Life insurance demand and borrowing constraints

The literature devoted limited attention to exploring the relationship between financial development and life insurance demand. Financial development supports life insurance supply by providing confidence in the financial system, more efficient payment systems, and higher availability of financial instruments. However, financial development reduces households' needs to save by relaxing borrowing constraints, indirectly affecting life insurance demand. We contribute by providing a demand‐driven explanation of the negative consequences of financial development on life insurance development. We find that more credit‐constrained countries have higher life insurance penetration on average. Indirectly, the role of borrowing constraints signifies the importance of life insurance policies as a financing tool in case of the realization of various background risks. This study integrates the knowledge from life insurance theory, life insurance lapse, policy loans demand, and saving under liquidity constraints literature and produces implications for researchers, policymakers, and life insurers.     

The Price Elasticity of Demand for Whole Life Insurance

In this study a real price index is created for whole life insurance sold in the United States from 1953 to 1979. New purchases of whole life insurance are shown to be negatively related to changes in this cost index, contrary to what has been widely accepted in the insurance literature, but consistent with economic theory. The existence of strong price elasticity of demand for whole life insurance does not ensure, however, that the insurance industry manifests a high degree of price competition.     

A Gentle Introduction to Risk Aversion and Utility Theory

While the topics of risk aversion and utility theory have been discussed extensively in the academic literature on risk and insurance, this literature does not include a pedagogical discussion that is widely accessible for classroom use. This article provides a practical introduction to risk aversion that is designed for readers with little prerequisite course work in economics or statistics. We describe a simple model of insurance demand that can be applied to the property, liability, life, and health insurance markets. We also demonstrate how risk aversion affects a variety of real-life insurance decisions made under conditions of uncertainty, including how much the market will bear to pay for insurance administrative expenses and how demand varies for different types of auto insurance coverage. Exercises and practice problems are provided so that readers can test their mastery of the concepts presented in the article. An instructional note on using this article to teach risk aversion in the classroom is also provided.     

Guaranteed renewable life insurance under demand uncertainty

Guaranteed renewability (GR) is a prominent feature in many health and life insurance markets. We develop a model that includes unpredictable (and unobservable) fluctuations in demand for life insurance as well as changes in risk type (observable) over individuals' lifetimes. The presence of demand type heterogeneity leads to the possibility that optimal GR contracts may have a renewal price that is either above or below the actuarially fair price of the lowest risk type in the population. Individuals whose type turns out to be high risk but low demand renew more of their GR insurance than is efficient due to the attractive renewal price. This results in imperfect insurance against reclassification risk. Although a first‐best efficient contract is not possible in the presence of demand type heterogeneity, the presence of GR contracts nonetheless improves welfare relative to an environment with only spot markets.     

Understanding the Shift in Demand for Cash Value Life Insurance

Ownership of cash value life insurance in the United States has fallen in recent decades. Changes in age cohorts, family composition, and tax laws may have contributed to this decline. We identify factors that influence the demand for cash value life insurance and test whether they alone can explain the sharp decline in ownership. Demographic and tax code changes do not explain the decrease in permanent insurance. There is a consistent downward trend in demand from 1992 to 2010—particularly among middle‐age and younger households. The fewer households who own cash value policies are on average wealthier and more financially sophisticated, suggesting that permanent life insurance is increasingly being used as a tax shield rather than as a hedge against a loss in human capital.     

Household Life Cycle Protection: Life Insurance Holdings, Financial Vulnerability, and Portfolio Implications

Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, we examine the life cycle demand for different types of life insurance. Specifically, we test for the consumer's aversion to income volatility resulting from the death of a household's wage‐earner through the purchase of life insurance. We first develop a financial vulnerability index to control for the risk to the household. We then examine the life cycle demand for life insurance using several definitions of life insurance. We find, in contrast to previous research, that there is a relationship between financial vulnerability and the amount of term life or total life insurance purchased. In addition, we find older consumers use less life insurance to protect a certain level of financial vulnerability than younger consumers. Secondly, our study provides evidence that life insurance demand is jointly determined as part of a household's portfolio. Finally, we consider the impact of family members' nonmonetary contribution on the household's life cycle protection decision. Our results provide some evidence that households take into account the value of nonmonetary contribution in their insurance purchase.     

Household Life Insurance Demand

Abstract

What types of households own life insurance? Who owns term life and who owns whole life insurance? These are questions of great interest to insurers that operate in a highly competitive market. To answer these questions, we jointly examine household demand of two types of insurance, term and whole life, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, a probability sample of the U.S. population. We model both the frequency and the severity of demand for insurance, building on the work of Lin and Grace by using explanatory variables that they developed. For the frequency portion, the household decisions about whether to own term and whole life insurance are modeled simultaneously with a bivariate probit regression model. Given ownership of life insurance by a household, the amounts of insurance are analyzed using generalized linear models with a normal copula. The copula permits the bivariate modeling of insurance amounts for households who own both term and whole life insurance, about 20% of our sample. These models allow analysts to predict who owns life insurance and how much they own, an important input to the marketing process.

