ECONOMIC ISSUES FROM THE BROADS GRAZING MARSHES CONSERVATION SCHEME

The paper examines two key issues relating to the use of fixed-price conservational contracts of the type embodied in the new Environmentally Sensitive Area policy in the UK. It uses data for the Broads Grazing Marshes Conservation Scheme (BGMCS). The budgetary costs of the fixed-price contract are compared to those of (i) public purchase of land with leaseback for grazing, and (ii) of individual management agreements. Using a net present value criterion, public purchase emerges as the cheapest option, and management agreements as a superior option in defined circumstances. The paper also explores equity and efficiency issues arising from fixed price contracts. It is concluded that for many farmers and landlords in the BGMCS the fixed payment exceeded what was necessary to achieve the conservational objectives, while at the same time it was less than the profit foregone by farmers who might possibly have switched to arable farming.     

Labour control regimes in the rural and urban workplaces of global production networks: The coffee case of Colombia

This study analyses the local labour control regimes (LCRs) in the workplaces of global production networks. Using the ethnographic approach, it examines the control strategies utilized by several stakeholders in coffee production and consumption sites in Colombia. The results demonstrate that transformations in the value chains have changed LCRs due to neoliberal openness and new consumption trends, which led to the creation of exploitation, discipline, and mobilization of labour practices. Rural production occurs in farms with predominant piecework and daily payment, where women play traditional roles that render their contributions invisible and undervalued. Employment in urban cafeterias includes stable and flexible contracts with low wages, increased activities, and supervision. Both situations link productive and reproductive work. Under these scenarios, employees manage various levels of negotiation, response, and endurance.     

Endogenous institutional innovation and agroindustrialization on the Peruvian coast

This paper presents an analysis of endogenous institutional innovations that have recently emerged in the agroindustrial zone of Chincha, on the coast of Peru. These innovations include: (1) contracts between agroindustrial firms and large farmers, introduced by the firms themselves to assure timely delivery and compliance with strict requirements implied by the emerging demanding quality and safety standards for agro‐export of processed asparagus; (2) management services exchanged for labor supervision and land collateral in share tenancy contracts between a management company and “farmer companies” of small cotton farmers. These contracts introduced by the management company illustrate those described theoretically by Eswaran and Kotwal [Am. Econ. Rev. 75 (3), 352–367]. The nature and importance of these institutional changes are twofold: (1) They were induced institutional innovations driven by the requirements of agroindustrialization itself. (2) Together they had ambiguous employment and income impacts (tending to the negative). On the one hand, the emergence of asparagus and firm‐farm contracts reduced employment through exclusion of small farms and shifts to capital‐intensive crops. On the other hand, the reinforcement of smallholder cotton and the emergence of farmer companies increased employment and income of smallholders. The institutional innovation allowed them to reduce risk and increase profits and thus access some of the benefits of agroindustrialization and globalization. While processing firm‐farm contracts are common in Peru, as is the presence of NGOs bringing subsidized credit, the private management firm innovation is rare and new in Peru and apparently also in the region, and of great interest. In fact, policymakers and NGOs have recently discovered that this innovation is taking place and are asking hard questions about whether this innovation can and will be diffused. The interest in the private for‐profit institutional change is sharpened by growing doubts about how economically sustainable and widespread a response NGO help can be to small farmers in maintaining their participation in income‐enhancing agroindustrialization. Moreover, with changes in land laws and markets the fluidity of the situation is apparent, with agroindustrial firms even starting to ask themselves whether contracts with large farms are necessary and best.     

Contract farming,contract design and smallholder livelihoods*

Contract farming has gained in importance in many developing countries. Previous studies analysed effects of contracts on smallholder farmers’ welfare, yet mostly without considering that different types of contractual relationships exist. Here, we examine associations between contract farming and farm household income in the oil palm sector of Ghana, explicitly differentiating between two types of contracts, namely simple marketing contracts and more comprehensive resource-providing contracts. Moreover, we look at different income sources to better understand how both contracts are linked to farmers’ livelihood strategies. We use cross-sectional survey data and regression models. Issues of endogeneity are addressed through measuring farmers' willingness-to-participate in contracts and using this indicator as an additional covariate. Farmers with both types of contracts have significantly higher household incomes than farmers without a contract, yet with notable differences in terms of the income sources. Farmers with a marketing contract allocate more household labour to off-farm activities and thus have higher off-farm income. In contrast, farmers with a resource-providing contract have larger oil palm plantations and thus higher farm incomes. The findings suggest that the two contract types are associated with different livelihood strategies and that disaggregated analysis of different income sources is important to better understand possible underlying mechanisms.     

