我国上市公司盈余管理实证研究

盈余管理是困扰上市公司信息质量的一个主要问题.过度的盈余管理,必然造成会计信息失真,影响资本市场的资源配置.从上市公司盈余管理的配股动机出发,采用Fama-French三因素模型分析配股政策对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响,结果表明:配股政策对上市公司盈余管理行为有显著影响,我国上市公司的盈余管理行为是政策诱导型的.因此,加强证券市场监管是治理盈余管理问题的根本出路.     

浅析盈余管理对会计信息质量的影响

适度的盈余管理并不影响企业会计信息质量,但一定要把握好度,否则就造成过度盈余管理甚至会演变为财务舞弊.完善公司治理结构、加强外部审计、完善会计准则体系以及优化会计报告结构和内容等手段可以防止盈余管理过度化,从而提高会计信息质量.     

新会计准则下上市公司盈余管理行为分析

对于企业会计信息的外部使用者来说,盈余信息是最为重要、最为直观的一种会计信息,在企业对外披露的财务报告中占有核心的地位.尤其对于上市公司来说,可通过盈余管理来控制财务报表中的盈余信息,从而影响会计信息质量.本文具体分析盈余管理产生的原因、上市公司进行盈余管理的动机、盈余管理的策略及实施手段,并分析会计准则对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响.     

关于盈余管理与会计信息质量的思考

在我国企业日常的会计实务操作中,盈余管理已成为一项较为重要的工作。企业的盈余管理对会计信息质量、企业价值最大化的财务管理目标产生了一系列的影响,本文通过深入分析企业盈余管理的成因及手段、对会计信息质量的影响,探讨规范企业盈余管理、提高会计信息质量的有效途径。     

我国上市公司股权结构与盈余管理关系研究

上市公司的会计信息质量是证券市场稳定发展的根本,但近年来我国许多上市公司的会计信息严重失真,盈余管理混乱的现象十分严重。本文基于我国上市公司股权结构的特点以及它们对盈余管理的影响展开研究。     

提高会计信息可比性能抑制盈余管理吗?

本文研究中国上市公司会计信息可比性对管理层盈余管理行为的抑制作用。研究发现,虽然会计信息可比性的提高对应计盈余管理具有一定程度的抑制作用,但真实盈余管理现象随着会计信息可比性的提高而显著增加,表明会计信息可比性是管理层从应计盈余管理向真实盈余管理转变一个重要诱因。进一步研究发现,当管理层薪酬更高时,随着会计信息可比性的提高,应计盈余管理向真实盈余管理的转变越明显。但是在股权集中度较高、信息披露规范和监管环境趋紧的情况下,随着会计信息可比性提升,管理层实施真实盈余管理的上升势头在一定程度上受到了抑制。     

我国上市公司股权结构与盈余管理关系研究

上市公司的会计信息质量是证券市场稳定发展的根本,但近年来我国许多上市公司的会计信息严重失真,盈余管理混乱的现象十分严重。本文基于我国上市公司股权结构的特点以及它们对盈余管理的影响展开研究。     

公司治理结构与盈余管理模式的互动分析

公司治理结构影响会计信息质量,会计信息质量的高低对公司治理结构的完善起到关键作用.盈余管理通过会计政策的选择与公司治理结构产生关系,公司治理结构对盈余管理模式具有重要影响,这种影响体现在内部治理和外部治理两个方面.同时,不同的盈余管理模式对公司治理结构的完善起着不同的作用.     

