Moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production crop insurance: evidence from the Philippines

This article examines the moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production (COP) crop insurance products. Building on existing crop insurance models of moral hazard, as well as a survey‐based data set that allows us to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection, we find evidence that farmers insured under COP contracts spend more on chemical fertilizers and pesticides (i.e. those inputs whose costs determine the indemnity payments). However, since these same COP insured farmers are still likely to use less inputs (like effort) whose costs do not enter the indemnity payment formula, and yield depends on both types of inputs (i.e. the determinants and non‐determinants of the indemnity payments), the final moral hazard effect of COP insurance on yields is ambiguous. Our analysis also suggests that farmers who tend to spend less on chemical fertilizers and pesticides are the ones with private information on soil conditions and pest incidence. These are the types of farmers who adversely select into COP contracts that only cover weather related losses.     

Developing Experience-Based Premium Rate Discounts in Crop Insurance

This article addresses the feasibility of implementing an experience-based premium rate discount system in crop insurance. While adverse selection and moral hazard in crop insurance have been extensively studied in the past, discount systems or bonus–malus incentives have not, to our knowledge, been investigated. Our empirical analysis indicates that a crop insurance discount system could be implemented based on a measure of favorable past insurance experience. The estimated average discounts based on the rating methods developed in this study ranged from 5% to 9% (depending on the crop being considered).     

Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance

Along with adverse selection, moral hazard is one of the major hurdles that private and public insurance plans must contend with. Moral hazard occurs if risks are endogenous to a producer's behavior and if the insurer is unable to properly monitor the insured. We review the role of moral hazard in the US crop insurance program. We conduct an empirical analysis of one important aspect of the US crop insurance program—prevented planting. This provision provides indemnity payments if conditions are not suitable for planting. The program has been the subject of considerable controversy, especially during 2019, when the rate of claims is expected to be especially high. Because loss adjustors may encounter difficulties in assessing the weather conditions associated with prevented planting claims, the program is susceptible to moral hazard. We consider the extent to which prevented planting claims may be endogenous to prices. We find significant evidence of moral hazard. The likelihood of prevented planting claims increases as the expected market price decreases or as fertilizer costs increase for corn and soybeans in the Prairie Pothole Region and for grain sorghum and cotton in all states.     

MALLEE WHEAT FARMERS' DEMAND FOR CROP AND RAINFALL INSURANCE

Producers' demand for a crop insurance program with indemnities based on their actual yields and a rainfall insurance program with indemnities based on area rainfall is analysed. Actuarial costs of these hypothetical programs are estimated. Tobit procedures are used to analyse factors influencing the amount which farmers would be willing to pay for the alternative insurance programs. Factors related to the absolute size of risk and capacity to bear risk, as well as personal characteristics and risk attitudes of producers, have effects on the demand for insurance as hypothesised. Problems of adverse selection are associated with the area yield-based program, while both crop and rainfall insurance programs may involve some moral hazard. Producer participation in either program would be limited.     

Risk aversion and land allocation between annual and perennial crops in semisubsistence farming: a stochastic optimization approach

This article analyzes the effect of production uncertainty on farmland allocation decisions between perennial and annual crops, focusing on a representative farmer's attitude toward risk. A dynamic stochastic optimization model that considers net planting—the difference between new plantings and removals of perennial crops that achieve full production cycle—is used. The effect of uncertainty on the representative farmer's decisions to increase or decrease perennial crops’ acreage, on the optimal path, is examined. Our results reveal that the response of optimal path of net planting to uncertainty related to perennial crop production is highly affected by the farmer's attitude toward risk. A risk‐averse or a low‐risk loving farmer tends to reduce land allocation to perennial crops under uncertainty, while a high‐risk loving farmer will do exactly the opposite. Also, due to disutility of farming, the farmer tends to reduce land allocation to perennial crops when prices are high enough for him to attain a desired income level expectation. One implication of this research is the need for mechanization—in sub‐Saharan countries in particular—that increases per‐acreage yield and output in semisubsistence agriculture.     

