Open-book accounting: Reason for failure of inter-firm cooperation?

Inter-firm accounting techniques such as open-book accounting (OBA) have been described as an important means for effectively managing costs in buyer–supplier relationships and for improving relationship quality. However, disclosing cost data also implies for the supplier the risk that the buyer uses the data during price negotiations to pressure the supplier's profit margin. To date, there is sparse empirical evidence addressing the extent to which cost-data disclosure does affect the supplier's perception of the exchange relationship. This study addresses this gap by investigating the impact of OBA on supplier relationship satisfaction. The findings indicate that OBA may negatively affect supplier relationship satisfaction and thus represents a potential risk to cooperation. The results further suggest that effective safeguards against opportunistic behavior, such as relational social norms, significantly attenuate the negative effect of OBA on supplier relationship satisfaction.     

OUTSOURCING AND MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM: TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL

We analyze the effect of buyer, contract, and vendor characteristics on abnormal stock returns among firms that have announced large scale Information Technology (IT) and Business Process outsourcing (BPO) contracts. We draw upon a comprehensive dataset on outsourcing announcements, augmented with data from public sources. Salient buyer factors examined include use of a wide range of organizational controls. On the vendor side, we examine the impact of vendor size, contract size and reputation. Our study shows that use of behavior controls, outcome controls (negative), vendor reputation, and industry of buyer firm affect market value. When limited to buyer related factors, use of behavior and clan controls is positively related to abnormal returns around IT outsourcing announcements. An interesting finding is that IT and BPO success require different sets of controls. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interorganizational cost management in the exchange process

This paper explores interorganizational cost management (IOCM) practices in the exchange process. IOCM can be defined as buyers’ and suppliers’ coordinated efforts to reduce costs. Past research has primarily argued that such practices depend on component characteristics, relationship characteristics, and characteristics of the transaction. Based on a study of three buyer–supplier relationships, this article also finds variations in IOCM practices between six main activities in the exchange process. In this process, the supplier's management accounting is found to be more important than recognized by prior research. The deepest collaboration around IOCM issues and the greatest joint use of suppliers’ management accounting in the three cases typically occurs in earlier activities in the exchange process, including supplier selection, joint product design and joint manufacturing process development. In later activities in the process, during full-speed production as well as in product and manufacturing process redesign, suppliers’ managerial accounting plays a lesser role in our study.     

Customers and cash: How relationships affect suppliers' cash holdings

If one customer accounts for a large portion of a supplier's sales, then the loss of that one customer can cripple the supplier's financial health. As a precaution against the additional operating risk induced by being in an important relationship with a customer, I find that suppliers in such relationships hold more cash on average than suppliers that are not in important relationships. Additionally, supplier's cash holdings increase proportionately with the importance of their customer relationships. Being in an important relationship affects cash holdings and leverage differently, indicating that firms manage cash and debt for different purposes. I find that suppliers in relationships primarily accrue cash through issuance of stock as opposed to debt or retained earnings. The results highlight the importance of understanding buyer–supplier relationships when evaluating a firm's financing policy.     

Evidence on the Determinants of Credit Terms Used in Interfirm Trade

Trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay payment. In this paper we document the rich variation in interfirm credit terms and credit policies across industries. We examine empirically the firm's basic credit policy choices: whether to extend credit or to require cash payment; and, if credit is extended, whether to adopt simple net terms or terms with discounts for prompt payment. We also examine determinants of variations in two-part terms. Results are supportive primarily of theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer creditworthiness.     

Trade Credit, Corporate Groups, and the Financing of Belgian Firms

We investigate the role of trade credit as a source of financing. Using a sample of 661 large non-financial Belgian firms for the 1989–1991 period, we find that the amount of trade credit a buyer takes is determined by his need for funds and the internally available funds. Trade credit is primarily used to finance short-term assets. As such, it seems to be an important alternative not only for short-term bank debt but also for long-term financial debt, including intragroup debt. We find no evidence that the amount of trade credit taken is influenced by affiliation with the supplier.     

