Political freedom and the response to economic incentives: labor migration in Africa, 1972-1987

This study examines the thesis that political institutions and the freedoms and civil rights generated by these institutions affect migration decisions. The hypothesis is based on one stated by Adam Smith in 1776, that economic conditions that reflect greater political freedoms and civil liberties harbor higher levels of resource mobility in response to economic incentives. Pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis is based on data from the World Bank for 32 African countries during 1972-87. Findings support the hypothesis that migration rate is more affected by the expected returns ratio to labor in countries where civil liberties are greater than in nations with fewer civil liberties. The implication, from the inclusion of institutional factors in the model, is that civil liberties have an indirect impact on the rate of labor migration out of agriculture in Africa. The impact is a mix of economic incentives and civil liberties. In the political rights model, the most free countries had the largest migration elasticity. The findings on political rights impacts support findings by Friedman and McMillan that civil liberties are a more important determinant of economic growth than political rights. Further testing for measurement error confirmed that the data were flawed, but not so greatly that the basic findings were overturned. The migration out of African agriculture was found to be sensitive to the effect of price signals, which were conditioned by the degree of political rights and civil liberties. Policy makers are urged to consider both changes in pricing and institutions.     

The French Communication Industry Defined and Analyzed through the Social Fabric Matrix,the Filiere Approach,and Network Analysis

This paper examines the relative impact of economic freedom, civil liberties, and political rights on growth. A system of three simultaneous equations is used to unearth the channels through which these institutional dimensions affect economic growth. These include greater efficiency and enlarged investment in physical and human capital. The sample contains 79 countries and six periods covering the years from 1976 to 2005. The results show that the three dimensions of institutional quality are important for economic growth either through a better allocation of resources or, indirectly, through the stimulation of investment in physical and human capital.     

Economic freedom, civil liberties, political rights and growth: a causality analysis

Several empirical studies have established the relationship between economic freedom, civil liberties and political rights, and economic growth. Nevertheless, few studies analyze the directions of causality. This paper studies the causality relations between the institutional dimensions mentioned above and economic growth, as well as the interrelations between them, using the Granger methodology with panel data for 187 countries and five-yearly observations for the period 1976–2000. In addition, the relations between these freedoms and investment in physical and human capital are examined, to be able to isolate the direct and indirect effects on growth. The authors acknowledge the suggestions made by the editor and the reviewers, which have improved this work with respect to its initial version.     

Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions

We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992–2005. We find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.     

Unbundling democracy: Political rights and civil liberties

Much recent political economy and political science literature views democracy in terms of political rights. This view, often referred to as electoral democracy, is particularly pronounced in the empirical literature. We reincorporate the role of civil liberties, which are at the core of modern democracy, in two ways. We identify four fundamental sources of potential differences in the evolution of political rights and civil liberties. We present systematic, robust and varied empirical evidence on the direct impact of two of these potential sources of differences using cross-national panel data and accounting for the modernization hypothesis. We obtain two noteworthy empirical results: civil liberties exhibit greater persistence than political rights in affecting subsequent outcomes; and, our main result, civil liberties are complementary to political rights when affecting subsequent outcomes, while the reverse is not the case. Consequently, one must incorporate civil liberties as a determinant of electoral democracy. More generally, both dimensions must be considered to understand the setbacks recently experienced by many democracies, despite their holding of free and fair elections.     

Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries

Focusing on developing countries in three geographical areas (South-East Asia, Latin America and European Union), we explore the relation between political variables and tax revenue, public spending and their structure. We build a new dataset for the 1990–2005 period with fiscal, political and socio-economic variables. Since democracy is a complex and multidimensional concept, we measure it using two variables, the political strength of democratic institutions, and the protection of civil liberties. We perform three sets of estimates: (i) cross-country pooled OLS regressions with region fixed effects, (ii) country fixed effects regressions and (iii) region specific regressions with country fixed effects. While the first model delivers some significant correlations between political variables and tax items, when controlling for country fixed effects we find that tax revenue and tax composition are in general not significantly correlated with the strength of democratic institutions and the protection of civil liberties. The only exceptions are indirect, trade and property taxes. A similar result applies to public spending, with the exception of defense expenditure. Overall, our findings cast some doubt on the exact public policy channels through which political institutions affect economic development.     

