基于Copula-Jump-GARCH的资产组合风险分析

本文结合Jump-GARCH模型和t-Copula函数,建立Copula-Jump-GARCH模型,对银行面临的资产组合情况进行分析,并给出了风险最小的资产组合形式。     

后金融危机时代货币政策对资产价格的影响研究——基于中国数据的脉冲响应分析

本文利用金融危机爆发以来的货币供应量和房产价格指数、上证A股指数等变量,通过向量自回归模型的脉冲响应函数建立了资产价格对货币政策冲击的反应模型,用实证分析的方法分析了货币政策工具变量的冲击导致的资产价格变动的特点.总结了后金融危机时代货币政策对资产价格和大众投资行为影响的规律,为今后及时准确地调整我国的货币政策,实现我国资产价格稳定和金融市场平稳较快增长提出参考性的政策建议.     

商业银行授信资产组合管理研究

本文在介绍资产组合管理理论、工具和模型的基础上,针对目前中国银行业风险管理的现状,选取了样本银行的历史数据作为检验样本,采用CreditRisk 模型和RAPM模型分别对银行零售信贷资产和公司信贷资产进行实证分析。主要结论为:(1)CreditRisk 模型可以应用于估计中国银行业零售信贷资产组合的损失分布并确定相应的经济资本;(2)RAPM模型对银行公司信贷资产在行业和客户规模的组合优化方面提供了量化分析工具;(3)对中国银行业采用现代风险管理理念、技术、手段来提升授信资产组合的管理水平提供了可供参考的发展路径。     

资产泡沫与最优货币政策

本文在一个包含价格与工资双重黏性的动态新凯恩斯框架中引入内生资产泡沫和劳动力市场摩擦。本文研究发现，资产泡沫能够通过金融成本渠道缓解企业信贷约束，进而对通胀形成向下的压力。因此在经济过热、资产价格上涨的条件下，通胀依旧可能是温和的。这在一定程度上可以解释为什么短期内资产价格的上涨反而可能压低通胀。在此情形下，通胀指标可能会失真，传统货币政策规则虽然能够稳定通胀，却可能无法有效稳定经济，货币政策有理由针对资产泡沫实行逆风干预。本文发现紧缩的货币政策能够有效降低资产泡沫的规模，在货币政策目标中考虑资产泡沫或资产价格将有助于稳定经济，并且能够有效提升社会福利水平。在模型中引入宏观审慎政策之后，逆风货币政策依然能够提高社会福利水平。这说明盯住资产泡沫的货币政策在理论上是有效的，对于完善央行的货币政策框架具有重要的政策意义。治理资产泡沫的根本途径仍在于消除金融市场摩擦，增加安全资产的供给以及建立健全安全、透明和高效的融资体系。这不仅能挤出资产泡沫，还能促进实体经济的发展和提高投资效率。     

抵债资产存在的问题与监管手段

抵债行为成为银行盘活不良贷款的重要方式之一,抵债资产也已成为银行信贷资产重要的组成部分。鉴于这一资产是实物形态货币化反映的事实,抵债资产会计核算的进一步规范已是财政监督工作的一个重要课题。一、抵债资产接收、管理、处置过程中存在的问题1.在抵债资产接收过程中,抵债行为正成为银行消化"自办实体"损失的重要手段之一。20世纪90年代初,各银行为规避国家政策,银行发放贷款给自办实体,并辅之以截留收入留下的小金库资金、挪用的信贷资金等,由自办实体开发职工住房或办公楼等建设项目,建成后为银行所用。由此产生了大量来源于"自办实体"的     

关于资产价格对货币政策影响的思考

伴随着资产市场的发展,以股价和房价为代表的资产价格的大幅波动给一国经济带来消极影响,同时也对央行的货币政策提出了挑战。本文从货币需求的稳定性、货币供给结构、货币政策的资产价格传导机制等方面展开分析,提出关注资产价格波动、灵活微调货币政策、有效释放预期的政策建议,并指出研究的方向。     

资产价格应成为货币政策的重要参考因素

本文首先从理论上分析了资产价格波动对货币政策的影响机制,尔后通过对我国经济发展过程中资产价格与货币政策及通货膨胀进行实证分析后认为,不宜将资产价格直接作为货币政策的目标,但货币政策应高度关注资产价格变动,同时充分和前瞻地考虑其对资产价格的影响,并将资产价格作为货币政策的重要参考因素之一,最后给出了相关政策建议。     

