信息披露组合动机与及时性差异

本文将主要考察年报和一季度季报披露中存在的组合动机对年报和一季度季报披露及时性差异的影响。研究发现：由于一季度季报和上年年报均要求在4月30日之前披露的特殊性,上市公司管理层在信息披露的过程中可能存在组合动机和信息操作。年报和一季度季报的披露时间选择可能关键取决于年报和一季度季报披露的“好消息”或“坏消息”带来的积极影响或消极影响的组合与权衡。     

吉日偏好与上市公司年报披露时间选择

吉日偏好是否会影响上市公司年报披露时间的选择?本文通过实证分析发现,上市公司选择年报披露时间以尾数为8的日期最多,尾数为4的日期最少。年报为坏消息或好消息的上市公司选择在尾数为8的吉日公布年报对该公司五日收益率均有正向作用,好消息的正向作用更明显。本文得出结论:吉日偏好对上市公司年报披露时间选择的短期影响,是一种新的市场异象和日历效应新的表现。     

上市保险公司年度业绩预告的信息效应研究

基于事件研究法,用超额收益率分析我国三家上市保险公司年度业绩预告的信息含量,测度了信息披露的公正性,揭示了业绩预告信息质量的进步性。超额收益率和累积超额收益率的变化轨迹显示,三家保险公司的业绩预告都有信息含量;随着披露次数的增多,业绩预告的信息质量都在逐年提高。“好消息”的披露往往会导致累积超额收益率逆转上升;“坏消息”的披露一般能减缓累积超额收益率的下降速度。信息披露公正性的检验表明,当业绩预告为“好消息”时,一般不存在信息泄露;为“坏消息”时,通常存在不同程度的信息泄露。     

公司业绩组合、信息操作与中报的及时性

上市公司管理层在中报披露和预约披露中可能存在信息操作的动机，同时我国上市公司卷入盈余管理的可能性比较大，以至有时并不完全遵循“早些公布好消息，迟些披露坏消息”的规律。本文证实公司业绩组合和信息操作对中报披露和预约披露的及时性有着显著的影响。本文建议进一步减少上市公司信息操作空间和盈余管理行为，提高上市公司信息披露的及时性。     

数字

股指大涨700点市盈率不升反降随着上市公司年报的陆续披露,两市基于2006年收益水平形成的市盈率呈现出不升反降的局面——自2月底以来,尽管上证综指上涨700余点,深证成指上涨2300余点,但两市加权平均市盈率水平却从40倍多下降到39倍左右。业内人士分析说,按照年报披露的一般规律,后续披露年报的上市公司盈利状况可能低于之前,但估计所有上市公司披露年报后形成的两市静态市盈率仍将保持“略高于”40倍的水平。与此同时,从已披露一季报的上市公司情况来看,业绩增长的局面仍在持续,截至前日公布一季报的67家上市公司,加权平均每股收益为0.1948元,同比增长超过一倍。     

业绩持续增长与基金配置盲点

截止目前为止,06年的年报披露已进入尾声,从已公布的年报看,去年上市公司业绩可谓突飞猛进,每股收益平均增长达到惊人的50%!去年股指的持续大涨,有着坚实的业绩基础,今年一季度业绩增长更为惊人,那么,未来的业绩增长冠军是谁?哪些公司股价增长比不上业绩增长的步伐?机构配置的盲点在哪里?本专题将为您一一剖析。     

上市公司业绩增长的黄金岁月

截止目前为止,06年的年报披露已进入尾声,从已公布的年报看,去年上市公司业绩可谓突飞猛进,每股收益平均增长达到惊人的50%!去年股指的持续大涨,有着坚实的业绩基础,今年一季度业绩增长更为惊人,那么,未来的业绩增长冠军是谁?哪些公司股价增长比不上业绩增长的步伐?机构配置的盲点在哪里?本专题将为您一一剖析。     

寻找未来的业绩增长冠军

截止目前为止,06年的年报披露已进入尾声,从已公布的年报看,去年上市公司业绩可谓突飞猛进,每股收益平均增长达到惊人的50%!去年股指的持续大涨,有着坚实的业绩基础,今年一季度业绩增长更为惊人,那么,未来的业绩增长冠军是谁?哪些公司股价增长比不上业绩增长的步伐?机构配置的盲点在哪里?本专题将为您一一剖析。     