Producer Experience, Learning by Doing, and Yield Performance

Current crop insurance rating procedures consider only performance for the individual crop in question. Recent farm legislation has given producers considerable planting flexibility and, as a result, many have shifted to new crops. Producers without a production history for the new crop may be offered levels of insurance that do not accurately reflect their expected yields. Likewise, premium rates may not reflect a producer's actual risk for a new crop. We examine the extent to which information about expected yields may be gleaned from a consideration of historical performance on other crops. We also consider the extent to which yield performance exhibits learning by doing such that yields improve with experience. Though the results are mixed, we generally find that yield performance tends to improve with experience. However, when yields are conditioned on historical yield performance for other crops, the importance of experience is diminished significantly. Yield performance is related to a number of farm characteristics. Finally, we examine the extent to which yield variability is correlated across crops for individual farmers. Implications for crop insurance rating practices are discussed. The results demonstrate robust correlation between a farm's historical yield on other crops and a newly produced crop—a factor largely ignored in current crop insurance contracts.     

Evidence of climate change impacts on crop comparative advantage and land use

Relative agricultural productivity shocks emerging from climate change will alter regional cropland use. Land allocations are sensitive to crop profits that in turn depend on yield effects induced by changes in climate and technology. We develop and apply an integrated framework to assess the impact of climate change on agricultural productivity and land use for the U.S. Northern Great Plains. Crop-specific yield–weather models reveal crop comparative advantage due to differential yield impacts of weather across the region's major crops, that is, alfalfa, wheat, soybeans, and maize. We define crop profits as a function of the weather-driven yields, which are then used to model land use allocation decisions. This ultimately allows us to simulate the impact of climate change under the RCP4.5 emissions scenario on land allocated to the region's major crops as well as to grass/pasture. Upon removing the trends effects in yields, climate change is projected to lower yields by 33–64% over 2031–2055 relative to 1981–2005, with soybean being the least and alfalfa the most affected crops. Yield projections applied to the land use model at present-day input costs and output prices reveals that Dakotas’ grass acreage will increase by up to 23%, displacing croplands. Wheat acreage is expected to increase by up to 54% in select southeastern counties of North Dakota and South Dakota, where maize/soy acreage had increased by up to 58% during 1995–2016.     

Input use under cost-of-production crop insurance: Theory and evidence

There have been a number of previous studies that examined the effects of yield- or revenue-based crop insurance products on input use of farmers. However, no study has specifically investigated the input use impacts of a cost-of-production (COP) crop insurance policy, even though this type of crop insurance is the predominant one used in several other countries outside of the United States (such as the Philippines and China). This article aims to theoretically and empirically examine the effect of a COP crop insurance product on farmers’ chemical input use. Our theoretical model suggests that the effect of COP insurance on input use can either be positive or negative, with the resulting impact depending on the strengths of (a) the traditional moral hazard effect of insurance (i.e., an input use decreasing effect); versus (b) the marginal incentives to apply more inputs due to input levels being the main determinant for expected indemnity amounts in this type of insurance (i.e., an input use increasing effect). A survey data set from corn farmers in the Philippines is then used to empirically illustrate how a particular COP insurance product influences input use in a real-life context. In this case, we find that COP insurance increases the use of chemical inputs (e.g., fertilizers and total chemical expenditure), implying that the positive marginal incentive to apply more inputs dominates the negative moral hazard effect.     

Inter‐ and intra‐seasonal crop acreage response to international food prices and implications of volatility

Understanding how producers make decisions to allot acreage among crops and how decisions about land use are affected by changes in prices and their volatility is fundamental for predicting the supply of staple crops and, hence, assessing the global food supply situation. This study makes estimations of monthly (i.e., seasonal) versus annual global acreage response models for the world's principal staple food crops: wheat, corn, soybeans, and rice. Primary emphasis is given to the magnitude and speed of the allocation process. Estimation of intra‐annual acreage elasticity is crucial for expected food supply and for input demand, especially in the light of the recent short‐term volatility in food prices. The econometric results indicate that global crop acreage responds to crop prices and price risks, input costs as well as a time trend. Depending on respective crop, short‐run elasticities are about 0.05 to 0.40; price volatility tends to reduce acreage for some of the crops; comparison of the annual and the monthly acreage response elasticities suggests that acreage adjusts seasonally around the globe to new information and expectations. Given the seasonality of agriculture, time is of an essence for acreage response. The analysis indicates that acreage allocation is more sensitive to prices in the northern hemisphere spring than in winter and the response varies across months.     

