Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?

Governments the world over offer significant inducements toattract investment, motivated by the expectation of spilloverbenefits to augment the primary benefits of a boost to nationalincome from new investment. There are several possible sourcesof induced spillovers from foreign direct investment. This articleevaluates the empirical evidence on productivity, wage, andexport spillovers in developing, developed, and transition economies.Although theory can identify a range of possible spillover channels,robust empirical support for positive spillovers is at bestmixed. The article explores the reasons and concludes with areview of policy aspects.      

The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in Closed and Small Open Economies

The efficiency cost of taxation has become an increasingly important consideration in the evaluation of alternative tax policy options. This paper provides a review of estimates of the efficiency costs of taxation and presents some new estimates for small open economies. The available studies suggest that, in closed economies, the distortions from taxation are highest for corporate taxes and lowest for wage taxes. This efficiency ranking of different taxes does not hold in small open economies. It is shown that, in a small open economy, this ranking is reversed. Personal income taxes are less distortionary than wage taxes primarily because the link between domestic saving and investment is severed. Corporate taxes are also less distortionary for a variety of factors, such as changes in depreciation levels, payments to foreigners and terms of trade.     

Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality since 1980

One of the most contentious issues of globalization is the effectof global economic integration on inequality and poverty. Thisarticle documents five trends in the modern era of globalization,starting around 1980. The first trend is that growth rates inpoor economies have accelerated and are higher than growth ratesin rich countries for the first time in modern history. Developingcountries’ per capita incomes grew more than 3.5 percenta year in the 1990s. Second, the number of extremely poor peoplein the world has declined significantly—by 375 millionpeople since 1981—for the time in history. The share ofpeople in developing economies living on less than $1 a dayhas been cut in half since 1981, though the decline in the shareliving on less than $2 per day was much less dramatic. Third,global inequality has declined modestly, reversing a 200-yeartrend toward higher inequality. Fourth, within-country inequalityin general is not growing, though it has risen in several populouscountries (China, India, the United States). Fifth, wage inequalityis rising worldwide. This may seem to contradict the fourthtrend, but it does not because there is no simple link betweenwage inequality and household income inequality. Furthermore,the trends toward faster growth and poverty reduction are strongestin developing economies that have integrated with the globaleconomy most rapidly, which supports the view that integrationhas been a positive force for improving the lives of peoplein developing areas.      

STABILIZATION POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The article focuses on the design of stabilization measuresto correct excessive balance of payments deficits and moderatethe rate of inflation. It distinguishes three sources of balanceof payments difficulties—excessively expansionary aggregatedemand policies; domestic supply shocks stemming, for example,from increases in real wages in excess of productivity growth;and external terms of trade shocks. It also analyzes the effectsof devaluations. The second part of the article discusses policiesaimed at reducing the rate of inflation and summarizes the theoreticalliterature on the dynamics and the transitional costs of adjustmentto lower rates of inflation in closed economies. Evidence onthe adjustment costs of disinflationary policies is reviewed,and the discussion is extended to some recent analysis of adjustmentin open economies.      

How Effective Are Second-Generation Road Funds? A Preliminary Appraisal

Underfunded, inefficient road maintenance is a perennial problemin many developing economies. To address it, some countrieshave created "second-generation" road funds that are financedby fuel levies and managed by boards representing the interestsof road users. Macroeconomists often oppose such funds, arguingthat this earmarking of revenue reduces fiscal flexibility.Some argue that such road funds should be seen as an interimstep toward fully commercialized road maintenance or good publicsector governance—and hence subject to sunset provisions.Decisions on whether to retain (or create) such funds shouldthen be based on their effects on resource allocation, operationalefficiency, and rent seeking. Using evidence on new road fundsin Africa, this article finds that they have not underminedfiscal flexibility. Moreover, they have improved the administrationof road funding (in terms of execution capability) and its outputs(in terms of road conditions). So, although criteria for assessingroad funds remain relevant, the funds should not automaticallybe considered temporary mechanisms. But when establishing newfunds, government's continued role in approving spending onroad maintenance should be explicitly recognized.      