我国上市公司盈余管理对股价影响的实证分析

盈余管理在西方被称为“市场参与者的游戏”，近年来日益受到我国会计学界的关注。证券市场的迅速发展要求上市公司提供高质量的会计信息，由于盈余管理与会计信息质量关系密切，使得对上市公司盈余管理问题的研究成为投资者、债权人、政府主管部门以及会计准则制定机构关注的重点。另一方面，证券市场经验数据证明，股价的波动也同盈余管理密切相关，而利益相关者很可能利用盈余管理手段来影响股价从而获取利益。因此，加强我国上市公司盈余管理和股价相关性的研究，对提高上市公司会计信息质量和改善证券市场资源优化配置功能有着重要意义。本文运用实证分析方法，选取了竞争性强的家电行业和竞争性弱的石油行业的上市公司，从盈余管理度量着手，研究竞争性不同行业的上市公司盈余管理对股价的影响大小，并对投资者的行为提出相关建议。     

新会计准则下上市公司盈余管理行为分析

对于企业会计信息的外部使用者来说,盈余信息是最为重要、最为直观的一种会计信息,在企业对外披露的财务报告中占有核心的地位。尤其对于上市公司来说,可通过盈余管理来控制财务报表中的盈余信息,从而影响会计信息质量。本文具体分析盈余管理产生的原因、上市公司进行盈余管理的动机、盈余管理的策略及实施手段,并分析会计准则对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响。     

Information asymmetry,mutual funds and earnings management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how information asymmetry and mutual fund ownership affect listed companies’ earnings management. We show that (1) reducing information asymmetry improves firms’ earnings management behavior; (2) relative to short-term mutual funds, long-term mutual funds promote earnings quality by adopting a monitoring role; and (3) by dividing firms into high/low information asymmetry groups, we find that the information environment significantly increases the effect of long-term mutual funds on firms’ earnings management. In this paper, we provide new evidence for the role that institutional investors play in a typical emerging capital market. Our results have clear policy implications: to increase earnings quality, it is essential to improve information transparency and develop long-term institutional investors.     

CEO's financial experience and earnings management

We study whether Chinese CEOs with financial experience engage in more earnings management or less earnings management than those without such experience. In doing so, we distinguish between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Overall, we find that CEOs with financial experience tend to do less real earnings management, while we find no evidence that they do either more or less accrual-based earnings management. Our findings tend to confirm that CEOs with financial experience provide more precise earnings information and higher quality financial statements.     

政府干预、盈余管理与信息披露质量——来自深圳股票市场A股上市公司的经验证据

通过以深圳证券交易所2006-2010年信息披露质量评级报告结果及3185家上市公司的A股数据为研究样本,从政府干预的角度分析了盈余管理与信息披露质量之间的内在关系。实证表明,政府干预与盈余管理呈负相关关系;政府干预与信息披露质量显著负相关;盈余管理与信息披露质量呈负相关关系,且政府干预行为影响其负相关关系。这说明在政府干预的情况下,上市公司可能通过降低信息披露质量来配合其盈余管理,从而使信息使用者与上市公司信息不对称。     

Earnings quality and short selling: Evidence from real earnings management in the United States

Prior research provides evidence consistent with managers using real earnings management (REM) to increase earnings. This study examines whether short sellers exploit the overvaluation of firms employing REM. I find that firms with more REM have higher subsequent short interest. The positive relation between REM and short interest is more pronounced in settings where the costs associated with accrual‐based earnings management are high, such as when a firm has low accounting flexibility or faces greater scrutiny from a high quality auditor. I also find some evidence that short sellers respond to REM more than to other fundamental signals of firm overvaluation. My inferences are robust to the use of propensity score matching. Collectively, my evidence suggests that short sellers not only trade on REM information, but they also trade as if they understand the substitutive nature of alternative earnings management methods. This study provides additional insight into the important role that short sellers play in monitoring managerial operating decisions and overall earnings quality.     

Earnings and capital management and signaling: the use of loan-loss provisions by European banks

This paper investigates the relationship between loan-loss provisions (LLPs) and earnings management in the context of the capital adequacy of Euro Area (EA) banks versus non-EA credit institutions. This paper also examines whether LLPs signal managements’ expectations concerning future bank profits to investors. Additionally, this paper traces the role of bank regulations and creditor protection systems in explaining income smoothing. Evidence drawn from the 1996 to 2006 period indicates that LLPs do reflect changes in the expected quality of a bank's loan portfolio for both groups of banks, and that earnings management is an important determinant of LLPs for EA intermediaries, whereas non-EA credit institutions use LLPs to signal private information to outsiders. The paper also finds that higher protection of creditors’ rights significantly reduces the incentives to smooth earnings for EA banks. During the recent financial crisis, EA bank managers are much more concerned with their credit portfolio quality and do not use LLPs for discretionary purposes, whereas LLPs at non-EA banks are used to smooth income more than for the purposes of managing capital ratios or conveying private information about future performance to the market.     

