Peasants,bandits, and state intervention: The consolidation of authority in the Ottoman Balkans and Southern Italy

This paper explores the role of bandits and state intervention in the Ottoman Balkans and Southern Italy in the 19th century by using archival documents. I argue that the states may react similarly and radically when their authority is challenged in the periphery. The Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Italy developed the same forms of state intervention to fight against the bandits, even though these two states had fundamentally different political, cultural, and socio‐legal structures. I present three different forms of state intervention: (i) victim‐centred state intervention; (ii) security‐centred state intervention; and (iii) authority‐centred state intervention. These three forms consolidated the state's authority while making the two states both fragile and dependent on other social agencies in the long term. I further claim that consolidation of the state's authority manifests the paradox of state intervention and creates more vulnerabilities in traumatic geographies.     

The State and Marketing in African Countries

The paper reviews policies and regulations concerning the marketing of food and other consumer items in Ghana for the period 1970-85. Major reasons advanced for government intervention have been the need to control inflation and the belief that traditional and private sector distribution systems are inefficient. The examination indicates the disastrous effects of government intervention. In particular it led to widespread shortages of food, smuggling, hoarding and corruption. Intervention created a class of newly rich people who had preferred access to government officials. The impact of intervention in Ghana mirrors the experience of other African countries. Analysis of the experience with intervention suggests that problems attributed to food marketers are actually the result of government macroeconomic policies. Changes in macroeconomic policies are therefore necessary if marketing is to contribute effectively in making food available at reasonable prices. Marketers need to become more aware of political variables in their environments as a result of these macroeconomic policies as well as how to adapt their marketing strategies.     

Food market liberalization: History and prospects

Abstract

Government intervention has been a feature of food markets in both industrialized and agrarian economies. However, the last 10 years have seen reforms aimed at reducing intervention; these have been a characteristic of ‘structural adjustment’. The process of reform has involved the replacement of administered by market‐determined prices and the abolition of trading parastatals or the removal of their monopoly. Despite an almost complete consensus that reforms are necessary and the absence of coherent local opposition, the pace and extent of reforms have varied. Moreover, views about liberalization tend to be polarized. Proponents argue that continued intervention is inefficient, unaffordable and distorting; antagonists suggest that unmodified markets lead to unacceptable inequalities, and expose producers and consumers to unacceptable risks. Moreover, weak fragmented markets do not constitute a sufficient base for sustained growth. This paper reviews the experience. It concludes that simple solutions of substituting public with private trading are not necessarily possible nor desirable, and argues that the nature of the debate may be misleading. The way forward may not lie in a choice between private market supremacy and conventional government intervention.     

Government intervention and market integration in Indonesian rice markets

Long-run spatial price relationships in Indonesian rice markets and factors affecting the degree of market integration are evaluated using multivariate cointegration tests with weekly price data for the 1982-1993 period. The analysis includes evaluation of pre-self-sufficiency and post-self-sufficiency periods as well as Cot the entire period. The cointegration tests for entire Indonesian rice market, represented by the nine most relevant price series, indicate that relative to the pre-self-sufficiency period, the post-self-sufficiency period has a smaller degree of market integration. The change of the degree of market integration over time indicates that rationalizing of the Indonesian rice price policy beyond 1984 rice self-sufficiency has resulted in a less integrated market. This suggests that the policy shift has allowed the government to decrease its intervention without significantly decreasing market integration, indicating that the private sector is responding to price signals appropriately. It is possible that further reduction in intervention through widening the band between the floor and ceiling price could be accomplished without greatly affecting market integration. Regression results show that government intervention in terms of rice procurement significantly influenced market integration during the period of post-self-sufficiency (1985-1993) and the entire period of 1982-1993. This indicates that this aspect of government intervention has had positive influences on market integration, in contrast to distribution efforts, which were not found to be statistically significant, Procurement prices may be high, and could perhaps be lowered, reducing program costs. Regional per capita income is also found to be positively related to highei levels of market integration, suggesting that in periods of economic growth, government intervention may be decreased, thereby reducing program costs.     

The economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement

This study relaxes the assumption of perfect and costless policy enforcement found in traditional agricultural policy analysis and introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the economic analysis of output subsidies. Policy design and implementation is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between the regulator who decides on the level of intervention, an enforcement agency that determines the level of policy enforcement, and the farmer who makes the production and cheating decisions. Analytical results show that farmer compliance is not the natural outcome of self‐interest and complete deterrence of cheating is not economically efficient. The analysis also shows that enforcement costs and cheating change the welfare effects of output subsidies, the efficiency of the policy instrument in redistributing income, the level of government intervention that transfers a given surplus to agricultural producers, the socially optimal income redistribution, and the social welfare from intervention.     

EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION AND HIDDEN SECTORAL TRANSFERS BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

Government intervention changes the allocation of resources through effects on input and output prices. While explicit forms of intervention have been the subject of many studies, implicit forms of intervention have been given much less attention. The price and output policies pursued by public authorities systematically cross-subsidise from densely populated to sparsely populated areas. Thus, their effects are in the opposite direction from the effects of tariffs and quotas. Examination of the effects of one form of intervention in isolation overstates the net effects of that intervention. Effective rates of cross-subsidies must be taken into consideration when attempting to measure the impact of government intervention on resource allocation.     

Intervention bias in agricultural policy

This paper re-examines the motivation for government intervention in agriculture to support farm prices and incomes. A model is outlined in which the government has a preference for higher farm incomes but fails to provide farmers with the socially optimal level of price support, even when one accepts the government's income redistribution goals as a valid reflection of social preference. It is shown that agricultural policy has an intervention bias: government price supports generally are higher than would be socially optimal. The source of the intervention bias is a time inconsistency in optimal agricultural policy formation, caused by the government's inability to precommit to a rule for setting future price support levels. Simulation results indicate that in some circumstances the intervention bias in agricultural policy can be substantial.     

征收和出让土地中政府干预对土地配置效率影响的定量研究

研究目的:定量评价征收和出让土地中的政府干预对土地资源从农业用地转为城市建设用地的配置效率的影响。研究方法:建立包含征收、一级出让和二级转让的多市场均衡模型,并进行实证研究。研究结果:1999—2005年征收和出让土地中的政府干预造成江西省鹰潭市农地资源被城市建设用地过度占用达183.48 hm2,占总非农化面积的33.73%。研究结论:征收和出让土地中的政府干预造成农地过度非农化,致使农村和城市土地利用效率的降低。     

Animal disease outbreaks and food market price dynamics: Evidence from regime‐dependent modelling and connected scatterplots

The economic impacts of animal disease outbreaks have been widely discussed in the literature. Most authors have centred their attention on estimating the direct costs. Recent studies have shown that the indirect economic effects might lead to equal or even higher welfare losses. This study aims to contribute to this field of research by assessing the effect of an animal disease outbreak on food market price dynamics in Mexico, accounting for the potential effect of an antitrust intervention. We employ a regime‐dependent vector error correction model and a connected scatterplot analysis. The results show that both the outbreak and the antitrust intervention caused structural breaks in food market price dynamics between producers and consumers, reflected in an increase in the absolute component of the marketing margin, with serious food security implications.     

北京市基于社会效用最大化下的土地政策选择

研究目的：构建政府运用土地政策调控市场的社会效用函数，并分析其最优政策选择。研究方法：文献资料法，动态优化分析法，实证研究方法。研究结果：（1）政策调控周期内最优干预力度应逐渐减小；（2）政策调控周期内应持续干预；（3）具体干预时间依赖于效用函数、存量运动方程及价格和干预之间关系等约束条件。研究结论：基于社会效用最大化下的最优土地政策路径可作为评估土地政策调控效果的有力参考。     

Wheat policy and economy-wide reform in Brazil

In recent years, the wheat sector in Brazil has moved from governmental protection and public intervention to a free market and privatization. In this study, those changes are analyzed through measures of governmental intervention on nominal rates of protection and on welfare of producers and consumers. Elasticities of demand and supply of wheat are estimated, and the effects of changes in policies are analyzed under official and shadow exchange rates. Welfare measures indicate that almost US$ 8 billion were spent from 1970 until 1989 with policies to subsidize producers and consumers. The policy-induced stimulus to consumer demand exceeded the stimulus to domestic production, and self sufficiency in wheat declined. The reduction in wheat subsidies since 1989 was more than an isolated sector-specific policy. It was part of macroeconomic antiinflation policy, and it coincided with other economy-wide changes such as real appreciation and a decline in international commodity prices.     