Moreover, our findings suggest that household demand for term and whole life insurance is jointly determined. After controlling for explanatory variables, there exists a negative relationship for a household’s decision to own both whole and term life insurance (the frequency part) and a positive relationship for the amount of insurance purchased (the severity part). This indicates that the greater the probability of holding one type, the smaller the probability of holding the other type of life insurance. However, higher demand for both types of insurance exists when a household decides to own both. This mixed effect extends prior work that established a negative relationship, suggesting that term life insurance and whole life insurance are substitutes for one another. In contrast, our findings reveal that the ownership decision involves substitution, but, for households owning both types of insurance, amounts are positively related. Therefore, term and whole life insurance are substitutes in the frequency yet complements in the severity.     

The role of life insurance in an emerging economy: Human capital protection,assets allocation and social interaction

In this paper, we provide micro-econometric evidence on the determinants of life insurance demand in China, the largest emerging market in the world. We employ the China Household Income Project (CHIP) dataset for the year 2002 in the analysis. The timing is ideal, because of the nature of the less well developed capital markets and social security systems in China in 2002, which sets a suitable stage to study the insurance demand behavior of emerging markets. The results indicate that both the human capital protection motive and the asset allocation motive are important in explaining the purchase of life insurance in China. In addition, we present three empirical regularities: (1) the positive correlation between the returns to human capital and the returns to market portfolio decrease the demand for life insurance; (2) both the current wealth and future income of a household exert curvilinear impacts on life insurance demand; (3) the breadth of a households social connections has substantial impacts on life insurance demand.     

Long-Term Care Insurance and Life Insurance Demand

This article investigates the interaction between life insurance and long-term care insurance markets on the demand side. In the model utility depends on both consumption and bequest, and utility from consumption is contingent on the state of health. While the demand for life insurance increases both with decreasing income and with a rising degree of altruism, the influences of these two parameters on the demand for long-term care insurance are ambiguous. If the utility shock arising from disability declines, both insurance demands will rise.     

Does Social Capital Reduce Moral Hazard? A Network Model for Non‐Life Insurance Demand*

We study the effect of social capital in an environment in which formal, marketed insurance contracts coexist with informal agreements. We show that in the absence of peer monitoring and social pressure, non‐marketed contracts crowd out formal ones due to moral hazard. We prove, by means of an equilibrium concept typical of the network literature, that social capital can reduce moral hazard in informal agreements. We then show that under certain conditions, social capital increases the demand for marketed insurance contracts. The theoretical model we outline provides us clear guidance to measure social capital in a provincial‐level data set. The empirical model, which is estimated controlling for panel and spatial structure, supports our claim that social capital increases the demand for non‐life insurance.     

Adverse Selection in Term Life Insurance Purchasing due to the BRCA1/2 Genetic Test and Elastic Demand

Consumer groups fear that the use of genetic testing information in insurance underwriting might lead to the creation of an underclass of individuals who cannot obtain insurance; thus, these groups want to ban insurance companies from accessing genetic test results. Insurers contend that such a ban might lead to adverse selection that could threaten their financial solvency. To investigate the potential effect of adverse selection in a term life insurance market, a discrete‐time, discrete‐state, Markov chain is used to track the evolution of twelve closed cohorts of women, differentiated by family history of breast and ovarian cancer and age at issue of a 20‐year annually renewable term life insurance policy. The insurance demand behavior of these women is tracked, incorporating elastic demand for insurance. During the 20‐year period, women may get tested for BRCA1/2 mutations. Each year, the insurer calculates the expected premiums and expected future benefit payouts which determine the following year's premium schedule. At the end of each policy year, women can change their life insurance benefit, influenced by their testing status and premium changes. Adverse selection could result from (i) differentiated benefits following test results; (ii) differentiated lapse rates according to test results; and (iii) differentiated reactions to price increases. It is concluded that with realistic estimates of behavioral parameters, adverse selection could be a manageable problem for insurers.     

Can the Life Insurance Market Provide Evidence for a Bequest Motive?

Using U.K. microeconomic data, we analyze the empirical determinants of participation in the life insurance market. We find that term insurance demand is positively correlated with measures of bequest motives like being married, having children, and/or subjective measures of strong bequest motives. We then show that a life‐cycle model of life insurance demand, saving, and portfolio choice can rationalize quantitatively the data in the presence of a bequest motive. These findings provide evidence supporting the presence of a bequest motive.     

The Demand for Life Insurance in OECD Countries

This article examines the determinants of life insurance consumption in OECD countries. Consistent with previous results, we find a significant positive income elasticity of life insurance demand. Demand also increases with the number of dependents and level of education, and decreases with life expectancy and social security expenditure. The country's level of financial development and its insurance market's degree of competition appear to stimulate life insurance sales, whereas high inflation and real interest rates tend to decrease consumption. Overall, life insurance demand is better explained when the product market and socioeconomic factors are jointly considered. In addition, the use of GMM estimates helps reconcile our findings with previous puzzling results based on inconsistent OLS estimates given heteroscedasticity problems in the data.     

