Restricting CEO pay

We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives.     

The CEO pay slice

We investigate the relation between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)—the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the Chief Executive Officer—and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The CPS could reflect the relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extracts rents. We find that, controlling for all standard controls, CPS is negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's q. CPS also has a rich set of relations with firms' behavior and performance. In particular, CPS is correlated with lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, higher odds of the CEO receiving a lucky option grant at the lowest price of the month, lower performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and lower stock market returns accompanying the filing of proxy statements for periods when CPS increases. Taken together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher CPS is associated with agency problems and indicate that CPS can provide a useful tool for studying the performance and behavior of firms.     

The timing of pay

There exists large and persistent variation in not only how, but when employees are paid, a fact unexplained by existing theory. This paper develops a simple model of optimal pay timing for firms. When workers have self-control problems, they under-save and experience volatile consumption between paychecks. Thus, pay whose delivery matches the timing of workers' consumption needs will reduce wage costs. The model also explains why pay timing should be regulated (as it is in practice): although the worker benefits from a timing profile that smoothes her consumption, her lack of self-control induces her to attempt to undo the arrangement, either by renegotiating with her employer or by taking out payday loans. Regulation of pay timing and consumer borrowing is required to counter these efforts, helping the worker help herself.     

Nonprofit executive incentive pay

We utilize information only recently disclosed on Form 990 to examine the use, and consequences of, incentive pay at nonprofit organizations. Bonuses are common in nonprofits, as we observe that approximately 45% of the 44,000 organization-year observations in our sample reported paying CEO bonuses. We find that the bonuses are positively associated with profitability, competition from other nonprofits, firm size, available cash, and use of compensation consultants and committees, while negatively related to board oversight, donations, and grants. Our results also suggest that donors look unfavorably at the payment of bonuses; that is, bonuses are associated with lower future donations. Nonetheless, we find evidence consistent with the payment of bonuses incentivizing nonprofit executives, as despite reduced fundraising, future profitability and program services are positively associated with current bonus compensation.     

Does accounting conservatism pay?

We investigate whether or not there is a link between conservative accounting practices and the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance. Using several accrual‐based measures of accounting conservatism as well as alternative measures of accounting performance, we estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation that incorporates the interaction of accounting conservatism and accounting performance. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. These results support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism, by limiting earnings management opportunities and improving the reliability of accounting performance measures, allows firms to formulate contracts that tie executive compensation more closely to accounting performance.     

Compensation consultants and CEO pay

The study examines the practice of employing multiple compensation consultants. Examining data of a sample of UK companies over the period 2003–2006 we find that CEOs receive higher equity-based pay when firms employ more than one compensation consultant. An increase in the number of compensation consultants is also associated with an increase in CEO equity-based pay, whereas no decline in CEO pay takes place when firms reduce the number of pay consultants. We also observe that the market shares of compensation consultant are positively related to CEO equity-based pay.     

Board affiliation and pay gap

This paper examines the effects of board affiliation on the corporate pay gap.Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2011, we find that boards with a greater presence of directors appointed by block shareholders have lower pay gaps. Furthermore, the governance effects of board affiliation with and without pay are distinguished. The empirical results show that board affiliation without pay is negatively related to the pay gap, while board affiliation with pay is positively related to the pay gap. Overall, the results shed light on how block shareholders affect their companies' pay gaps through board affiliation.     

Six dangerous myths about pay

Every day, executives make decisions about pay, and they do so in a landscape that's shifting. As more and more companies base less of their compensation on straight salary and look to other financial options, managers are bombarded with advice about the best approaches to take. Unfortunately, much of that advice is wrong. Indeed, much of the conventional wisdom and public discussion about pay today is misleading, incorrect, or both. The result is that business people are adopting wrongheaded notions about how to pay people and why. In particular, they are subscribing to six dangerous myths about pay. Myth #1: labor rates are the same as labor costs. Myth #2: cutting labor rates will lower labor costs. Myth #3: labor costs represent a large portion of a company's total costs. Myth #4: keeping labor costs low creates a potent and sustainable competitive edge. Myth #5: individual incentive pay improves performance. Myth #6: people work primarily for the money. The author explains why these myths are so pervasive, shows where they go wrong, and suggests how leaders might think more productively about compensation. With increasing frequency, the author says, he sees managers harming their organizations by buying into--and acting on--these myths. Those that do, he warns, are probably doomed to endless tinkering with pay that at the end of the day will accomplish little but cost a lot.     

