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1.
The Determinants of REIT Cash Holdings 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
William G. HardinIII Michael J. Highfield Matthew D. Hill G. Wayne Kelly 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2009,39(1):39-57
The factors influencing the cash holdings of REITs are examined with the view that the REIT industry should yield new information
regarding the drivers of corporate cash policy due to their unique operating conditions. The availability of REIT line of
credit data also allows us to test the association between cash holdings and line of credit access and use. Data constraints
in prior investigations have left this an unresolved empirical question in the cash holdings literature. The baseline results
show that REIT cash holdings are inversely related to funds from operations, leverage, and internal advisement and are directly
related to the cost of external finance and growth opportunities. Cash holdings are also negatively associated with credit
line access and use. The results imply that REIT managers elect to hold little cash to reduce the agency problems of cash
flow thereby increasing transparency and reducing the future cost of external capital.
相似文献
G. Wayne KellyEmail: |
2.
Corporate voluntary disclosure and the separation of cash flow rights from control rights 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Kin-Wai Lee 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2007,28(4):393-416
We find that corporate voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with the separation of cash flow rights from control
rights. This result is consistent with the notion that as the separation of cash flow rights from control rights increases,
controlling owners have larger incentives to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders and low corporate disclosure
constitutes a mechanism to facilitate controlling owners in masking their private benefits of control. The negative association
between voluntary disclosure and the separation of cash flow rights from control rights is less pronounced for firms with
greater external financing needs. This result suggests that for firms with high separation of cash flow rights from control
rights, those with greater external financing needs undertake higher firm-level voluntary disclosure to reduce information
asymmetry. We also find that the negative association between voluntary disclosure and the separation of cash flow rights
from control rights is less pronounced for firms that have a large non-management shareholder. Our result supports the role
of large non-management shareholder in mitigating agency problems associated with the separation of ownership and control.
相似文献
Kin-Wai LeeEmail: |
3.
This study investigates whether the association between ownership structure and leverage varies with the magnitude of growth
opportunities. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, managers receive utility from increasing firm size and the over-investment
problem is more severe for firms with fewer growth opportunities. Considering the disciplinary role of leverage on the over-investment
problem and ownership structure as a control mechanism to affect financing decisions, we hypothesize that the association
between ownership structure and leverage is stronger for firms with fewer growth opportunities. We find that the association
between equity ownership and leverage is significant for low-growth firms, but not for high-growth firms. The results mostly
hold when sample firms are partitioned into large and small firms to directly control for the effect of firm size on the association
between ownership structure and leverage.
相似文献
Kishore TandonEmail: |
4.
Mine Ertugrul Özcan Sezer C. F. Sirmans 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2008,36(1):53-80
This paper studies the determinants of corporate hedging practices in the REIT industry between 1999 and 2001. We find a positive
significant relation between hedging and financial leverage, indicating the financial distress costs motive for using derivatives
in the REIT industry. Using estimates of the Black–Scholes sensitivity of CEO’s stock option portfolios to stock return volatility
and the sensitivity of CEO’s stock and stock option portfolios to stock price, we find evidence to support managerial risk
aversion motive for corporate hedging in the REIT industry. Our results indicate that CEO’s cash compensation and the CEO’s
wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility are significant determinants of derivative use in REITs. We also document a
significant positive relation between institutional ownership and hedging activity. Further, we find that probability of hedging
is related to economies of scale in hedging costs.
相似文献
C. F. SirmansEmail: |
5.
We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO’s compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we further find that CEO compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus stock-based) compensation. We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in CEO annual wealth which includes expected changes in the value of the CEO’s equity holdings in addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more influence on governance negotiating different contracts.
相似文献
Fernando PenalvaEmail: Phone: +34-93-2534200 |
6.
Concentration of Banking Relationships in Switzerland: The Result of Firm Structure or Banking Market Structure? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Doris Neuberger Maurice Pedergnana Solvig Räthke-Döppner 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2008,33(2):101-126
Switzerland is one of the countries with the highest concentration of bank–customer relationships. The present paper seeks
to find out whether this can be explained by the structure of Swiss firms or by the organization of the Swiss banking market.
Using survey data from small and medium-sized enterprises in 1996 and 2002, we examine the influence of firm-, loan-, and
bank-specific variables on the number of banking relationships. We find that firm and industry structure have the largest
explanatory power, while banking market structure and conduct play a minor role. Relationship lending by state-owned cantonal
banks and small regional banks tends to enhance the concentration of banking relationships.
相似文献
Doris NeubergerEmail: |
7.
John J. Maher Robert M. Brown Raman Kumar 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2008,31(2):167-189
We examine the valuation effects of overall demand for corporate equities combined with the influence of abnormal earnings
and unexpected funds flow. Our results indicate that the expected and unexpected net new total flow of funds into all stock
mutual funds do not by themselves have a meaningful effect on firm equity valuation. However, we find the combination of unexpected
funds flow and realized abnormal earnings have significant and important valuation effects. Importantly, the valuation impact
is greatest for those firms with high earnings growth potential that also operate in an environment characterized by high
information asymmetry.
相似文献
Raman KumarEmail: |
8.
Louis T. W. Cheng Hung-Gay Fung Tak Yan Leung 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2007,28(1):23-54
The literature has suggested that earnings and earnings forecasts provide stronger signals than dividends about future performance
of a firm. We test the information effects of simultaneous announcement of earnings and dividends in the Hong Kong market,
distinguished by three interesting features (concentrated family-shareholdings, low corporate transparency, and no tax on
dividends). Our results show significant share price reactions to unexpected earnings and dividend changes, but dividends
appear to play a dominant role over earnings in pricing, a result contrary to findings in the literature. The signaling hypothesis
works primarily for firms with earning increases, while the maturity hypothesis works mainly for firms with earnings declines.
相似文献
Tak Yan LeungEmail: |
9.
Hemang Desai Srinivasan Krishnamurthy Kumar Venkataraman 《Review of Accounting Studies》2006,11(1):71-90
We study the behavior of short sellers around earnings restatements. We find that short sellers accumulate positions in restating
firms several months in advance of the restatement and subsequently unwind these positions after the drop in share price induced
by the restatement. The increase in short interest is larger for firms with high levels of accruals prior to restatement.
We document that heavily shorted firms experience poor subsequent performance and a higher rate of delisting. Overall, these
results suggest that the motive for short selling is, at least in part, related to suspect financial reporting and that short
sellers pay attention to information being conveyed by accruals.
相似文献
Hemang DesaiEmail: Phone: +1-214-768-3185 |
10.
Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Christina E. Bannier 《Financial Markets and Portfolio Management》2007,21(4):445-470
Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length bank lending. We show that
such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of inefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly
relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing. Yet, in order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk,
the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt must not become too large. For firms with intermediate expected profits,
the probability of inefficient credit-renegotiation is shown to decrease along with the relationship bank’s information precision.
For firms with extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.
相似文献
Christina E. BannierEmail: |