Climate policies and learning by doing: Impacts and timing of technology subsidies

We study the role of technology subsidies in climate policies, using a simple dynamic equilibrium model with learning by doing. The optimal subsidy rate of a carbon-free technology is high when the technology is first adopted, but falls significantly over the next decades. However, the efficiency costs of uniform instead of optimal subsidies, may be low if there are adjustment costs for a new technology. Finally, supporting existing energy technologies only, may lead to technology lock-in, and the impacts of lock-in increase with the learning potential of new technologies as well as the possibilities for early entry.     

Consumer support for environmental policies: An application to purchases of green cars

This paper focuses on how consumer motivation can be tapped in order to encourage the adoption of cleaner technologies. Consumers are heterogeneous — they may be guided by intrinsic motivation or extrinsic motivation. While information provision policies (such as the energy label for cars) may be effective in encouraging certain consumers to adopt green cars, financial incentive schemes (such as subsidies or fines) may be more persuasive for extrinsically-motivated consumers. We develop a dynamic theory of adoption of environmental innovations, in which information-provision policies are followed by financial incentives (first ‘carrot’, then ‘stick’ incentives). Analysis of a survey dataset of Swiss households observes considerable heterogeneity in terms of support of information-provision or financial incentive policies, in line with our conjectures. Our results will be of particular interest to policymakers interested in guiding consumers towards cleaner technologies.     

不同权重下政府补贴对供应链的影响

在考虑政府对制造商和消费者的补贴权重的情况下,基于博弈理论建立了制造商和零售商的决策模型,分析了不同权重下政府补贴对消费者、企业决策及其绩效的影响。数理模型推导和算例分析的结果表明:政府只对消费者补贴将导致企业提高价格,政府只对制造商补贴将导致企业降低价格;随着政府补贴的增加,消费者的实际支出价格减少,需求量、制造商利润和零售商利润均增加;政府补贴权重不同,企业决策也不同;政府补贴政策的实施对于消费者、企业和政府都是有利的;政府和企业更倾向于政府对制造商补贴,而消费者更希望政府对消费者补贴。     

Modelling future uptake of solar photo-voltaics and water heaters under different government incentives

To accelerate the adoption of technologies to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the residential sector, government policy makers offer a range of fiscal instruments and incentives. Despite the high costs of these schemes, methods are lagging to systematically evaluate their likely effectiveness amongst a geographical landscape of heterogeneous consumers. To address this need, a model was developed for spatial adoption of technologies such as water heaters and solar photo-voltaic panels (PVs), across housing stock, given government policy incentives. By combining features of choice modelling, Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) and diffusion models, it provides a capability to analyse future adoption patterns of the competing technology options under a range of features for purchase timing and choice. The model was implemented across 2.7 million residential dwellings in the State of New South Wales (NSW) of Australia to estimate future stock of PV and water heater options at geographical units of 250 households. Validation against actual numbers of PV installations at each postcode showed the model was effective at identifying high versus low adoption locations. Application to a wide range of policy scenarios, ranging from feed-in tariffs to upfront rebates, showed substantial differences in their effectiveness to accelerate uptake, and the government expenditure required.     

产学研合作创新补贴方式研究:以欠发达地区企业为例

针对企业创新行为给予补贴是政府鼓励企业创新的常见政策,由于受自身条件限制,欠发达地区政府在创新补贴发放形式上必须作出合理的选择。在考虑企业学习吸收能力的同时引入创新投入分配比例系数并建立三阶段博弈模型,分析欠发达地区产学研合作创新政府补贴策略的最优方式。分析结果表明:欠发达地区政府实施创新补贴策略可以有效激励企业加大创新投入规模;在宽松的知识产权保护政策下,随着学习吸收能力的提高,企业投入产出及社会福利均增加;相比之下,政府采取创新产品补贴策略时的各项产出均优于创新投入补贴。     

On the paradoxical case of a consumer-based environmental subsidy policy

We apply an environmentally differentiated duopoly model to the analysis of environmental policy involving consumer subsidies based on the emission levels of the products consumers purchase. More specifically, we consider the environmental and welfare effects of subsidizing consumers who purchase environmentally friendly goods in the case of a partially covered market with a Cournot duopoly. We show that, paradoxically, the subsidy policy degrades the environment, and that the optimal policy depends on the degree of marginal social valuation of environmental damage. That is, if the marginal social valuation of environmental damage is larger than a certain value, a consumer-based environmental subsidy policy is not socially optimal.     

