented by input sales are more relevant the larger the difference in marginal costs, since they allow for the shifting of production towards the relatively more efficient firms, while maintaining firms’ incentives to collude. A price of the input above that posted by an alternative source or sales of the input below cost may be observed, depending on the realization of downstream firms’ costs.      

Permanence discounting for land-based carbon sequestration

One major concern regarding land-based carbon sequestration involves the issue of permanence. Sequestration may not last forever and may either be released in the future or require expenditures to maintain the practices that keep it sequestered. In this paper, we investigate the differential value of offsets in the face of impermanent characteristics by forming a price discount that equalizes the effective price per ton between a “perfect offset” and one possessing some with impermanent characteristics. We find this discount to be a function of the future needs to replace offsets (in the face of lease expiration quantity or volatilization upon activities such as timber harvest) and the magnitude of any needed maintenance costs. We investigate the magnitude of the discounts under alternative agricultural tillage and forest management cases. In those studies, we find that permanence discounts in the range of 50% are not uncommon. This means that in the market place an impermanent sequestration offset may only receive payments amounting to 50% of the market carbon price. Furthermore, we find that in the face of escalating carbon prices that offsets may prove to be worthless.     

The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments

In the infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments, we characterize the Pareto frontier of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for all possible combinations of discount factors. Play paths implementing Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are uniquely determined in all but the first period. Full cooperation does not necessarily implement these payoffs even when it maximizes total stage game payoffs. Rather, when the difference in players' discount factors is sufficiently large, Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are implemented by partial cooperation supported by repeated payments from the impatient to the patient player. When both players are sufficiently patient, such payoffs, while implemented via full cooperation, are supported by repeated payments from the impatient to the patient player. We characterize conditions under which public randomization has no impact on the Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs and conditions under which such payoffs are robust to renegotiation.     

Product differentiation,price discrimination and collusion

The existing literature which analyses the relationship between the product differentiation degree and the sustainability of a collusive agreement on price assumes that firms cannot price discriminate, and concludes that there is a negative relationship between the product differentiation degree and the critical discount factor. This paper, in contrast, assumes that firms are able to price discriminate. Within the Hotelling framework, three different collusive schemes are studied: perfect collusion on discriminatory prices; perfect collusion on a uniform price; collusion not to discriminate. We obtain that the critical discount factor of the first and the third collusive scheme does not depend on the product differentiation degree, while the critical discount factor of the second collusive scheme depends positively on the product differentiation degree. Moreover, we show that imperfect collusion is more difficult to sustain than perfect collusion.     

封闭式基金折价均值回归研究——基于协整分析

以我国仍在交易的25支封闭式基金为研究对象,利用每支基金从上市第2年到2010年12月的交易价格和净值的周数据进行实证分析。运用恩格尔-格兰杰两步法并进行Johansen协整检验,证实了我国封闭式基金折价存在均值回归现象。同时,误差修正模型分析结果显示,25支样本基金中有22支基金的交易价格与净值的误差修正项显著,说明封闭式基金的交易价格和净值的变动均会影响基金折价,其中交易价格变动对折价的影响更大。最后,提出我国基金投资者可通过投资折价较大的封闭式基金获得超额收益。     

Severance Payments and Unemployment Insurance: A Commitment Issue

In the event of a job termination, many workers receive severance payments from their employer, in addition to publicly provided unemployment insurance (UI). In the absence of a third party enforcer, contracts featuring severance payments must be supported by an implicit self‐enforcing contract. Workers believe employers will make severance payments only if it is in their best interest ex post. If firms discount the future deeply, they will reduce the severance payment they offer, in order to relax their incentive constraint. Workers are forced to bear risk, and too many workers are laid off. We show that a well‐designed public UI system can correct these distortions.     

Advance disposal fee vs. disposal fee: A monopolistic producer’s durability choice model

This study examines how the timing of waste disposal fee collection affects the producer’s choice of built-in product durability and social welfare in a durable-goods monopoly model. We categorize the waste disposal fee policies into two: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. We show that a DF policy has two opposing effects on durability. Firstly, a DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase durability in order to delay the households’ waste disposal and to discount future payments of the disposal fee (the payment-discounting effect). Secondly, a DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally in order to mitigate the payment of the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce durability in order to avoid market saturation and the associated future price cuts (the illegal-dumping effect). When the disposal fee is low, the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect under a DF policy, leading to the enhancement of durability. In this case, from a social welfare viewpoint, a DF policy may be more desirable than an ADF policy if the environmental damage associated with illegal dumping is not serious. However, when the disposal fee is high, a DF policy induces more illegal dumping, reduces durability, and inflicts more environmental damage. Therefore, an ADF policy is more socially desirable than a DF policy when the disposal fee is high. Moreover, we consider an oligopoly case and find that an ADF policy is more socially desirable in an industry with smaller market power.     

Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock

A two-agent model for the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock is developed to investigate the economic benefits that can be realized from the resource, and the effect of exploitation on stock sustainability under cooperation and non-cooperation. The two agents are identified in this study as a trawl fishery versus a coastal fishery. Unlike in Munro (1979), where conflicts in the management strategies of agents arise from differences in the perceptions of the discount factor, fishing effort costs, and consumer preferences, here conflicts arise mainly from the differences in fishing gear and grounds, and the age group of cod targeted by the two agents. Using a game theoretic framework, we show that given available data, the optimum optimorum is obtained under cooperation with side payments and no predetermined harvest shares, in which case the coastal fishery buys out the trawl fishery. However, sensitivity analysis shows that if the price premium assumed for mature cod is taken away, the trawl fishery takes over as the producer of the optimum optimorum.