企业并购中各利益主体的行为动机

企业并购行为是企业并购利益主体在并购过程中所采取的有特定目的的行动。各利益主体从其自身利益出发,在并购的各个环节都会有不同的行为取向和行为方式。作者认为,利益决定动机,动机支配行为。同一动机可能有不同的行为方式,同一行为方式也可能有不同的动机,背后起主导作用的是利益。不同利益主体在并购中存在不同的利益,受这些利益所支配的倾向性动机便有所不同。本文旨在剖析各利益主体在企业并购中的行为动机,以期为企业并购行为的规范抛砖引玉。     

物流负外部性及其政府规制

通过建立博弈模型,对企业与企业、企业与政府在实施绿色治理物流负外部性的过程中的博弈行为及企业与政府之间的合谋行为进行了分析。分析结果表明,在政府规制前提下,为了激励企业实施绿色物流,政府应尽量减少监督检查成本,并对负外部性比较严重的企业加以重罚,对实施绿色物流的企业给予补贴,以提高企业实施绿色物流的积极性;另外,在进行政府规制的过程中,必须制定严格的监督机制、奖惩机制和利益协调机制,增加企业寻租的成本和风险,尽量避免企业和政府合谋行为的产生。     

信息披露、寻租与政府补贴有效性

采用深交所信息考评结果作为信息披露质量的代理变量,考量政府补贴的寻租行为及其有效性。实证显示,信息披露质量较低的企业,获得的政府补贴更多,但政府补贴无益于企业绩效和社会绩效的提高,从而支持了企业寻租假设。结果表明,信息透明度的提高有助于政府补贴资金的有效配置,提高社会整体福利。     

制度滞后与管理缺位:改革财政存款现行交存方式势在必行——对湖南省商业银行交存财政存款情况的调查

由于目前财政存款交存管理中存在较多的弊端,只有通过制度的改革才能解决。改革的根本目的在于,加强财政存款的管理,重新调整利益双方的利益关系,减少交存中的"寻租行为",促进人民银行货币政策目标的实现。     

我国投资银行国企并购业务拓展策略初探

我国国企并购与西方发达国家相比,无论从理论上还是从实践上都显现出独有的"中国特色".一方面,各级政府尤其是地方政府作为其行政边界内国有企业的产权主体,从自身利益出发左右企业并购,并在企业并购中发挥中介替代功能.另一方面,我国企业并购的特殊制度背景和证券市场的不成熟,决定了目前我国投资银行业务的单一以及企业对投资银行的低层次需求,投资银行在企业并购中的作用甚微.因此,在现阶段拓展我国投资银行的国企并购业务已迫在眉睫,刻不容缓.     

存贷款中的寻租行为分析

一、寻租概念的界定寻租是指那种利用资源并通过政治过程获得特权从而构成对他人利益的损害大于租金获得者利益的行为,因而也常被称为“直接的非生产性寻利活动”(ＤＵＰ),从这个概念不难看出,寻租是通过自己握有的资源或是特权来实现的;另一方面,他在获得租金的同时构成了对他人利益的损害,而且这个损害要大于自己所获得的租金。　　二、国有商业银行存在寻租行为中国目前商业银行的国有性质决定了其在存贷款中必然会存在寻租现象,这是一个不争的事实,笔者认为,其中原因可以归纳为如下几个方面:首先,也是最根本的原因,我们虽然把四家专业银…     

会计制度变迁和会计寻租

会计准则具有的经济后果是利益相关者之间利益冲突与协调的结果.在会计制度的变迁过程中,原有会计制度的均衡状态被打破,与准则相关的利益集团围绕新的会计准则制定展开新一轮的博弈并达到新的均衡.我国会计制度的"双轨制"变迁模式是利益相关者的利益冲突重新协调与折衷的结果,会计寻租对此起到了推动作用,"双轨制"反过来又进一步促使会计寻租的发生.利益相关者之间的多重博弈使会计寻租达到纳什均衡状态,基于会计寻租的"双刃"性,对会计寻租的控制只能适度地进行.     

政府干预与并购绩效关系研究

并购几乎是世界上每一个大公司发展的必由之途。中国企业并购只有不到二十年的历史。在经济全球化的背景下,中国如何跨越在企业并购中与发达国家在时间跨度上长达近一个世纪的差异及由此带来的在并购理论、制度、人才等方面的差距是我们面临的严峻挑战。在这个过程中,政府干预可以发挥重要的作用。怎样定位政府干预在企业并购中的地位,规范政府干预在企业并购中的行为,提高政府干预企业并购的效率,提升企业绩效和社会福利,促进经济发展,就成为本文力图阐明的核心。     

企业并购中的税收筹划研究

在新时期环境下,经济竞争十分激烈,各行各业都面临着巨大的经营考验,同时在市场经济条件下,发生在企业间的并购也是越来越普遍,而在企业并购中成本问题为重点考虑内容。企业要在并购活动过程中对涉税的部分实施税收筹划,控制企业并购风险,提高企业整体的利益,下面,本文就针对企业并购中的税收筹划进行研究,希望对企业并购提供一定的帮助。     

公司兼并利益相关者行为决策分析

公司兼并涉及许多利益相关者,包括股东、经理、地方政府、债权人、职员、供应商和客户等.依据理性人等假设,分析了在强弱兼并、强强兼并与弱弱兼并模式下,股东、经理与地方政府的行为决策,揭示兼并决策属群体决策过程,单个利益主体仅考虑自身利益最大化,会导致兼并交易费用提高,降低兼并效率.得出在利益相关者中合理分配兼并收益,是兼并获得成功和提高兼并效率的基础.     