Auction winning,social dynamics and non-compliance in a payment for ecosystem services scheme in Indonesia

Conservation auctions for payment for ecosystem services (PES) are useful to identify the levels of incentives that will cover the opportunity costs of farmers supplying ecosystem services. Although auctions are increasingly used for allocation in PES schemes, the factors that lead to their successful implementation and eventual environmental outcomes are poorly understood in developing countries. We investigated the socio-economic and institutional contexts that led to smallholders' auction winning and eventual compliance using linear mixed-effects models, and post-auction and post-contract surveys. We employed a case study of a conservation contract preceded by a sealed-bid, multiple round, uniform price auction for watershed services from coffee farmers in Lampung, Indonesia. The auction participants presented low education levels, low asset endowments and small plot sizes. The study obtained evidence that farmers with larger plot areas were more likely to win the contracts, suggesting economies of scale. Most farmers considered the auction a fair self-selection mechanism to allocate contracts where allocation was not influenced by power or social rank. Non-compliance was associated with labor availability constraints, short duration of land ownership and existence of previous conservation applications, suggesting lax of capability to invest in applying conservation agriculture. Final bids were however not good predictors of compliance, among other factors, calling into question the potential of auctions to elicit the actual incentive from the farmers. Ensuring that farmers understand the purposes of auctions for effective contract allocation beyond a mere game and identifying farmers that might encounter difficulties fulfilling the contract could increase the likelihood that such a PES scheme would be successful.     

Formal and informal contract farming in Mozambique: Socially embedded relations of agricultural intensification

This paper explores the role of contract farming arrangements in agricultural intensification in sub-Saharan Africa, combining secondary literature and original case material from Mozambique. The paper extends the scope of “contract farming” beyond the formal contracts between large companies and small-scale producers to include less formal credit agreements between farmers and traders. It argues that such informal contract arrangements are evidence of farmers' agency in “real markets.” In the studied cases, farmers use contract farming opportunities to intensify agricultural production by investing in irrigation and inputs. While informal contracts typically concern locally consumed crops, thus with more possibilities for side selling than formal contracts for export crops with company-controlled markets, informal contract compliance reflects closely knit social ties between the contracting parties. In both formal and informal contracts, purchasers tend to seek out producers who are already irrigating, thus obtaining gains from farmers' earlier investments. This also implies contract farming as a mechanism for accelerating social differentiation arising from unequal access to irrigation. The paper argues that the significance of informal contracts in the studied cases raises the possibility that informal contract farming by local traders plays a more important role in agrarian transformation in Africa than formal contract farming by large companies.     

Hedging Opportunities for Canadian

The unprecedented commodity price volatility in the last decade has resulted in a growing interest in futures trading by farmers. One of the major reasons often provided for the usefulness of commodity futures markets is that they provide a mechanism whereby producers can shift the risk of price change onto others. Interestingly, little research has been conducted on the effectiveness of the WCE as a hedging tool for farmers.
The objective of this paper was to investigate the extent to which the futures contracts for rapeseed, barley and flaxseed can be used by farmers in order to reduce price risk (measured by volatility). Drawing on earlier literature, the theory of hedging was reviewed and formulae for estimating the optimal hedge and the effectiveness of hedging were presented. An empirical analysis determined that the Winnipeg rapeseed, barley and flaxseed futures contracts are very useful in terms of allowing a producer the opportunity to reduce exposure to price risk.     

Multi-stakeholder platforms for linking small farmers to value chains: evidence from the Andes

Value chains linked to urban markets and agro-industry present new opportunities for adding value and raising rural incomes. Small farmers, who produce small volumes, struggle to enter these markets. A lack of trust among value chain actors increases transaction costs and short-circuits innovation. This paper explores how multi-stakeholder platforms have been used to address these problems in potato-based value chains in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. It uses the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to understand how platforms work. Differences in characteristics of the value chains, the participating actors and institutional arrangements have led to the emergence of two types of platforms. The first type brings traders, processors, supermarkets and others together with farmer associations and research and development (R&D) organizations to foster the development of new market opportunities through commercial, institutional and technological innovation. The second type is structured around geographically delimited supply areas, meshing farmers and service providers to address market governance issues in assuring volumes, meeting quality and timeliness constraints and empowering farmers. Evidence from these cases indicates that platforms that bring stakeholders together around value chains can result in new products, processes, norms and behaviours that benefit poor farmers, which could not have been achieved otherwise.     

Auctions as a Means of Creating a Market for Public Goods from Agriculture

The paper looks at the possibility of creating a market for environmental goods and services in the countryside by awarding conservation contracts to farmers on the basis of competitive bidding. Auctions have several theoretical advantages over alternative allocation mechanisms (such as standard-rate payments) because they allow the participants to deal with informational asymmetries and the uncertainty about the value of the (non-market) goods being traded. A formal model of bidding behaviour in ‘green auctions’ shows that bidding strategies are determined by the individual farmers' costs of implementing the conservation contracts and their beliefs about the maximum acceptable payment level, making the auction an imperfect cost revelation mechanism. Auctions can reduce the information rents accruing to farmers and can increase the cost-effectiveness of public goods provision. Strategic bidding behaviour in multiple-signup auctions as well as high transaction costs are potential sources of reduced efficiency.     