碳交易及补贴机制下供应链差别定价研究

研究了碳交易机制、补贴机制以及碳交易及补贴机制下，一个二级供应链中普通产品和低碳产品竞争的差别定价策略，通过求解Stackelberg博弈模型得出单一的补贴政策并不能激励制造商进行节能减排，应与碳交易机制结合使用，其节能减排效果优于单一的碳交易机制。最后通过一个算例分析验证了碳交易及补贴机制的有效性。研究表明：碳交易价格升高到一定程度时，普通产品的零售价批发价均升高，低碳产品的价格均下降，普通产品的销量下降，低碳产品销量上升，碳排放总量下降；随着低碳补贴的增加，普通产品的零售价，低碳产品的批发价、零售价均降低，普通产品的销量下降，低碳产品的销量上升，其中低碳产品的价格和需求量对低碳补贴的反应更加敏感，使碳排放量降低的同时还提高了制造商和零售商的利润。     

Incentives for Technology Adoption Under Environmental Policy Uncertainty: Implications for Green Payment Programs

Water quality protection policy in the UnitedStates has been based on the provision offinancial incentives to farmers for adoptingimproved nutrient management practices.Increasing reliance on subsidy programs couldresult in expectations for such programs in thefuture. Using an option-value model thatindicates uncertainty can lead to a delay ininvestment, this paper analyzes the extent towhich uncertainty about cost-share subsidypolicies would impact adoption decision.Application of the model to adoption ofsite-specific technologies indicates thatuncertainty about subsidy policies has thepotential to impact the investment decision.When there is currently no cost-share subsidy,an increase in the probability of an expectedpolicy delays adoption. If the policy is ineffect, an increase in the probability of awithdrawal of the program encouragesinvestment. Cost-share subsidy policy is mosteffective when it is immediately offered andguaranteed that it will be removed soon.     

Combining choice modelling and multi-criteria analysis for technology diffusion: An application to the uptake of electric vehicles

Efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the residential sector by adopting technologies such as solar photovoltaics and electric vehicles (EVs) have major implications for the capacity of electricity distribution networks, particularly at local areas with high uptake. Consumer decisions to purchase these technologies are also influenced by several complex criteria such as costs/benefits, performance, appeal/status, risk, psychographics, and demographics. This complexity motivated the development of an innovative diffusion model, incorporating features of multi-criteria analysis and choice modelling, to estimate the adoption of these technology options spatially across the landscape of heterogeneous consumers. We test the model to forecast market share of EVs through to 2030, using the vehicle stock across all 1.5 million households in Victoria, Australia. Seven financial and non-financial criteria were included and calibrated via focus groups and a large‐scale survey. Annual change of criteria values and their elasticity to adoption were incorporated. Geographical differences in uptake of EVs were primarily due to driving distance, employment status and household income, with urban areas having about three times the proportional uptake. By testing the model for a range of incentives, we demonstrate its capability to inform and evaluate policy options.     

Income based price subsidies and parallel imports

We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI and both countries provide a subsidy to their poorer buyers as the subgame perfect equilibrium policies. However, when the Poor is able to PI a different equilibrium may arise. We show that the ability of the Poor to allow PI might increase welfare in this country even if it is never implemented. We also prove that as the Poor country gets richer, it will not be in their best interest to sign an agreement with the Rich to commit to not allowing PI.     

Income based price subsidies and parallel imports

We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI and both countries provide a subsidy to their poorer buyers as the subgame perfect equilibrium policies. However, when the Poor is able to PI a different equilibrium may arise. We show that the ability of the Poor to allow PI might increase welfare in this country even if it is never implemented. We also prove that as the Poor country gets richer, it will not be in their best interest to sign an agreement with the Rich to commit to not allowing PI.     

Boosting the spread of new technologies: an integrative propositional analysis of diffusion policies

ABSTRACT

Although many studies have recognised the importance of defining specific public policies to encourage technology diffusion, many authors fail to provide a clear view about either the policies that affect the diffusion of technologies or the effect of the different political instruments. Adopting a content analysis of papers that directly or indirectly refer to the diffusion of a new technology, this study applies the integrative propositional analysis (IPA) methodology to: (a) identify the repertoire of the different diffusion policies identified by previous studies; (b) classify these policies according to the type of instruments that they use; (c) analyse the impact of each policy on the different adoption factors that may inhibit or foster the diffusion of a new technology; and (d) evaluate the scope of each type of policy in terms of the number of affected adoption factors.     

Do more subsidies promote greater innovation? Evidence from the Chinese electronic manufacturing industry

Existing research provides contradictory insights about the effect of government subsidies on enterprise technology innovation. By explaining this mechanism with resource allocation, information efficiency and risk control channels, we systematically suggest three effects, leading to an inverted U-shaped relationship between the amount of subsidies and four indicators of technology innovation. Empirical evidence based on dataset of Chinese electronic manufacturing industry confirms that subsidies can promote enterprise technology innovation but it will inhibit innovation when there are too much or excessive amount of subsidies. Meanwhile, the impact of subsidies is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises than state-owned ones. Furthermore, the level of regional economic development moderates the impact of government subsidies. The government can take advantage of diverse subsidy policies to drive sustainable technology innovation.     

EXPORT SUBSIDIES VERSUS EXPORT QUOTAS WITH INCOMPLETELY INFORMED POLICY MAKERS*

This paper analyses export subsidies (price incentives) and export quotas (quantity controls) in the Brander‐Spencer (1985) model when policy makers have limited information on demand and cost structures. We examine necessary or sufficient information for policy makers to determine welfare‐enhancing policies. It is crucial that they know the elasticity value of the slope of the inverse demand curve and the market share. It is also shown that for policy makers, export quotas are superior to export subsidies under certain conditions.     