Sequential procurement auctions and their effect on investment decisions

We characterize the optimal mechanism and investment level in an environment where (i) two projects of independent costs are purchased sequentially, (ii) the buyer can commit to a two‐period mechanism, and (iii) the winner of the first project can invest in a cost‐reducing technology between auctions. We show that, in an attempt to induce more competition in the first period, the optimal mechanism gives an advantage to the first‐period winner in the second auction. As a result of this advantage, the first‐period winner invests more than the socially efficient level. Optimal advantages, therefore, create two different channels for cost minimization in buyer‐supplier relationships.     

Lock‐In Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from DIP Loans

Do prior lending relationships result in pass‐through savings (lower interest rates) for borrowers, or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers? Theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry, higher switching costs, and limited access to capital markets, they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders. Firms in Chapter 11 seeking debtor‐in‐possession (DIP) financing often fit this profile. We investigate the presence of lock‐in effects using a sample of 348 DIP loans. We account for endogeneity using the instrument variable (IV) approach and the Heckman selection model and find consistent evidence that prior lending relationship is associated with higher interest costs and the effect is more severe for stronger existing relationships. Our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock‐in effect under certain circumstances, such as DIP financing.     

Preferred suppliers in auction markets

This article examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer does not have this ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred supplier a right of first refusal on the lowest price from the other suppliers. When the buyer has this ability, their joint surplus can be maximized by a revelation game for the cost of the preferred supplier and a reserve price based on that cost.     

Downstream Value of Upstream Finance

We examine market value implications of managing liquidity via supplier financing. Results suggest a direct link between shareholder wealth and use of trade credit, and the relation exhibits significant cross‐sectional variation. In particular, the market value of trade credit varies with the liquidity of goods sold and competition in product markets. Evidence also indicates the value‐supplier financing association strengthens with financial constraint, which supports the financing motive for trade credit. Further findings are consistent with the transaction cost motive. Overall, we conclude that shareholders value the strategic benefits associated with supplier financing and that downstream firms’ characteristics influence this value.     

Do firms' relationships with principal customers/suppliers affect shareholders' income?

In this paper, we examine whether a firm's relationship with its principal customers/suppliers affects its payout policies. A firm has customer–supplier relationships when its business depends on a small number of major customers/suppliers. The extant literature indicates two channels through which customer–supplier relationships might negatively affect a firm's dividend payments: 1) the high financial distress costs associated with relationship-specific investments and 2) the information certification effect of the principle customer. Consistent with expectations, our study reveals a negative relationship between a firm's dependence on customer–supplier relationships and its dividend payments. This result is robust to various model specifications and consistent with evidence regarding the time-series properties of dividends. Moreover, we find that high financial distress costs associated with relationship-specific investments are the key channel through which a firm's customer–supplier relationship affects its dividend payments. Overall, our results suggest that a firm's relationship with its non-financial stakeholders, such as principal customers/suppliers, is an important determinant of its shareholders' income.     

Buyer Search Intensity and the Role of the Residential Real Estate Broker

This study examines the impact of the real estate broker on the effectiveness of buyer search by focusing on the linkages between search intensity and the duration of search. How long a buyer searches depends on how sensitive the buyer is to within-period search costs and across-period, sequential search costs. High-income individuals and other homebuyers with high within-period search costs tend to search longer and less intensively. Buyers with high across-period search costs, such as out-of-town buyers, tend to search more intensively. Brokers, by reducing the opportunity costs of within-period search, increase buyer search intensity, which in turn reduces actual search time.     

Vendor Financing

This paper shows that, even in the presence of a perfectly competitive banking industry, it is optimal for firms with market power to engage in vendor financing if credit customers have lower reservation prices than cash customers or if adverse selection makes it infeasible to write credit contracts that separate customers according to their credit risk. We analyze how the advantage of vendor financing depends on the relative size of the cash and credit markets, the heterogeneity of credit customers, and the number of firms in the industry.     

