A quantitative theory of tax evasion

I present a simple, unified approach to study the tax evasion practices often observed in developing countries. I develop a general equilibrium model where heterogeneous establishments optimally select themselves into informality, tax compliance, and formal tax evasion. Informal firms evade taxes by staying small, while larger, formal firms can engage in costly tax evasion. In equilibrium, tax revenues rely on medium-sized firms, which are scarce. In a calibration exercise using data from Mexico, I find that reducing the returns to tax evasion by formal firms increases tax revenues by up to 68%. However, economies where such returns are too high face a trade-off between tax collection and aggregate efficiency, as cracking down on formal tax-evading firms pushes some firms into informality. Last, as the economy develops, the informal sector shrinks, while the tax-evading sector expands, thus limiting potential collection. If lower informality is a byproduct of development, and not vice versa, a solid tax base can be achieved by fiscal authorities effectively by focusing on formal tax evasion.     

Taxing the Financially Integrated Multinational Firm

This paper develops a theoretical model of corporate taxation in the presence of financially integrated multinational firms. Under the assumption that multinational firms use some measure of internal loans to finance foreign investment, we find that the optimal corporate tax rate is positive from the perspective of a small, open economy. This finding contrasts the standard result that the optimal‐source‐based capital tax is zero. Intuitively, when multinational firms finance investment in one country with loans from affiliates in another country, the burden of the corporate taxes levied in the latter country partly falls on investment and thus workers in the former country. This tax exporting mechanism introduces a scope for corporate taxes, which is not present in standard models of international taxation. Accounting for the internal capital markets of multinational firms thus helps resolve the tension between standard theory predicting zero capital taxes and the casual observation that countries tend to employ corporate taxes at fairly high rates.     

Asymmetric Responses of the Underground Economy to Tax Changes: Evidence From New Zealand Data

This paper considers the relationship between taxes and the size of the New Zealand underground economy. Previous studies indicate that a positive relationship exists in this and certain other countries. This paper addresses the question: 'Is the response of the underground economy to an increase in taxes the same as its response to a decrease in taxes?' We find that although the effect on the underground economy of an upward movement in the effective tax rate is numerically greater than that of a downward tax movement, this difference is not statistically significant.     

Tax enforcement,tax compliance and tax morale in transition economies: A theoretical model

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between tax enforcement, tax compliance and tax morale within countries characterised by rapid introduction of market institutions and slow evolution of political regimes, such as transition economies. The paper investigates a coordination game in which the government is ex-ante committed to tax enforcement and can observe the proportion of tax-compliant agents in the economy. In turn, two groups of agents (third-party reporting and self-reported income) are keen to evade taxes unlawfully but have limited information on how many others evade taxes; their tax morale is therefore an endogenous function of agents' perception on tax compliance. The model predicts that the lower the quality of political institutions and the weaker tax morale, the less tax compliance can be achieved. The third-party reporting group will also be bearing higher tax burden than the self-reported income group. The model entails that having political institutions of good quality is not a sufficient condition to conduce to tax enforcement or tax compliance. Due to the endogenous role of tax morale, the government could be pushed ex-post towards poor or no tax enforcement. If good political institutions are not accompanied by good information about the enforcement of tax collection, there is scope for co-existence of poor tax enforcement, low tax compliance and weak tax morale. As such, this model well describes the tax evasion behaviour observed since the outset of transition from planned to market economy.     

The myth of a booming town: a two-sector model of Macau economic growth

This paper builds a trade-based equilibrium, two-sector model to reveal the inefficiency of a foreign-dominated, gaming-biased, bubble growth in Macau. This fast GDP growth that has not led to much real development as measured by the effective GNP would likely have adverse impacts on the city's long-term prosperity. We employ the model to analyze why various gaming markets have adopted differing tax rates. This work provides a rigorous argument against the problematic attempts to push for low tax convergence in the Asian gaming market. To neutralize the damaging effects of foreign domination in the local economy, we offer several policy recommendations for reviving home businesses and enhancing domestic welfare in Macau. It is suggested that enforceable laws should be made to prevent the foreign firms with cross-market operations from stealing away Macau customers, that differential taxes on casino operators and income taxes on player winnings should be chosen to support Chinese-owned casinos and curb pathological gambling, and that a sovereign wealth fund should be established to stop too much of Chinese gaming money from being lost too fast and foster Macau's economic autonomy by reducing its overreliance on foreign concerns for output growth.     