A simpler way to pay

There have been many changes in professional services since Egon Zehnder founded his executive search firm nearly four decades ago--not the least of which has been a shift in the way professionals pay themselves. When he started, compensation everywhere was strongly tied to seniority. Today, partners at most professional services firms are paid according to the size of their client billings and their ability to bring in new clients. But Egon Zehnder International, which now has 57 offices worldwide, has stuck with the old-fashioned way to pay. In addition to giving partners base salaries and equal shares in a percentage of the profit, the firm apportions another fraction of the profit based only on length of tenure as partner. Yet the firm attracts outstanding consultants, and its turnover rate is low. The reasons, the author says, are simple: the firm's approach to compensation forces it to hire team players--consultants who get more pleasure from the group's success than from their own advancement. And the seniority-based system requires the firm to find people who want to stay for the long haul. Call the system a relic, says Zehnder, but don't call it nonsense. It works. In this article, the author describes the extremely intensive interview process used to hire the right kind of people. By the time the interviews are over, he says, potential hires know that people in the firm's Boston office think and act the same way as people in its Brazil offices--and that they themselves must think and act that way if they are to succeed at the firm.     

国际投资者最关注中国什么?

是否应该看好中国市场的发展 欧美投资者共同的一点就是对中国的经济非常看好,而且对中国的股市非常看好,我想在来年或者是在中期,有很多国际基金会把他们的财产、基金投到中国或亚洲.     

Asymmetric benchmarking of pay in firms

This paper examines whether asymmetric benchmarking of pay exists for vice presidents (VPs). Using ExecuComp data for 1992–2007, we find that companies reward VPs for good luck but do not penalize them for bad luck. However, asymmetric benchmarking of VP pay is mitigated by governance, CEO power, gender, and industry factors. The presence of asymmetric benchmarking of pay could suggest that managers are involved in skimming, or it could mean that firms insulate managers from poor firm performance to prevent them from accessing outside opportunities. We find that unlike CEOs, asymmetric benchmarking of pay for VPs is not consistent with the skimming hypothesis.     

Confucian culture and the external pay gap

We examine the impact of Confucian philosophy on external pay gaps, and find that a Confucianist atmosphere is negatively associated with firms’ external pay gaps for both executives and employees. Mechanistically, the Confucian concept of “righteousness” reduces the self-interested motivation of management, in turn reducing executives’ external pay gap; “humaneness” causes management to focus on protecting employees’ rights and interests, benefiting employees’ compensation; and “honesty” improves information disclosure, reducing the external compensation gap for both executives and general employees. The inhibitory effect of Confucian culture on the external pay gap is greater in regions with weak formal institutions and non-state-owned firms, while foreign cultural shocks attenuate the Confucian influence. Finally, the Confucian culture-driven reduction of the external pay gap improves enterprises’ economic efficiency.     

The case of the unpopular pay plan

Three years after launching the team-based Quality For All program, Top Chemical Company CEO Sam Verde was searching for a team-based compensation system that would reflect his company's new philosophy. With a committee gathered to discuss the issue, Verde confronts the fact that changing pay plans is an issue few people can agree on. "Very simply," explains vice president for compensation Gilbert Porterfield, "the plan is designed to give employees working on teams real incentives for constant improvement and overall excellence. The variable aspect of the system pays employees for the performance of their group." This doesn't sit well with the others. "It's going to punish teams like mine for the failings of others instead of rewarding us for the work we do and have already done," says packaging team representative Ruth Gibson. Another committee member feels that team-based anything is a "motivational happy land that doesn't square with how people really work." While Verde likes the proposed pay plan, he has doubts over whether his employees will accept the risk. Upper management has no problem basing 60% of its pay on TopChem's performance. But getting line employees to risk part of their salaries--even as little as 4%--on the ups and downs of the chemical industry may be more trouble than it's worth. Four experts on compensation reveal where Top Chemical went wrong in its plan and how Sam Verde might bring about change successfully.     

Educational predictors of professional pay and performance

This paper reports the results of a study which examined the relationship between several educational indices, and the pay and performance of professional accountants. The findings indicated that there was little relationship between educational background and subsequent on-the-job performance. With respect to pay, the results indicated that, at the entry level, salary was primarily a function of the level of educational attainment and the quality of the institution attended. No relationship was found between academic performance and public accounting compensation.