Life-cycle effects in small business finance

This paper studies the life-cycle profiles of small firms’ cost and use of credit using a panel of Finnish firms. The choice of method matters for the conclusions drawn about the relationship between firm age and financing costs; the cross-sectional age profiles of financing costs are hump-shaped and consistent with hold-up theories, whereas methods that control for cohort fixed effects demonstrate that the financing costs decrease monotonically as the firms mature. The life-cycle profiles of the use of credit also indicate that firms are more dependent on financial intermediaries in the early periods of their lives. Furthermore, the cohorts born during recessions pay higher financing costs and use smaller amounts of bank loans, even after their creditworthiness is controlled for. The recession cohort effect appears to be more related to the experience of starting-up the firm in the recession than to the CEOs growing up in a recession during their early adulthood.     

Implicit benefits and financing

Social relationship and business connections create implicit benefits between borrowers and lenders. We model how implicit benefits and repayment enforcement costs influence credit allocation, cost, and renegotiation. The optimal solution illustrates that financing with implicit benefits may achieve lower financing costs, higher managerial effort, and better outcomes for both borrowers and lenders. This result is consistent with the continuing expansion of alternative financing despite formal financial intermediation, the rise of corporate insider debt, and joint ownership of debt and equity. The growing size and complexity of projects and changes in community relationships can explain expansion of financing with standard intermediation.     

Intrafirm Trade,Bargaining Power,and Specific Investments

This paper compares the performance of standard-cost with negotiated transfer pricing under asymmetric information. Negotiated transfer pricing generally achieves higher expected contribution margins, as this method tends to be more efficient in aggregating private information into a single transfer price. Standard-cost transfer pricing confers more bargaining power to the supplier and therefore generates better incentives for this division to undertake specific investments. The opposite holds for buyer investments. If a corporate controller has disaggregated information about divisional costs and revenues, then the firm can improve upon the performance of standard-cost transfer pricing by setting a centralized transfer price equal to expected cost plus a suitably chosen mark-up.     

The Role of Information and Opportunism in the Choice of Buyer-Supplier Relationships

An important characteristic of any buyer-supplier relationship is the amount and type of information that is exchanged between the contracting parties. Buyer-supplier networks are characterized by greater information exchange than arm's-length transactions. This enhanced information exchange allows for greater production efficiency but increases the potential for information misappropriation. In this paper we characterize the set of innovations for which each of these forms of exchange relationships is efficient. We then explore the effect of an initial information linkage between the buyer and supplier. Such linkages increase the set of innovations for which networks are efficient. However, such linkages have a negative effect on the buyer's incentive to innovate and an ambiguous effect on the supplier's incentive to invest in flexible production techniques. Finally, we identify settings in which the buyer-supplier surplus is greater with such linkages.     

Stock price fragility and the cost of bank loans

This study examines whether the flow volatility experienced by institutional investors affects firms’ financing costs. Using Greenwood and Thesmar’s (2011) stock price fragility measure, we find that there is a positive relationship between fragility and firms’ costs of bank loans. This effect is most pronounced when lenders rely more on institutional shareholders to discipline corporate management, or when loans are made by relationship lenders, suggesting that unstable flows could weaken institutional investors’ monitoring effectiveness and strengthen relationship banks’ bargaining power.     

关系型借贷对中小企业融资成本的影响——基于广西中小企业调查的实证研究

文章在研究关系型借贷理论的基础上,分析了中小企业的关系型借贷与融资成本之间的关系,通过构建计量经济模型实证研究了合作的银行数量、银企合作时间、企业的人情消费和银企关系的满意度等因素对中小企业融资成本的影响.研究发现：银企关系的满意度和企业销售额与贷款利率呈显著的负相关关系;银企合作时间等其他因素符合假设但并不显著.最后,从企业、银行和政府的角度,提出了降低中小企业融资成本的相关政策建议.