我国国有企业特殊社会责任研究

国有企业具有与一般企业不同的特殊社会责任,这根源于社会主义市场经济体制下国有经济功能的要求,国有经济的功能决定了国有企业的特殊社会责任。在一般市场经济,计划经济,社会主义市场经济三种条件下国有经济具有各自不同的功能,社会主义市场经济条件下国有经济的功能,决定了中国国有企业既具有一般企业的社会责任又具有特殊的社会责任。中国国有企业的特殊社会责任主要体现在八个方面。     

国有经济、行政级别与中国城市的收入差距

本文根据1990-2008年间省级面板数据的估计结果表明,由于在1999年后国有企业的经营目标由多元化趋于利润最大化,国有经济对不同行政级别城市的收入差距的影响在1999年前不显著,在1999后则显著为正。而且,反映政府支持国有经济能力的两个重要指标——政府支出的比重和金融深化程度,也因国有企业的经营性质在1999年前后的变化也具有类似的特征。     

国有企业改革对共同富裕的影响效应研究

作为经济体制改革的中心环节，国有企业改革始终为共同富裕巩固并夯实所有制基础、分配基础以及物质技术基础，同时也要处理好发展与共享的平衡统一问题，改革成效外在表现为国有经济比重和企业经济效益等指标的变动。通过对共同富裕指标体系的构建和测度，可进一步实证分析国有企业改革对共同富裕的影响效应及其具体路径，进而为深化改革提供指引。国有企业经济效益对共同富裕的影响体现为双方面，既正向作用于发展水平，同时对共享水平具有负向影响。国有经济比重则主要通过正向作用于共享水平对共同富裕产生影响。国有企业并不简单代表着法权关系，其本质上反映了劳动者与生产资料的直接结合方式以及相应的分配制度。应正视改革在经济收益和社会责任目标下的双重诉求，推动质与量共荣共进。     

我国现代企业区位选择亟待解决的问题

随着我国企业制度的转变和企业区位环境的变化，工商企业区位选择面临许多新的问题，本文在企业区位的扩展延伸，企业区位选择构成和内容的扩展，企业区位选择主体的变化，国有经济和国有企业区位布局的选择及调整和网络经济条件下企业区位选择等方面作了一些探索。     

对否定社会主义国有经济的几种观点的辨析

公有制为主体、多种经济成分共同发展,是《党章》和《宪法》的规定,必须遵守。各种否定国有经济的观点,诸如国有经济与市场经济不相容、国有企业是垄断企业、国有企业与民争利、照搬西方国家的国有经济比重、国有经济必须从竞争性领域退出、国有经济产权不明晰、私营经济是先进生产力的代表等言论,都是站不住脚的。     

关于国有企业改革的几点思考

关于国有企业改革的几点思考李海青，琚华琴近些年来，非国有企业具有强劲的发展势头，而国有企业的发展却出现了停滞，甚至后退的现象，国有企业在国有经济中的比重不断下降。拿工业部门来说，国有工业总产值占全国工业总产值的比重，１９７８年为７７．６％，１９８５年...     

市场分割条件下的混合所有制经济竞争模型与规制策略

通过构建市场分割条件下的混合所有制经济竞争模型,本文对全国性国有企业在中国改革发展过程中的作用提供了新的解释。全国性国有企业在参与区域竞争的过程中,具备一种区域整合的功能:它面向全体市场的决策与分别面向各区域市场的决策等价,全社会总剩余最大化目标也可以分解为各区域社会剩余最大化的子目标之和,在其效率较高的情况下,将迫使地方企业改进成本或者退出市场,而只有当地方企业有足够高的效率的时候,全国性国有企业才会选择退出策略。国有企业事实上可以作为一种内部规制工具对市场分割的负面效应进行一定程度的制衡,在明确规制规则的条件下,我们可以通过动态调整企业目标函数以实现整体市场福利的最大化。     

