Are Public and Private Social Expenditures Complementary?

Most analyses of social protection are focussed on public arrangements. However, social effort is not restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be substitutes to public programs. OECD data indicate that accounting for private social benefits has an equalising effect on levels of social effort across a number of countries. This suggests complementarity between public and private social expenditures. But their distributional effects differ. Using cross-country data, we find a negative relationship between net public social expenditures and income inequality, but a positive relationship between net private social expenditures and income inequality. We conclude that changes in the public/private mix in the provision of social protection may affect the redistributive impact of the welfare state.Part of Leiden Social Security Incidence Project. Revised version of a paper presented at the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Lisbon, Portugal (March 10–14, 2004), and at the 60th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Milan, Italy (August 23–26, 2004). The usual disclaimer applies.     

Explaining the wealth holdings of different cohorts: Productivity growth and Social Security

In this paper, we explore the reasons why different generations accumulate different amounts of wealth. We use basic economic theory to propose two indicators of the economic conditions under which households accumulate wealth. The first one represents productivity differences across cohorts: The aggregate level of gross national product per capita around the time the head of the household entered the labor market. The second measure summarizes the changes in Social Security during the head of household's working life. Using panel data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, we show that productivity growth can explain all the cohort effects present in income data, while productivity growth and the generosity of Social Security can explain all the cohort effects present in household net worth. We also find a limited offset of Social Security on wealth holdings.     

On the Pro-Social Security Rhetoric

We propose to reframe Social Security to offer a coherent anti-privatization rhetoric that has not been fully provided in the contemporary literature. The dissatisfaction that motivated this study centers on the observation that the prevalent anti-privatization rhetoric exposes the drawbacks of Private Retirement Accounts (PRAs), but this rhetoric itself doesn't satisfactorily explain why the current Social Security system is more desirable. In reframing Social Security, we will follow a two-stage strategy. First, we will articulate the desirability of Social Security grounded in the function it serves in a way PRAs are not suited for serving: being a social income insurance scheme whose provision inherently favors the least fortunate in a Rawlsian fashion. Second, we will concentrate how Social Security provides this non-market choice by drawing on the unique resources not entirely available to the market.     

Strengthening Social Security

Social Security's core protections must be maintained, according to this author. He believes that by creating universal savings accounts and investing a small portion of the Social Security trust fund in equities, it is possible to secure the long-term future of Social Security without subjecting workers to the risks of individual, private accounts.     

Privatizing Social Security

This paper studies the political sustainability of the existing pay-as-you-go Social Security system in the face of recent demographic patterns. We analyze different approaches to privatizing the system and consider what it would require for them to be politically implementable. The analysis is based on an overlapping-generations economy where an initial generation would choose to implement a pay-as-you-go social insurance system. We study the sustainability of this system in each subsequent period. We describe some transition policies that make the current generations of agents at least as well off as the maintenance of the Social Security system. All feasible transition policies use debt to finance the benefits during the transition period, shifting at least some of the cost to unborn generations.     

Social Security Liabilities

This paper reviews the long-term financial problems facing the U.S. Social Security system. Not only is the system out of long-term actuarial balance, but implicit rates of return on worker contributions are low and dropping. The paper discusses different approaches for dealing with the twin problems suggested by the 1994–1996 Advisory Council on Social Security, ending with a case for a middle-of-the-road approach featuring modest long-term benefit cuts and small, centrally managed, add-on individual accounts. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: H55.     

The effect of changes in Social Security on bequests

The net effect on intergenerational transfers of an increase in Social Security benefits will depend on how much of the increase is consumed and how much bequeathed. I show analytically that the marginal propensity to consume an increase in Social Security benefits is indeterminate: it could range from zero to 1.0 or even larger. At one extreme bequests would fully offset the increase in benefits; at the other bequests would fall. According to simulations based on an estimated model of life-cycle behavior, consumption increases by slightly more than the increase in Social Security benefits, causing bequests to fall. That is, bequests do no offset at all an increase in transfers from the younger generation to the older.     