On the nonlinear relation between product market competition and earnings quality

The literature documents conflicting results regarding the influence of product market competition on earnings quality. We extend this stream of literature by incorporating competition’s effect on both the opportunities and the incentives to manage earnings. The combination of both effects results in a nonlinear relation between product market competition and earnings quality. At low competition levels, additional information associated with one more rival helps reveal earnings irregularity and deter earnings management to a larger extent than its effect on the incentives to manage earnings, suggesting a positive relation between competition and earnings quality. At high competition levels, the latter effect dominates the former. We thus predict a positive (negative) relation between competition and earnings quality at low (high) competition levels. Consistent with our hypothesis, we document an inverted U-shaped relation between earnings quality and product market competition.     

Political embeddedness and firms’ choices of earnings management strategies in China

We examine whether and how political embeddedness influences financial reporting quality in China by investigating how government ownership and political connections affect Chinese listed firms’ choices of earnings management strategies. The results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and in particular, central SOEs, are more likely to substitute accrual-based earnings management strategies with costlier but less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-SOEs. The results also indicate that politically connected enterprises (PCEs) are more likely to employ less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-PCEs, so much so that PCEs’ total earnings management level is higher than that of non-PCEs.     

信息透明度对资本配置效率的影响——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

以2001~2012年沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,借鉴Wurgler的资源配置效率估算模型,从盈余管理角度探讨了中国现实制度背景下信息透明度对资本配置效率的影响。实证结果表明,无论是在行业层面还是公司层面,信息透明度与资本配置效率均呈显著的正相关关系,其中以修正的DD模型衡量的盈余管理解释力度最强。进一步采用深交所信息披露考评结果作为稳健性检验的替代指标,结论依然不变。可见,改善上市公司盈余质量,提高信息透明度,是正确引导证券市场资本有效配置的关键。     

Timing,earnings management and over-reaction around pure placings

This paper provides new evidence about firms conducting pure placings in the UK. It examines their abnormal performance (stock and operating), earnings management (accrual and real activities) and abnormal growth prospects for up to three years surrounding the event. It questions whether (i) timing, (ii) earnings management and/or (iii) over-reaction hypotheses can explain these performance, earnings quality and growth paths. The results document that pure placing firms have high earnings quality and abnormally high growth opportunities at the announcement. For this reason, the market is overenthusiastic. It expects more than what is eventually fulfilled, in line with the over-reaction hypothesis. Weak evidence that placing firms may exploit market timing is noted, whilst there is no supportive evidence of earnings management. These findings distinguish the earnings quality and growth opportunities of pure placing firms from that of firms conducting open offers, firm commitment offers and other seasoned equity offerings (SEO) that are not private placements, for which prior evidence reports mainly timing and/or earnings management prior to the event. This paper facilitates a better understanding of UK SEO.     

Mandatory IFRS adoption: the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management

This paper examines whether firms substituted real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management after the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became mandatory. Using a sample of 101,331 firm-year observations from 33 countries between 2000 and 2010, we show that IFRS adoption came with the unintended consequence of certain firms substituting real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management, especially among firms in countries with strict enforcement regimes. Furthermore, we document that the trade-off is confined to EU countries in which strong firm-level characteristics (i.e. the firm-level mechanism of control, the market’s level of scrutiny, and firm-specific incentives to provide transparency) are coupled with strong enforcement. We also show that IFRS had an effect in countries outside the EU, albeit at a different time. Overall, the results suggest that accounting regulators’ efforts to increase earnings quality might have had the unintended consequence of increasing real earnings management activities.