The U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Program

The US. Federal Crop Insurance Program has evolved from a government-run yield insurance program for wheat farmers to a public-private partnership that provides a variety of yield and revenue insurance products to producers of over 100 different crops. US. policy-makers continue to struggle with defining an appropriate role for the federal government in helping crop farmers manage revenue risk. New approaches using area-yield or weather-based options may hold promise for the future     

Moral hazard: the effect of insurance on risk and efficiency

While there is a large body of literature investigating the effect of crop and livestock insurance on input and yield, limited attention has been paid to the effect of insurance on efficiency. This article investigates how insurance affects technical efficiency and whether insurance alters the utilized input quantity to a riskier bundle using the Norwegian salmon farming industry as a case. The results illustrate that insurance has an enhancing effect on production and efficiency and changes the utilized input mix—a well‐insured farmer uses more feed and less capital and labor than a less‐insured farmer. When linking this to each input's risk profile, the results indicate that insurance will induce the use of the risk‐increasing factor (feed) and reduce the use of the risk‐decreasing factors (labor and capital)—thereby increasing production risk and indicating moral hazard.     

我国森林保险发展缓慢的深层次原因及对策分析

从经济学角度分析了我国森林保险发展缓慢的原因与森林保险发展过程中信息不对称问题,逆向选择和道德风险现象突出使得保险公司保险产品供给不足,林农投保需求减少,投保积极性不高,导致森林保险发展缓慢。通过对森林保险中的主体行为博弈分析,指出建立以政府为主导的政策性森林保险,更适合当前林业发展的需要,并给出相应的对策。     

Motivations to grow energy crops: the role of crop and contract attributes

Perennial energy crops are a promising source of bioenergy whose production involves production risks, long‐term commitment of land and need for crop‐specific investments without the coverage of crop insurance potentially available for conventional crops. We conduct a choice experiment in five states in the Midwestern and South‐central regions of the U.S. to examine the effect of crop‐contract attributes on the joint discrete‐continuous choice decisions to adopt an energy crop and convert acres to it from a status quo use, while controlling for the effect of various farmers’ risk and time preferences, sociodemographic characteristics, and availability of crop insurance for conventional crops. We find robust evidence that high discount rates, high upfront establishment costs and need for crop‐specific investments create disincentives for adoption and allocation of land to energy crop production. The effects of riskiness of returns and risk aversion are less robust across specifications. The effect of conventional crop insurance on the energy crop adoption decision differs across types of insurance; in particular, farmers with revenue insurance are statistically significantly less likely to adopt an energy crop. Our results have implications for the design of effective contracts and policy incentives to induce the production of energy crops.     

Risk preferences of commodity crop producers and specialty crop producers: An application of prospect theory

Producers’ decisions, such as crop insurance, contract agreement, and technology adoption, involve considerable risk and uncertainty. Particularly, specialty crop production is more vulnerable to risk and requires more intensive management than commodity crop production, while risk mitigation tools for specialty crop production are comparatively limited. We apply Prospect Theory (PT) to analyze risk preferences of U.S. producers, and further compare the preference differences between commodity crop and specialty crop producers. Reference dependent, diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion, and probability weighting, as well as certain farm characteristics and producer demographics, are found to have a significant impact on grower risk attitudes. In addition, we do not observe significant differences in the base PT estimates between commodity crop and specialty crop producers. However, the relationships between risk behavior and individual characteristics vary between the two types of producers, which shed lights on the development of agricultural policies and provide implications for the design of contract and insurance.     

An Empirical Analysis of Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program

The extent to which crop insurance programs have resulted in additional land being brought into production has been a topic of considerable debate. We consider multiequation structural models of acreage response, insurance participation, CRP enrollment, and input usage. Our analysis focuses on corn and soybean production in the Corn Belt and wheat and barley production in the Upper Great Plains. Our results confirm that increased participation in insurance programs provokes statistically significant acreage responses in some cases, though the response is very modest in every case. In the most extreme cases, 30% decreases in premiums as a result of increased subsidies provoke acreage increases ranging from 0.2% to 1.1%. A number of policy simulations involving increases in premium subsidies are considered.     