完善我国社会保障基金投资运营机制对策研究

社会保障基金是社会保障制度实施的核心条件和物质基础,社会保障基金投资运营机制的完善关系到社会保障基金的安全和有效运行。完善我国社会保障基金投资运营机制必须以福利经济学与投资组合理论为科学依据,关注社会保障机制与社会保障制度的协调发展。尤其在我国经济转型期,合理解决社会保障基金投资运营机制的关键在于社会保障基金应实行资本化经营,资金投向应逐渐向低风险、长收益的项目上实现多元化战略投资转移。     

Social Security and the increasing longevity gap

Growth in overall life expectancy is straining the Social Security budget, and the gap in life expectancy between the rich and poor is widening. Motivated by these facts, this paper does four things. First, we develop a simple way to summarize the degree of progressivity in a Social Security system. Second, we show that growth in the life expectancy gap over the last few decades unwinds three-quarters of the progressivity of the Social Security system. Third, we develop simple reforms to Social Security that maintain the progressivity of the system and restore fiscal solvency. Fourth, we estimate the welfare effects of these potential reforms.     

Home production and Social Security reform

This paper incorporates home production into a dynamic general equilibrium model of overlapping generations with endogenous retirement to study Social Security reforms. Specifically, home production takes housing, home input, and home hours as inputs and produces a good that is substitutable with market good. As such, the model differentiates both consumption goods and labor effort according to their respective roles in home production and market activities. Using a calibrated model, we conduct a policy experiment where we eliminate the current pay-as-you-go Social Security system. We find that the experiment has important implications for labor supply as well as consumption decisions and that these decisions are influenced by the presence of the home production technology. More importantly, comparing our economy to a one-good economy without home production, the welfare gains of eliminating Social Security are magnified significantly especially in the long run. The reasons are twofold and related to the general aspects of home production. First, home production implies a more elastic labor supply rendering the payroll labor tax more distortionary. Second, home production introduces insurance possibilities that are not present when only market-produced goods are available and, thus, reduces the need for government redistributive policies.     

Social Security and personal saving: 1971 and beyond

Feldstein (1996, 1974) reported that Social Security in the U.S.A. reduced personal saving (“saving”) in 1992 (1971) by $416 ($61) billion. I reestimate his life-cycle consumption specification using data from the latest NIPA revision, correct his calculations, and find that the implied reduction in 1992 (1971) saving is now $280 ($22) billion, 48% (16%) of actual net private saving, with a standard error of $114 ($14) billion. If structural breaks around WWII and the 1972 Social Security amendments (which raised real per capita SSW by 22%) are allowed, and the market value of Treasury debt included in the specification, the reduction in 1971 and 1992 saving attributable to Social Security is at most 0.55 times its standard error, and 12% of net private saving. I then reestimate the preferred specification of Coates and Humphreys (1999), allowing for these structural breaks and relaxing other restrictions. The implied effect of Social Security on saving is again statistically zero. First version received: September 2000/Final version received: September 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  I thank Les Oxley for pointing out that correcting for AR(1) residuals is not a categorical imperative but a cultural relative, in which case common factor restrictions are crucial.     

Social Security must be reformed

Today's Social Security system must be reformed not only because it will soon be in financial crisis but also because it is simply a bad deal for most Americans, this author believes. She argues that it should be transformed into a system of personal retirement accounts and uses the example of San Diego, which opted out of Social Security in 1981 and replaced it with a mandatory defined contribution program for city employees, to show the benefits of private accounts.     

Labor supply responses to marginal Social Security benefits: Evidence from discontinuities

A key question for Social Security reform is whether workers respond to the link on the margin between the Social Security taxes they pay and the Social Security benefits they will receive. We estimate the effects of the marginal Social Security benefits that accrue with additional earnings on three measures of labor supply: retirement age, hours, and labor earnings. We develop a new approach to identifying these incentive effects by exploiting five provisions in the Social Security benefit rules that generate discontinuities in marginal benefits or non-linearities in marginal benefits that converge to discontinuities as uncertainty about the future is resolved. We find that individuals approaching retirement (age 52 and older) respond to the Social Security tax-benefit link on the extensive margin of their labor supply decisions: we estimate that a 10% increase in the net-of-tax share reduces the two-year retirement hazard by a statistically significant 2.0 percentage points from a base rate of 15%. The evidence with regard to labor supply responses on the intensive margin is more mixed: we estimate that the elasticity of hours with respect to the net-of-tax share is 0.42 and statistically significant, but we do not find a statistically significant earnings elasticity. Though we lack statistical power to estimate results within subsamples precisely, the retirement response is driven mostly by the female subsample, while the hours response comes from the male subsample.     