法团主义视野下政府与非政府组织的互动关系研究——以社会福利服务领域中的个案研究为例

法团主义,是研究国家与社会关系的一种西方理论模式,于20世纪90年代在对多元主义质疑中出现。本文以法团主义理论为基础,以依赖、回馈等概念为分析工具,运用个案研究方法对社会福利服务领域中非政府组织与政府的互动关系进行比较深入研究,发现个案与政府所形成的合作关系,建立在非政府组织依赖、回馈政府,政府支持、控制非政府组织的基础之上,并具有人治化色彩。从实证分析入手,提出二者关系由人治化向制度化发展是必要的。     

Cross-border acquisitions of US financial institutions: Impact of macroeconomic factors

This study investigates the impact of mergers and acquisitions on US bidders and targets involved in cross-border mergers of financial institutions. The findings indicate that while US targets experience positive significant wealth gains, US bidders encounter insignificant wealth gains during the merger announcements. There are also differences in wealth gains with respect to industry classification and to the regional location of foreign targets and bidders. The macroeconomic variables, including foreign and US economic conditions, level of economic development of target country, exchange rate volatility along with the effectiveness of foreign government, relative size of participants, and control of target largely explain the wealth gains to bidders and targets.     

Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Firm Size

We propose a theory of mergers that combines managerial merger motives with an industry-level regime shift that may lead to value-increasing merger opportunities. Anticipation of these merger opportunities can lead to defensive acquisitions, where managers acquire other firms to avoid losing private benefits if their firms are acquired, or "positioning" acquisitions, where firms position themselves as more attractive takeover targets to earn takeover premia. The identity of acquirers and targets and the profitability of acquisitions depend on the distribution of firm sizes within an industry, among other factors. We find empirical support for some unique predictions of our theory.     

Cross-ownership,returns, and voting in mergers

We show that institutional shareholders of acquiring companies on average do not lose money around public merger announcements, because they hold substantial stakes in the targets and make up for the losses from the acquirers with the gains from the targets. Depending on their holdings in the target, acquirer shareholders generally realize different returns from the same merger, some losing money and others gaining. This conflict of interest is reflected in the mutual fund voting behavior: In mergers with negative acquirer announcement returns, cross-owners are significantly more likely to vote for the merger.     

The effect of merger anticipation on bidder and target firm announcement period returns

This paper examines investors' anticipation of bidder and target merger candidacy and if investor anticipations about candidacy affect the distribution of value between bidder and target firm shareholders. We find that bidder firms can be predicted more accurately than target firms. To investigate how merger announcement period returns are distributed among bidder and target shareholders, we control for different degrees of predictability in bidder and target selection and find that the difference between bidder and target firm three-day cumulative abnormal returns around a merger announcement decreases significantly. Thus, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the asymmetry in investor anticipations about merger candidacy causes disparity in bidder and target firm announcement period abnormal returns.     

Technology centrality,bilateral knowledge spillovers and mergers and acquisitions

We construct a search and matching model, which features heterogeneous firms with different management skills and industry-specific knowledge capital, to study individual firms’ behavior in the M&A market. Two firms form a merger if the bilateral knowledge spillovers between them result in a productivity gain, generating a merger surplus larger than the transaction cost. Three key predictions are produced from the model: (i) acquirers with higher technology centrality and management skill exert higher search intensities; (ii) targets with higher technology centrality and lower management skill exert higher search intensities; and (iii) acquirer–target firm pairs with larger bilateral knowledge spillovers generate larger surplus and are more likely to consummate a merger deal. We find strong empirical support for these predictions from merger deals in the U.S. between 1984 and 2020.     

Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers

In contrast to the widely held belief that targets capture the lion's share of merger gains, I show that the average dollar gains to targets are only modestly more than the dollar gains to acquirers. To help explain the variation in merger outcomes, I present empirical evidence in support of a new hypothesis that a target's relative scarcity (proxied by its market power) and product market dependence (proxied by customer-supplier relations) help to explain its share of the total merger gains. These results provide new evidence for an unexplored role of product markets on bargaining outcomes in mergers.     

Understanding merger incentives and outcomes in the US mutual fund industry

This paper examines the incentives of acquirers and targets in the merger market. Using data on acquisitions among mutual fund management companies from 1991 to 2004, I estimate a two-sided matching model of the merger market jointly with equations representing merger outcomes. According to the empirical investigation, although the desire to achieve a sufficient scale to attract investors is a key driver for mergers, some mergers seem to be driven by objectives other than shareholder value maximization. I find that companies that are potentially prone to misaligned incentives between owners and managers are more acquisitive than others, yet have significantly worse post-merger operating performance. I also find that these acquirers, despite their higher willingness to pay for targets, are not any more likely to match with high-quality targets, potentially due to targets’ incentive to avoid bad organizations.     

Deal Size,Bid Premium,and Gains in Bank Mergers: The Impact of Managerial Motivations

Do mergers with greater target relative to acquirer size create more value than mergers with smaller relative sized targets? Do larger bid amounts represent wealth transfers from acquirers or do they signal greater expected merger gains? We hypothesize that the relations among aggregate merger gains, relative size, and bid premiums are asymmetric across mergers made by value‐enhancing versus value‐reducing managers. We use a large sample of bank mergers to test these predictions and find that the value response to different explanatory variables is asymmetric. Our findings provide new insights into how the market values merger bids.     

中国境外投资风险及其防范研究

实施“走出去”战略既是企业的微观投资行为也是政府的宏观管理问题,境外投资比国内投资面临的风险更大。因此,要防范境外投资风险更需要政府的支持,一方面通过建立境外投资协调机制对境外投资予以监管和保护;另一方面通过构建境外投资风险预警系统,加强境外投资风险的识别和预控。