Effects of subsidized crop insurance on crop choices

This study focuses on how subsidized crop insurance affects crop choices. Crop insurance may change farm investments by reducing risks and providing subsidies. First, actuarially fair insurance reduces risks in crop production and marketing, holding the expected return constant. Second, insurance subsidies encourage farms to purchase crop insurance, which increases the expected return to insured risky crops. Farms also have many self‐insurance mechanisms such as crop diversification or working off the farm. We derive conditions under which (1) unsubsidized and actuarially fair crop insurance or (2) insurance premium subsidies lead to more investment in a risky higher return crop. We then examine the role of self‐insurance for these conditions. The impact of premium subsidies is decomposed into a direct profit effect and an indirect coverage effect. These effects are explained by substitutions between market insurance and self‐insurance and between a risky crop and a safe crop. We discuss each effect as a combination of subsidy and risk effects. Numerical illustrations show that an insurance subsidy has a larger impact on risky crop investments compared to that of an input subsidy when farms are more risk‐averse and have high costs of self‐insurance. The framework provides a novel way to evaluate subsidized crop insurance programs.     

云南粮食主产地区演变的特征及原因探析

为保障粮食安全,国家划分了粮食主产区、产销平衡区和主销区三大功能区。作为国家粮食产销平衡区,云南粮食生产的首要任务就是保证本地区粮食基本自给。随着经济发展和土地的多元开发利用,20世纪80年代以来,云南粮食主产地区总体呈现"小稳定、大变动"的调整演变格局。文章通过对云南各地区地貌、粮食单产、粮食播种面积、粮食总产量、经济发展水平、人均占有量等指标的分析结果表明,云南粮食主产地区呈现向坝区集中、由生产条件好的地区向播种面积大的地区转变、由经济发达地区向欠发达地区转移、存在显著的粮食商品化差异等特征,粮食主产地区对云南粮食生产和粮食安全的贡献和影响力日益增强。该文通过对成本收益、耕地面积与人均耕地等指标的分析结果表明,粮食作物经济效益低,人地矛盾突出、与粮争地,"重农抓粮"考核机制不完善分别是云南粮食主产地区变化的根本原因、客观原因和制度原因。     

Supply Response under Risk: Implications for Counter-Cyclical Payments' Production Impact

This study investigates the role of risk in farmers' acreage decisions for major field crops in the North Central region by revisiting an earlier study by Chavas and Holt. The empirical model is forward-looking and reflects better variable measurement. We test the effects of wealth and revenue risk on supply response. Estimated results are also used to examine the production impact of counter-cyclical payments (CCPs). We find that the effects of risk on supply response are not strong. An increase in initial wealth would lead to greater crop acreage, consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion. The effect of CCPs on production appears to be negligible.     

The effectiveness of weather index insurance in managing mariculture production risk

Mariculture is a high-risk industry that is susceptible to weather disasters. However, due to moral hazard, adverse selection and high transaction costs, traditional indemnity insurance policies are not available. An emerging alternative is the development of weather index mariculture insurance. This research assesses the effectiveness of weather index mariculture insurance by using the swimming crab precipitation index insurance as an example. The theoretical and empirical results suggest that weather index mariculture insurance is not always effective. It cannot be guaranteed to promote the welfare of mariculturists and reduce the tail risk of income, especially in the case of gross rates. However, in the case of low basis risk, it could be a viable option for the government because of the low subsidy cost required.     

Warming temperatures will likely induce higher premium rates and government outlays for the U.S. crop insurance program

Likely climate change impacts include damages to agricultural production resulting from increased exposure to extreme heat. Considerable uncertainty remains regarding impacts on crop insurance programs. We utilize a panel of U.S. corn yield data to predict the effect of warming temperatures on the mean and variance of yields, as well as crop insurance premium rates and producer subsidies. While we focus on corn, we demonstrate that the subsidy impacts are likely to carry over to other major program crops. We find that warming decreases mean yields and increases yield risk on average, which results in higher premium rates. Under a 1°C warming scenario, we find that premium rates at the 90% coverage level will increase by 39% on average; however, there is considerable statistical uncertainty around this average as the 95% confidence interval spans from 22% to 61%. We also find evidence of extensive cross‐sectional differences as the county‐level rate impacts range from a 10% reduction to a 63% increase. Results indicate that exposure to extreme heat and changes in the coefficient of variation are large drivers of the impacts. Under the 1°C warming scenario, we find that annual subsidy payments for the crop insurance program could increase by as much as $1.5 billion, representing a 22% increase relative to current levels. This estimate increases to 3.7 billion (57%) under a 2°C warming scenario. Our results correspond to a very specific counterfactual: the marginal effect of warming temperatures under current technology, production, and crop insurance enrollments. These impacts are shown to be smaller than the forecasted impacts under a commonly used end‐of‐century general circulation model for even the most optimistic CO₂ emissions projection.