Determinants of Underwriter Participation in Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock: An Empirical Study

This paper examines an optimal underwriter participation model and develops testable hypotheses regarding the influence of certain factors on the degree of underwriter participation in initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock. The issue of underwriter participation is important primarily due to the tradeoff between foregone underwriter compensation and underwriting risk reduction. The results of this paper indicate that factors related to the issue, issuing firm, underwriter, and IPO market conditions all are important determinants of the participation decision. Interestingly, the results also show that the importance of these factors is not consistent across underwriter prestige groups. In particular, factors external to underwriters (e.g., the issuing firm and market characteristics) are more important for explaining nonprestigious underwriter participation, while factors related to underwriters themselves play a more important role for explaining prestigious underwriter participation.     

Relationship-Specific Assets and the Pricing of Underwriter Services

This paper investigates the effect of setup costs on the pricing of investment banking services. The existence of setup costs is predicted to result in lower underwriter spreads in IPOs for firms that are expected to issue again. Consistent with this prediction, I find significantly lower spreads for firms that make subsequent issues. I also find that a firm's likelihood of changing underwriters in a subsequent offer is related to the time between offerings and the underwriter's pricing performance in the IPO. These results suggest that the deviations from optimal IPO pricing carry a penalty for the underwriter.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.     

Underwriter Spread, Underwriter Reputation, and IPO Underpricing: A Simultaneous Equation Analysis

This paper studies the relationships between underwriter reputation, underwriter spread, and IPO underpricing. We consider the information content of underwriter spread and find that it conveys information pertinent to IPO quality. Because underwriter spread is endogenous, underpricing and underwriter spread are jointly determined in a simultaneous equation system. Also, we examine the IPO market for evidence of segmentation, and our results suggest some market segmentation. Underwriter spread impacts initial underpricing for a group of medium-reputation underwriters, while underpricing affects underwriter spread for groups of low- and high-reputation underwriters. Consequently, high-risk IPOs may not be priced the same way as low-risk IPOs. We attribute this finding to regulation, competition, and/or market segmentation.     

Two‐Sided Matching: How Corporate Issuers and Their Underwriters Choose Each Other

In this article, the authors update and confirm the findings of a 2005 article that was the first to view corporate underwriter choices as the outcome of a two‐sided matching process in which issuers look to the abilities of the underwriters offering their services and underwriters focus on the quality of the issuers that wish to use their services. This view offers a contrast with both the conventional representation of issuer‐underwriter associations as one‐sided decisions (by either issuers or underwriters) and the classical economist's representation of a competitive market in which prices serve as the primary market‐clearing mechanism. In their examination of both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) during the period 1980–2010, the authors continue to find strong evidence that higher‐quality issuers associate with more reputable underwriters and lower‐quality issuers match with lower reputation underwriters. Moreover, when examining cases of underwriter switching between an IPO and SEOs by the same issuer, they find that cases involving the largest divergence in the relative rankings of issuer and underwriter were the most likely to produce a change of underwriter—and that issuers that experienced larger post‐ IPO increases in quality were more likely to find more reputable underwriters for their SEOs (than for their IPOs). The authors also find that the larger the number of offerings brought to market in a given year, the smaller the market share of the top‐tier underwriters, likely reflecting the willingness of the most reputable underwriters to turn down business to maintain quality and reputation. Finally, the most reputable underwriters appear to benefit from the fact that the issuers whose IPOs they underwrite end up raising larger amounts of capital, both at the time of the IPO and in the larger and more frequent seasoned offerings by such issuers that come after the IPO. This evidence in support of two‐sided matching suggests that, especially for high‐quality issuers, the reputation of the underwriters they contract with for security offerings is likely to be more important than the underwriting fees they incur. What's more, the authors' finding that the most reputable underwriters are less likely to lose high‐quality clients and have more stable market share—and that the higher‐quality issuers they attract end up raising larger amounts of capital over their lives as public companies—suggests that underwriters' investments in building and preserving their reputations have a large expected payoff.     

