How well do conservation auctions perform in achieving landscape‐level outcomes? A comparison of auction formats and bid selection criteria

This paper studies the performance of auction design features regarding pricing mechanisms and bid selection criteria for securing wildlife zones across different holdings. We compare two pricing mechanisms: a discriminatory‐price auction and a uniform‐price ascending auction, and four bid selection criteria on the basis of: total bid, bid‐per‐value ratio, bid‐per‐area ratio and a mixed criterion where bids are formed on the basis of cost but they are selected based on the bid‐per‐value ratio. We develop a best‐response group‐bidding model for a discriminatory‐price auction where bidders form optimal group bids for individual wildlife zones. In the uniform‐price ascending auction, individual landholders respond to prices, which are successively raised by the auctioneer and whenever all the landholders from a single zone agree to participate (i.e. the first zone is formed), the auction stops. Based on numerical simulations using a bio‐economic model of malleefowl conservation, we observe that the discriminatory‐price auction is more cost‐effective than the uniform‐price ascending auction. However, the budgetary cost‐effectiveness of a discriminatory‐price auction is sensitive to bidder uncertainty about the number of competing bidder groups and the highest cost of establishing a wildlife zone among these groups. In terms of bid selection, the mixed bid selection criterion performs best. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.     

Evaluation of the Influence of Agricultural Price Policy on Cotton Production in Côte-d'Ivoire

In this paper the impact of the cotton pricing policy of the marketing board of Côte-d'Ivoire is investigated. A theoretical model is developed to derive the price level which maximizes revenue generated from the marketing board's cotton transactions. A dynamic cotton supply function was estimated and used to compute elasticities. The estimates indicate that farmers in the Country response to price changes and that the pricing policy of the marketing board has been consistent with an objective of generating revenue for the government.     

Strategic pricing in a differentiated product oligopoly model: fluid milk in Boston

In an imperfectly competitive industry, differentiated products compete with each other with price rather than quantity as the strategic variable. Several previous studies have employed a generalized Nash–Bertrand model: Liang (1989) , Cotterill (1994) , Cotterill et al. (2000) , and Kinoshita et al. (2002) ; however, only Liang has explored the theoretical foundations of that model. This article generalizes the Liang two‐good model to three goods. A surprising and important result follows. Price‐conjectural variations do not exist in models with three or more goods. Price‐reaction functions, however, exist in multiple‐good models. We estimate them jointly with a brand‐level demand system to evaluate the total impact of a brand manager's price change on own quantity. In a differentiated product market, this is a useful addition to a partial demand elasticity approach, because a change in one brand's price typically engenders a price reaction by other brands that affects own quantity via substantial cross‐price elasticities among substitutes. Strategic pricing in the Boston fluid milk market was also influenced by the existence of a raw milk price support program, the Northeast Dairy Compact. We find that the advent of the Compact was a focal point event that crystallized a shift away from Nash–Bertrand to more cooperative pricing. If the downstream market is not competitive, one needs to consider strategic price reactions when designing and evaluating agricultural price programs.     

Price Discrimination in Russian Wheat Exports: Evidence from Firm‐level Data

Russia emerged as an important wheat exporter in recent years raising the question of how this will affect international wheat markets. In particular developing countries – the main destination of Russian wheat exports – could be harmed by aggressive pricing behaviour. This article analyses the exertion of price discrimination by Russian wheat exporting firms based on Krugman's pricing‐to‐market hypothesis. We apply Knetter's panel model to a firm‐level dataset and find evidence for price‐discriminating behaviour by Russian firms in 25 out of 61 destination countries over the period 2002–2011.     

