EU Enlargement and Inward FDI

The authors attempt to highlight the effects of the recent surge of FDI in the enlargement states on domestic investment and growth. A similar analysis is carried out for the EU-15 in order to ascertain whether this type of capital inflow has a differential impact in these two regions of the European Union. Empirical analysis, based on dynamic panel data models, suggests the existence of a positive contribution of FDI to greater domestic investment and economic growth in the new member states. The evidence obtained for the EU-15 old member countries confirms the FDI-growth nexus but does not suggest a positive impact of FDI on domestic investment, which would be consistent with these capital inflows being of a different nature for these more advanced economies.     

FISCAL POLICY AND OPTIMAL TAXATION: EVIDENCE FROM A TAX SMOOTHING EXERCISE

Testing the tax smoothing hypothesis for the EU‐15, we hypothesise that the introduction of the 3%‐deficit rule of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 may have inhibited tax smoothing as European Union (EU)‐member states are no longer capable of letting the deficit grow as much as implied by expected decreases in government expenditure. Our results show that for some countries this fiscal rule may have indeed changed the validity of the tax smoothing hypothesis, thus implying that EU accession has caused welfare losses.     

Panel data modelling and the tax-spend controversy in the euro zone

This article attempts to differentiate between the debatable tax and spend, spend and tax, fiscal synchronization and institutional separation hypotheses in order to explore empirically the interplay between public expenditures and public revenues in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) member states. For this purpose, panel data models are derived to test the validity of the four hypotheses in EMU countries. A notable characteristic of this article is that the four hypotheses are tested by dividing EMU countries into various subgroups and using disaggregated data for government expenditures and revenues. Seeking for the robustness of the empirical evidence, the panel data methods of Generalized Two-Stage Least Squares (GTSLS) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) are accordingly applied to identify the relationship between public outlays and taxation receipts. GTSLS and GMM results strongly support the fiscal synchronization hypothesis implying that budget decision-making is significantly influenced by both government expenditures and revenues components.     

Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the extent to which the capital endowment of the medium‐sized country is similar to that of the large or small country. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country is to the average one, the less likely the tax harmonization including the median country is to prevail and the more likely the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country is to prevail. We also show that partial tax harmonization makes the member countries of the tax union better off and non‐member countries worse off, which stands in sharpe contrast with previous studies, such as Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) and Bucovetsky (2009).     

Discrimination and job search theories for black British young men

The paper examines empirically the relationship between government revenues and expenditures in four European countries: Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. In relative terms all four may be considered as the poorest members of the European Union. Yet, they present a fairly diverse picture as far as their macroeconomic performance and fiscal position is concerned. The empirical findings from cointegration and causality tests that are reported here indicate that in the case of Greece and Ireland tax and spending decisions are taken simultaneously by the fiscal authority, the tax-and-spend hypothesis is supported in the case of Spain, while absence of any causal ordering between government expenditure and tax revenues has been established for Portugal.     

Achieving the triple dividend in Portugal: a dynamic general-equilibrium evaluation of a carbon tax indexed to emissions trading

Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we simulate the environmental, economic, and budgetary effects in Portugal of a new carbon tax indexed to the carbon price in the European Union’s Emissions Trading System market. Through careful recycling of the carbon tax revenues to finance lower personal income taxes, lower Social Security contributions, and higher investment tax credits – in particular when changes are directed at promoting energy efficiency – we show that it is possible to design a carbon tax reform that boosts economic growth and strengthens fiscal consolidation. These results served as the basis for a new carbon tax eventually approved by the Portuguese Parliament.     

Why the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment with a Sales Factor*

Using a two‐country tax competition model with a multinational enterprise (MNE), this paper addresses the question of whether the European Union should replace separate accounting (SA) in corporate income taxation by formula apportionment (FA) and, if so, which apportionment factors should be used. Our main result is that FA with a sales factor may mitigate or even eliminate fiscal externalities caused by the countries' tax policy. Hence, our analysis provides a microfoundation for the sales apportionment factor. In an empirical calibration to the EU‐15 we show that the transition from SA to FA with a sales‐only formula raises average tax rates by 2% and average tax revenues by 1 billion euros or 0.1% of GDP. These effects result in an increase of welfare.     

