基于价格博弈的贸易合同管理

跨国贸易给国际交流带来便利的同时,也会因为价格问题引起贸易摩擦.文章从招投标和交易达成阶段分析交易双方之间存在的价格博弈,通过贸易合同中价格水平的规定、 合同术语的选择等方面降低双方因不确定因素引起的价格博弈损失,进而降低交易风险、 实现共赢.     

NEC与FIDIC施工合同的交易费用比较

与FIDIC合同相比,NEC合同更提倡合同双方相互信任,促进良好的工程管理,改善合同双方对立关系。本文首先阐述NEC合同的概念和类型,并对交易费用理论与工程项目的交易属性进行分析,然后从合同制订原则、合同清晰性、合同条款等方面比较NEC施工合同和FIDIC施工合同,并最终得出结论,NEC施工合同更有利于降低合同实施过程中的交易费用。     

逆向选择

最佳也是最终的解决办法,就是尽量使交易双方信息对称,愈是信息传递和沟通得充分,愈是有利交易的达成,也就愈有利于市场的健康发展。     

逆向选择

最佳也是最终的解决办法，就是尽量使交易双方信息对称，愈是信息传递和沟通得充分，愈是有利交易的达成，也就愈有利于市场的健康发展。     

广告主与搜索引擎的双向博弈分析

文章基于萨缪尔森的双向叫价博弈模型,对关键词广告拍卖中的一类特殊情形进行研究—某些关键词广告的拍卖中只有一个广告主进行竞价。假设买方的估价是广告主的私有信息,而广告位的成本也是搜索引擎的私有信息,建立一个广告主和搜索引擎的双向叫价非完全信息贝叶斯博弈模型。在假设双方的报价策略均是自己估价的线性函数的条件下,求解了使广告主和搜索引擎收益最大化的贝叶斯纳什均衡,给出了广告主和搜索引擎的均衡报价策略,分析了拍卖能够达成时双方交易的效率,并得到了效率最高时双方的最优出价策略及最高效率。当广告主和搜索引擎第一次博弈不能达成交易时,双方会通过多次重复谈判和协商,经过多轮的重复报价序贯博弈达成最终交易,给出了双方序贯博弈的均衡报价策略;还给出了拍卖序贯博弈的交易流程图和一些数值算例。研究结果对广告主和搜索引擎的报价策略提供了理论参考依据。     

合同、诚信和双边长期交易关系的管理

合同理论能很好地解释独立交易双方的长期交易关系的机理。在合同理论基础上，作者提出了长期交易关系的管理模型，即通过合同、资产（资源）、权力和诚信之间的相互作用和合理安排来克服或降低机会主义的同时，提高交易方收益的模型。     

定金的多角度经济学解释

定金作为保证交易双方信守承诺的信用工具,其法律意义不言自明.笔者应用博弈论、最优停止理论、期权理论对定金进行了分析和解释,揭示了定金背后的微观经济含义.从博弈论的角度分析,定金的存在使双方都有积极性履行合同;根据最优停止理论,定金的存在降低了某一特定值,使双方更容易达成交易;应用期权理论分析,定金使买卖双方分别获得了买入、卖出的期权.     

略谈建设工程施工合同管理

如何有效地防范、控制、加强施工合同的风险管理和索赔管理，防止减少企业损失，是我们需要十分重视、认真分析研究的问题。对建筑企业来说，施工合同管理贯穿在合同管理的始终，合同法规范双方当事人的行为，调整和完善经济运行关系，维护交易、生产秩序，保护合同当事人的合法利益。本文通过下述对工程施工招投标阶段合同风险的分析、防范以及对施工合同纠纷的处理几个方面谈谈笔者的拙见，希望能起到抛砖引玉的作用，为建设方的合同管理做一点有益的工作。     

合同内容和合同的法律基础

<正> 合同内容有人认为,“合同”即为合同协议书,这不完全。合同内容是指构成合同的全部文件。在实际承包工程中,合同内容以及在执行上的优先次序为: 1、合同签订后双方达成一致的信件、会谈纪要、备忘录、修正案等。它们是对合同的修改和补充,具有最高的优先地位。2、双方已经签订的合同协议书,即合同文本。3、中标通知书。4、投标书。5、合同条件。通常为国际通用的FIDIC条款,或     

合同与企业理论前沿综述

合同和企业理论的研究是当前国际学术界十分活跃的一个领域。本文对近期国际学术界在合同和企业理论的研究动态做一个较为全面的介绍 ,并提出对相关问题的思考 ,希望这一工作能够对国内的相关研究提供有益的帮助。     

Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

We scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature. This literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing—or of even foreseeing—the possible states of nature in advance. We argue, however, that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting ( i.e. transaction costs need not be relevant ), provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs (even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast). In other words, all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming, an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature. The foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate. Moreover, we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality. However, even if renegotiation is allowed, the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse.     