On the Demand for Portfolio Insurance

While insurers manage underwriting risk with various methods including reinsurance, insurers increasingly manage asset risk with options, futures, and other derivatives. Previous research shows that buyers of portfolio insurance pay considerably for downside protection. We add to this literature by providing the first evidence on the cost of portfolio insurance, the payoff to portfolio insurance, and the relative demand for portfolio insurance across VIX levels. We find that the demand for portfolio insurance is relatively high at low levels of VIX, suggesting purchasers demand more downside protection when this protection is cheap on an absolute basis (but expensive on a relative basis). We also provide the first evidence on the hedging behavior of specific investor classes and show that the demand for portfolio insurance is driven by retail investors (individuals) who buy costly insurance from institutional investors. Results are consistent with other types of paradoxical insurance‐buying behavior.     

乐观预期、保障能力与商业保险购买——来自中国家庭的微观证据

本文基于中国家庭微观调查数据,在考虑商业保险“保障”和“投资”双重属性的前提下,实证研究了乐观预期对家庭商业保险购买的影响。结果发现,乐观预期对家庭商业保险购买存在显著的积极影响,即户主乐观预期程度越高,家庭购买商业保险的意愿越强。进一步区分保障型商业保险和投资型商业保险,发现乐观预期对商业保险购买的积极影响主要来自对投资型商业保险的需求,对保障型商业保险购买的影响则不显著。更重要地,不同风险保障能力下乐观预期对商业保险购买存在异质性影响,家庭储蓄较多、社会保障覆盖较好以及社会资本水平较高的家庭,乐观预期对商业保险购买的积极影响更大。本研究不仅有助于从预期视角理解商业保险市场的“有限参与”之谜,也为提升家庭风险保障和财富增值能力提供了借鉴。     

国外寿险领域银行保险的发展及对中国的启示

银行保险是目前国际上盛行的保险销售渠道,尤其是在寿险领域中成效显著。通过分析银行保险在寿险领域中的发展状况,研究了银行保险寿险产品的特征与趋势,以及影响银行保险在寿险领域中发展的相关因素。本文认为,我国保险公司在开展银行保险方面,应首先保证银行保险的低成本优势,同时依据现阶段的政策环境,顺应银行与客户的需求,开发新型的银保寿险产品。     

An Analysis of the Demand for Earthquake Insurance

This research examines the decision to purchase earthquake insurance by analyzing data on earthquake insurance price and penetration in the New Madrid fault zone in Missouri. Earthquake risk is of concern to consumers, the insurance industry, industry regulators, and government agencies because of the potentially catastrophic nature of losses resulting from a major earthquake. Despite the significance of the earthquake peril, the recent literature does not contain estimates of the price and income elasticity of the demand for earthquake insurance. Our analysis indicates that homeowners acquire earthquake insurance because of risk considerations, at higher levels of risk the demand for earthquake insurance is higher, and the price of earthquake coverage does not provide incremental information in explaining the demand for earthquake coverage.     

经济政策不确定性、地区文化与保险需求

本文在拓展背景风险理论研究的基础上,揭示了经济政策不确定性对保险需求的影响及其受地区文化制约的理论机制。并利用2007-2017年中国30个地区的月度面板数据,检验了经济政策不确定性、地区文化与保险需求间的内在联系。结果发现:第一,经济政策不确定性会对保险需求产生显著正影响,且这种效应在地区人身险需求上表现更明显;第二,将地区文化指标集纳入经济政策不确定性与保险需求关系的研究框架,发现地区文化差异会对经济政策不确定性影响保险需求产生调节效应。因此政府需在充分重视经济政策波动和文化对经济活动的双重影响基础上,加强国内社会保障体系建设,建立更透明的信息传递渠道,培育人们主动抵抗风险的意识和文化习惯,调整保险供给结构,以减少不确定性对社会经济行为的负面冲击。     

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Life Insurance

Prior research suggests that neither the choice to own life insurance nor the amount purchased is consistently related to the presence of children in the household. While these perplexing findings are based on a static framework, we alternatively examine life insurance demand in a dynamic framework as a function of changes in household life cycle and financial condition. Our results indicate both a statistically and economically significant relation between life events, such as new parenthood, and the demand for life insurance. We also provide new evidence in support of the emergency fund hypothesis: households in which either spouse has become unemployed are more likely than other households to surrender their whole life insurance.     

Income heterogeneity and index insurance demand

Weather index insurance as a tool to insure the income of agriculturally active households has triggered extensive discussions in the literature. Despite the convincing theoretical argumentation, the demand for these products stays behind expectations. Several studies revealed effects impacting the demand for index insurance, such as liquidity constraints, basis risk, lack of understanding and trust in insurers and products alike. This paper takes a different perspective and hypothesizes that low demand is due to heterogeneous risk exposure towards weather variability among potential insured. The paper tests the impact of income heterogeneity as a measure of risk exposure on insurance demand and finds that risk exposure negatively affects insurance demand. In order to increase demand, it is concluded that product design should emphasize more the importance of income risk composition and exposure of potentially insured.