深化国有企业改革的战略思路与政策建议

我国国有企业改革主要应该在以下三个基本层面进一步深化:(1)依据社会主义市场经济条件下国有企业的功能界定,对国有经济的总体布局进行战略性调整,平稳有序地组织国有经济进入、退出或保留于特定产业,实现国有资产的合理配置,提高国有经济的整体素质;(2)依据现代企业制度的基本要求,在国有经济合理布局的前提下,对除极少数企业外的国有企业实行产权多元化改革,形成规范的公司法人治理结构,促进大批企业家的生成;(3)依据社会主义市场经济条件下市场的功能界定,积极推进国民经济运行的市场化,形成有效竞争的市场结构,在公开、公平和公正的市场竞争环境中加快国有企业改革。     

建立国有资本财政收入制度的基本原则

1.确定国有资本投资收益上缴财政的数量界限取决于国有企业的经营状况和目标。国家收取投资收益的多少包含三个层次的具体内容:一是国家收取国有资本投资收益总量的多少;二是国家对每个企业收取国有资本投资收益的多少;三是国家收取国有资本投资收益总量中,集中上缴和追加投资各占多大比重。确定这三种数量的依据是国有资本的经营状况和经营目标。在市场经济条件下,国有资本经营状况主要表现为企业的盈亏状况,在外部环境不变的情况下,企业盈利越多,表明经营状况越好。我国国有经济的特殊性及其在国民经济中的主导地位,决定了国有资本除了最…     

深化国有企业分配制度改革的理论思考

国有企业分配制度改革是整个国有经济改革的重要组成部分 ,理顺国有企业分配关系是巩固社会主义基本经济制度和完善市场经济体制的需要。知识经济条件下 ,人力资本的作用是企业发展中的最根本要素。重构国有企业分配制度的理论依据在于重视人力资本的贡献 ,深化国有企业分配制度改革重在实行理论创新 ,构建国有企业收入分配新模式 ,是本文进行理论创新的尝试和探索。     

You are suffocating me: Firm-level analysis of state-owned enterprises and private investment

Literature on whether government spending crowds out or crowds in the private sector is large, but still without an unambiguous conclusion. Using firm-level data from Ukraine, this paper provides a granular empirical investigation to disentangle the impact of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on private firm investment in Ukraine—a large transition economy. Controlling for firm characteristics and systematic differences across sectors, the results indicate that the SOE concentration in a given sector has a statistically significant negative effect on private fixed capital formation, and that the impact of SOEs is stronger in those industries in which SOEs have a more dominant presence. These findings imply that private firms operating in sectors with a high level of SOE concentration invest systematically less than businesses that are not competing directly with SOEs.     

所有制对高绩效工作系统与员工满意度关系的调节作用

高绩效工作系统中的授权和培训会提高员工满意度,进而减少工作中的退缩性行为;相反,团队合作却会降低员工满意度。更重要的是,在不同所有制的企业中,高绩效工作系统对员工满意度的影响有所不同。     

国有企业双重效率损失研究

本文基于企业效率最大化要求剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对应这一企业理论分析了国有企业的生产效率损失和创新效率损失问题。国有企业的公有产权属性决定了国有企业中存在着生产效率和创新效率的双重损失。国有企业改革通过监督和激励机制设计在一定程度上实现了生产中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,从而提高了国有企业的生产效率。然而,由于创新具有不同于一般生产的特殊属性,已有国有企业改革措施并不能实现创新中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,因而无法改善国有企业的创新效率。由此,本文提出了国有企业的创新效率损失大于生产效率损失的理论假说。基于中国省级国有企业和民营企业的工业行业数据,统计分析和计量模型估计结果都稳健地支持了该假说。     

Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China’s stated-owned enterprises

This paper explores the effect of policy burdens of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on senior executives’ excessive perks. The empirical analysis demonstrates that SOE policy burdens are significantly and positively correlated with senior executives’ excessive perks, indicating that SOE policy burdens increase agency cost. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity. Moreover, we find the following evidences. Strategic policy burdens of SOEs have a significantly greater impact on their senior executives’ excessive perks, compared with social policy burdens. The positive impact of SOE policy burdens on excessive perks is significantly weaker in east China due to the higher degree of marketization. The central government’s stricter supervision can also alleviate the positive correlation between policy burdens of centrally administered SOEs and senior executives’ excessive perks.     

