公司治理的目标与模式:关于近期公司治理理论的简要评述

什么是公司治理的应有之义？公司治理因何而来？公司治理又应达成何种目标？有无最佳的治理模式？这一系列问题是公司治理理论与实践探讨的焦点。通过近期公司治理文献中对这一问题的观点考察，从对这些模式的特征及其产生原因的探讨中，可以得到融资结构是公司治理模式的基础等许多有益启示。     

中国独立董事制度理论研究的基本回顾

2000年以来,在公司治理研究领域,我国广大理论与实际工作者围绕独立董事制度展开了深入细致的研究。到目前为止,已经累计公开发表1000多篇理论文章。人们主要围绕着独立董事制度和独立董事行为人两个方面进行研究。为了清晰地反映该领域的研究进展和主要成就,本文仅对独立董事制度本身方面的研究情况进行一个系统的梳理,以便给我国独立董事制度的完善提供一些有用的理论指导。     

中国公司治理结构的现状

本文介绍了我国公司治理结构的发展与现状,并针对所存在的问题提出了一些改进意见.通过此文,可以使读者对公司治理结构有一个全面的认识,从而有助于国内企业公司治理结构的完善与发展.     

信托投资公司治理研究——兼评标准公司治理理论的适用性

标准的公司治理理论是以非金融企业为研究对象的,这一理论并不适用于定位于长期金融和资产管理功能的非银行性金融机构———信托投资公司。信托投资公司在治理目标、产品、信托合约、资产结构、两权分离、委托代理关系、政府管制等方面表现出的特殊性使其区别于一般公司。我们应根据这些特殊性对标准的公司治理理论进行修正,构建真正适应信托投资公司治理的理论及框架。     

中国公司治理中存在的问题与对策

本文分析我国上市公司治理中存在的问题,得出上市公司主体缺位、内部人控制严重、约束与激励机制残缺和股权结构复杂是企业经营绩效低下的主要根源。同时,提出国有股东退出、增加法人与职工持股、主银行模式和引进机构投资者等改善我国上市公司股权结构、提高核心竞争力的对策建议。     

公司治理评价指数:解析中国公司治理现状与走势

良好的公司治理质量是利益相关者利益的保障,而公司治理质量的好坏需要采用科学的方法予以评价。在中国公司价值评价中导入公正与系统的公司治理评价,对引导中国公司价值取向和公司治理的积极变革具有深远的影响,也反映出中国公司治理与价值评价已走向与世界接轨之路。     

中国公司治理结构的现状

本文介绍了我国公司治理结构的发展与现状，并针对所存在的问题提出了一些改进意见。通过此文，可以使读者对公司治理结构有一个全面的认识，从而有助于国内企业公司治理结构的完善与发展。     

Effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility reports: evidence from China

This article investigates effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. By using a unique longitude data set of Chinese publicly traded manufacturing firms from 2010 to 2016, this study finds that ownership structure and board characteristics are significantly associated with firms’ decisions to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. In particular, our study finds that state ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership and board size are positively and significantly associated with the decision to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. However, board independence is not related to the decision. We also find CEO duality is negatively and significantly related to the decision. Our findings highlight the role of corporate governance in firms’ transparency by influencing the voluntary disclosure of additional information on firms’ CSR activities.     

中国上市公司治理的主要问题探讨

本文首先界定了公司治理的概念和研究范畴,然后阐述了上市公司治理问题的理论分析框架及各国不同的治理模式。在此基础上,结合我国实际分析了上市公司治理存在的主要问题,得出了结论：我国上市公司治理所面临的主要问题与西方国家有很大的区别,西方国家成熟的公司治理理论不能完全照搬到我国,必须结合我国实际,从上市公司治理问题产生的根源入手,才能真正改善我国上市公司治理。     

Wage-setting institutions and corporate governance

We present a model in which wage-setting structures explain cross-country variation in corporate governance. The model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the levels of firm ownership concentration and investor protection legislation. Low and high degrees of centralization yield less concentrated ownership and more investor protection than intermediate degrees. Like recent research, this paper highlights labor as a key constituent in shaping corporate governance. However, our theory can resolve an important puzzle this research confronts, namely, why Scandinavian countries with higher than average labor strength also have higher than average investor protection legislation.     

Adverse selection and corporate governance

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse selection component than non-GLCs.     

Beta-convergence and sigma-convergence in corporate governance in Europe

This paper tests for beta-convergence and sigma-convergence in the corporate governance models, using a sample of corporate governance ratings for 198 European corporations listed on the FTSE Eurofirst 300 index. A piecewise linear regression is deployed to select a model and the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator is also applied to estimate an exponential model. It concludes that there is statistical evidence of beta- and sigma-convergence within countries and the results suggest that institutional differences between countries are statistically relevant.     

Insider trading legislation and corporate governance

This paper analyzes the impact of insider trading legislation on corporate governance. In a context where large, dominant shareholders can monitor underperforming companies, managers have an incentive to give early warnings about adverse developments to dominant shareholders. This information is effectively a bribe to induce dominant shareholders to sell their stock and refrain from intervention. If insider trading is unregulated, dominant shareholders collude with management at the expense of small shareholders. The optimal regime forces the company to disclose all material information to the market. Private contracting between companies and shareholders leads to optimal insider trading regulation only if initial shareholders can enter a binding commitment, otherwise large shareholders and managers recontract at the expense of small shareholders. Enforcement also matters. European Union legislation requires inside information to be precise. Such a narrow definition creates a grey zone, where information is private but cannot be classified as inside information. As a result the effectiveness of corporate governance and firm value are reduced. Regulation in the US that treats shareholders with a stake exceeding 10% as insiders is potentially harmful.     

The influence of pension funds on corporate governance

Although pension funds have gained importance in the last two decades, their role has not been described in detail by economic models. This article focuses on the scope of these institutional investors when they are not satisfied with a management team of a company in which the pension fund holds a block of shares. Stock holdings by pension funds are largely dispersed. Therefore, any intervention by pension funds in corporate governance requires the formation of a coalition of pension funds. The realization of a coordinated intervention, in turn, is subject to the problems related to the provision of public goods, such as free riding. We find that the stock dispersion and the combined share of pension funds, coordination costs and the attractiveness of the exit option are relevant factors for determining the probability of the success of interventions.     

论公司治理中的会计控制

会计控制作为公司治理中一项重要的制度安排,是包含企业在内的所有组织和机构正常运转的制度基础。会计控制的执行和作用的发挥离不开公司治理,只有将会计控制置于公司治理的环境中加以考虑,才能更好地理解会计控制在经济生活中的角色和地位,才能找出现实中存在的问题,并加以解决。