南水北调中线骨干工程水价合理标准与收费制度研究

南水北调中线工程供水目标为工业城市为主,兼顾农业和环境,兼有经营性和公益性,国家投巨资兴建,目的是最大限度地发挥工程综合效益。在考虑工程公益性和用水户水价承受能力的前提下,分析了骨干工程合理水价构成,指出两部制水价存在的问题,研究了水价补贴政策,按照"还本付息、保证运行"的原则,测算了骨干工程合理水价标准,并提出"足量供水定额收费"的制度建议。     

Agri‐environmental auctions for phosphorus load reduction: experiences from a Finnish pilot

We examine environmental auctions on working agricultural lands. We organized a discriminatory auction where farmers were asked to make bids on spreading gypsum on their fields to reduce phosphorus loads to surface waters. The parcel‐specific bids were ranked based on their load reduction–compensation ratios. To assess load reductions, we built an environmental benefit index (EBI) based on three factors: P‐status of the soil (phosphorus available for crops), field slope and location with respect to waterways. As the per tonne price of gypsum delivery from the factory was higher for small quantities, the auction format allowed bundling of field parcels to reduce transportation costs. We evaluate auction's ability to target the environmental (or abatement) measures to field parcels with the highest load reduction potential and analyse the economic efficiency of the auction by comparing the pilot auction with simulated bidding behaviour and with hypothetical flat rate payment schemes. The pilot auction targeted the environmental measures effectively. It was also more efficient than a flat rate payment, even when the flat rate scheme was combined with an EBI eligibility criterion.     

Valuing quality attributes of Australian merino wool

We measure the relationship between clean prices of individual lots of wool sold at auction and a range of characteristics of the raw wool. Based on the data for 111,440 fleece lots sold in the 2008–2009 auction season, five hedonic models are estimated to determine the premiums and discounts associated with each wool characteristic in five micron categories. Several wool characteristics exhibited significant nonlinear relationships, and therefore, joint density functions were assessed where appropriate. The results indicate that fibre diameter has the greatest influence on price in all markets. Brand contamination, higher levels of unscourable colour and vegetable matter contamination were found to negatively influence price.     

The Collusion-deterring Effect of Pre-attributed Supplies and the Hog Auction in Quebec

The hog/pork industry in Quebec has been going through major institutional changes since 1989, the year an electronic auction was put in place to market all of the hogs in the province. Because the auction's ability to generate high prices did not meet the expectations of hog producers, the pure auction system was replaced by a hybrid one in 1994. In this system, most of the hog supply was pre-attributed to processors at a negotiated price based on the US. price while the remainder of the provincial supply of hogs was sold through the auction. In this paper, we investigate how a seemingly inefficient marketing mechanism like pre-attributions can increase the efficiency of a usually efficient mechanism like an auction. We present theoretical arguments regarding the sustainability of collusion under the pure auction and hybrid systems in addition to analyzing auction prices with modern time series tools.     

The Impact of Market Intervention on Quota Mobility: The Case of the Ontario Dairy Industry

We examine the relationship between farm‐level scale efficiency and quota purchases in the Ontario dairy quota market before and after the implementation of a progressive transfer assessment policy and a price cap policy. We find that scale efficiency has a positive effect on net quota purchases and that the two regulations slowed down this effect. The largest deterrent in the movement of quota from less efficient to more efficient producers occurred after the implementation of the capital asset pricing policy. If the capital asset pricing policy remains in effect, it will likely take a longer time to achieve an efficient allocation of quota across producers in the industry. Nous examinons la relation entre l'efficience d'échelle agricole et les achats de quota au sein du marché des quotas laitiers ontariens, avant et après l'implantation d'une politique d'évaluation progressive de transfert, et d'une autre de plafonnement des prix. Nous avançons que l'efficience d'échelle a un effet positif sur les achats nets de quota et que les deux politiques ont freiné cet effet. La plus grande dissuasion au sein du mouvement des quotas de producteurs moins efficients vers ceux qui le sont plus, survient après le plafonnement des prix. Si la politique de plafonnement des prix demeure en vigueur, il faudra attendre encore longtemps avant de réussir une allocation efficiente des quotas parmi les producteurs de l'industrie.     