中小板:业绩跃升引领潮头

四月份进入上市公司年报和季报集中公布期,市场再现“涨也业绩,跌也业绩”景况。从年报的角度看,去年行情向好刺激了上市公司分红积极性,分红类上市公司占比创下历史新高,牛市行情中分红送股的抢权填权行情向来比较热闹,今年亦不例外。而从季报行情来看,06上市公司业绩普遍大幅增长,在新的会计准则下,今年一季度将成为部分上市公司业绩拐点,钢铁等板块已提前预演季报行情。围绕业绩,中小板、蓝筹股及高送转题材股争奇斗艳,将业绩浪推向了新的高潮……     

会计信息披露时机与内幕交易——基于年报首季报披露时差与异常超额交易量的实证研究

考虑到资金成本、市场的系统性风险和被监管的可能性,内幕交易者最可能利用两个相隔时间很短的定期报告进行内幕交易。因为这种交易模式最隐蔽,最安全。同时,因承担了高成本和高风险,内幕交易需要巨额的交易量才能获得超额收益。本文正是利用内幕交易的这些特征,找到了极好的研究样本（年报亏损下年首季报盈利且年报首季报先后公布的样本）和控制样本（年报亏损下年首季报盈利但年报首季报同时披露的样本或者年报亏损下年首季报仍然亏损且年报首季报先后公布的样本）,通过异常的超额交易量验证了内幕交易的存在。本文研究表明,在信息披露监管政策中,不仅要考虑信息披露的及时性和充分性,还应考虑信息披露过程是否为内幕交易提供了可乘之机。     

中国上市公司年度报告披露及时性实证研究

年度报告作为投资者决策的重要信息源之一,其及时性受到了监管部门和市场研究者的关注。本文通过对中国上市公司1993～2003年间公布的8294份年度报告披露时间进行多元回归分析,发现除盈利公司比亏损公司更及时地公布其年度报告外,标准无保留审计意见公司也较非标准无保留意见的公司更及时地披露其年度报告,证实了中国股票市场存在“好消息早,坏消息晚”披露的基本规律。而且,随着时间推移,我国上市公司年报披露的及时性在逐步提高。     

Voluntary Disclosures,Corporate Control,and Investment

We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns.     

Voluntary Disclosure of Good and Bad Earnings News in a Low Litigation Setting*

This study uses a historical setting in which expected litigation costs were low (i.e., Australia, from 1993 to 1996) to investigate whether companies with good news were more likely to preempt annual earnings than their counterparts with bad news. Empirical tests compare the probability of preemption conditional on having good news with the probability of preemption conditional on having bad news. The models control for other potential determinants of disclosure policy that have been documented in the literature. The results do not support the research hypothesis that companies with good news were more likely to preempt annual earnings than companies with bad news. This finding suggests that there may be other factors driving disclosure of bad news, in addition to those acknowledged in the extant literature. The evidence also indicates that in Australia during the investigation period, the probability of preemption was positively associated with firm size and analyst following and differed as a function of industry membership.     

媒体记者与公司管理层沟通提高了新闻报道质量吗?——基于公司调研活动的实证研究

本文以2007-2019年媒体记者参与的上市公司调研活动作为研究对象,实证检验了媒体记者与公司管理层直接沟通对媒体报道质量的影响。实证结果表明,调研媒体的报道语气整体更加乐观,集中体现在公司公布坏消息的情形之下。此外,仅当公司公布好消息时调研媒体的报道信息含量更高,而当公司公布坏消息时调研媒体的报道信息含量与非调研媒体没有显著差别。以上结果表明,媒体记者同管理层沟通后信息的阐述方式视调研所获取信息的性质而有所不同。进一步研究发现,分析师、机构投资者或者记者同行的共同参与,以及良好的公司信息环境能够帮助调研媒体改善新闻报道质量。参与公司调研是媒体维持和拓展经济业务的重要途径。在使用处理效应模型纠正变量自选择偏差及一系列其他稳健性检验之后,研究结论仍然成立。本文为媒体记者和上市公司管理层直接沟通所带来的经济后果提供了经验证据。     

INTERIM EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND THE FOURTH QUARTER GOOD NEWS EFFECT

This paper presents evidence of a larger return reaction (variance) to fourth quarter announcements that induce contemporaneously positive returns. The results are consistent with: (i) audited annual announcements being marginally more informative for reports that corroborate previously unaudited interim good news claims, and (ii) the level of marginal informativeness being a decreasing function of interim auditor involvement (proxied by firm size). The good news effect is robust over time, and sensitivity analyses fail to support competing explanations for the effect attributable to report timing differences or comparatively noisy fourth quarter bad news reports.     