Policy implications of potential conflicts between short-term and long-term efficiency in CO2 emissions abatement

This paper shows that, under certain conditions (including path dependence and lock-in), policies and measures leading to a cost-effective GHG emissions mitigation in the short term may not allow reaching long-term emissions targets at the lowest possible cost, that is, they might not be cost-effective in the long term. The reason is that, in a situation where currently expensive technologies have a large potential for cost reductions through learning effects and R&D investments, the implementation of incentive-based mitigation policies such as taxes or tradable permits will encourage the adoption and diffusion of currently low-cost abatement technologies, but might not be enough to make attractive the diffusion of expensive ones, which is a necessary condition for these technologies to realise their cost-reduction potential through the aforementioned effects. A simple model and a numerical simulation are provided to show this possible conflict between static and dynamic efficiency, which points out to the need to combine different instruments, some aiming at short-term cost-efficiency (such as incentive-based environmental policy) and others at encouraging dynamic cost reductions (such as technology/innovation policy).     

Clean technology — Innovation and environmental regulation

The development and diffusion of clean technologies has an important role to play in preventing pollution. Government must address the issue of how firms can be given the necessary incentive to develop environmentally sound production techniques and products. This paper focus on how subsidies can — under certain restrictive conditions — stimulate innovation. Subsidization is usually assumed to involve unit subsidies for pollution reduction. Unit subsidies have little to do with the subsidy schemes in actual use. Our focus is on subsidy schemes specifically designed to promote the development of clean technologies through the use of grants/financial aid. Based on data from the development projects initiated through The Danish Clean Technology Programme we analyze how environmental innovations take place when the polluters, their suppliers and consultants are actively engaged in the development processes. The main merit of subsidy schemes like the Danish one is its direct focus on the innovation processes and the active incorporation of the network of firms surrounding the polluters. Our findings lead us to conclude that when it comes to subsidization, the role of government should be redefined. Government can act as a matchmaker by providing firms with informative incentives and necessary contacts for finding more efficient technological solutions to specific environmental problems.     

Subsidies under uncertainty: Modeling of input- and output-oriented policies

Agricultural subsidies play an essential role in agricultural and rural development in many developed economies. Countries have implemented agricultural subsidy policies with a focus on food security and environmental protection. Agricultural production is risky and uncertain, influencing the efficiency of agricultural subsidies. This study develops a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of production uncertainties on the efficiency of agricultural subsidy policies under the double constraints of food security and environmental protection. The basic model is investigated under six different conditions, and expanded research also is presented. Our models show that uncertainty, including output, cost, and price uncertainties, and technology conversion efficiency significantly affects the efficiency of agricultural subsidies. Under high technology conversion efficiency, output-oriented subsidies are appropriate for food security and environmental protection goals. Policymakers should take both uncertainty and production efficiency into consideration when choosing between input-oriented and output-oriented subsidy policies.     

Explaining slow diffusion of energy-saving technologies; a vintage model with returns to diversity and learning-by-using

This paper studies the adoption and diffusion of energy-saving technologies in a vintage model. An important characteristic of the model is that vintages are complementary: there are returns to diversity of using a mix of vintages. We analyse how diffusion patterns and adoption behaviour are affected by complementarity and learning-by-using. It is shown that the stronger the complementarity between different vintages and the stronger the learning-by-using, the longer it takes before firms scrap old vintages. We argue that this is a relevant part of the explanation for the observed slow diffusion of energy-saving technologies. Finally, we show that an energy price tax reduces energy consumption, because it speeds up the diffusion of new energy-saving technologies and induces substitution from capital to labour.     

我国粮食安全与补贴政策研究

我国现行粮食补贴政策主要为确保国家粮食安全.我国现行粮食补贴政策对保证粮食数量安全起到了较大的作用,政策本身作用和政策的示范作用对提高农民的种粮积极性都有帮助.在现行粮食补贴政策中,粮食的质量安全只有通过生产环节的良种补贴来得以保证;而粮食的生态安全是粮食补贴政策中最需要加以完善的.为进一步提高粮食安全保障水平,粮食补贴政策的着力点在于提高科技要素的贡献率,防止粮食生产中“倒U型曲线”的出现,并通过扩大良种补贴范围,鼓励生物农药的使用,同时实行休耕地制度,保持土壤的肥力.     

低碳产业补贴政策对福利分配的影响

从低碳产业的外部性出发,探讨了补贴对低碳产业发展的影响。首先,通过假定补贴政策对低碳产品的需求弹性不同,分析了补贴增加的福利总额在生产者和消费者之间的分配。其次,假定对低碳产业生产者进行补贴,将会使整个低碳行业生产者收益增加,推动低碳产业的快速发展。最后,提出了构建低碳产业的补贴政策要根据低碳产业发展规划分步实施的政策思路。