Credit rationing or overlending? An exploration into financing imperfection

Small and new firms are deemed to be unable to obtain sufficient bank loans. This idea finds a strong theoretical support in credit rationing theory. However, this is vigorously challenged by De Meza and Webb (1987, 2000) suggesting that firms can benefit from an excess of credit, i.e. overlending. Credit rationing or overlending? The contribution of this empirical article is twofold: to our knowledge, it is the first to make an attempt in measuring the relative importance of these two types of financing imperfection and to explore factors leading to one or the other. We exploit a rich panel data set on the access to bank credit for new French businesses during the mid-1990s. Our results show that credit rationing was not highly spread among French new firms. The story told by De Meza and Webb (1987) appears to be a much more realistic model. In addition, we identify factors, linked to the starter, the project or the industry, that are closely associated with credit rationing and/or overlending. Most factors enter into a consistent relation: when they are positively (negatively) associated with credit rationing, they are negatively (positively) associated with overlending.     

Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Entry of Firms

With direct trade barriers banned, governments may be tempted to use indirect policy tools to interfere with trade, such as environmental taxes. The author uses a model of an endogenous market structure, where the number of firms is determined by a zero-profit condition in one country but is exogenously given in the other country, to show that a government harboring a fixed number of firms fails to affect aggregate supply, and therefore has little scope for improving domestic environmental quality (if pollution is transboundary). Moreover, owing to the absence of a terms-of-trade effect, it diverts from the classical strategic tax rule. The author argues that both governments arguably fix their equilibrium emission taxes "too low," meaning that tax competition plausibly leads to "ecological dumping."     

The marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in Africa

In this paper we propose estimates of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) in 38 African countries. We develop a simple general equilibrium model that can handle taxes on five major tax classes, and can be calibrated with little more than national accounts data. A key feature of our model is the explicit recognition of the informal economy. Our base case estimate of the average MCF from marginal increases in all five tax instruments is 1.2. Focusing on the lowest cost tax instruments in each country, commonly the VAT but not always, the average MCF is 1.1. Finally extending the tax base to include sections of the informal economy by removing some tax exemptions offers the potential for a low MCF source of public funds, and a lowering of MCFs on other tax instruments.     

Index to Volume 52, 2000

In an efficiency wage economy with variable profits, a shift from payroll to employment taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant at the initial wage. However, unemployment will rise if firms are constrained to zero profits in the long run and if tax revenues are constant. This reversal of employment effects occurs because the shift in taxes reduces wages. This implies a budget deficit. Hence, taxes will have to be raised if revenues are held constant. If the firm's profits cannot change, the tax increase will cause some firms to close down and unemployment will rise. Thus, the predicted employment consequences of changes in the tax structure depend on assumptions about the time horizon and budget constraint.     

Does tax competition make mobile firms more footloose?

We examine a two‐period regional model with evolving economic geography, potentially creating incentives for firm relocation between periods. We argue that tax competition makes firms more footloose, but that this increases efficiency relative to the laissez‐faire outcome. We establish that: (i) tax competition leads to efficient investment outcomes and (ii) firm mobility is greater with tax competition than with a laissez‐faire regime. When relocation is costly, there can be too little mobility over time, as firms do not take into account the impact of FDI on social welfare in each country. With lump‐sum taxes or transfers, firms capture these benefits and internalize them, such that tax competition leads to the efficient outcomes. When more time periods are examined, tax competition induces firm relocation sooner than in its absence.     

Capital Expansion, Endogenous Growth and Equilibrium Unemployment

A model is developed, which captures the interactions of unemployment and economic growth in general equilibrium. The economy evolves along a correct-expectations equilibrium path exhibiting endogenous job rationing, and productivity growth is driven by installation of new capital. Under the maintained hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than unity, unemployment benefits are shown to shift up the whole path of equilibrium unemployment, leaving the economy with a higher natural rate of unemployment and lowering the long-run growth rate permanently. Investment tax credits financed by lump sum taxes on total income are capable of lowering the natural rate and raising the economy's growth rate.     

AGE‐DEPENDENT TAXES WITH ENDOGENOUS HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION

We assess the gains attained by the introduction of age‐dependent labor income taxes in an overlapping generations economy where individuals live a meaningful life cycle and endogenously accumulate human capital. The model is sufficiently rich to isolate the role of general equilibrium effects, credit market imperfections, and different forms of human capital accumulation. The large welfare gains we obtain cannot be attained without age dependence, nor can they be attained with age‐dependent taxes if progressivity of labor income taxes and capital income tax rates are not suitably adjusted to profit from the complementarity of these instruments.     

