应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理研究综述

盈余管理在全世界都是普遍现象,也是学术界研究的热点。已有大量文献对企业盈余管理动因进行了梳理并取得了较为系统的理论,但对于应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的动因研究还有待完善。本文梳理发现,应计盈余管理动因:满足企业管理层的需要、获得企业持久稳定的发展、为企业平滑利润、降低企业经营所需的成本。真实盈余管理动因:摆脱监管机构的制约、隐藏"不端行径"、获得更为稳定的盈余收益。     

浅析我国上市公司中的盈余管理问题

随着资本市场的发展和上市公司的数量增多,我国上市公司的盈余管理问题逐渐凸现,并成为我国会计理论与实务界研究的新课题。盈余管理有着正反两方面的作用,但由于被上市公司所滥用,它的负面影响远远大于其正面影响,进而成为我国目前会计信息失真问题的重要原因之一。要解决我国目前的会计信息失真问题并促进我国资本市场的发展,就必须对上市公司的盈余管理问题进行研究和治理。     

企业盈余管理研究

文章首先介绍了企业进行盈余管理的动因,然后分析了我国企业进行盈余管理的积极影响和消极影响,最后给出企业进行盈余管理的相关建议,为我国企业盈余管理的发展提供借鉴。     

浅析盈余管理的动因和方法

从上个世纪八十年代开始,盈余管理这一行为在西方国家受到会计理论界的广泛关注,到目前为止,已取得很多值得关注的研究成果.而我国在这方面起步较晚,理论上的研究还不够成熟,本文将对盈余管理的动因和方法进行阐述.     

基于资本市场动因的上市公司盈余管理分析

本文立足资本市场观考察我国上市公司盈余管理的资本市场动因,认为获取和保持筹资资格是我国上市公司盈余管理的突出动机。分析我国上市公司盈余管理的资本市场动因存在的制度安排、股权结构、市场投机等三个主要原因,提出从改进证券市场监管的相关制度安排、加强会计准则等相关法规政策的建设、健全上市公司的股权结构和治理结构、强化审计中介机构的监督职能、增强市场信息的透明度等五个方面探讨基于资本市场动因的盈余管理控制对策。     

盈余管理初探

盈余管理是企业在有选择会计政策和会计估计的自由时,在合法的前提下选择使企业市场价值最大化的行为,是企业作为追求市场价值最大化的经济主体。只有对盈余管理理性对待与恰当运用,才能给企业带来一定的正面效应,实现效益最大化。近年来,盈余管理问题已成为影响会计信息质量的一大因素。结合国内外对盈余管理研究的基础上,对盈余管理概念、特征、成因进行初步探讨,进一步深化对盈余管理的认识,提出应对盈余管理的对策措施,以减少盈余管理带来的负面影响。     

盈余管理动机研究：—个文献综述？

有关盈余管理的研究可以追溯至20世纪80年代,由于其对资本市场和投资者利益日益彰显的影响．使其成为目前会计领域研究的焦点之一本文试图通过时盈余管理动机的回顾和评述,给出已有研究中的不足,启示,未来研究的方向。     

基于动机视角的国内盈余管理文献综述

盈余管理是会计理论研究的重要课题．我国对其研究还不纠十年的历史。到目前为止,国内资本市场的盈余管理现象愈演愈烈,对其研究依然热行。目前．就方法论而言．学术界对于盈余管理的研究,很多都是从动机出发的。因为根据研究过程中的经验教训．关注盈余管理的动机对于完整分析盈余管理行为是十分有效的,否则对盈余管理的研究是不完全的【l】。所以本文将从动机角度对盈余管理的国内研究现状进行归纳和总结。     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.     

业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

Abstract:   Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.     

公司治理结构与盈余管理模式的互动分析

公司治理结构影响会计信息质量,会计信息质量的高低对公司治理结构的完善起到关键作用.盈余管理通过会计政策的选择与公司治理结构产生关系,公司治理结构对盈余管理模式具有重要影响,这种影响体现在内部治理和外部治理两个方面.同时,不同的盈余管理模式对公司治理结构的完善起着不同的作用.     

Management of Earnings and Analysts' Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises

Abstract:  This paper corroborates the finding of prior studies that managers avoid reporting earnings lower than analyst forecasts (i.e., negative earnings surprises) and provides new evidence of actions contributing to this phenomenon. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence of both (1) upward management of reported earnings and (2) downward 'management' of analysts' forecasts to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Further analysis of the components of earnings management suggests that both the operating cash flow and discretionary accruals components of earnings are managed.     

Net Value Added and Earnings Determination

This paper argues that earnings are determined as a response to wealth, measured by net value added, and as an adjustment to the previous year level of earnings. The model appears well specified when applied to a random sample of firms-years. The results highlight the importance of wealth generation and the previous level of earnings as determinants of earnings.     

Earnings Management Around Share Repurchases: A Note

This work examines a subset of the important area of earnings management. Specifically, it seeks to identify the extent of earnings management preceding self-tender offers for a sample of U.S. firms. Pre-repurchase total accruals and discretionary current accruals were found to be somewhat lower for a sample of self-tendering firms compared to a sample of industry- and performance-matched control firms. Weak evidence of post-buyback accruals reversal is also presented. The evidence is weakly consistent with the notion that share repurchases are employed by managers to exploit shareholders through earnings management.     

Management Earnings Forecasts,Earnings Announcements,and Institutional Trading in China

Abstract:

In this study, we investigate the trading behavior of institutional investors in China according to management earnings forecasts (MEFs) and earnings announcements (EAs). MEFs are mandatory under the stringent regulatory framework in China. We find evidence that both MEFs and EAs have an effect on the market. However, MEFs have a bigger effect on the market than do EAs. According to a sample of semiannual observations of firms from 2003 to 2008, we find that changes in the stock ownership of institutions are positively associated with EAs but not significantly associated with MEFs. When we further examine the relations between institutional characteristics and trading strategies, we find that growth funds exploit the arbitrage opportunity of MEFs.     

Top Management Team Characteristics and Accrual-Based Earnings Management

This study examines how top management team (TMT) knowledge and average tenure affect accrual-based earnings management by investigating 4791 Taiwanese listed companies from 2006 to 2010. TMT members with more knowledge (higher education level, more accounting expertise, and greater prior top management experience) and longer average tenure have better performances and higher reputations, and are more aware of the litigation costs of earnings manipulations; therefore, they reduce managers' incentives to manage earnings (incentive-reduction effect). On the other hand, these TMT members are also likely to become entrenched and engage in more earnings manipulations (entrenchment-enhancing effect). The empirical results show that firms' TMT knowledge and average tenure are negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that the incentive-reduction effect is stronger than the entrenchment-enhancing effect, which makes TMT members less likely to engage in earnings management. Moreover, the above results are robust when employing different earnings management measures and suspect firm analyses, as well as considering endogeneity issues. Finally, the study suggests that the presence of a founding family may reduce the influences of TMT knowledge and average tenure on earnings management.     

The Relationship Between Bank Risk and Earnings Management: Evidence from Japan

Using stock price data drawn from the 1990s in Japan, this paper empirically shows that bank risk is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, indicating that investors misinterpreted high reported earnings as favorable information about bank financial health. We also show that the negative relationship was very powerful prior to the major bank failures in late 1997 and 1998, but it diminished subsequent to the failures. We conclude that investors started to anticipate potential manipulation of financial reports by bank managers more rationally after the major bank failures.