GOVERNMENT WAGE POLICY IN AFRICA: Some Findings and Policy Issues

This article documents recent trends in government wage andemployment levels for a number of African countries and challengesthe conventional wisdom that public wages are too high in Africa.Although most countries have significantly adjusted the realwages of government workers over the past decade, considerablevariance in cross-country experience with regard to governmentwage levels, wage structures, and employment growth is evident.On the basis of the observed trends, the article calls for amore microeconomic focus on the relationship between governmentpay and employment policies and on the real consequences ofsuch policies on the government's ability to provide goods andservices.      

LESSONS FROM THE SOUTHERN CONE POLICY REFORMS

This article assesses the design of stabilization and liberalizationprograms in the Abstract Southern Cone countries of Argentina,Chile, and Uruguay. With the exception of Chile, the reformswere not as widespread as some believed. Little trade liberalizationtook place in Argentina and Uruguay, although some of the antiexportbias was reduced by eliminating taxes on traditional exports.In all three countries, labor markets remained fairly highlyregulated, though it was easier to dismiss labor. In general,liberalization was gradual: even Chile's trade liberalizationspanned five years. The article also shows that the collapse of the three economiesin the early 1980s cannot be ascribed mainly to terms of tradeand interest rate shocks. The main causes of failure were poorlydesigned programs and poor implementation. These errors includedrestrictive wage legislation (Chile) or political instabilitycombined with a preoccupation with keeping unemployment as lowas possible (Argentina). Monetary policy to deal with growingfiscal deficits was inconsistent with the accompanying exchangerate policy (Argentina throughout its reform period and Uruguaytoward the end of its reforms). Financial deregulation was notmatched by appropriate supervision of the financial institutions. The article suggests several policy lessons for countries attemptingto resume growth and restore external balance through a combinationof liberalization and stabilization policies. First, it findsevidence that reductions in distortions produced efficiencygains in Chile and Uruguay even though Uruguay's reforms wereshort-lived. Second, the article shows that policy inconsistenciesundermined the credibility of the later stages of reform inall three countries, eventually producing a crisis. Third, itpresents data that call into question the use of exchange rate-basedstabilization, because of the slow convergence of domestic pricesand interest rates to international levels, which in turn canproduce unsustainably large capital movements. Fourth, the articlestresses the need for caution in financial deregulation.      

REFORMING FINANCE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIALIST ECONOMIES

Financial reforms initiated in most transitional socialist economiesdo not yet adequately provide many of the financial servicesassociated with market-oriented financial systems. Such services—mobilizingresources, selecting firms and allocating capital, monitoringfirm managers, and facilitating the management of transactionsand risk—are a necessary condition for economic reformto improve living standards. This article envisages four central strategies to guide reformof the financial sector: • Building an infrastructure based on clear and enforceableproperty rights, modern accounting and auditing standards, reliablepayments systems, sound prudential and enforcement regulations,and professionals trained in finance • Ending the shell game of trying to hide the losses ofstate-owned enterprises, and separating government decisionsto finance "priority" firms from the allocation decisions ofindependent financial institutions • Privatizing some financial institutions early—althoughnot necessarily precipitously—in concert with the privatizationof firms and supervisory capabilities, meanwhile cleaning upbank loans to maximize the chances that firms and banks willsucceed as private entities • Improving the tax system and stressing a prudent interestrate policy to reduce uncertainty, distortions, and excessiverepression of the financial sector.      

SOME LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE

The rapid economic growth of eight East Asian economies, oftencalled the "East Asian miracle, " raises two questions: Whatpolicies and other factors contributed to that growth? And canother developing countries replicate those policies to stimulateequally rapid growth? This article, based on case studies, econometric data, and economictheory, offers a list of the ingredients that contributed tothat success. But it is the combination of these ingredients,many of which involve government interventions acting together,that accounts for East Asia's success.      

THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF BEING A SMALL, REMOTE, ISLAND, LANDLOCKED, OR MINISTATE ECONOMY

Any index of smallness is somewhat arbitrary, but common practicehas been to use population and income criteria. Experience suggeststhat smallness is neither a necessary nor sufficient conditionfor poor development performance. This paper considers the problemsthat small economies are most often alleged to face, includingabsence of economies of scale, vulnerability, remoteness, reducedaccess to capital markets, problems of macroeconomic policydependence, and overstatement of real income. The paper concludesthat many of the alleged problems of small economies are eithernot peculiar to small economies or can be addressed throughsuitable policy measures.      