The Dilemmas of Tax Coordination in the Enlarged European Union

This study evaluates the economic effects of corporate tax coordinationin the enlarged European Union (EU) using a computable generalequilibrium model. Our main findings are as follows: (i) Corporatetax coordination can yield modest aggregate welfare gains. The2004 enlargement of the EU has increased the potential gainsfrom tax harmonization, provided corporate tax rates and taxbases are harmonized at their unweighted averages. (ii) Allscenarios for coordination leave some EU Member States as winnersand others as losers. An agreement on tax coordination is thereforelikely to require elaborate compensation mechanisms. (iii) Thelarge and diverse country effects suggest that Enhanced Cooperationfor a subset of the Member States may be the most likely routetowards tax coordination. (iv) Identifying winners and losersfrom coordination for the purpose of a compensation mechanismmay be problematic, since countries experiencing gains in GDPand welfare tend to lose tax revenues, and vice versa. (JELcodes: H25, H73, H87)     

Global capital markets,direct taxation and the redistribution of income

Standard fiscal theory suggests that taxation should be heaviest on the least mobile factors of production – for both efficiency and revenue reasons. A shift in tax burdens from capital to labour as economies become globally integrated is thus justified. This theoretical tradition (founded by Ramsay and continued by Mirrlees and Lucas) assumes by construction that profit taxes reduce investment and growth; and while sensitive to inter-generational equity, sidesteps the issue of income distribution within generations. In contrast, starting from Keynes’ critique of these assumptions and building on modern endogenous growth models, it can be shown that profit taxation is not necessarily injurious to productive investment. In practice, moreover, the effect of globalisation has not been to reduce tax rates on capital, but rather to erode the tax base itself (i.e. ‘tax evasion’). Improved information exchange between tax authorities, which is now being driven by fiscal insolvency in developed countries, would allow tax incidence to be shifted so as to improve income distribution within OECD countries. Such cooperation could also permit the replacement of the current discretionary system of fiscal transfers from rich to poor countries (‘development aid’) by equitable sharing of global capital tax revenue.     

The Oecd Model Tax Treaty: Tax Competition And Two‐Way Capital Flows*

Model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination, but do require that either credits or exemptions be applied to repatriated earnings. This contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where deductions are most efficient. I incorporate the fact that capital flows are typically bilateral. With symmetric countries, credits by both is the unique and efficient treaty equilibrium. This equilibrium weakly dominates the nontreaty equilibrium. With asymmetric countries, the treaty need not offer improvements without tax harmonization. With harmonization, it is always possible to reach efficient capital allocations while increasing both countries' welfares only if neither uses deductions.     

Supranational integration and national reorganization: On the Maastricht treaty’s impact on fiscal decentralization in EU countries

We explore the implications of European integration for fiscal decentralization in EU member states with a dataset on 21 OECD countries over the 1975–2000 period. The difference-in-difference methodology is used to establish causality. EU member states are classified as the treatment and non-EU OECD countries as the control group. The Maastricht treaty is interpreted as a quasi-experimental policy intervention that substantially advanced European integration. Our results suggest that tax decentralization has increased in EU countries after the signing of the Maastricht treaty. The treaty’s effect on expenditure decentralization also seems to be positive, but is less clear-cut.     

Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition

In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they simultaneously set capital taxes in every stage game when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity, whereas they may set capital taxes sequentially in every stage game when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that capital is owned by the country's residents, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving Late for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.     

Convergence Analysis of the Structure of Social Protection Financing

Expenditure on social protection in the European Union (EU) member states has been increasing rapidly over the last decade. To cover the increasing expenses, the countries need to find ways to increase revenues. Social protection financing systems and structure of financing vary across countries, but all of them use mainly two sources for financing: general government contributions and social tax revenue. The aim of this paper is to study the development of the structure of social protection financing at the main contributor level over the last decade, defining the trends that characterize the changes. We concentrate on convergence analysis of the structure of social protection financing, which is an important but, so far, insufficiently studied issue.This paper was presented at the 57th IAES Conference in Lisbon, March 10–14, 2004. The authors would like to thank the discussants in that session for their helpful suggestions. This paper was prepared with the support of the Estonian Science Foundation research grant. We wish to thank Reet Maldre for the assistance     

Some general equilibrium analysis applied to fiscal harmonization in the European community

This paper applies numerical general equilibrium analysis to consideration of domestic welfare impacts of some alternative schemes of fiscal harmonization in the E.E.C. A ‘coefficient of resource saving’ showing the maximum percentage resource shrinkage or minimum resource expansion consistent with a current welfare level is computed for each of 5 E.E.C. member states under a number of alternative tax replacements.     