Short Selling Pressure,Stock Price Behavior,and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price sensitivity to bad news by reducing the precision of bad news forecasts. This finding on management forecasts appears to be generalizable to other corporate disclosures. In particular, we find that, in response to increased short selling pressure, managers also reduce the readability (or increase the fuzziness) of bad news annual reports. Overall, our results suggest that maintaining the current level of stock prices is an important consideration in managers’ strategic disclosure decisions.     

An Experimental Market's Investigation of Discretionary Financial Disclosure

The extent to which market forces can induce full financial disclosure by managers has long been an issue of interest to regulators. Investigating this phenomenon with naturally occurring data produces a major obstacle: since managers' private information sets are unknown, it is necessary to make assumptions about them in order to interpret the nature (e.g., favourable or unfavourable, income increasing or income decreasing) of the information that is disclosed. The validity of the inferences relies critically on the validity of these assumptions. The present study uses a laboratory experiment to test three hypotheses derived from prior analytical and empirical research: (H1) When disclosure costs are zero, managers voluntarily disclose all (good and bad) news; (H2) When disclosure costs are positive. managers only disclose news which exceeds some threshold: and (H3) The mandatory disclosure of non-proprietary information induces an increase in the disclosure of correlated. proprietary information. One hundred and fifty-six subjects participated in markets with one firm manager and three investors. Over thirteen independent periods, the managers decided whether to truthfully disclose the liquidation value of the asset under their stewardship, and the investors submitted competing bids for the asset. With costless disclosure. investors price-protected themselves when managers withheld information, but the price penalty that they imposed was insufficient to induce full disclosure. With positive disclosure cost, investors reduced the price penalty that they imposed for non-disclosure, and managers disclosed proportionally fewer of the less extreme good news. Finally, mandatory disclosure of information had no significant impact on the voluntary disclosure of correlated proprietary information. Discussion centres on our failure to support the (equilibrium) prediction from analytical research that full disclosure should obtain when disclosures are costless. Several limitations of the study are examined. and it remains an open question whether additional trials (periods) in the present study might have provided full disclosure.     

Corporate governance and the informativeness of disclosures in Australia: a re‐examination

We re‐examine the association between corporate governance and disclosures reported by Beekes and Brown (2006), using an extended time series of Australian data. Since the ASX corporate governance guidelines were introduced in 2003, firms generally have increased their disclosure frequency and demonstrated an improvement in the timeliness of bad news relative to good news, indicating a levelling of disclosure practices and greater transparency. Better governed firms have become more cautious in their disclosure practices. However, they continue to be more balanced with respect to good and bad news timeliness. Changes to disclosure laws have also influenced company practices.     

Voluntary Disclosure,Manipulation, and Real Effects

We study a model in which managers’ disclosure and investment decisions are both endogenous and managers can manipulate their voluntary reports through (suboptimal) investment, financing, or operating decisions. Managers are privately informed about the value of their firm and have incentives to voluntarily disclose information and manipulate their reports in order to obtain more favorable terms when issuing equity to finance a new profitable investment opportunity. The model shows that treating managers’ disclosure and investment decisions both as endogenous and allowing managers to manipulate their voluntary reports yields qualitatively different predictions from when the disclosure and investment decisions are considered separately and managers cannot engage in manipulation. The model predicts that managers’ disclosure strategy is sometimes characterized by two distinct nondisclosure intervals (contrary to traditional threshold equilibria of voluntary disclosure models) and that managers with intermediate news sometimes forego the new profitable investment opportunity. As such, the paper highlights the importance of considering the interdependencies between firms’ disclosure and investment decisions and provides new empirical predictions.     

Determinants of Financial Ratio Disclosure Patterns of Australian Listed Extractive Companies

We investigate the disclosure patterns of Financial Ratios (FRDs) within the annual reports of 111 Australian listed resource companies over the period 2002 to 2006. Disclosure of financial ratio information increased over this period with a significant increase in disclosures recorded in the first full‐year annual report prepared following adoption of IFRS. The results of logistic regression analysis demonstrate that income tax and firm size are factors that are significantly associated with financial ratio disclosures. This study contributes to an understanding of the extent, trends and rationale behind resource firms’ financial ratio disclosure practices in Australia.