Underwriter reputation and underpricing: evidence from the Australian IPO market

Dimovski and Brooks (J Intern Financ Mark Inst Money 14:267–280, 2004b) examined 358 Australian industrial and mining company initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1994 to 1999 to report that more money was left on the table by IPOs that engaged underwriters than those that did not engage underwriters. Loughran and Ritter (Autumn 5–37, 2004) suggested that the negative relation between underwriter reputation and underpricing has reversed in the 1990s with U.S. IPOs. The main purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing in terms of Australian IPO data. In this paper, we use 380 Australian industrial company IPOs from 1994 to 2004 to perform the empirical study. Our results suggest that more prestigious underwriters are associated with a higher level of underpricing. Other variables that are found to be significant in explaining the level of IPO underpricing are market sentiment, share options, total capital raised and underwriter options.     

Underwriter Compensation Structure: Can It Really Bond Underwriters?

Underwriter compensation can be structured as all cash or a combination of cash and warrants. Using a sample of small initial public offerings (IPOs), we find that underwriter compensation contracts that include warrants in exchange for cash can serve as certification for IPO firms by substituting for reputation capital. When underwriters accept warrants when they could have received more cash compensation, the IPOs avoid the well documented long‐run underperformance. However, when underwriters receive warrants after maximizing cash compensation, the IPO experiences higher underpricing and poorer long‐run performance. The findings are consistent with a motivation by the underwriters to circumvent regulatory constraints.     

Heterogeneous Beliefs,IPO Valuation,and the Economic Role of the Underwriter in IPOs

We empirically analyze the economic role of the underwriter in initial public offerings (IPOs), distinguishing between the “certification” and “market power” hypotheses. We find that equity in high‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs is priced higher and further away from intrinsic value than that in low‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs. Our results are robust to controlling for the endogenous selection of firms to take public by underwriters. Overall, our results support the market power hypothesis and reject the certification hypothesis, indicating that the role of underwriters is to obtain the highest possible valuation for the IPOs that they back rather than to price the equity close to intrinsic value.     

Underpricing and long-run performance of Chinese IPOs: the role of underwriter reputation

This study examines the impact of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing and long-run performance in the China stock market over the period 2001 to 2006. This sample period is notable for the implementation of a verification and approval system that occurred during it, which provided underwriters more freedom to price IPOs. We develop two alternative proxies to measure underwriter reputation based on either the ratio of the total gross proceeds raised or the number of IPOs managed by each underwriter. We find that underwriter reputation does not affect the level of underpricing, but that the level of long-run underperformance is significantly mitigated when IPOs are managed by more prestigious underwriters.     

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Information Asymmetry is usually assumed in most explanations of the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). In Baron's (1982) model, the underwriter is better informed than the issuing firm concerning the demand for the IPO. The greater uncertainty associated with the demand will lead to a greater underpricing due to the enhanced value of the underwriter's expertise. In the case that the issuer is also an informed investment banker, Baron's hypothesis predicts no underpricing. Our results based on Canadian investment bankers do not support Baron's hypothesis.     

Underwriter Quality and Long‐Run IPO Performance

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long‐run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.     

IPO市场承销商声誉机制的形成机理及实证检验

本文认为，考虑到中国IP0市场的特殊背景，承销商声誉的形成高度依赖于证券监管力量。本文实证结果显示，中国IPO市场承销商声誉的阶段性积累虽已初具雏形，但并没有形成明朗的分化，承销商声誉机制在一定程度上仍处于缺位状态。制度的市场化改革取向和外部约束力量的增强，是中国承销商声誉阶段演进的动力。同时，IPO市场上监管制度的缺陷以及由此导致的监管效率低下、市场约束机制弱化，是阻碍承销商声誉阶段性推进的主要原因。     

Earnings management in IPOs: Post-engagement third-party mitigation or issuer signaling?

Initial public offering (IPO) firms typically hire auditors, underwriters, and attorneys to assist in the IPO process. Many firms that take the IPO route are also backed by venture capitalists. In the extant literature, these four specialists (auditors, underwriters, attorneys, and venture capitalists) are termed third-party certifiers. In this study, we examine 3900 IPOs from 1985 to 2005 and document a significant negative and robust correlation between IPO firm earnings management and the presence of prestigious third-party certifiers. Next, we test if this correlation is driven by (1) IPO firms attempting to signal firm quality or (2) third-party certifiers mitigating earnings management in the issuing firm. Using a two-stage multivariate model, we find empirical support for the signaling hypothesis — IPO firms self-select prestigious certifiers for IPOs. We do not find support for post-engagement mitigation hypothesis — after engagement, third-party certifiers do not significantly impact earnings management in IPOs.     

Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks

We find that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. Among the various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, the Carter–Manaster measure is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the context of the three-year performance of IPOs. The study also provides an updated list of the Carter–Manaster measure for various underwriters.     

Universal Banking, Asset Management, and Stock Underwriting

This paper examines institutions that underwrite IPOs and have asset management divisions from 1993 through 1998. We provide evidence that these firms use asset management funds as vehicles to help them earn more equity underwriting business. We also show that asset managers affiliated with IPO underwriters use their superior information about their own institution's IPOs to earn annualised market adjusted returns 7.6% above asset managers of firms who did not underwrite the IPO. Superior future returns by asset managers who trade affiliated IPOs are dependent on the information environment for the IPO and the underwriter reputation rank.     

On investment banker monitoring in the new issues market

This article primarily addresses two largely unanswered questions in the financial economics literature: (i) is there a demand for lead bank monitoring in the initial public offering (IPO) market?, and (ii) does monitoring by the lead investment banker lead to better post-issue performance? We find evidence consistent with the demand for underwriter monitoring in the IPO market. We examine variables which proxy for the incentives of lead underwriters to supply monitoring post-issue. These variables include lead investment bank reputation and whether warrants are issued to the underwriter by the issuing firm. We find that lead bank reputation is positively associated with the post-issue performance of IPO firms. We also examine whether additional value added monitoring is provided by unaffiliated analysts. The number of unaffiliated analysts following is positively correlated with post-issue performance. Our results are consistent with third party monitoring in the new issues market.     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.     

Why do firms switch underwriters?

In the mid-1990s, 30% of firms completing an SEO within three years of their IPO switched lead underwriter. This article provides evidence on why they switched. Contrary to predictions of prior research, there is little evidence that firms switch due to dissatisfaction with underwriter performance at the time of the IPO. A surprising result is that switchers’ IPOs were significantly less underpriced than non-switchers’ IPOs. However, switchers raised fewer proceeds than expected, compared to the mid-point of the filing range, while non-switchers raised significantly more proceeds. There are two main reasons for switching. Firms graduate to higher reputation underwriters, and they strategically buy additional and influential analyst coverage from the new lead underwriter. Survey results support these conclusions.     

Stabilization and the aftermarket prices of initial public offerings

The paper examines the determinants of stabilization and its impact on the aftermarket prices. We use a unique dataset to relax several assumptions in the stabilization literature. We find that underwriters support IPO prices shortly after listing, particularly in cold markets and when demand is weak. We also show that stabilized IPOs are more common amongst reputable underwriters. This finding suggests that stabilization may be used as a mechanism to protect the underwriter’s reputation. It also implies that reputable underwriters may possess private information and price IPOs closer to their true values (i.e., higher than those indicated by the weak premarket demand). Consistent with the latter view, we show that stabilized IPOs are offered at higher prices and suffer less underpricing than those indicated by the premarket demand, firm characteristics and market-wide conditions. The post-IPO performance results indicate that stabilized IPOs are unlikely to be mispriced as their prices do not exhibit any significant reversal after the initial stabilization period. We conclude that stabilization may be superior to underpricing as it protects investors from purchasing overpriced IPOs, benefits issuers by reducing the total money “left on the table” and enhances the overall profitability of underwriters.     

Securities litigation,withdrawal risk and initial public offerings

I examine the relations between litigation risk, withdrawal risk, and the costs of going public using a sample of withdrawn and completed initial public offerings (IPOs) filed during 1996–2005. Firms with a higher probability of offer withdrawal face higher litigation risk if they complete these offers. Firms with higher litigation risk pay slightly higher gross spreads, but do not underprice their IPOs by a greater amount. Withdrawal probability is strongly and positively associated with underwriter gross spreads, consistent with underwriters charging fees that reflect the probability of not getting paid. When the pre-market demand for an IPO is weak, a higher withdrawal probability raises underpricing on completed deals.