Aid, Growth and Democracy

To the extent that aid is justified by the benefits to the recipient, rather than to the donor, it might be reasonably judged on two criteria: growth and poverty-alleviation. We study the first of these criteria. We find that the long-run growth impact of aid is conditional on the degree of political and civil liberties in the recipient country. Aid has a positive impact on growth in countries with an institutionalized check on governmental power; that is, in more democratic countries. The data suggest, however, that if this is not the case, aid will be used to satisfy the government's own non-productive goals. We also find that aid on average is not channeled to more democratic countries, even though there are large cross-country differences between major donors.     

ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The paper deals with the estimation of comparable human rights ratings (defined as a composite of political rights, civil liberties and state power indices) for 154 countries, excluding territories, of the world in 1983. It then develops a theory to gauge the sensitivity of these ratings to a specific disaggregation suggested by the theory of political economy and establishes the close nexus existing between economic systems, political structures and human rights. The results indicate that increasing government intervention, whether economic or political, unequivocally tends to worsen the human rights situation. Moreover, it is seen that affluence and income distribution are significant predictors of human rights ratings across countries.     

Democracy in the neighborhood and foreign direct investment

The determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been extensively studied. Even though there is extensive research in the area, most of it is based on analyzing the effects of host country characteristics on FDI flows, and yet there is little research on how neighboring country characteristics play a role in facilitating FDI flows to host countries. This paper analyzes the association between the democracy level in neighboring countries and FDI flows to host countries. Using bilateral FDI flows from the OECD countries, with a large host country sample, we find that countries surrounded by democratic countries attract higher FDI flows. Furthermore, we find evidence that countries that are surrounded by neighboring countries with good institutions tend themselves to have better institutions, experience lower civil conflict, and have higher political stability and hence indirectly attract higher FDI flows. Our findings suggest that if neighboring countries act in such way as to become more democratic, FDI flows to these countries would be higher since not only does improving the quality of democracy attract more FDI inflows, but also being surrounded by neighboring advanced democratic countries will also lead to higher FDI flows to them.     

A sensitivity analysis of the impact of democracy on economic growth

Often it is maintained that democracy is a luxury which comes at a price in terms of subsequent slower increases in national living standards. However, various recent cross-section studies on economic growth have found evidence that lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with economic growth. Using various measures of democracy the robustness of previous research is examined. Both direct and indirect effects of lack of civil and political liberties are analysed. Our main conclusion is that the relationship between democracy and economic growth is not robust.     

Financial development,political rights,civil liberties and economic growth: Evidence from South Asia

A number of existing studies have examined the theoretical link between financial development and economic growth. Kose et al. (2010), among others, have argued that financial development can affect the extent of the benefits from foreign direct investment. Other studies, such as Huang (2010) have suggested that the quality of political institutions can also affect the level of financial development. This implies that the extent of the benefits from financial development also depend on the quality of governance. However, few empirical studies have considered these issues. By making use of panel data over the period 1970 to 2009, this paper focuses on the impact of the interaction of (i) financial development and foreign direct investment and (ii) financial development and the quality of governance on economic growth in South Asia. Our empirical analysis, suggests that financial development has contributed to an increase in the benefits of FDI in South Asia. In addition, improvement in political rights and civil liberties has also enhanced the benefits of financial development in South Asia.     

Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK

Transnational terrorism in Western countries has raised questions about security measures that constrain civil liberties. This is the first paper that uses a terrorist attack, that in the London 7/7/2005, as an exogenous source of variation to study the dynamics of risk perception and the effect on the readiness to trade off civil liberties for enhanced security. In this framework we show that willingness to trade off security for liberties is dramatically affected by changes in individual risk assessments due to a terrorist attack. We document the extent of persistence of changed attitudes.     

