人为低地价害了谁——低地价政策质疑

若问地方政府什么任务最重，十有八九会说“招商引资”。我国大多数地区还处于“政府找项目”的发展阶段，求发展的心情十分迫切。于是，低地价甚至零地价成了不少政府亮出的一张王牌。我国东部某区域，近十个城市一直都在土地价格上较着劲———究竟看谁能忍受地价在成本价以下的压力。在这一区域，地价在１０万元以下，意味着连成本都收不回来，“五通一平”土地成本至少在９万元以上。缺口部分怎么办？只有靠财政补贴。某市招商局局长说，财政不但补贴土地价差，还补贴水电增容费。土地是各级政府经营的重要土地资产，政府如此不惜血本，…     

新一轮土地调控背景下“低工业地价”改革对策探讨

透过"低工业地价"现状,从理论层面上分析"低工业地价"形成的原因.指出"低工业地价"是工业用地在协议出让方式下,同一区域内各地方政府之间恶性竞争的结果.在阐述"低工业地价"原因的基础上,提出构建以市场配置工业用地为主的机制,加大力度实行工业用地招拍挂.完善工业用地区域价格机制,征收工业用地不动产税,建立耕地保护目标责任,将土地占用与"政绩"挂钩.是新一轮土地调控解决"低工业地价"问题的必然趋势和必然选择.     

轨道交通建设对城市地价的影响——以南京市地铁1号线为例

回顾了国内外有关轨道交通对土地和房地产价格影响的研究文献,基于特征价格模型,结合影响土地价格的其他特征,建立了轨道交通建设对城市地价影响的计量经济模型,对南京市土地价格受轨道交通运营的影响规律进行实证研究.结果显示,在不同的城市区位圈内轨道交通对土地价格的影响各不相同.从城市中心区向外围,轨道交通站点的影响辐射逐步扩大,距站点距离的增加对土地价格的影响有衰减作用.轨道交通对其周边地价的增值作用为政府对地价进行评估与监管提供了决策参考.     

制约我国城市土地集约利用的原因及其对策

通过分析当前制约城市土地集约利用的原因,以期为未来改革方向提供参考.借助经济学理论,利用经济学中基本的供求分析方法分析中国的土地市场供给状况和城市土地集约利用的关系.研究认为:土地市场不健全,特别是土地征用市场和土地出让市场不健全造成了城市土地低密度外延扩张和城市存量土地集约利用程度低.土地供给机制不合理、土地价格在很大程度上偏离土地价值,引致目前的经济发展模式仍是土地替代型而不是资本、技术密集型利用方式.因此,需要通过建立一个供给控制下的需求驱动市场、通过地租地价的变动规律,以及加快地方政府绩效评估制度和激励与约束机制改革,来引导和提高城市土地集约利用度.     

建设工程项目成本管理问题与对策

自2008年金融危机以来,房地产行业的经营状况受到严重影响。土地价格逐年上升,建设成本和劳动力成本逐渐增加,企业之间的竞争也日趋激烈,行业利润率逐步下降。因此,对于企业来说,成本管理变得更加重要,甚至是企业在竞争中取得胜利的关键。本文进行成本控制的研究主要是集中在项目建设阶段,根据我国房地产现状,揭示现阶段在成本控制上存在的主要问题,并结合项目建设各程序的特点,提出相应的对策。     

经济增长背景下的土地财政与土地出让行为分析

研究目的：对分税制后广泛存在于地方政府的土地财政和其与地方政府土地出让行为的相互关系进行研究,并分析地方政府差别化土地出让策略的原因。研究方法：理论分析、文献分析与面板向量自回归实证模型分析相结合。研究结果：协议出让土地价格和招拍挂土地出让价格之间体现了一种非对称的互动关系。协议出让土地价格对其自身的短期滞后响应比较明显,且作用为正,招拍挂土地出让价格对协议出让土地价格没有明显的滞后效应;而招拍挂土地出让价格却受到协议出让土地价格及其自身明显而持续的正向滞后影响。研究结论：地方政府之所以热衷于土地出让,并在工业用地和商住用地出让上采取差别化策略,根源在于地方政府对土地财政的追求,这也是当前中国以＂经营土地＂为特征的经济增长模式的根本源头。     