On the Number and Heterogeneity of Bidders in Livestock Auctions

We show in the context of livestock auctions that a seller's revenue may increase or decrease as the number of buyers increases, whether the additional bidder wins or not an object. Additional bidders who fill part of their demand from an outside source may have an even more adverse effect on prices. We use data from the Quebec daily hog auction to measure the effect of new bidders on auction prices. Variations in the number of bidders come from the entry and exit of Quebec packers and sporadic invitations extended to Ontario packers. We find that entry by Quebec packers had a significant positive impact on hog auction prices but that sporadic participation by Ontario packers did not have a significant impact on hog prices.     

Experimental Auction Procedure: Impact on Valuation of Quality Differentiated Goods

Despite increased use of experimental auctions, a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results. This study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions. Results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than English, Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) , and random n th price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, and that random n th price auction yields lower valuations than English and BDM auctions. We find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations, but the effect varies across auction mechanism.     

A Reexamination of Price Dynamics in the International Wheat Market

This paper examines price relationships in the international wheat market for the years 1981–93 using a cointegration and error correction approach. Price series are found to be first-differenced stationary and cointegrated. Our results provide evidence that the United States, Australia, the European Union and Argentina react to Canada's pricing decisions, whereas Canada does not respond to any other price changes except Australia's. Similarly, the United States also plays a strong role in the pricing of other exporters (except Canada) and its pricing decision is affected by changes in Canadian and Australian prices. The remaining exporters such as the European Union and Argentina respond to the U.S. and Canadian price changes but do not have any influence on other prices. Overall, our results suggest that there is no distinct price leader in the international wheat market. Nous examinons les rapports deprixjouantsur le marché international du blé durant la période 1981–1993, suivant une démarche de co-intégration et de correction des erreurs. Nous avons constaté et vérifié que les séries de prix se révélent stationnaires lorsqu‘exprimées en première différence et qu‘elles sont cointégrées. Nos observations démontrent que les États-Unis, I'Australie, I'Union européenne et I'Argentine réagissent aux décisions de tariflcation prises au Canada et que de son côté, le Canada ne réagit à aucun autre changement du régime de tarification sauf à celui de I'Australie. De même, les États-Unis jouent également un rôle important dans la tarification des autres exportateurs (le Canada excepté) et ses décisions de tarification sont sensibles aux changements affectant les prix canadiens et australiens. Le reste des exportateurs, notamment I'Union européenne et I'Argentine, sont en mesure de réagir aux changements des prix appliqués aux États- Unis et au Canada, mais Us n‘ont aucune influence sur la tarification des autres exportateurs. Toutes ces observations nous amènent à conclure qu'il n'y a pas vraiment de leader dans l'établissement des prix du blé sur le marché international.     

Auction markets for specialty food products with geographical indications

We present a first analysis of online auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction prices, trade volume, and value for domestic and foreign-origin specialty ham with geographical indications (GIs) that were sold in online auctions in Germany within a 1-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may influence online bidding behavior and final auction prices. We estimate positive auction price effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a discount, that higher shipping costs have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays yield lower prices. The model may be used to estimate the value of GIs. In our example, we estimate relative price differences of 20–30% for the GIs of three specialty hams (Prosciutto di Parma, Jamón Serrano, and Schwarzwälder Schinken).     

Output and Price Determination in the Canadian Chicken Industry: Which Should Come First?