The Value of Dairy Quota under a Commercial Export Milk Program

This paper argues that under a commercial export milk program, the market value of quota will be determined by the spread between the domestic market price and the export price, rather than the conventional wisdom that it is determined by the spread between the domestic milk price and the marginal cost of production. Under this new economy, it is argued that ultimately the market price of dairy quota will be priced independently of firm marginal costs, which implies that low-cost (or high-margin) producers will not hold an economic advantage in bidding for quota over higher-cost producers. Regression results are consistent with the hypothesized positive relationship between quota values and the difference between domestic and export milk price. The average export price has generally increased over time and is approximately equal to the marginal cost for an average producer. The results have implications for a World Trade Organization (WTO) challenge. New Zealand and the United States feel the domestic program acts as an export subsidy by cross-subsidizing production of commercial export milk. The results here suggest that the prices for the filled export contracts are approximately the marginal cost of production for the average producer and not lower, as suggested by the challenge. Export contracts were found to have higher price risk than domestically produced milk. The risk is compounded by the short-term nature of most export contracts. The increase in risk for the commercial export milk program (CEM) implies that it is unlikely many farmers will greatly diversify into CEM contracts unless the uncertainty is reduced.     

Bilateral Information Asymmetry in the Design of an Agri‐Environmental Policy: An Application to Peatland Retirement in Norway

Agriculture is a significant source of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. GHG mitigation through agri‐environmental programmes could be important in achieving emission reduction targets under the 2015 UN climate agreement. This study uses the principal‐agent model to examine a peatland retirement programme to reduce agricultural emissions in Norway. The focus is on the role of the government's private information in programme design. Two cases are examined. First, optimal contracts are derived when farmers have private information about the costs of implementing peat land retirement, but the government reveals its information on the resulting public benefits through differentiated contracts. This corresponds to the standard targeting strategy with one‐sided information asymmetry. In the second case, an informed principal model developed by Maskin and Tirole in a 1990 study is employed to address bilateral information asymmetry. Using the informed principal model, the government offers the same menu of contracts to farmers in order not to disclose information on the public benefits from land retirement. Empirical results show that the government can achieve a higher payoff by using a pooling offer.     

Contracting and Farmers’ Perception of Unfair Trading Practices in the EU Dairy Sector

It is commonly asserted that unfair trading practices (UTPs) emerge largely as a result of contract incompleteness. In line with this view it is claimed that making contracts more complete will represent an antidote to UTPs. In this paper we argue that this does not need to be the case. This is because contracts, except for their potential to increase the surplus generated in the transaction, determine how this surplus will be divided. This, in turn, makes it possible for both trading partners to use contractual terms to turn the distributional conflict to their advantage. In the presence of unequal distribution of bargaining power this may lead to a situation in which the stronger party may succeed in tilting the contract in its favour by including UTPs in the contract content. Drawing insights from data collected in 2017 through a field survey among dairy farmers in France, Germany, Poland and Spain, we find support for this argument. Our estimation results show that contract completeness increases the likelihood of farmers reporting that their contracts with processors include the practices that may be considered as UTPs. Further, and also in line with this argument, contract completeness does not seem to affect UTPs during the contract execution or its termination.     

Guanxi Networks,Buyer-Seller Relationships,and Farmers' Participation in Modern Vegetable Markets in China

The aim of this study is to investigate the joint effects of small-scale farmers’ guanxi networks and buyer-seller relationships on their marketing behavior in China. A survey of 167 vegetable farmers shows that farmers' guanxi networks have significant effect on trusting relationship building with buyers and on their investment behavior for transactional specific assets. Guanxi networks also help to improve farmers’ participation in modern high-value markets (e.g., supermarkets and international markets) and encourage relational transactions. Farmers’ modern market participation will be further enhanced by trusting buyer-seller relationships with buyers and complying with buyers' quality requirements. The application of formal contracts, on the other hand, is closely related to farmers’ trusting relationships with buyers and transactional specific assets for vegetable transactions. Some policy implications are discussed.     