征地主体行为的法经济学分析

研究目的:从政府、企业、农村集体及农户等征地主体行为角度,分析中国征地制度运行中各征地主体之间的相互关系,评价政府行使土地征用权的成本和收益以及由此而带来的农户及企业响应的成本和外在成本等.研究方法:法经济学理论与方法.研究结果:地方政府滥用征地权是追求自身利益最大化的结果,低标准补偿下农户行为给政府、企业、社会带来了较高的外在成本,导致征地效率损失.研究结论:法经济学理论和方法对征地制度改革和创新具有政策意义.     

农民工就业成本与收益的经济学分析

从经济学的角度来研究农民工(主要是第二代农民工)从2004年以来的回流现象,应比较他们在城务工与在家务农的差量收益和差量成本.本文通过分析比较得出,农民工在城务工与在家务农相比,边际收益在逐年递减而边际成本逐年递增.吸引和留住农民工,政府应深化户籍制度改革和建立完善的社会保障制度,企业则应转变观念,建立和谐的人文氛围和健全的内部管理机制.     

“限地价,竞配建”土地出让方式的理论分析与实证研究

研究目的:对中国土地市场中新兴的"限地价,竞配建"挂牌方式进行研究,并与"定配建,竞地价"招标方式相对比。研究方法:建立有限价的两阶段拍卖和封闭式拍卖模型,分析开发商和地方政府的最优策略。研究结果:(1)在限制拍卖起始价的前提下,结合"溢价率超50%需上报"的规定,"限地价,竞配建"方式可有效控制地价并促进保障房的开发;(2)"限地价,竞配建"挂牌方式可通过相应的招标方式实现,但并不同于"定配建,竞地价"的招标方式。研究结论:"限地价,竞配建"挂牌方式和"定配建,竞地价"招标方式是促进保障房建设的重要手段。地方政府若希望落实保障房建设,挂牌方式更好;若希望降低地价,招标方式更好。     

国外地价与房价关系及其启示

研究目的:介绍美国、英国、瑞典、韩国、日本以及新加坡等国家地价与房价的关系.研究方法:比较分析法.研究结果:国外地价与房价的关系可分成4类:一是地价低房价也低的国家(瑞典),二是地价低房价不低的国家(美国),三是地价高房价不高的国家(新加坡与英国),四是地价高房价也高的国家(韩国与日本).研究结论:中国应根据人多地少的基本国情,借鉴国外有关经验,协调好地价与房价的关系,促进房地产业的健康发展.     

Industrial land price between China’s Pearl River Delta and Southeast Asian regions: Competition or Coopetition?

The planned economy system’s previous form of industrial land market control in China has led to current market failure because of a large amount of industrial land being sold at a very low price, causing extensive overuse of land and negative effects on land management. As the “World Factory”, the Pearl River Delta (PRD) is well known for its rapid urbanization largely driven by Foreign Direct Investment in labor-intensive industries. A low-land price strategy has been commonly adopted by the local government in order to attract industrial investment. In the past decade, the PRD has increasingly faced the increasing competition from its neighboring competition from its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia that have established preference policies to attract FDI and foreign enterprises. Despite a growing body of literature on the internal forces of industrial land in China, little is known of the external forces involved except for the importance of FDI and the intensity of interregional competition between China and other countries in attempting to attract foreign investment. This research fills the knowledge gap by modeling the situation in the form of an international cooperative game model aimed at revealing the industrial land price formation mechanism between the PRD region and Southeast Asian regions. The conditions of industrial land in the area and several Southeast Asian countries are first analyzed for their industrial land price movements in recent years. A game theoretic model is then built that exhibits similar characteristics. The result indicates that the governments’ low land price strategy and the competition between the PRD and its neighboring countries have created unnecessarily high social and environmental costs. Policy suggestions are made to encourage a more appropriate use of industrial land in China, and the most important being the need for a mindset shift from competition towards coopetition between the PRD and Southeast Asian regions.     