Bilateral bargaining between chicken producers and processing firms determined chicken prices in Ontario from 1995 to 2002. A significant reform in 2003 introduced a formula‐based live price that is a function of chicken producers' costs. The latter pricing mechanism reduces the risk faced by processing firms and producers because the chicken price is known when output decisions are made. However, the pricing formula also involves some risk in that the cost components may be far removed from actual costs when production is carried out. Expected farm prices under the two different pricing mechanisms are also not identical. The producers' and processors' expected utility of profits under each pricing mechanism is computed. The bargaining pricing mechanism generally yields higher expected utility for producers than the formula‐based price. Conversely, processing firms obtain a higher expected utility under the formula‐based pricing than under the bargaining framework. These conclusions critically hinge on the size of the producers' margin component in the formula‐based price. In that sense, the formula‐based pricing mechanism did not lessen the significance of relative bargaining strengths in establishing the distribution of welfare in the chicken industry. Des négociations bilatérales entre les producteurs de poulet et les entreprises de transformation déterminaient le prix du poulet vivant en Ontario de 1995 à 2002. Une formule de prix établie en fonction des coûts de production des producteurs de poulet fut introduite en 2003. Ce mécanisme réduit le risque auquel sont confrontés les transformateurs et les producteurs parce que le prix du poulet vivant est connu lorsque les décisions de production sont prises. Cependant, la formule de prix comporte aussi un risque dans le sens où la composante du coût dans la formule de prix peut être différente des coûts réels de production du poulet vivant. Les prix espérés du poulet vivant sont aussi différents dans les deux systèmes de prix. L'utilité espérée des profits pour les producteurs et les transformateurs de poulet est calculée dans les deux mécanismes. Le modèle fondé sur la négociation génère une utilité espérée des profits plus élevée pour les producteurs que la formule de prix. À l'inverse, les transformateurs obtiennent une utilité espérée des profits plus élevée selon la formule de prix que selon le modèle fondé sur la négociation. Ces conclusions sont étroitement liées à la taille de la marge des producteurs utilisée dans le calcul de la formule de prix. Dans ce sens, l'introduction d'un nouveau mécanisme de détermination des prix n'a pas modifié l'importance du pouvoir relatif de négociation dans la distribution du surplus économique au sein de la filière canadienne du poulet.     

An Experimental Analysis of Modifications to the Centralized Milk Quota Exchange System in Quebec

Using experimental economics, this paper tests the potential impacts of modifying the centralized quota exchange system in Quebec with the intent of decreasing the quota price while minimizing negative impacts on auction effectiveness. Two separate treatments are applied to a uniform price auction similar to that employed in Quebec. The first treatment is an exclusion (5% or 15%) of the highest buyer bids and seller offers. The second is a tax (2% or 10%) on all units offered for sale that remain unsold. Various combinations of the two treatments are also tested. The results suggest that exclusion of the highest bids and offers can decrease the price of the quota and that a 15% exclusion rate is more effective than a 5% rate. The tax alone has little impact on quota price. The combination of the two treatments generates a more marked reduction in both the number of exchanges and the price of the quota than when the tax or the exclusion is applied individually. However, the combination of treatments results in a greater loss of economic efficiency. In all cases, relatively small market price reductions are realized at the expense of substantial losses in economic efficiency. La présente étude teste de manière expérimentale la capacité d'une modification au système centralisé de vente du quota à faire diminuer le prix du quota laitier au Québec tout en minimisant les impacts négatifs des changements sur l'efficacité de l'enchère. Cette modification consiste à appliquer deux traitements sur l'enchère de prix uniforme où s'échange le quota. Le premier traitement consiste en une exclusion (5% ou 15%) des mises les plus élevées des acheteurs et des vendeurs. Le second traitement est une taxe (2% ou 10%) appliquée aux unités que les vendeurs mettent en marché et ne réussissent pas à vendre. Différentes combinaisons de ces deux traitements sont également testées. Les données générées permettent de conclure que le mécanisme d'exclusion des mises les plus élevées permet de faire diminuer le prix du quota, l'exclusion de 15%étant plus efficace que celle de 5%. Pour sa part, la taxe seule a peu d'impact sur le prix du quota tandis que la combinaison des deux traitements entraîne une diminution du nombre de transactions et du prix du quota plus marquée que lorsque les traitements de taxe et d'exclusion sont appliqués individuellement. Cela a comme corollaire d'entraîner une perte d'efficacitééconomique plus importante. Dans tous les cas, des baisses de prix de marché relativement modestes sont réalisées au coût d'importantes pertes d'efficacitééconomique.     

