均衡信贷配给、信用担保与中小企业融资

以信贷配给的双重均衡性为出发点，从信息成本的角度，可揭示出中小企业融资的根本困境在于其特定信息结构所对应的边际信誉成本低于大企业。因此，解决的途径在于引入专业化的信用担保机构。提高信息处理能力，降低信息成本，以改变信贷配给的均衡位置，促使信贷配给的局部均衡向总体福利均衡收敛。这也是由中小金融机构与信用担保机构作用的差异所决定的，因为前者只能弥补“信贷缺口”，并不能缓解信贷配给。     

信贷配给、影子银行监管与中国民营企业融资

影子银行是信贷配给条件下民营企业融资的代偿性制度安排,治理影子银行风险将导致民营企业融资约束进一步收紧.本文构建了一个引入"信贷配给强度"的DSGE模型,提出信贷配给强度是驱动影子规模变动的重要动因,金融监管对民营企业融资的影响程度受信贷配给强度影响,治理信贷配给问题可以缓解金融监管与民营企业融资间的政策冲突,并在长期内实现影子银行的自我抑制."十四五"时期应以大力发展普惠金融为契机,探索纠正信贷配给的制度化政策框架;改革优化政策性金融体系,搭建支持民营中小企业的信用供给基础设施.     

论信贷配给作用于宏观经济波动的机理

当宏观经济进入衰退阶段,由于商业银行的资本充足率下降、信贷环境恶化,商业银行为实现自身利益最大化目标,其最优选择行为是发生较为严重的信贷配给行为,这将导致融资企业的信贷可得性下降。由于融资企业信贷可得性的直接影响和间接影响,将会引起融资企业及其相关企业的投资下降,在投资乘数效应的作用下,其结果是宏观经济衰退更加严重,宏观经济陷入经济衰退与信贷配给相互作用的恶性循环中,宏观经济衰退的程度会进一步加大。当宏观经济进入繁荣阶段,具有与上述相类似的过程。可见,信贷配给是宏观经济波动的加速器。我国商业银行的信贷配给虽呈现关系型信贷配给的特征,但也具有上述功能。     

不对称信息下农村中小企业的信贷配给

我国农村中小企业规模小,产品和技术落后,且治理结构不规范,讲信用不够,特别是财务信息不透明,在与银行的信贷融资中存在严重的信息不对称,使银行的信贷风险上升,交易成本增加。由此导致银行的信贷配给,也使农村中小企业面临融资信贷难。为此,本文提出一些缓解银行对农村中小企业信贷配给的对策措施。     

金融供应链下商业银行信贷配给改进的机理和实践研究

金融供应链为商业银行突破传统信贷配给技术提供了机遇。本文从供应链关系结构中企业融资改进的机会分析入手,剖析了金融供应链下银行内生性改进信贷配给行为的条件,提出金融供应链之所以为银行改善信贷配给提供了一种创新渠道,是因为其在供应链企业之间存在隐含担保,并从理论机理与实践经验两方面验证了银行信贷配给改进的实施机会。     

商业银行信贷配给与企业规模关系研究

近年来,我国商业银行信贷配给现象严重,商业银行倾向于为大型企业融资,而中小企业却很难获得信贷资金支持。企业规模对商业银行信贷资金供给产生了重要的影响。信贷市场在我国资金配置中占据着主导地位,中小企业融资主要通过信贷市场来完成,如何解决中小企业融资难题引起了广泛的关注。因此,本文研究我国商业银行信贷配给与企业规模的关系具有一定的理论意义和现实意义。     

融资良方

今年以来,国家的宏观调控政策调整使银行机构信贷规模进一步收紧,由于固定资产投资的惯性较大,对贷款的依赖性较强,导致很多银行机构小企业信贷计划被大企业挤压和占用,小企业的＂挤出效应＂逐渐显现。单靠银行贷款,已远远不能满足中小企业的资金需求,中国的融资结构开始改写。创新融资理念和多元化的融资方式开始逐一登上市场的舞台。     

我国信贷配给对中小企业融资的影响

由于信贷市场上信息不对称以及道德风险的存在,信贷配给一直存在着.而近年来,随着我国商业银行资产质量管理的加强,我国的信贷市场也逐渐走向规范,因而信贷市场也出现了信贷配给现象.这种信贷配给主要针对这资产质量差、风险高的中小企业.这也是我国中小企业融资难问题的原因之一.针对这一现象,我们应采取相关措施,减少信贷配给中小企业融资问题带来的障碍,为我国中小企业的发展创造良好的资金信贷条件.     