New evidence regarding the effects of contract farming on agricultural labor use

Contractual agreements between smallholder farmers and agribusiness companies have gained in importance in many developing countries. While productivity and income effects of contracting in the small farm sector were analyzed in many previous studies, labor market and employment effects are not yet well understood. This is an important research gap, especially against the background of continued population growth and structural transformation. Here, we investigate the effects of two types of contractual agreements between large international processing companies and smallholder farmers on agricultural labor use, household labor allocation, and hired labor demand in Ghana's palm oil sector. We use cross‐sectional survey data and a willingness‐to‐pay approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity between farmers with and without contracts. We find that agricultural labor intensity is substantially reduced through the contracts, because contracting in Ghana is associated with the adoption of labor‐saving procedures and technologies. Simple marketing contracts lead to reallocation of the saved household labor to off‐farm employment, whereas resource‐providing contracts lead to a stronger reallocation of labor within the farming enterprise. Household labor is more affected by labor savings than hired labor.     

The leakage and livelihood impacts of PES contracts: A targeting experiment in Malawi

Most evaluations of payments for environmental services programs focus on immediate environmental impacts, and do not measure the effects on socioeconomic outcomes or on other land use activities (leakage). Efficient allocation of land use contracts, through auctions for example, may help mitigate concerns about adverse livelihood or leakage effects. This study reports on a field experiment that varied the allocation of afforestation contracts to smallholder farmers in Malawi. Households were randomly assigned to participate in an auction or in a lottery for the contracts, which provided three years of payment based on tree survival outcomes. Households that did not receive a contract as a result of the lottery form a pure comparison group. The results show evidence for within-farm leakage for households that received a contract at random, in the form of additional land clearing. Randomly contracted households are also more likely to report household labor shortages. These effects are mitigated to some degree when contracts are assigned through an auction. Together, the results point to leakage and livelihood impacts from payments for environmental services that are often overlooked in standard evaluations, but which may be reduced through improvements in contract targeting.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production crop insurance: evidence from the Philippines

This article examines the moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production (COP) crop insurance products. Building on existing crop insurance models of moral hazard, as well as a survey‐based data set that allows us to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection, we find evidence that farmers insured under COP contracts spend more on chemical fertilizers and pesticides (i.e. those inputs whose costs determine the indemnity payments). However, since these same COP insured farmers are still likely to use less inputs (like effort) whose costs do not enter the indemnity payment formula, and yield depends on both types of inputs (i.e. the determinants and non‐determinants of the indemnity payments), the final moral hazard effect of COP insurance on yields is ambiguous. Our analysis also suggests that farmers who tend to spend less on chemical fertilizers and pesticides are the ones with private information on soil conditions and pest incidence. These are the types of farmers who adversely select into COP contracts that only cover weather related losses.     

Slippage in the Conservation Reserve Program or Spurious Correlation? A Comment

The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) pays farmers about $2 billion per year to retire cropland under ten- to fifteen-year contracts. Recent research by Wu found that slippage—an unintended stimulus of new plantings—offsets some of CRP's environmental benefits. Wu does not account for the endogeneity of CRP enrollments. Furthermore, the data used by Wu cannot be used to estimate slippage arising from a price feedback effect. We replicate Wu's findings, demonstrate the possible presence of spurious correlation, and construct new estimates with corrections for endogeneity and other econometric problems. We find no convincing evidence of slippage.     

Contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality: experimental evidence from the Vietnamese dairy sector

In emerging markets for high‐value food products in developing countries, processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality. One widely embraced approach is contract farming. But relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context. We use the example of the Vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk. A framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments, a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk, on farmers’ investment in quality‐improving inputs. Statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use, resulting in better output quality. The bonus payment generates even higher quality milk. We also find that input choice levels depend on farmers’ socio‐economic characteristics such as wealth, while individual risk preferences seem to be less important. Implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed.     

Factors influencing hedging decision: evidence from Brazilian citrus growers

The purpose of this study was to analyse the hedging behaviour of 98 citrus growers from the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Marketing behaviour was modelled as a choice between spot market, short and long‐term forward contracts. A multinomial logistic regression model was used to evaluate the role of behavioural, personal and managerial variables in the choice. Results indicated that the factors which explain the use of forward contracts by citrus growers are the following: risk propensity; trade with juice processing companies; farming diversification; overconfidence in management; participation in pools; use of management tools; and technical assistance. The results can be useful for farmers, policymakers, government agencies, traders and extension agents.     

The Role of Farmer's Behavioral Attitudes and Heterogeneity in Futures Contracts Usage

The relationship between farmers' behavioral attitudes and use of futures contracts is examined, taking into account non-directly observable variables and the heterogeneity of farmers. The relationships are tested on a stratified data sample of 440 farmers. Cluster analysis and covariance structure equation models are used to validate the relationships. Farmers are found not to be homogenous regarding the factors influencing their use of futures. Heterogeneity at the segment level masked important effects at the aggregate level, notably risk attitude. Furthermore, several psychological constructs for farmers related to market orientation, risk exposure, market performance and entrepreneurial behavior play important roles in their use of futures contracts.