城市再生水项目的特许经营权拍卖机制设计及水价研究

通过对城市再生水特许经营项目的考察,探讨了特许经营项目中再生水如何定价的问题,设计了一种具有可分性的再生水特许经营权拍卖机制,并分别研究了在这种拍卖机制下项目公司向政府指定机构售水的价格的影响因素以及政府指定机构向用户售水的价格的确定方法。最后考察了这种拍卖机制所具有的激励相容特点。     

Dynamic relationships between US and Thai rice prices

Relationships between the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) estimated World Market Price, the Thai milled rice price, US transportation-adjusted cash rough rice price, and the Chicago Rice and Cotton Exchange rough rice futures price are examined for the 1987–1991 marketing years. Specifically, a cointegration analysis is used to address the pricing and informational efficiency of the respective markets. Testing indicates the system is described by two cointegrating vectors. The analysis preformed herein provides insight into the pricing performance of several world rice markets.     

Structural Econometrics of First-price Auctions: A Survey of Methods

Over the past decade, the structural analysis of auction data has attracted considerable attention. The structural approach relies on the hypothesis that observed bids are the equilibrium bids of the gametheoretic auction model under consideration. In this paper, we survey econometric methods that have been recently developed for estimating first-price auction models within the private value paradigm. In particular, we focus on two important issues. A first question is to know whether the structural elements of the model, mainly the underlying latent distribution of bidders private values, are identifiable from observations, usually the observed bids. A second issue concerns the estimation of the underlying density. This can be performed through different methods ranging from parametric to nonparametric ones. After a brief review of basic auction models, we first consider the simple first-price auction model with- in the symmetric independent private value paradigm with a nonbinding reserve price. In a second part, more advanced models are considered allowing for a binding reserve price, affiliation among private values, and asymmetry among bidders. The conclusion presents some future lines of research. Depuis une dizaine d'années, I'analyse structurale des mécanismes en jeu dans la conduite des enchères suscite une attention considérable. Cette démarche structurale sefonde sur I'hypothèse selon laquelle les offres observées constituent les offres à l'équilibre d'un modèle d'enchères basé sur la théorie des jeux. Dans le présent exposé, nous pas sons en revue les méthodes économétriques qui ont été mises au point ces derniéres années pour construire des modéles d'enchéres au premier prix dans le cadre du paradigme des valeurs personnelles. Nous nous intéressons en particulier à deux questions importantes: la première est de savoir si les éléments structuraux du modèle, essentiellement la distribution latente sous-jacente des valeurs personnelles des enchérisseurs sont identifiables à partir des observations, c'est-à-dire habituellement les offres observées. La deuxième question concerne l'estimation de la densité sousjacente. Elle peut se faire par différentes méthodes allant des paramétriques au non paramétriques. Après une brève revue des modèles d'enchères de base, nous considérons d'abord le modèle d'enchère, simple au premier prix dans le cadre du paradigme des valeurs personnelles indépendantes symétriques, assorti d'un prix minimum non liant. Dans la seconde partie, nous examinons des modèles plus avancés, autorisant unprix minimum liant, Vaffiliation parmi les valeurs personnelles et I'asymétrie parmi les enchérisseurs. En conclusion, nous proposons quelques avenues de recherches futures.     

农民用水户的农业水价承受能力研究

基于对3个典型地区68户农业用水户入户调查数据,采用支付意愿评估法分析农民用水户的水价承受能力问题。分析调查从家庭特征、水费支出情况、水费承受意愿以及对水价变动反应等方面分析和探讨了农业用水户面对不同水价政策变动的态度和应对措施。分析结果表明:水价变动对农民用水户的用水意愿和实际用水行为均能产生显著作用,其应对农业水价改革的决策行为是"理性的"和"利己的",国家制定的相关政策只有在能够充分考虑到农户的实际反应时才能发挥最大的政策效应。     

土地拍卖中的预算约束因素研究

研究目的:分析土地拍卖中"价高者得"可能导致低效后果的原因,完善土地出让制度。研究方法:运用资产拍卖理论分析土地拍卖过程。研究结果:现实存在的预算约束确实会扭曲资源配置的效率,导致价高者得的规则失效。研究结论:政府应根据不同的现实条件选择合适的拍卖形式,设计与之相符的拍卖规则,控制非理性竞争,在实现较大收益的同时保证效率最优化。