风险态度、农户信贷与信贷配给——基于张家港市问卷调查的分析

笔者利用张家港市农户的调查数据,运用Probit和Logit模型实证风险态度与信贷配给之间的关系。研究表明,农户风险态度与信贷配给呈显著的正向关系,农户的风险规避意识越强产生的需求型信贷配给越强烈。农户的风险态度决定了风险成本与风险溢金,进而影响了信贷行为及其信贷配给程度。缓解农户信贷配给应从政府、金融机构和农户三方面着手。     

信贷配给条件下的中小企业融资——兼评介入型融资理论和破解策略

信贷配给一直是计划经济时期金融资源行政分配的基本手段，计划行政目标决定了信贷资金的分配方式和构成，企业受信完全服从于计划分配体系的“贷款额度”。计划体系的瓦解和贷款额度的取消使人们认为信贷资源分配将体现市场化和竞争原则，使信贷市场走向均衡。而事实上市场条件下银行的商业化和利率的市场化形成了新的信贷配给，对企业融资和信贷市场的均衡产生了新的影响，     

The Significance of Credit Rationing on Real Investment Activity – A Test for the Significance of Capital-Market Imperfection in Japan

Does bank credit matter to the real investment finance of firms? If so, to what kind of firms does it matter, and why? Despite the progress of research in this field, there is still little empirical consensus on these problems. This paper contributes to the understanding of capital-market imperfection in Japan by answering these questions. I introduce new methods to test the significance of credit rationing and show that bank credit is indeed a very important determinant of real investment activity of small firms. The availability of long-term loans has particularly significant effects on the investment opportunities of small firms, although large firms with capital of more than 1 billion yen are free from credit rationing. JEL Classification Numbers: C51, E44, G21.     

Trade liberalization,wilful credit defaults and bank bribery in a credit-constrained economy

The rising incidence of credit defaults may cause credit crunch. This affects the ability of firms to finance working capital and also fixed capital formation. Naturally, this is a major macroeconomic shock. This paper is an attempt to address the microeconomic foundation of such macroeconomic shock. We provide a theoretical framework to explain the economic rationale behind ‘wilful corporate defaults’ and ‘financial corruption’ in the specific context of trade liberalization. First, we model the behavioural aspects of wilful corporate defaulters and bank officials to determine the bank bribe rate as an outcome of the Nash bargaining process in a two-stage sequential move game. Based on the results of the partial equilibrium framework, we examine aspects of trade liberalization in an otherwise 2 × 2 general equilibrium framework. We also compare the efficacy of punishment strategies to economic incentives to deter credit defaults and banking sector corruption. Methodologically, our analytical model integrates finance capital distinctly from physical capital in Jonesian general equilibrium framework. Interestingly, our findings indicate that there exists a trade-off at equilibrium between curbing credit defaults and bribery. We also find that not all punishment strategies are equally effective at deterring credit defaults if general equilibrium interlinkage effects are carefully dealt with.     

The underground economy and its macroeconomic consequences

This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.     

Industrial districts and financial constraints to innovation

Informational frictions between borrowers and lenders are particularly acute for innovative firms undertaking high‐risk projects. As a consequence, banks may end up denying credit to them. However, the literature on relationship finance predicts that a closer relationship between credit suppliers and obligors is deemed to alleviate information asymmetries, hence preventing credit rationing from occurring. The question of whether such situations also apply to innovative firms has so far remained relatively unexplored. Using a cross‐section of Italian manufacturing firms, I find that credit constraints appear to be more severe for firms undertaking innovative activities, although such effects are weaker when measures of R&D intensity are included. The empirical analysis also shows that firms located in an industrial district have easier access to external finance. If I move to consider firms engaged in substantial R&D activities located in a district, results suggest that they can benefit from better financial conditions.     