Inequality Beyond GDP: A Long View

This paper addresses international inequality in multidimensional well-being during the last one-and-a-half centuries. Inequality fell in health and education since the late 1920s, due to the globalization of mass schooling and the diffusion of the health transition, but only dropped in population-weighted terms from 1970 onward for political and civil liberties, as the emergence of authoritarian regimes increased its dispersion since the end of World War I. In terms of augmented human development inequality declined since 1900. These results are at odds with per capita income inequality that rose over time and only shrank from 1990 onward. The gap between the OECD and the Rest of the world accounted only partially for inequality in well-being since the dispersion within developing regions became its main driver from the mid-20th century onward. Countries in the middle and lower deciles of the world distribution achieved the largest relative gain over the past century.     

Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties: An international political perspective

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognizing that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.     

Autocracy,Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the Developing Countries

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between political regimes and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to the developing countries for a sample of 134 countries over the 1983–2002 period. Using two categorical measures of regime type and three different measures of FDI, this study finds that, regardless of the measures of regime type, democracies are not significantly associated with either FDI in level or FDI as a ratio to GDP; democracy is positively related to a higher level of per capita FDI, but this result is not robust to alternative measures of political regime. Taken as a whole, there is no evidence of a systematic relationship between democracy and FDI inflows. This result suggests that being a democracy does not help attract higher levels of FDI.     

Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations in Income Inequality

This paper explores the propositions that, income inequality is relatively stable within countries; and that it varies significantly among countries. A new and expanded data set provides broad support for both propositions. Drawing on a political economy and capital market imperfection arguments to explain the intertemporal and international variation in inequality, the empirical analysis shows that the predicted variables associated with the first argument (a measure of civil liberties and the initial level of secondary schooling) and the second argument (a measure of financial depth and the initial distribution of land) are indeed important determinants of inequality.     

Is Foreign Direct Investment “Gender Blind”? Women's Rights as a Determinant of US FDI

The impact of women's rights on a country's competitiveness in the global economy is a source of contention. While educational opportunities for women, as well as political empowerment, are linked to a variety of positive outcomes, the impact of economic rights is mixed. Toward better understanding these issues, we focus on the role of women's rights in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Though foreign capital plays a key role in the development strategies of many countries, and many of the growth areas in FDI rely heavily on women's labor, extant literature on the determinants of FDI largely ignores gender. To gain insight into these issues, we examine the impact of women's political, economic, and educational rights across four different types of US FDI into the developing world. We find a mixed relationship between women's rights and FDI that varies across industrial sectors.     

THE POLITICS OF FDI EXPROPRIATION

I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e., the Lucas Paradox). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document that (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk (IR) receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) IR is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the IR channel. I inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group‐specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. I show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment.     

The effects of transition and political instability on foreign direct investment inflows

This paper examines the effects of transition and of political instability on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the transition economies of Central Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans. We find that FDI flows to transition economies unaffected by conflict and political instability exceed those that would be expected for comparable West European countries. Success with stabilization and reform increased the volume of FDI inflows. In the case of Balkan counties, conflict and instability reduced FDI inflows below what one would expect for comparable West European countries, and reform and stabilization failures further reduced FDI to the region. Thus, we find that the economic costs of instability in the Balkans in terms of foregone FDI have been quite high.     

Educated dictators attract more foreign direct investment

Since political risk is greater in dictatorships than in democracies, this paper investigates the hypothesis that foreign investors scrutinize public information on dictators to assess this risk. It checks whether foreign investors use five relevant dictators’ characteristics: age, political experience, education level, education in economics, and prior experience in business. The study is performed on a sample of 100 dictatorial countries from 1973 to 2008. We find that educated dictators are more attractive to foreign investors. We obtain strong evidence that greater educational attainment of the leader is associated with higher FDI. We also find evidence that the leader having tertiary education in economics and prior experience in business is associated with greater FDI. By contrast, the leader's age, and political experience have no relationship with FDI.