跨界鱼群保护与渔业管理组织一一基于集体干预理论的实证分析

跨界和高度洄游鱼群因特殊的生活习性涉及多国管辖海域。沿海国采取单边措施难以起到理想的保护作用,需要国际社会集体干预。国际社会集体干预理论的实践创造了较成熟的国际渔业管理组织模式。跨界鱼群协定对渔业管理组织模式进行了有效规制。我国与周边沿海国家在养护与管理跨界和高度洄游鱼群方面的争端较多。如果能够通过渔业谈判建立必要的渔业管理组织,将在很大程度上缓解此类特殊鱼群衰竭之势并有效化解渔业管理权争端。     

Assessing the Effect of Bilateral Collaborations on Learning Outcomes

Despite recent interest in the effects of student-driven collaborations on learning outcomes, little or no empirical investigations examine the potential benefits from collaboration between instructors of separate, but related, courses. This study proposes a learning intervention that explicitly accounts for interdependencies across courses and extends the traditional definition of collaborative learning to include the synthesis of teaching and learning in four courses through bilateral, group activities between instructors and among students. A student-performance measure assesses the intervention. Statistical results suggest that the collaborative learning intervention improved student-writing performance.     

Classical decision rules and adaptation to climate change*

One approach to rationalising policies for addressing potentially catastrophic climate change when such policies may prove unnecessary is to suppose the policies provide a form of social insurance even in the presence of pure uncertainty. Then, provided the policies are effective, such insurance can be justified as a precautionary or minimax response. Even if the policies are potentially ineffective however, intervention can be justified as an attempt to minimise the regret experienced by future generations. This reasoning extends to justify ‘all weather’ policies provided such policies always reduce policy costs. If, however, policy decisions provide ‘all weather’ benefits in only certain states of the world, this rationale breaks down. Minimising regret can establish a case for ‘mixed’ policy responses provided adopting a policy mix precludes the chance that intervention will fail altogether. Precautionary policies and policies which minimise regret are computed for a simple, dynamic, adaptive climate change planning problem and sufficient conditions for policy maker pessimism provided.     

农地经营权流转价格扭曲的政府干预效应 ——基于边际价格理论的实证分析

研究目的：考察政府不同干预行为对农地经营权流转价格扭曲的影响效应,为完善农地生产要素配置及优化农地市场内外环境等提供政策建议。研究方法： Binary Logistic模型。研究结果：（1）当前农地经营权流转价格本应反映承包地利用产生的经济效益,由土地要素投入产出品的边际收益价值所决定;但受市场机制不完善、乡土伦理规范等多重影响,农地实际流转价格与要素价格间产生差异,表现为农地经营权流转价格扭曲。（2）政府不同的干预行为对农地经营权流转价格扭曲产生差异化效应。政府主导流转的直接干预模式会引起流转价格的高价扭曲,而通过构建流转交易平台、提供补贴等政策间接干预会缓解流转价格的低价扭曲。（3）对土地的经济诉求和保障诉求是造成流转价格扭曲的重要原因。研究结论：农地经营权流转价格的形成应交予市场,政府应避免直接干预造成价格的人为扭曲,可通过土地流转中介组织或补贴政策来间接培育优化农地市场交易环境。     

AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND MCA's: A SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how some aspects of agrimonetary system of the Common Agricultural Policy may be analysed using spatial equilibrium diagrams, modified to include foreign exchange sectors. The model analyses the effects of monetary compensatory amounts on intra-Community trade. The results are: first, when the intervention price is below the market price, both the importing and the exporting country gain in social welfare; and second, when the intervention price is effective, only the importing country gains. In each case the cost of the MCA's exceeds these welfare gains. From a budgetary viewpoint there is a trade-off between the cost of intervention buying and the cost of the trade subsidy.     