Conflict,distribution, and finance in alternative macroeconomic traditions

Power and conflict are issues that loom large in the work of David Gordon. They are also issues that are largely absent in conventional macroeconomics. This paper shows how these concepts can be introduced within alternative macroeconomic traditions, and it shows how their significance depends on the particulars governing the construction of the macroeconomic process. The paper details the implicit economic process embedded in the new classical, neo-Keynesian, classical Marxist, and Kaleckian constructions of macroeconomics. It then develops a general post Keynesian model that fuses the insights of the classical Marxist and Kaleckian models regarding the significance of conflict and income distribution, with the insights of the neo-Keynesian model regarding the place of finance. Last, the paper argues that finance matters both for aggregate demand and as a worker discipline device. This represents a supply side channel for finance that links with modern new classical models that emphasize credit rationing     

Credit rationing or overlending? An exploration into financing imperfection

Small and new firms are deemed to be unable to obtain sufficient bank loans. This idea finds a strong theoretical support in credit rationing theory. However, this is vigorously challenged by De Meza and Webb (1987, 2000) suggesting that firms can benefit from an excess of credit, i.e. overlending. Credit rationing or overlending? The contribution of this empirical article is twofold: to our knowledge, it is the first to make an attempt in measuring the relative importance of these two types of financing imperfection and to explore factors leading to one or the other. We exploit a rich panel data set on the access to bank credit for new French businesses during the mid-1990s. Our results show that credit rationing was not highly spread among French new firms. The story told by De Meza and Webb (1987) appears to be a much more realistic model. In addition, we identify factors, linked to the starter, the project or the industry, that are closely associated with credit rationing and/or overlending. Most factors enter into a consistent relation: when they are positively (negatively) associated with credit rationing, they are negatively (positively) associated with overlending.     

农地确权、信贷配给释缓与农村金融的深度发展*

作为一项基础性、制度环境层面的变革，农地确权帮助更多农户进入金融市场、促进农村金融宽度意义上的“量”变作用已经初步显现。但是，它是否可以提高农户贷款数量，缓解信贷配给并促进农村金融深度意义上的“质”变？这是一个重要但鲜有研究的问题。本文从供给、需求、交易成本、价格、风险配给等角度，分析了农地确权缓解信贷配给、促进农村金融深度发展的理论机理，并通过有序多分类变量回归及倾向得分匹配方法进行实证分析。研究表明，农地确权对农户金融参与深度的影响主要表现为：因降低信息成本而缓解价格配给，因弱化农户的损失规避心理而缓解风险配给；同时，数量配给和交易成本配给的释缓作用尚未充分显示。     

Lending technologies,banking relationships,and firms’ access to credit in Italy: the role of firm size

This paper analyses the role of lending technologies and banking relationships on firms’ credit access in Italy. Using EFIGE firm-level data, we show that the depth and strength of firm–bank relationships have heterogeneous effects on credit demand and rationing probabilities depending on the size of the borrower. Multiple banking relationships alleviate financial constraints for small firms, while borrowing from a large number of lenders hinders access to credit for large companies. Small and medium-sized enterprises with a higher share of debt with the main bank have a lower probability of being credit denied, as debt concentration contributes to overcome the opacity problems typical of the SMEs. Long-lasting relationships, by reducing information asymmetries, significantly improve access to credit for small and large firms. Conversely, we find that medium-sized enterprises are more exposed to financing constraints as relationship duration increases, due to possible lock-in effects. Finally, firms maintaining banking relationships based on transactional technologies are more likely to be credit denied, while the use of relationship lending technologies improves credit availability for both small and large enterprises.     

Financial constraints and unemployment equilibrium

The aim of this paper is to show that a robust determination of unemployment equilibria can be based on the integration of credit rationing into a general equilibrium model. We first review some of the Keynesian macroeconomic models. We show that the problems bequeathed by Keynes’ legacy are only partially solved by the strand of the new Keynesian economics based on market imperfections and endogenous rigidities. In order to overcome these problems we refer to credit rationing. In particular, we build a simple general equilibrium model in which prices are–in principle–perfectly flexible and credit rationing implies unemployment equilibria.     

Credit availability and investment: Lessons from the “great recession”

The paper argues that the traditional difficulty encountered in finding evidence on the effects of credit availability on economic activity depends on the fact that these effects are powerful but rare and vary with the cycle. The global financial crisis offers an opportunity to test this assumption. The paper exploits a unique dataset, including direct information on credit rationing for 1200 Italian firms over the last twenty years. We find that the elasticity of a firm’s investment to the availability of bank credit has been significant in periods of economic contraction, but not in other periods (the ability to tap alternative sources of finance may arguably explain this result) and that during the global crisis the impact of credit quantity constraints on Italian investment in manufacturing was significant.