论农村正规金融与非正规金融的竞争与合作

非正规金融一直都作为一股强劲的草根力量活跃在金融市场,特别是农村金融市场.如何正确看待农村正规金融与非正规金融之间的竞争,并且利用非正规金融的优势发展正规金融,成为一个值得研究的新问题.本文在调查基础上,从非正规金融对正规金融的冲击入手,分析了非正规金融的相对优势,阐述了两种金融的几种合作模式以及效果.     

非正规金融市场:反应性还是自主性?——基于温州民间利率的经验研究

关于温州非正规金融市场利率的大多数典型事实都可以在"反应性"非正规金融范畴内得到合理的解释.支持温州非正规金融具有"反应性"的有力证据来自于对相关变量进行Granger因果关系检验及其脉冲响应分析.这些实证分析表明,正规金融对中小企业的信贷扩张将深刻改变非正规金融市场资金价格的短期走势.然而协整分析表明,在非正规金融市场利率与中小企业信贷水平之间并不存在一种长期的均衡关系.一个整合的分析框架应该被应用于理解温州非正规金融.在该框架中,非正规金融的"反应性"与"自主性"是互为补充的.     

中国农村非正规金融履约机制的实证研究

中国农村非正规金融的履约机制包括信息和信任机制、重复博弈和信誉机制、严厉的惩罚机制、灵活的担保机制、女性市场定位机制等.以湖北农村非正规金融为例,对它的履约情况进行了实证分析,得出结论:农村非正规金融具有极强的自生能力和可持续性.结论的政策含义是:压制、取缔非正规金融的行为不可取,强制性地将非正规金融正规化的行为同样不可取,正确的做法应是放松管制,引导正规金融与非正规金融的联接,促成农村一体化金融市场的形成.     

浅析我国农村的非正规金融

我国的农村金融可以分为正规金融、非正股金融和准正规金融三个类别,在有正规金融的情况下农户为什么要选择非正规金融？非正规金融存在的理由和作用又是什么？本文从非正规金融与正规金融的关系和非正规金融地位以及作用等方面阐述了非正规金融存在的必然性。     

浅析我国农村的非正规金融

我国的农村金融可以分为正规金融、非正股金融和准正规金融三个类别,在有正规金融的情况下农户为什么要选择非正规金融?非正规金融存在的理由和作用又是什么?本文从非正规金融与正规金融的关系和非正规金融地位以及作用等方面阐述了非正规金融存在的必然性.     

信息不对称条件下的农村金融供给不足及农村非正规金融的发展

对农村正规金融机构和农户之间的借贷博弈分析表明：在信息不对称条件下仅依赖正规金融机构是远远不能满足广大农户的金融需求的。而农村非正规金融具有交易成本优势和供给灵活等特点,能很好地适应农村金融市场的需求。为促进农村非正规金融的发展,短期应确立农村非正规金融的合法地位,以合会为突破口,大力发展农村非正规金融;中期应促进农村正规金融和非正规金融的融合;长期则应建立农协,实现农村农业产业和金融机构一体化。     

智能手机使用与相对贫困家庭金融参与行为

金融可及性不足导致相对贫困家庭难以获得发展机会,本文探究智能手机使用在相对贫困家庭金融参与中发挥的作用。通过对2021年中国家庭金融调查数据进行分析发现,使用智能手机的相对贫困家庭参与正规金融市场的概率与金融资产配置比例更高,而其非正规金融市场参与概率会降低,在考虑内生性问题及进行一系列稳健性检验后的结论依然成立。渠道分析显示,智能手机的使用通过增加家庭社会互动、正规金融获得和金融知识素养提高相对贫困家庭正规金融市场的参与率。异质性分析表明,智能手机促进正规金融市场参与的效果与地区信息基础设施建设程度密切相关。进一步分析表明,智能手机主要依靠移动互联网对相对贫困家庭的金融行为产生作用。建议加快推进金融创新与移动互联网信息基础设施建设,发挥正规金融市场在缓解相对贫困问题中的正向作用。     

金融生态环境视角的非正规金融生态状况研究

运用金融生态理论,从金融生态环境角度分析非正规金融存在的经济基础、非正式制度的作用、法制环境以及金融生态的自我调节机制.可以认为中小企业和个私经济是非正规金融存在的经济基础;善于利用社会传统和习俗等非正式制度进行有效的风险控制是相对正规金融的优势;非正规金融没有合法地位,经营方式隐蔽,处于监管之外,导致金融风险隐患的形成;非正规金融市场化的利率机制会产生某些负效应.针对非正规金融生态上述现状,提出相应政策建议.     