Privatization's impact on private productivity: The case of Brazilian iron ore

A major motivation for the recent wave of privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was a belief that privatization would increase SOE productivity. There are now many studies showing most privatizations achieved this goal. Our theme is that the productivity gains from privatization are much more general and widespread than has typically been recognized in this literature. In assessing the productivity gains from privatization, the literature has only examined the productivity gains accruing at the privatized SOEs. But privatization may have significant impact on the private producers that often exist side-by-side SOEs. In this paper we show that this was indeed the case when Brazil privatized its SOEs in the iron ore industry. That is, after their privatization, the iron ore SOEs dramatically increased their labor productivity, but so did the private iron ore companies in the industry.     

The dynamics of wage determination in Romania

This article examines wage developments in Romania over the last 20 years, discusses the evolving role of government wage policy and structural labour market changes, and analyses the dynamics of the wage determination process. It finds that government wage policy has had a significant demonstration effect on private sector wages, driven mainly by policy decisions over the past few years. The article also finds strong causality from private sector wages to wages in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and government. No causality was found for changes in government wages to wages in SOEs or from SOE wages to private sector wages.     

Business fixed investment of Chinese manufacturing firms in the post-financial crisis era

ABSTRACT

I document the investment decline of Chinese manufacturing firms after 2011, following the end of the 4 trillion fiscal stimulus program and expansionary monetary policies for combating the 2008–2009 financial crisis. I employ a difference-in-difference strategy to show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) acted as investment stabilizers. In the post-crisis era, SOEs’ investment rates fell less compared to their private counterparts. Moreover, they had a smaller chance of exiting the market than private firms. In the face of monetary tightening, SOEs enjoyed a much smaller increase in the interest rates of their long-term debts. Although these may fuel the growth of the SOE sector relative to the private sector, and thus raised concerns for capital misallocation, the adverse effect on reallocation was dampened by shadow banking.     

The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession

We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra ( 2002 ) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large state‐owned enterprise (SOE) share, multinational share, or small foreign import share. From the model we reveal the Chinese government's preference towards different interest groups under the binding tariff constraint from the WTO commitments. The estimated structural parameters imply that the political weights on both the SOE profits and consumer income diminish with the economic opening. More important, the government still favours SOEs over consumer income. Our findings are consistent with the special features of China's economy.     

中国国有企业改革：经验、困境与出路*

作为国有企业产权改革主要模式，“混合所有制”改革是否有助于确保国有资产保值增值，是否有助于推动中国经济可持续发展等问题仍存在探讨空间。本文基于对于改革开放以来中国国有企业改革的成就和教训的考察，指出“混合所有制”可以作为竞争性部门国有企业改革的一个过渡形式；对于垄断央企的改革应该充分借鉴国际上自然垄断行业的改革经验，打破行政垄断，推动竞争性框架建立，并切实实现从“管企业”逐步调整为“管资本”，通过改革实现国有资产的保值增值，并为经济创造新的增长点。     

An efficient privatization mechanism

We consider the privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of which markets can be opened to competition once privatization takes place and competitors can compete successfully against them in a few years. The currently used “Revenue Maximization (RM)” scheme maximizes the government revenue from privatization but does not provide incentives for the privatized SOE to charge a price lower than the monopoly price until competition arises. We propose the “Welfare Maximization (WM)” scheme, which induces the privatized SOE to charge a competitive price without resorting to regulation. Also, WM provides greater incentives for post-privatization cost reduction.