Why OECD Countries Should Reform Rules of Origin

With preferential trade agreements on the rise worldwide rulesof origin—which are necessary to prevent trade deflection—areattracting increasing attention. At the same time, preferenceerosion for Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) recipientsis increasing resistance to further multilateral negotiations.Drawing on different approaches, this article shows that thecurrent system of rules of origin that is used by the EuropeanUnion and the United States in preferential trade agreements(including the GSP) and that is similar to systems used by otherOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countriesshould be drastically simplified if developed economies reallywant to help developing economies integrate into the world tradingsystem. In addition to diverting resources for administrativetasks, current rules of origin carry significant compliancecosts. More fundamentally, it is becoming increasingly clearthat they are often been designed to force developing economiesto buy inefficient intermediate products from developed economiesto "pay for" preferential access for the final product. Theevidence also suggests that a significant share of the rentsassociated with market access (net of rules of origin compliancecosts) is captured by developed economies. Finally, the restrictivenessof rules of origin is found to be beyond the levels that wouldbe justified to prevent trade deflection, suggesting a captureby special interest groups. The article outlines some alternativepaths to reforms. JEL codes: F13, F15     

WHEN DO HETERODOX STABILIZATION PROGRAMS WORK?: Lessons from Experience

What advantages and disadvantages does the heterodox strategyoffer to stabilization programs in countries with chronic highinflation? Heterodox stabilization programs, in our definition,are those that support orthodox policies— that is, tightfiscal policy and a fixed exchange rate—with the initial,temporary use of incomes policies— that is, price andwage controls. This evaluation, based on several heterodox programs,successful and unsuccessful, from the 1960s and 1980s in LatinAmerican countries and Israel, affords four principal lessons: * The rapid reduction in inflation at the beginning of heterodoxprograms (which usually comes about at small cost) is the easypart; the problem is to maintain price stability over time. * Incomes policies in heterodox stabilization programs are justifiedonly in countries with high chronic inflation, where persistentinflation is more pervasive and problematic. * There is a case for a bigger fiscal adjustment in heterodoxthan in orthodox programs because of the risk that a programwith price controls may be misperceived as a populist devicefor achieving price stability without adjusting. * The failure of a heterodox program is more likely to destabilizeinflation than is the failure of an orthodox program.      

Price-Wage Dynamics and Inflation in Socialist Economies: Empirical Models for Hungary and Poland

This article analyzes the determinants of open inflation intransitional socialist economies, with reference to recent experiencein Hungary and Poland. A simple inflation model is centeredon the transmission process and on the short-run dynamics ofinflation. Further incorporating a number of features specificto socialist economies and working with quarterly data, dynamicprice and wage equations are estimated. The estimated equationsallow satisfactory exploration of the role and weight of foreignprices and domestic factors in propagating inflation. Foreignprices matter, but developments on the cost side are criticalin relating exogenous, policy-driven adjustments to the pricelevel to increases in the rate of inflation. The absence ofconventional market-based, equilibrating mechanisms requiresthat nominal anchors, particularly wage restraints, featureprominently in any stabilization program adopted by reformingsocialist economies.     

MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES

This study indentifies the factors that influence the performanceof state industries.Based on a review of thirteen countries,the authours isolate three qualities in the business and managerialenvironment that distinguish successful public enterprises fromthe others. These are (a) the degree of competition that publicenterprises are exposed to; (b) the degree of financial autonomyand accountability under which public enterprises operater;and (c) the extent and manner in which managerial autonomy andaccountability are ensured. It is impossible, and perhaps misleading,to assess statistically the importance of each of these factors.Where all three exist, however, the performance of public enterprisesis significantly better than in those cases where most or allthese factors are absent.      