Local economic structure,regional competition and the formation of industrial land price in China: Combining evidence from process tracing with quantitative results

The price of industrial land in China has been found distorted and remarkably low. However, it is overlooked that industrial land price is relatively high in some regions. This local variation cannot be explained by classical theories on land price that focus on local economic level, population density, and location factors. We propose a theoretical framework incorporating local economic structure and governments’ behavior in regional competition, to interpret the formation of industrial land price in China. We first model local firms as foot-tight ones, whose relocation costs are enormous, and outside firms as foot-loose ones, whose relocation costs are negligible. Then we divide local governments as outside-capital-dependent governments (OCDGs) and non-outside-capital-dependent governments (NOCDGs) according to the role of outside capital in local economic structure. In such a setting, OCDGs are supposed to aggressively pursue outside firms and use industrial land as a critical endowment to engage in race-to-bottom competition, making the price extremely low. On the contrary, the optimal strategy for NOCDGs, who lack strong incentives in attracting outside investment, is to stay aside and let potential land users compete to determine the land price, resulting in a higher land price. Evidence from quantitative results and comparative case studies with process tracing based on Suzhou and Wenzhou together prove the validity of this theory. This paper advances the conventional understanding of industrial land price and concludes with implications on industrial land policies and sustainable development.     

Industrial land price and its impact on urban growth: A Chinese case study

China is experiencing rapid progress in industrialization, with its own rationale toward industrial land development based on a deliberate change from an extensive to intensive form of urban land use. One result has been concerted attempts by local government to attract foreign investment by a low industrial land price strategy, which has resulted in a disproportionally large amount of industrial land within the total urban land use structure at the expense of the urban sprawl of many cities. This paper first examines “Comparable Benchmark Price as Residential land use” (CBPR) as the theoretical basis of the low industrial land price phenomenon. Empirical findings are presented from a case study based on data from Jinyun County, China. These data are analyzed to reveal the rationale of industrial land price from 2000 to 2010 concerning the CBPR model. We then explore the causes of low industrial land prices in the form of a “Centipede Game Model”, involving two neighborhood regions as “major players” to make a set of moves (or strategies). When one of the players unilaterally reduces the land price to attract investment with the aim to maximize profits arising from the revenues generated from foreign investment and land premiums, a two-player price war begins in the form of a dynamic game, the effect of which is to produce a downward spiral of prices. In this context, the paradox of maximizing profits for each of the two players are not accomplished due to the inter-regional competition of attracted investment leading to a lose-lose situation for both sides’ in competing for land premium revenues. A short-term solution to the problem is offered involving the establishment of inter-regional cooperative partnerships. For the longer term, however, a comprehensive reform of the local financial system, more adroit regional planning and an improved means of evaluating government performance is needed to ensure the government's role in securing pubic goods is not abandoned in favor of one solely concerned with revenue generation.     

土地非农化过程中的博弈关系

研究目的：模拟土地非农化过程中中央政府与地方政府以及地方政府之间的博弈关系。研究方法：斯坦克尔伯格模型和库诺特竞争模型。研究结果：土地税费政策监管不力和地方政府间的过度竞争是造成土地过度非农化的一个重要原因。研究结论：要协调好经济发展与土地资源保护间的关系必须从两方面着手：一是完善土地非农化过程中的税费政策，加强税费监管；二是引导地方政府改变经济发展模式，避免以牺牲土地资源为代价的恶性竞争。     

China’s local governments breaking the land use planning quota: A strategic interaction perspective