农村非正规金融的缺陷及规范建议

由于规模小、贷款频率高、财务状况差、担保品缺乏等原因,农村中小企业只好通过正规金融渠道融取所需资金。非正规金融具有交易成本低、运作简单方便等优势,成为中小企业所青睐的融资平台。但非正规金融毕竟是一种不规范的金融形态,政府应采取相应措施规范其运作,使其更好地服务于农村经济,乃至国家经济发展大局。     

互补、替代与转化:非正规金融与正规金融的关系

非正规金融以顽强的生命力自发产生于民间经济,但一直游离于国家金融体系建设规划之外,并因其所隐含的金融风险而备受质疑.非正规金融究竟是过渡性的制度安排,还是金融市场体系的有机构成?对这一问题的认识将直接影响我国关于非正规金融的政策效果.本文从历史的角度回顾了国内外非正规金融发展的经验,并探讨非正规金融与正规金融之间的关系,在此基础上提出对非正规金融所应持有的政策倾向.     

Information, Informal Finance, and SME Financing

Informal finance exists extensively and has been playing an important role in small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing in developing economies. This paper tries to rationalize the extensiveness of informal finance. SME financing suffers more serious information asymmetry to the extent that most SMEs are more opaque and can only provide less collateral. Informal lenders have an advantage over formal financial institutions in collecting “soft information” about SME borrowers. This paper establishes a model including formal and informal lenders and high- and low-risk borrowers with or without sufficient collateral and shows that the credit market in which informal finance is eliminated will allocate funds in some inefficient way, and the efficiency of allocating credit funds can be improved once informal finance is allowed to coexist with formal finance. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2005, 7 (in Chinese)     

Vertical Links Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions

The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions. Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special attention is paid to the Philippines. It is argued that the effects of stronger vertical links depend on the form of lender competition. In particular, if the relationship between lenders is one of strategic cooperation (sustained by threats of reprisal in a repeated setting), an expansion of formal credit may worsen the terms faced by informal borrowers.     

普惠金融对不同群体就业的影响研究——基于世界银行全球普惠金融调查数据

普惠金融的发展对促发展、稳就业、保民生具有非常重要的意义.考虑到非正规金融服务是对普惠金融的一项重要补充,本文基于2014年与2017年世界银行全球普惠金融调查数据,实证分析了正规金融服务与非正规金融服务对不同群体就业的异质性影响.研究结果表明:①在青年群体中,正规账户服务、正规储蓄服务和正规信贷金融服务对就业具有显著的促进作用;②相比于城镇群体,正规信贷服务和数字金融服务对农村群体就业的促进作用并不显著;③非正规信贷服务对不同群体的就业具有显著的促进作用.在考虑了更换就业、普惠金融的代理指标,采用不同年份的样本及采用倾向得分匹配法来减少样本选择性偏误等内生性问题后,结果依然稳健.最后,指出要积极推进普惠金融服务的广度和深度,加大普惠金融服务对不同群体就业的拉动作用.     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

Dual Financial Systems and Inequalities in Economic Development

This paper analyzes the emergence and the evolution of a modern banking system, in a developing economy where banks coexist with informal credit institutions. Banks have a superior ability in mobilizing savings while informal lenders enjoy a superior information on borrowers. More specifically, banks cannot observe perfectly the behavior of borrowers; therefore the latter need to provide collateral assets in order to obtain bank loans. Physical collateral is not needed to borrow in the informal credit market: informal lenders can rely on social networks to obtain information on borrowers' behavior and invoke social sanctions to enforce repayment. The sustained growth path is associated with the successful development of the banking system that gathers savings on a large scale. However, informal lenders and other traditional credit institutions are necessary in the first stage of development when collateral is scarce. In this economy, the development of modern financial intermediaries is closely associated with the accumulation of collateral assets by entrepreneurs. This implies that the initial level of development as well as the initial distribution of wealth will determine the joint evolution of the real side of the economy and the financial system. Under certain conditions, two long-run steady-state equilibria exist: in the first one the economy stops growing and the banking system never successfully develops; in the second one the economy reaches a sustained growth rate and the informal sector asymptotically vanishes. The impact of the following policies is discussed: financial repression, micro-credit institutions and redistribution of assets.     