资本约束对商业银行资产配置行为的影响——基于175家商业银行数据的经验研究

本文使用1998～2009年我国175家商业银行的资产配置数据,研究了资本监管制度对银行资产配置行为的影响。本文发现,现行的资本监管制度对银行资产配置行为具有重要影响,资本监管制度实施之后,银行依据自身资本水平调整资产结构,资本充足银行持有更多的风险资产,贷款比例较高;而资本不足银行则减持风险资产,贷款比例下降。此外,由于不同规模商业银行面临的融资约束不同,资本水平对资产配置行为的影响存在一定的差异,资本对城市及农村商业银行的约束效应更明显。本文的这些发现为监管当局的资本监管政策提供了经验证据,并提出进行差异化监管的政策建议。     

资产证券化条件下的货币政策有效性研究——基于次贷危机背景的分析

本文通过建立数理模型并运用美国金融市场数据,研究了资产证券化条件下的货币政策有效性,研究结果表明,资产证券化对货币政策有效性产生了负面作用,减弱了传统货币政策工具的使用效果,而这是造成次贷危机的重要原因之一.因此,本文认为,随着资本市场与货币市场的互动性增强,必须重视资本市场对货币政策有效性的影响,中央银行应通过调整和完善政策体系、改进货币政策调控对象和方式、有效运用货币政策工具,提高货币政策的有效性.     

存款保险制度与银行资产证券化

存款保险制度的实施可能会提升银行风险承担，并导致资产流动性结构恶化，而这些因素构成了银行发展资产证券化的潜在动因。本文以2012年信贷资产证券化重启后的银行数据为样本，研究存款保险制度对银行资产证券化发展的影响。研究发现：存款保险制度的实施显著促进了银行资产证券化发展。机制检验表明，主动风险承担的提升、资产流动性结构的恶化及资本充足水平的降低，是存款保险制度促进银行资产证券化发展的重要作用渠道。进一步检验异质性特征，发现存款保险制度的实施主要促进了银行抵押贷款证券化的发展，并对全国性和城市商业银行的资产证券化发展具有显著促进作用。本文不仅基于银行微观行为深化了对存款保险制度影响效应的认知，而且拓展了银行资产证券化的研究视域，对进一步优化存款保险制度和资产证券化发展路径提供了新的思路。     

Portfolio and financing adjustments for U.S. banks: Some empirical evidence

This paper presents a model of the portfolio and financing adjustments of U.S. banks over the business cycle. At the core of the model is a moral hazard problem between depositors/bank regulators and stockholders. The solution to this problem takes the form of shared management of the bank. Stockholders manage the bank's portfolio and the regulator manages the financing of the portfolio. The model predicts that portfolio adjustments are made to conform to the risk aversion of shareholders and financing adjustments are made to offset changes in portfolio risk. Regression evidence for 1955–2000 fails to reject these predictions.     

中小企业供应链融资的风险度量--基于R银行交易数据的研究

本文以某城市商业银行开展汽车行业供应链融资数据为样本,运用信用计量模型（CreditMetrics）进行信贷资产组合的信用风险度量模拟,将供应链融资中涉及的主要风险和收益转化成整条供应链融资资产组合的在险价值,探讨城市商业银行运用该模型进行信贷风险量化管理的可行路径。     

中国银行特许权价值的风险自律效应研究

将银行破产风险分解为经营不确定性与风险覆盖能力、杠杆风险与资产组合风险,建立动态面板模型并采用2003~2013年中国上市银行的数据和系统广义矩估计方法,分析特许权价值激励银行降低风险承担的途径和方式。研究发现：我国银行特许权价值具有抑制银行风险的自律效应,银行为避免过高风险而遭受监管惩罚或丧失市场资源,保持特许经营条件和优势,将进行积极的风险管理;特许权价值的风险自律效应主要通过促使银行提升风险覆盖能力、降低资产组合风险和杠杆风险来实现。     

行业组合视角下的银行信贷优化管理——基于中国商业银行的优化模型设计与实证分析

本文在经济下行周期的背景下,从行业组合的视角探讨商业银行如何根据国家政策及自身战略积极布局信贷资产,从被动调控向主动管理转变,实现收益、风险及资本的优化。本文提出两个优化模型——基于最优增长率的均值方差基准模型和专家判断的主动配置模型,通过加入风险相关性、风险容忍度、经济资本等约束,为银行在不同风险偏好下积极配置资产提供依据。本文通过中国商业银行的历史数据,验证上述两个优化模型,发现组合在提升收益、降低风险和提升资本使用效率方面均得到改善,模型具有有效性。     

Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach

This paper proposes a new method to measure and monitor the risk in a banking system. Standard tools that regulators require banks to use for their internal risk management are applied at the level of the banking system to measure the risk of a regulator’s portfolio. Using a sample of international banks from 1988 until 2002, I estimate the dynamics and correlations between bank asset portfolios. To obtain measures for the risk of a regulator’s portfolio, I model the individual liabilities that the regulator has to each bank as contingent claims on the bank’s assets. The portfolio aspect of the regulator’s liability is explicitly considered and the methodology allows a comparison of sub-samples from different countries. Correlations, bank asset volatility, and bank capitalization increase for North American and somewhat for European banks, while Japanese banks face deteriorating capital levels. In the sample period, the North American banking system gains stability while the Japanese banking sector becomes more fragile. The expected future liability of the regulator varies substantially over time and is especially high during the Asian crisis starting in 1997. Further analysis shows that the Japanese banks contribute most to the volatility of the regulator’s liability at that time. Larger and more profitable banks have lower systemic risk and additional equity capital reduces systemic risk only for banks that are constrained by regulatory capital requirements.     

Allen and Gale on risk-taking and competition in banking

Using an elegant simple model, Allen and Gale [Comparing Financial Systems, MIT Press, 2001] obtain a result with significant policy implications: portfolio risk of banks increases as competition in banking, measured by the number of banks, increases. That result is, however, lacking in robustness. If banks play a game not all that different from that assumed by Allen and Gale, then, we show, a markedly different result obtains: risk-taking by banks is independent of the number of banks.     

Foreign Banks in Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence

We study how foreign bank penetration affects financial sector development in poor countries. A theoretical model shows that when domestic banks are better than foreign banks at monitoring soft information customers, foreign bank entry may hurt these customers and worsen welfare. The model also predicts that credit to the private sector should be lower in countries with more foreign bank penetration, and that foreign banks should have a less risky loan portfolio. In the empirical section, we test these predictions for a sample of lower income countries and find support for the theoretical model.     

Foreign bank entry,credit allocation and lending rates in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from Poland

Earlier studies have documented that foreign banks charge lower lending rates and interest spreads than domestic banks. We hypothesize that this may stem from the superior efficiency of foreign entrants that they decide to pass onto borrowers (“performance hypothesis”), but could also reflect a different loan allocation with respect to borrower transparency, loan maturity and currency (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). We are able to differentiate between the above hypotheses thanks to a novel dataset containing detailed bank-specific information for the Polish banking industry. Our findings demonstrate that banks differ significantly in terms of portfolio composition and we attest to the “portfolio composition hypothesis” by showing that, having controlled for portfolio composition, there are no differences in lending rates between banks.     

Banks' noninterest income and securities holdings in a low interest rate environment: The case of Italy

Using a sample of 440 Italian banks over the period 2007–2016, we find that low interest rates motivate banks to expand their fee and commission income and to restructure their securities portfolios. A granular breakdown suggests that banks grow noninterest income in various ways, including portfolio management, brokerage and consultancy services and increase fee income from current account and payment services. In addition, banks rebalance securities portfolios away from those “held for trading” to securities “available for sale” and “held to maturity.” Our findings allude to different behavior between large and small banks: while larger banks increase brokerage, consultancy and portfolio management services, smaller banks generate fees from customer current accounts.     

Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis

We propose a simple model that is suitable for evaluating alternative bank capital regulatory proposals for market risk. Our model formalizes the conflict between bank objectives and regulatory goals. Banks' decisions represent a tension between their desire to exploit the deposit-insurance put option and their desire to preserve franchise value. Regulators seek to balance the social value of deposits in mediating transactions against the deadweight costs of failure resolution. Our social welfare criterion is standard: a weighted average agents' utilities.We demonstrate that banks do not incrementally alter their portfolio risk as the economic environment changes. Rather, banks either choose the minimal feasible risk or the maximal feasible risk. This pattern, in turn, drives regulatory decisions: The first goal of the regulator is to induce banks to choose the minimal risk level. For all nontrivial cases, unregulated banks fail to choose the first-best allocations. Traditional ex-ante capital requirements can induce banks to choose the socially-optimal level of portfolio risk, but the required capital is often inefficiently high. In contrast, variants of the Federal Reserve Board's precommitment proposal imply far smaller efficiency losses, and achieve allocations at or near the first-best for most reasonable model specifications. The ex-post penalties required for the optimal implementation of precommitment are not excessively large. The welfare gains from precommitment are even higher when the precommitment penalty function is precluded from sending banks into default. We conclude that state-contingent regulatory mechanisms, of which the precommitment approach is an example, offer the possibility of substantial gains in regulatory efficiency, relative to traditional state non-contingent regulation.