In China, the planning quota, i.e., the binding target of construction land (BTCL) in land use planning for 15 years (2006–2020), was exhausted within only 7 years, which represents a very serious problem. This result not only nullifies the meaning of the plan itself but also threatens China's food and ecological security and poses great challenges to sustainable development. Here, we develop an analysis framework for local governments that break the BTCL in view of the strategic interactions of transferring newly increased construction land (NCL) among local governments and perform an empirical analysis of data on 262 prefecture-level cities from 2007 to 2016. The two main conclusions are as follows. First, adjacent local governments engage in positive strategic interactions regarding the quantity of NCL transferred. Second, positive strategic interactions regarding the quantity of NCL transferred are important reasons why local governments break the planning quota. In addition, we find that better economic development corresponds to more obvious positive strategic interactions. We also find that fiscal incentives and land misallocation play a significant role in promoting the increase in NCL, while strengthening land law enforcement can effectively constrain the increase in NCL. This paper enriches the literature on the reasons for planning failures, extending the research perspective to the level of interaction effects among local governments, and this paper provides new evidence regarding the strategic interaction among Chinese local governments. Moreover, this paper provides an important new path for the central government to constrain urban land expansion and to control the behavior of local governments that break the planning quota.     

中国土地利用总体规划实施中主要问题及成因分析

研究目的:探讨中国土地利用总体规划实施过程中存在的三大主要问题及其成因。研究方法:采用利益分析和制度分析的方法剖析问题成因。研究结果:现行的土地收益分配制度使地方政府和开发商成为建设用地开发的主要推动力量,而耕地保护成本与收益承担主体的不一致是耕地保护规划难于落实的根本原因;违法违规土地开发难于制止是因为合法用地的成本大于非法用地;而开发区土地利用效率低下则是因为低地价造成了土地与资本的替代。研究结论:要解决这些问题必须通过制度建设调整利益关系。     

基于多层级指标体系的城镇低效工业用地认定与查询*——以山西省榆社县为例

［目的］基于地方普遍反映低效工业用地利用量最大，程度最重的问题，文章将探寻城镇低效工业用地认定和查询的新方法，为地方政府科学化、层次化管理工业用地提供帮助，更好地促进土地资源的集约节约利用。［方法］基于多层级指标体系，以企业基础设施完备度为控制轴，企业经济效益和社会效益为评价轴，构建工业用地三维认定查询模型，创新工业用地的结果查询模式。［结果］以山西省榆社县为例，采用多层级指标体系能够得出，越是规模以上企业，其基础设施越完备、经济效益和社会效益分值越高，从侧面也可以反映出来地均税收和地均产值是造成该宗地高效利用和低效利用的关键。［结论］采用多层级指标体系确定的低效工业用地于与《山西省城镇低效用地编制要点》中确定的低效工业用地一致。且多层级指标体系不仅能将工业用地划分为高效利用、一般利用、低效利用、极差利用4个层次，还能对每个层级的分数进行比较，从而找出低效用地产生的原因，更好地指导地方政府对于工业用地的差异化管理和再开发工作。     

土地财政对实际汇率的影响 ——理论与实证

研究目的:探究中国土地财政政策对外部实际汇率的影响,客观分析土地财政对实际汇率影响的传导路径,反思土地财政对实际汇率的政策意义.研究方法:中介效应分析,静态及动态面板模型.研究结果:地方政府对土地财政的依赖会导致省际实际汇率贬值,土地财政通过要素市场扭曲收益效应与房价效应两条中介渠道对实际汇率产生影响,即土地财政通过促进要素扭曲收益提升与房价收入比提升的传导机制导致外部实际汇率贬值.研究结论:地方政府应避免工业企业利用政策优势落入价格竞争陷阱,同时扭转房地产行业的畸形状态.     

资源枯竭型城市工矿用地退出利益冲突及解决策略研究

深度挖掘工矿用地的潜在价值将满足资源枯竭型城市转型发展过程中的用地需求,减小政府的土地开发成本,保障有限的土地资源得到最有效使用。本文以工矿企业持续退出,城市转型发展对建设用地需求增大为背景,以地方政府、工矿企业、投资商为主要利益相关者,构建完全信息动态博弈模型,分析工矿用地退出中存在的利益冲突。研究表明:地方政府、工矿企业、投资商在工矿用地退出过程中将会以各自所能获利多少进行博弈。只有各利益主体积极表达利益诉求,厘清产权归属,使各利益主体均衡享有工矿用地退出收益才能更好实现退出进程。