Formal microlending and adverse (or nonexistent) selection: a case study of shrimp farmers in Bangladesh

Microcredit schemes have become a popular means of improving smallholders’ access to credit and making long term investment possible. However, it remains to be explored whether the current microcredit schemes are more successful than earlier formal small scale lending in identifying successful borrowers. We studied shrimp farming in a rural region in Bangladesh where formal microlending is well established, but where more expensive informal microlending coexists with the formal schemes. Farmers – both those who exclusively use formal loans and those who also use informal loans – remain credit-constrained; both types overutilize labour in order to reduce the need for working capital. However, the credit constraint is actually milder for the informal borrowers: the implicit shadow price of working capital is substantially higher in the group that only takes formal loans than in the group that also uses informal loans. These results suggest that informal lenders – with their closer ties to the individual farmers – remain more successful in identifying those smallholder farmers that are most likely to use the borrowed funds successfully. Informal lenders have an information advantage that formal microlenders lack: the latter need to find routes to access this information in order for formal microcredit schemes to succeed.     

Dependence of Informal Interest Rates and Level of Lenders’ Influence in the Informal Loan Market in Thailand

Informal finance with usurious interest rates seems to be the last resort for the poor in many developing countries. In Thailand, informal credit lenders can freely set up extortionate interest rates and use controversial enforcement actions to pressure borrowers to repay loans, because that legal enforcement is not practical due to the low punishment levels for those lenders. Despite widespread interest in the determinants of the informal interest rates, it remains a largely unexplored area. This study investigates whether level of lenders’ influence over the borrower, and some characteristics of the borrowers, are related to informal interest rates, enabling the rates to be classified into particular categories. Ordered logistic regression is used to analyze the data. The investigation was based on information collected in a survey presented to a sampled population of 694 participants from Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Phathum Thani, and Samut Prakan where the number of informal loans during the last seven years is highest when compared to other regions of the country. The results suggest that the level of lenders’ influence over the borrower in order to obtain a loan correlates with the informal interest rates applied. Moreover, some characteristics of a borrower, i.e., debt-to-income ratio and high level of familiarity between an informal lender and a borrower, also significantly affect the rates.     

Access to capital in rural Thailand: An estimated model of formal vs. informal credit

This paper analyzes the mechanism underlying access to credit, focusing on two important aspects of rural credit markets. First, moneylenders and other informal lenders coexist with formal lending institutions such as government or commercial banks, and, more recently, micro-lending institutions. Second, potential borrowers presumably face sizable transaction costs in obtaining external credit. We develop and estimate a model based on limited enforcement and transaction costs that provides a unified view of these facts. Based on data from Thailand, the results show that the limited ability of banks to enforce contracts, more than transaction costs, is crucial in understanding the observed diversity of lenders.     

Interaction of formal and informal financial markets in quasi-emerging market economies

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the interaction of formal and informal financial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market economies. Using a four-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the formal financial sector, we come up with three fundamental findings. First, we demonstrate that formal and informal financial sector loans are complementary in the aggregate, suggesting that an increase in the use of formal financial sector credit creates additional productive capacity that requires more informal financial sector credit to maintain equilibrium. Second, it is shown that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same direction. We demonstrate that in some instances, interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy, the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus, the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of monetary policy on economic activity. Third, the model shows that the risk factor (probability of success) for both high and low risk borrowers plays an important role in determining the magnitude by which macroeconomic indicators respond to shocks.     

Does formal financial development crowd in informal financing? Evidence from Chinese private enterprises

The relationship between formal and informal finance is uncertain. They serve as substitute for high-quality borrowers but are complement for low-quality borrowers. As formal financial institutions expand, they may concentrate on high-quality borrowers or diversify among borrowers of different qualities. Using unique survey data from Chinese private firms, we are allowed to investigate the relationship for a group of borrowers who were considered as low-quality. We find that formal financial development imposes a crowd-in effect for private firms’ informal financing, especially in East China. There is heterogeneity between East and West China. We document that the crowd-in effect is greater for private firms with bank access or of large size.