制度变迁与乡村非正规制度——中国乡镇企业的财产形成与控制

各种非正规制度是如何促使在计划经济体系内部顺利实现了一种渐进式的制度变迁的 ?本文首先区分出了非正规市场、非正规合约的概念 ,并将影响非正规合约缔约过程的各种行为和人际关系称为非正规制度。非正规合约作为一种无形资产 ,它不仅创造收入流 ,而且能够形成为协约双方都带来利益增进、促使生产改善、效率提高的新的制度结构。本文分别说明了非正规制度对创新者的创新动机和对创新者权威和合法性的影响 ,同时说明了由非正规合约所形成的产权合约对乡镇企业早期资源动员和财产形成过程中合约的作用及作用的方式 ,回答了长期争论的市场化的交易是如何从计划经济体制内部产生出来的问题     

Promises, trust, and contracts

A transaction involving a buyer and a competitive seller isstudied under the hypothesis that individuals may have a certaintendency to keep promises. The parties can choose a completecontract where costly arrangements are made so that it is verifiablewhether the seller has delivered a certain quality. Alternatively,they can choose an incomplete contract where the quality agreedupon by the two parties is unverifiable, and one party is giventhe residual right to decide whether the quality is indeed delivered.Although complete contracts are always available, it may beoptimal to use incomplete contracts, and social surplus canincrease in contract costs. Social surplus is higher when thebuyer has the residual right if under this arrangement incompletecontracts are optimal; and social surplus is higher when theseller has the residual right if only under this arrangementincomplete contracts are optimal.     

A transaction cost model of contract choice: The case of petroleum exploration

The growing literature on transaction costs posits that the structures of contracts involving exchange under uncertainty are influenced by the costs incurred by the contracting parties prior to, as well as after, a contract is signed. This research investigates the contractual responses to the substantial uncertainty attending the exchange of rights to underground petroleum deposits. It develops a transaction cost model to explain the payment structure found in these contracts. The model identifies the major transaction costs associated with the payment types used in oil and gas exploration contracts, including ex ante measurement costs and ex post production inefficiencies, and explains their effect on contract structure. Testable implications concerning variations in the payment structure of petroleum exploration contracts are generated and tested using data from private oil and gas mineral rights leasing contracts in four western states. The study has direct public policy significance in that it delineates the implications of different payment structures of oil and gas leasing contracts. These implications can be used to evaluate proposals to reform federal oil and gas leasing policies. In addition, while there has been considerable analysis of federal offshore oil and gas leasing contracts, there has been a dearth of research on private onshore oil leasing practices. This study helps to fill this empirical void.     

威廉姆森交易费用理论述评

通过对威廉姆森关于交易费用的界定、合同人的假设、交易维度及契约类型和治理结构等内容介绍和评价,并且概括了威廉姆森关于交易费用理论应用范围和领域,旨在客观地评价威廉姆森关于交易费用理论的学术贡献及其理论渊源及实质。     

工业园区废弃物交易生态协作激励机制

在分析工业园区废弃物交易存在资产专用性和不确定性等问题的基础上,通过构建园区废弃物交易生态协作收益模型,分别探讨了社会最优条件下、单期交易条件下和关系契约条件下有助于废弃物交易双方生态协作的最优激励机制安排。研究结果表明:资产专用性和不确定性等导致单期交易下生态协作存在效率损失,此时根据生产效率分配协作租金可最大程度地减少生态协作效率损失;关系契约推动了生态协作效率的提升,利用企业可通过隐藏废弃物在利用环节的价值增值信息以及调节奖励支付规则等获得社会最优条件下的生态协作收益;废弃物交易双方越关注未来的预期收益,废弃物交易中的协作程度越高,废弃物交易双方获取的生态协作收益就越大;废弃物再利用的成本越高,越需要交易双方进行长期协作,越需要对园区进行政策干预。     

Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?

Environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties. There is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments. This paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs. The theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as: 1) transaction characteristics; 2) transactor characteristics; 3) nature of the institutional environment; and 4) nature of the institutional arrangements. We examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two Australian-based development offset schemes with different policy designs. We found evidence of all four theory-based categories of influence in the policy case studies. The degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties. Policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator. An important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given.     

On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships

We study renegotiation in an agency setting where the number of offers and accept/reject decisions parties can make is potentially unlimited. Thus any contract, either on or off the equilibrium path, may be subject to possible renegotiation. We first show that the principal will not be able to gain complete access to the agent’s private information with unlimited renegotiation, unlike when the potential number of renegotiations is finite. Rather the agent either employ a randomized reporting strategy or do not to report at all. We then identify conditions under which expected allocations are most efficient with the contract that induces no agent communication. More significantly, by doing so we also identify conditions under which the parties are made strictly worse off by committing to end renegotiation after a fixed number of rounds. We thank workshop participants at University of California, Irvine, University of Chicago, Duke University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, University of Houston, London School of Economics, University of Minnesota, Ohio State University, the Carnegie Mellon Accounting Research Conference, the editor, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

订单农业履约率的概率辨析

农业远期合约是一种具有局限性和偶遇性特征的交易契约,我国的“订单农业”合约中的双方处于不完全信息状态,形成了基于信息非对称导致的市场失灵。对“订单农业”中签约双方违约可能性进行了概率辨析,论述了控制农户和公司出现违约的理论和思想,提出必要先期支出、必要价格空间等指标概念和计算方法,引入了期货市场的价格发现和套期保值机制,来构建农业再生产过程的信息发现和信息传递机制,实现农业经营风险的外部转移,提高我国农业履约率。     

CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

This paper derives estimating equations from a model where individuals consume two classes of goods, and the degree of contract enforcement affects the transaction cost of trade in the two classes of goods differentially. Empirically, using Rauch's classification, internationally traded goods are classified into differentiated goods and those possessing a reference price, with the presumption that contract enforcement issues are more important for the former. It is verified that the measures of contract enforcement affect the volume of trade in both types of goods, but the impact is larger for differentiated goods.