Tax Reform,Delocation, and Heterogeneous Firms*

The standard international tax model is extended to allow for heterogeneous firms when agglomeration forces are important, enabling us to study the relocation effects of taxes that vary according to firm size. We show that allowing for heterogeneity permits a given tax scheme to have an endogenously different effect on the location decision of small and big firms, with the biggest firms being endogenously more likely to relocate in reaction to high taxes. We show that a reform that flattens the tax–firm–size profile can raise tax revenue without inducing any relocation.     

Corporate tax evasion: The case for specialists

We analyze the role of accounting specialists who help corporations evade/avoid taxes in a game of incomplete information played by a tax authority, corporate taxpayers, and an accounting specialist. In addition to a full equilibrium characterization, we establish that (i) marginal changes in enforcement are not effective when evasion/avoidance is pervasive; (ii) fines on firms as opposed to specialists are more effective in such situations; (iii) reducing auditing costs and increasing “creative accounting” costs are effective in curbing evasion when tax compliance is relatively high.     

The Significance of Credit Rationing on Real Investment Activity – A Test for the Significance of Capital-Market Imperfection in Japan

Does bank credit matter to the real investment finance of firms? If so, to what kind of firms does it matter, and why? Despite the progress of research in this field, there is still little empirical consensus on these problems. This paper contributes to the understanding of capital-market imperfection in Japan by answering these questions. I introduce new methods to test the significance of credit rationing and show that bank credit is indeed a very important determinant of real investment activity of small firms. The availability of long-term loans has particularly significant effects on the investment opportunities of small firms, although large firms with capital of more than 1 billion yen are free from credit rationing. JEL Classification Numbers: C51, E44, G21.     

Distortions,efficiency and the size distribution of firms

We develop a model of firms’ growth in which the tax and credit environments act as selection mechanisms. Such a model, parametrized and validated using a variety of data restrictions, can rationalize observations about input choices and size patterns typical of many developing countries. Using counterfactual experiments, we show that firms’ optimal responses to the tax environment are effective in reducing efficiency losses. As a consequence, tax distortions only account for 13% of the gap in output per worker between an undistorted economy and the benchmark. Credit constraints account for 44% of this gap. However, the interaction between the cost of capital and credit constraints appears to be the most important source of misallocation and can explain up to 85% of the difference in output per worker between the benchmark and first-best.     

Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting

The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium stochastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deterministic general equilibrium models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments (e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than revenue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits). To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first-best.     

Industry equilibrium with outside financing and moral hazard: Implications for market integration

In this paper, we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that (1) firms need outside financing and (2) they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks. We characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing, where firms choose not to take risks, and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing. In both cases, we show that competition increases and prices decline as markets integrate. However, in markets with credit rationing there is typically more exit, a smaller decline in prices and, most strikingly, the market value of the industry increases rather than decreases.     

Testing for the Ratchet Effect in the R&D Tax Credit

Many countries have implemented the R&D tax credit to encourage firms’ R&D spending. The design of the tax credit is important for its effectiveness. Some countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Japan, France and the US have employed an incremental R&D tax credit system. The US case that made a major change in its design from the moving average base to the fixed base in calculating the credit provides us with a natural experiment to measure the effectiveness of the tax credit from the perspective of the ratchet effect. By applying an endogenous switching regression model to US manufacturing firm data, we attempt to measure the ratchet effect of R&D credit on firms’ R&D investment. According to the empirical results, the R&D tax credit policy has been effective with the price elasticity, –1.818, for the qualified firms, and the re-design of R&D credit improved the positive impact of R&D credit. This provides some policy implication for those countries that adopted an incremental credit system. In addition, our result suggests the existence of selectivity bias in the previous literature.     

The shadow economy in three Mediterranean countries: France,Spain and Greece. A MIMIC approach

This paper offers estimations of the evolution of the shadow economy in three Mediterranean countries, namely France, Spain and Greece. A multiple indicators and multiple causes model based on the latent variable structural theory has been applied. As established by Giles (Working paper on monitoring the health of the tax system, 1995), filtered data to solve the non-stationary problems are used. The model includes the tax burden (both as a whole and disaggregated into direct taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions), a proxy of regulation burden, theu nemployment rate and self-employment as causes of the shadow economy and the GDP growth rate, the labour force participation ratio and the currency ratio as indicators of the underground economy. The results confirm that unemployment, the fiscal burden and self-employment are the main causes of the shadow economy in these countries, and confirm that an inverse relationship exists between the official GDP growth rate and that of the unofficial economy. This paper has benefited from the comments and suggestions of the anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies. The paper was partly written when third author was visiting Real Colegio Complutense at Harvard University. The hospitality of this Institution is gratefully acknowledged.