Exact Utilities under Alternative Monetary Rules in a Simple Macro Model with Optimizing Agents

We construct an optimizing-agent model of a closed economy which is simple enough that we can use it to make exact utility calculations. There is a stabilization problem because there are one-period nominal contracts for wages, or prices, or both and shocks that are unknown at the time when contracts are signed. We evaluate alternative monetary policy rules using the utility function of the representative agent. Fully optimal policy can attain the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Fully optimal policy is contrasted with both naive and sophisticated simple rules that involve, respectively, complete stabilization and optimal stabilization of one variable or a combination two variables. With wage contracts, outcomes depend crucially on whether there are also price contracts. For example, if labor supply is relatively inelastic, for productivity shocks, nominal income stabilization yields higher welfare when there are no price contracts. However, with price contracts, outcomes are independent of whether there are wage contracts, except, of course, for the nominal wage.     

A SURVEY OF THE COSTS OF WORLD SUGAR POLICIES

The world sugar market has long been characterized by volatileprices and widespread intervention. Controls on domestic prices,demand, and supply have created an inefficient pattern of worldproduction, consumption, and trade. Without government controls,production would shift from the countries with higher cost,subsidized production (especially the European Community, Japan,and the United States) to the countries with lower costs (suchas Australia, Brazil, and Thailand). The resources saved couldthen be directed to other activities. Sugar policies in countries with high costs reduce world sugarprices quite substantially in the long run and increase pricevariability significantly; production controls in countrieswith low costs increase world prices somewhat and also increasetheir variability. What would happen if all interventions ceased? Average worldsugar prices would probably— but not definitely—rise. World prices would definitely vary less, and economicconditions would definitely improve, especially in developingcountries that depend heavily on sugar exports. But the prospectsfor substantial reform of the sugar market are not promising,even though the GATT Uruguay Round continues. This article putsforward some modest proposals for changing the existing interventionsto lessen economic distortions and reduce costs.      

Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services

The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goodsand reduce poverty vary across countries. Even in democracies,politicians often have incentives to divert resources to politicalrents and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at theexpense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfectionsin political markets that are greater in some countries thanin others. This article reviews the theory and evidence on theimpact on political incentives of incomplete information forvoters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and socialpolarization. The analysis has implications for policy and forreforms to improve public goods provision and reduce poverty.      

MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The short-run adjustment problem in developing countries involvesboth the improvement of the current account and the reductionof inflation. In both cases, the usual reason for adjustmentis shown to be the fiscal deficit. The article distinguishesprimary adjustment costs, which are inevitable, from secondarycosts, which result, for example, from failure to devalue orfrom real wage rigidity. The article then analyzes the effectsof expenditure reduction and currency devaluation on varioussectors of the economy. Reducing inflation involves both aninflation tax replacement and a price adjustment problem, and"heterodox" policies designed to deal with the latter are discussed.If the fiscal deficit cannot be reduced, the article argues,improving the current account may be at the cost of increasinginflation and likewise reducing inflation may be at the costof worsening the current account.      

Foreign Bank Entry: Experience, Implications for Developing Economies, and Agenda for Further Research

In recent years foreign banks have expanded their presence significantlyin several developing economies. In Argentina and Chile in LatinAmerica and in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in EasternEurope, foreign-controlled banks now hold more than half oftotal banking assets. In other regions the trend is similar,though foreign bank entry has been slower. Despite the growingnumber of countries embracing foreign bank entry, importantquestions are still being debated: What draws foreign banksto a country? Which banks expand abroad? What do foreign banksdo once they arrive? How do foreign banks' mode of entry andorganizational form affect their behavior? This article summarizescurrent knowledge on these issues. Because the existing literaturefocuses heavily on developed economies, it also puts forth anagenda for further study of the causes and effects of foreignbank entry in developing economies.      

THE RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MACROECONOMIC THEORY

This article reviews recent developments in macroeconomic theoryand considers their relevance for developing countries. Particularemphasis is given to the rational expectations revolution. Thearticle asks whether government policies are systematic andsuggests the need to study the expectations on which governmentsbase their decisions. Also discussed are the neo-Ricardian theorem,the implications of real wage rigidity and of supply side modelswith sectoral income effects, and recent models involving largegroup interaction.