Agricultural Comparative Advantage and Government Policy Interventions

International trade patterns are often explained by comparative advantage which is frequently thought to depend on variations in national factor endowments. Government intervention in agricultural markets may also have an impact on trade patterns. This study explores the relation between factor endowments and agricultural trade patterns and examines the impact of agricultural and environmental policies on trade flows. Measures of national endowments of capital, labour, land and energy reserves are computed for a sample of 40 countries and used to estimate Heckscher‐Ohlin‐Vanek equations with net trade in several agricultural commodities as the dependant variable. Variables measuring agricultural policy and environmental regulations are added to the equations and tested for significance. The variables representing government intervention do not contribute to the explanation of trade patterns while national factor endowments do account for much of the variation in trade patterns of grains, oilseeds, cotton, and, to a lesser extent, meat products and an aggregate of all agricultural goods. Commodities such as sugar, tropical products and fruits and vegetables do not appear to be well explained by factor endowments.     

Foreign direct investment‐facilitated development: the case of the natural gas industry of Trinidad and Tobago

Since the last decade, governments in less‐developed countries have increasingly viewed foreign direct investment (FDI) as a catalyst for economic growth and transformation. The early literature argues that FDI‐facilitated development occurs when a less‐developed country assimilates, adapts and diffuses the positive externalities arising from the interaction of the multinational enterprise's (MNE) ownership advantage with its locational attributes. This paper, however, posits that FDI‐facilitated development is not an effortless process. It occurs only when host developing‐country governments implement intervention policies that are aimed at increasing indigenous technological capabilities. These policies enhance the absorptive capacity of host countries, allowing them to capture the spillovers arising from the MNE activities. The paper explores this for Trinidad and Tobago, a recipient of substantial FDI inflows in its natural gas industry for the last decade. It shows that FDI‐facilitated development only occurs when governments in less‐developed countries pursue credible intervention policies.     

农村集体资产股份合作社发展过程中政府的角色分析——基于苏州与佛山的案例比较

在快速城市化和工业化进程中,城郊农村地区的集体土地的资产价值逐步显化。为保证集体资产保值增值,这些地区建立了由政府主导的农村集体资产股份合作社。本文以苏州市高新区和佛山市南海区为例,从政府干预的角度剖析政府主导型农村集体资产股份合作社治理的现状,并分析了政府干预其治理的内在逻辑。分析发现,政府通过为集体资产股份合作社提供政策指导、项目倾斜、财政扶持、规则制定等措施逐步实现了合作社效率与公平的双赢。然而,随着政府干预强度的不断提高,政府逐渐介入合作社内部事务,合作社被纳入政府行政体系之中,既削弱了合作社经济效率也加大了政府负担。鉴于此,建议政府把握好干预的强度及边界,逐渐退出对合作社内部经营管理事务的介入,通过激发合作社内部管理层的投资积极性,在维持社会稳定的前提下提高合作社的经营效益。     

Allocation trade in Australia: a qualitative understanding of irrigator motives and behaviour*

Governments in Australia are purchasing water entitlements to secure water for environmental benefit, but entitlements generate an allocation profile that does not correspond fully to environmental flow requirements. Therefore, how environmental managers will operate to deliver small and medium‐sized inundation environmental flows remains uncertain. To assist environmental managers with the supply of inundation flows at variable times, it has been suggested that allocation trade be incorporated into efforts aimed at securing water. This paper provides some qualitative and quantitative perspective on what influences southern Murray–Darling Basin irrigators to trade allocation water at specific times across and within seasons using a market transaction framework. The results suggest that while irrigators now have access to greater risk‐management options, environmental managers should consider the possible impact of institutional change before intervening in traditional market activity. The findings may help improve the design of intervention strategies to minimise possible market intervention impacts and strategic behaviour.