Convergence of fiscal pressure in the EU: a time series approach

The study of fiscal convergence in the EU is a relevant issue in the context of economic integration and fiscal harmonization and we report new empirical evidence on this topic using a time series approach. We apply unit root and stationarity tests with an endogenous break for the study of long run, deterministic and stochastic convergence of the national tax burden taking Germany, the United Kingdom and the European average as benchmarks. Only the United Kingdom and Germany show long run convergence and few countries converge despite harmonization efforts and fiscal competition.     

Tax competition,tax coordination and tax harmonization: The effects of EMU

There is little doubt that the step towards a monetary union in Europe will increase both the distorionary effects of existing differences in national tax systems and the intensity of tax competition for internationally mobile commodity and factor tax bases. This paper discusses selected issues of commodity and capital tax coordination that are likely to be affected by monetary unification. Starting from the distortive present scheme of value-added taxation in Europe we first analyze the effects of a switch to a general origin-based VAT as a way to maintain national tax rate autonomy over this important tax base. While an origin-based VAT would neither distort trade flows — both within the EU and with third countries — nor investment decisions in the long-run, its short-run effects are likely to be severe in the absence of exchange rate flexibility. In the field of capital taxation the focus switches to the feasibility of regional harmonization measures when there is no cooperation with the rest of the world. We argue that in a monetary union the mobility costs of capital will be significantly lower within the EU as compared to outside investments. This provides an efficiency argument for minimum source taxes on both interest income and corporate profits even if cooperation with third countries is infeasible.     

EU-type carbon emissions trade and the distributional impact of overlapping emissions taxes

The European Union fulfills its emissions reductions commitments by means of an emissions trading scheme covering some part of each member state’s economy and by national emissions control in the rest of their economies. The member states also levy energy/emissions taxes overlapping with the trading scheme. We investigate the impact of that double regulation on the distribution of national welfares. In certain very special cases emissions tax increases turn out to be exactly offset by permit price reductions such that permit-exporting [permit-importing] countries lose [gain] from an increase in the overlapping emissions tax. These results are not general due to market-interdependence effects, which may even reverse the sign of welfare changes. For that ambiguity and other reasons the case is made for abolishing overlapping taxes.     

Tax principles and tax harmonization under imperfect competition: A cautionary example

This paper shows that under imperfect competition, the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonization may depend crucially on whether taxes are levied by the destination or the origin principle. In a standard model of imperfect competition, while harmonization always makes at least one country better off, and may be Pareto-improving, when taxes are levied under the destination principle (which currently applies in the European Union), harmonization of origin-based taxes (as recently proposed by the European Commission) is certain to be Pareto-worsening when the preferences in the two countries are identical, and is likely to be so even when they differ.     

HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND CONTINUOUS TRAINING: EVIDENCE FOR EU COUNTRIES

This paper links data on continuous training from the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) to information on skill levels and earnings from the EU KLEMS growth and productivity accounts, to examine the relative magnitudes of continuous workforce training versus human capital formation through the general education system in the European Union. The measurement methodology draws from the literature on measuring intangible investments by firms and sources of growth in an accounting framework. The results suggest that in the EU15 group of countries, intangible investments in continuous training represent just under 2 percent of GDP or about 35 percent of expenditure on general education. The share of GDP accounted for by training is less than a third as large in the new member states. A growth accounting method is employed to show that failure to account for continuous training leads to an underestimate of the impact of human capital on output growth in the EU.     

EU regional policy and tax competition

The European Union (EU) provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructures, i.e. roads and railways, which link the EU member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility. This raises the question of whether EU involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies. Moreover, an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition. We analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms. We show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition. In contrast, with regard to union-periphery infrastructure, the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures. Here, the effects on tax competition are ambiguous. Our results provide a rationale for EU-level regional policy that supports the development of intra-union infrastructure.