DISENTANGLING THE ANNUITY FROM THE REDISTRIBUTIVE ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES*

In the United States, the life-cycle relationship between initial Social Security contributions and subsequent benefits causes the effect of Social Security on income distribution to be overestimated in a single-period analytical framework. By separating the annuity from the redistributive aspects of Social Security we provide a life-cycle framework for measuring its net effect on redistribution. To this point in its history, we find all income classes have received positive net life-cycle income transfers and, in an absolute sense, upper-income groups have done at least as well as lower-income groups. This suggests a reason for the near-universal support of Social Security by past generations, as well as the controversy which now surrounds it. As it becomes apparent to younger cohorts of taxpayers that many of them will be net losers, it is inevitable that Social Security will be subject to the same controversy as other welfare programs which attempt to redistribute income.     

A Positive Theory of Social Security

In many countries, social security accounts for a large fraction of the government budget. Why is this so, given that at any point in time the number of recipients of social security benefits is smaller than the number of contributors? In the overlapping‐generations model studied in this paper, all individuals currently alive vote on social security in every period. In equilibrium, the size of social security is larger, the greater is the proportion of elderly people in the population, and the greater is the inequality of pre‐tax income within each generation. Both predictions of the theory are supported by the empirical evidence in cross‐country data.     

PROVIDING INCOME SECURITY TO THE ELDERLY: THE ROLE OF PROGRAMS OTHER THAN SOCIAL SECURITY

Social Security retirement benefits have had a dramatic effect on the elderly's economic well-being over the last four decades. Many other facets of federal law have also enhanced the elderly's income security and should not be overlooked, however. Today, the elderly receive income from an amalgam of publicly and privately organized programs and individual provisions. The primary goal of these programs is to provide adequate income to the elderly. While all the major components of this loosely configured system, as we know it now, have evolved in the last 45 years, they have not developed at the same rate. It is important to understand this point because the relative role of the various income sources for future groups of the elderly will be somewhat different than for current ones     

Social Security Reform and Corporate Governance

Abstract

This paper considers implementation issues arising from potential reforms to the United States Social Security system. Many reform proposals involve individually invested accounts, but the corporate governance implications of such accounts have not been fully explored. Existing reform plans will result in a large fraction of votes being concentrated at one private fund manager. The implications for corporate governance and debt management under alternative fund management strategies are evaluated. The use of futures to construct synthetic investments could alleviate corporate governance and debt management problems.     

社会保障税与社会保障制度优化

社会保障税是指定用于社会保障的工薪税。本文分析了工薪税的税收归宿和劳动供给弹性的影响。当劳动供给弹性较小时 ,税收主要由劳动力负担 ,而且可能会增加就业压力 ;工薪税在劳动同质程度较高时可以取得较好的再分配效应。本文还描述了社会保障制度优化的理论过程。社会保障制度优化是指现收现付计划和强制储蓄计划的最优搭配 ,它以“黄金律”条件下的隔代帕累托改进为标准。就同代收入再分配而言 ,将收入再分配计划的目标定为提高受益人的受教育水平 ,而不是直接为其提供免费的社会福利 ,将有助于缓解收入再分配的代价。     

Projected U.S. Demographics and Social Security

Without policy reforms, the aging of the U.S. population is likely to increase the burden of the currently unfunded Social Security and Medicare systems. In this paper we build an applied general equilibrium model and incorporate the population projections made by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare implications of alternative fiscal responses to the retirement of the baby-boomers. Our calculations suggest that it will be costly to maintain the benefits at the levels now promised because the increases in distortionary taxes required to finance those benefits will reduce private saving and labor supply. We also find that the “accounting calculations” made by the SSA underestimate the required fiscal adjustments. Finally, our results confirm that policies with similar long-run characteristics have very different transitional implications for the distribution of welfare across generations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D58, E21, E62.     

Social Security fixes--beware of conjurers!

Among the many proposals for reform, there is one that offers the best chance of truly solving Social Security's financial problems, these authors believe. That proposal would increase savings by requiring workers to invest an additional 2% of their covered wages in individual accounts. At retirement, 75% of the money would go toward buying the current level of Social Security benefits, and 25% would be given to the individual as an "extra" pension. Individuals, not the government, would control investment of these accounts.